

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | M | E | M | Y | P | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5
 7 8 | 9 | 14 | 15 | 25 | 26 | 30 | 57 | 58 | 80

CON'T
 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 9
 7 8 | 60 | 61 | 68 | 69 | 74 | 75 | 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During integrated leak test, Procedure 3.17.1, CIS was intentionally allowed to
 0 3 | actuate. Subsequent CIS reset resulted in CIS/SIAS primary component cooling
 0 4 | CEDM cooler return valve, PCC-A-270, unexpectedly opening. Subsequent CIS
 0 5 | actuation failed to close the valve. PCC-A-270 should not automatically reopen
 0 6 | upon CIS reset, but open only by individual switch actuation. Since PCC-A-268,
 0 7 | the redundant CIS trip valve for PCC-A-270, was operable when this problem may
 0 8 | have existed at power, containment isolation would have been accomplished had it
 7 8 9 | 80

0 9 | S | D | 11 | E | 12 | A | 13 | R | E | L | A | Y | X | 14 | A | 15 | Z | 16
 7 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 18 | 19 | 20
 17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | OCCURRENCE CODE | REPORT TYPE | REVISION NO.
 8 | 2 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32
 ACTION TAKEN | FUTURE ACTION | EFFECT ON PLANT | SHUTDOWN METHOD | HOURS | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
 A | 18 | Z | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | 23 | Y | 24 | L | 25 | A | 1 | 0 | 9 | 26
 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | An open coil in the Engineered Safety Feature Reset panel valve switch control
 1 1 | relay, Agastat model number EGPD001, allowed the valve to incorrectly open upon
 1 2 | CIS reset. The valve's failure to close on CIS could have been caused by a
 1 3 | partially dirty lockout relay contact, a transient ground in the failed coil, or
 1 4 | an incorrect wiring scheme. All normally open CIS, SIAS, CSAS and RAS lockout
 7 8 9 | 80

1 5 | H | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | N/A | 30 | B | 31 | Surveillance Test | 32
 7 8 9 | 10 | 12 | 13 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 80

1 6 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | N/A | 35 | N/A | 36
 7 8 9 | 10 | 11 | 44 | 45 | 80

1 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | N/A | 39
 7 8 9 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 80

1 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | N/A | 41
 7 8 9 | 11 | 12 | 80

1 9 | Z | 42 | N/A | 43
 7 8 9 | 10 | 80

2 0 | N | 44 | N/A | 45
 7 8 9 | 10 | 80

8210260208 821018
 PDR ADDOCK 05000309
 S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

 68 69 | 80-91-7-92E
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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (Cont'd)

been required. There was no adverse effect on the health and safety of the public.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Cont'd)

relay contacts will be cleaned prior to startup, the Agastat relay coil was replaced and the wiring in the Engineered Safety Feature Reset valve control circuit was verified. After relay replacement, the valve tested satisfactorily. This is the first relay of its type to fail.