Docket No. 50-271

Mr. Donald A. Reid, Vice President Operations Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation Ferry Road Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

Dear Mr. Reid:

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON PROPOSED CHANGE NO. 173, BWR THERMAL HYDRAULIC STABILITY AND PLANT-INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR BWROG OPTION 1-D LONG TERM STABILITY SOLUTION - VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION (TAC NO. M89201)

In conducting its review of your application dated March 31, 1994, the NRC staff has prepared the enclosed Request for Additional Information (Enclosure 1), which is required for completion of the staff's review. The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L. 96-511.

> Sincerely, Original signed by: Daniel H. Dorman, Project Manager Project Directorate I-3 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Enclosure: As stated

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

June 9, 1994

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Sincerely,

Daniel H. Dorman, Project Manager Project Directorate I-3 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure: As stated

cc w/enclosure: See next page Mr. Donald A. Reid, Vice President Operations Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

CC:

Mr. Jay Thayer, Vice President Yankee Atomic Electric Company 580 Main Street Bolton, Massachusetts 01740-1398

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Public Service Board State of Vermont 120 State Street Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Chairman, Board of Selectmen Town of Vernon Post Office Box 116 Vernon, Vermont 05354-0116

Mr. J. P. Pelletier, Vice President Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation Ferry Road Brattleboro, Vermont 05301

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Resident Inspector Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 176 Vernon, Vermont 05354

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Mr. David Rodham, Director Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency 400 Worcester Rd. P.O. Box 1496 Framingham, Massachusetts 01701-0317 ATTN: James Muckerheide

Mr. Raymond N. McCandless Vermont Division of Occupational and Radiological Health Administration Building Montpelier, Vermont 05602

Mr. L. A. Tremblay
Senior Licensing Engineer
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corporation
580 Main Street
Bolton. Massachusetts 01740-1398

Enclosure



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATING TO PROPOSED CHANGE NO. 173 TO LICENSE NO. DPR-28

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION

DOCKET NO. 50-271

The NRC staff's preliminary review of Vermont Yankee Proposed Change No. 173, "BWR Thermal Hydraulic Stability and Plant-Information Requirements for BWROG Option 1-D Long Term Stability Solution," has identified some deficiencies. The following additional information will be required for the staff to complete its review.

1. Page 2 of the March 31, 1994, application (BVY 94-36) states that "Power distribution controls will be administratively implemented to assure that plant operation is maintained within the safety and analysis basis from which the power and flow limits are derived." However, the application does not describe these controls at all. Power distribution controls in Solution 1-D are crucial to guarantee that (a) the exclusion region remains valid and (b) out-of-phase oscillations do not develop in the case of inadvertent entry into the exclusion region.

Frovide a detailed description of the power distribution controls and the administrative procedures used to implement them.

2. Throughout the proposed Technical Specification (TS) changes, one reads sentences like "oscillations ... can be readily detected", or "the APRM flow biased scram function will suppress oscillations prior to exceeding the fuel safety limit." These sentences are grossly incorrect in the case of out-of-phase oscillations and may lead operators to a false sense of security. The staff has agreed that Solution 1-D plants are more <u>likely</u> to observe in-phase core-wide oscillations than out-of-phase, but calculations show that out-of-phase oscillations are <u>possible</u>. The removal of all out-of-phase instability monitoring requirements and the "flavor" of the proposed TS changes indicates an overconfidence that may be detrimental to safety.

Provide an operator training plan and/or changes in the proposed TSs to address concerns about the possibility of out-of-phase instabilities.

3. The proposed TSs do not address specifically any reload confirmation procedures, and it appears that the exclusion region is recalculated every reload. Originally, type-1 solutions were envisioned with permanent exclusion regions that did not change on a cycle-by-cycle basis unless significant deviations existed with respect to the reference cycle.

Provide a description of the reload confirmation or exclusion region definition process.