NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [| | | | |] (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Field	Entry
0 1	LICENSEE CODE (2)	N C B E P 2
	LICENSE NUMBER (3)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0
	LICENSE TYPE (4)	4 1 1 1 1
	CAT (5)	
CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE (6)	L
	DOCKET NUMBER (7)	0 5 0 - 0 3 2 4
	EVENT DATE (8)	0 4 0 5 8 3
	REPORT DATE (9)	0 4 1 9 8 3

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 An evaluation of currently active Fire Protection System LCOs revealed required
0 3 continuous fire watches for inoperable fire detectors in the Augmented Off-Gas (AOG)
0 4 Building had not been established when the detectors were declared inoperable on
0 5 2-13-83. Instead, hourly fire watches, which had already been in effect prior to
0 6 declaring the detectors inoperable, were maintained until the discovery of this event.
0 7 This event did not affect the health and safety of the public.
0 8 Technical Specifications 3.3.5.7, 3.7.8, 6.9.1.8.b

0 9	SYSTEM CODE (11)	CAUSE CODE (12)	CAUSE SUBCODE (13)	COMPONENT CODE (14)	COMP. SUBCODE (15)	VALVE SUBCODE (16)
	A B	A	A	I N S T R U	E	Z

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 3	—	0 4 3	/	0 1	T	—	0

ACTION TAKEN (18)	FUTURE ACTION (19)	EFFECT ON PLANT (20)	SHUTDOWN METHOD (21)	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED (23)	NPRD-4 FORM SUB. (24)	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER (25)	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER (26)
X	X	Z	Z	0 0 0 0	Y	N	Z	Z 9 9 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Responsible shift Operations and Fire Protection group personnel failed to recognize
1 1 the need for a continuous fire watch whenever fire detectors on both sides of a broken
1 2 fire penetration seal are inoperable. Following this discovery, continuous fire watches
1 3 in the affected areas of the AOG Building on 4-5-83 were established.
1 4

1 5	FACILITY STATUS (28)	% POWER (29)	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31)	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	E	1 0 0	NA	C	System LCO Assessment

1 6	ACTIVITY RELEASED (33)	CONTENT OF RELEASE (34)	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z	Z	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

1 7	NUMBER (37)	TYPE (38)	DESCRIPTION (39)
	0 0 0	Z	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1 8	NUMBER (40)	DESCRIPTION (41)
	0 0 0	NA

8304260227 830419
PDR ADOCK 05000324
S PDR

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

1 9	TYPE (42)	DESCRIPTION
	Z	NA

PUBLICITY

2 0	ISSUED (44)	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N	NA	

NAME OF PREPARER M. J. Pastva, Jr. PHONE: 919-457-9521

GPO 917-926

LER ATTACHMENT - RO #2-83-43

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2 Event Date: April 5, 1983

While performing an evaluation of the currently active LCOs for the fire protection system, it was discovered that continuous fire watches in the AOG Building, required due to the inoperability of the building fire detection system, had not been posted since the system was declared inoperable on February 13, 1983. At the time, hourly fire watches within the building were in effect due to fire barrier penetrations, which were for the installation of a plant modification in the building, being inoperable. When the detectors were declared inoperable, the acting Operations Shift Foreman determined that hourly fire watches were required per Technical Specification 3.3.5.7 and contacted responsible Fire Protection group personnel to verify that appropriate watches would be posted. In conversation with responsible Fire Protection group personnel, it was indicated that hourly fire watches in the building were already in progress and would be maintained until notified otherwise in order to cover the inoperability of the building fire detectors. Following discovery of this deficiency on April 5, 1983, the required continuous fire watches were established in the building.

This event resulted from the Operations Shift Foreman's determination that hourly versus continuous posted fire watches were required due to the inoperability of the AOG Building fire detection instrumentation. This decision was based solely with respect to Technical Specification 3.3.5.7, which concerns the subject instrumentation. However, Technical Specification 3.7.8, which requires a continuous fire watch for areas affected by a nonfunctional fire barrier where the fire detection system on both sides of the detector is inoperable, was not considered.

As a result of this event, fire detection systems will be returned to service, if applicable, by bypassing inoperable detectors (with fire watches established as required for the inoperable detector(s)). Continuous fire watches are also being established as an interim measure where hourly fire watches were required until such time that the plant General Manager has determined that adequate training and control within the plant Fire Protection group exists. In addition, an interim program has been implemented to help improve plant awareness and conformance to applicable Fire Protection System requirements.