

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 82-016/01T-0

Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1
Docket No. 50-266

While performing quarterly inservice testing (IT-60) of containment isolation valves at 0447 hours on October 2, 1982, one valve failed to close. Containment isolation valve 1CV-3200C failed to close upon receipt of a remote manual close signal.

This valve is one of two automatic containment isolation valves, in series, in the suction line to the containment radioactive gas and particulate monitoring system. Valve 1CV-3200C is located inside containment and receives a containment isolation signal along with series valve 1CV-3200B, which is located outside of containment.

Valve 1CV-3200C is a 1-inch, 150 psig, Copes-Vulcan globe valve. This valve incorporates a D-100-60 air operator. The operator is designed to open the valve via application of pressurized air and close the valve with energy stored in a spring, when the pressurized air is allowed to bleed off.

Upon identification that 1CV-3200C failed to close, the series containment isolation valve, 1CV-3200B, was closed to assure containment integrity.

Further investigation into the valve failing to close revealed that the solenoid valve, 1SV-3200C, that allows the air pressure to bleed off of the air operator's diaphragm, failed to cycle.

Valve 1SV-3200C is a "Asco" Model HB-8302-C-25-F, 3-way AC solenoid valve.

The "Asco" solenoid valve was lightly tapped to jar the piston loose and the air-operated containment isolation valve closed. The containment isolation valve, 1CV-3200C, was cycled numerous times without any further problems. The containment radioactive gas and particulate monitoring system was then returned to normal service.

The root cause for the Asco solenoid valve failing to cycle is not known at this time. The solenoid valve is scheduled to be replaced during the upcoming refueling shutdown, scheduled for October 22, 1982. In the interim, the frequency of inservice testing has been increased.

At no time was the public health and safety jeopardized as the second series containment isolation valve operated properly and demonstrated an acceptable leak tightness during the last Type "C" valve test.

This event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.A.3, "Abnormal degradation discovered in fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, or primary containment."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event, and a 24-hour written notification was made on October 4, 1982.