NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	M D C C N 1 (2)	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3)	4 1 1 1 1 (4)	(5)
		LICENSEE CODE	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	CAT

CON'T

0	1	REPORT SOURCE L (6)	0 5 0 0 0 3 1 7 (7)	0 9 1 3 8 2 (8)	1 0 1 3 8 2 (9)
			DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During normal power operation at 1025 and again on 9-20-82 at 1000 while
0 3 performing a surveillance test, No. 11 emergency diesel generator failed
0 4 to achieve the required 900 RPM within 10 seconds (T.S. 3.8.1.1.b). The
0 5 diesel was repaired and tested satisfactorily both times. The other
0 6 emergency diesel generators remained operable during the events.
0 7 Similar events: none.
0 8

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	E E (11)	X (12)	Z (13)	Z Z Z Z Z Z (14)	Z (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
8 2	—	0 5 2	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
F (18)	Z (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	Z (25)	Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Investigation revealed both start failures were caused by a loose con-
1 1 nector on speed switch 0-SS-4848 (Synchro Start Products, Model GT-2N),
1 2 though the first failure was mistakenly attributed to a loose lead on
1 3 speed switch 0-SS-4847. The connector was tightened and lock-wired to
1 4 prevent recurrence. The other diesels' connectors were properly tight.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	E (28)	1 0 0 (29)	N/A	(31)	

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	N/A	N/A

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	N/A

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	N/A

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	N/A

8210250160 821013
PDR ADOCK 05000317
S PDR

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	N (44)	N/A	

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PO 917-926

LER NO. 82-52/3L
DOCKET NO. 50-317
LICENSE NO. DPR 53
EVENT DATE 09-13-82
REPORT DATE 10-13-82
ATTACHMENT

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (CONT'D)

While troubleshooting the event of September 13, 1982, an electrician found a loose wire from the overspeed trip speed switch, O-SS-4847. Suspected cause of the loose wire is vibration from the diesel engine and possibly an improperly crimped lug. The loose lead was repaired and the diesel tested satisfactorily.

On September 20, 1982, the diesel exhibited a similar problem. Investigation revealed a loose threaded connector on speed switch O-SS-4848 (Synchro Start Products, Model GT-2N), adjacent to O-SS-4847, caused the diesel start failure. The loose connector is also suspected to have caused the first event, because circuit analysis shows a loose lead on O-SS-4847 would not have caused the described failure.

While the electrician worked on O-SS-4847 on September 13, 1982, he may have adequately made up the contacts of the loose connector to O-SS-4848 resulting in a satisfactory post maintenance test.

The cause of the connector loosening is believed to be the high vibration from the diesel engine. A method has been developed to lock-wire the field connector to the body of the speed switch to prevent recurrence. The switches on emergency diesel generators #12 and 21 have been checked and are properly tight. The switch on diesel #21 has been lock-wired. The one on #12 is scheduled for other maintenance and will be lock-wired as part of this work.