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POLICY ISSUE
(Information)

FOR: The Commission

FROM: William J. Dircks
Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT: SALEM RESTART EVALUATION

PURPOSE: To provide the Commissioners with a revision to the draft Staff Safety Evaluation previously provided to the Commission on April 8.

This SER incorporates Section C.9, which was not included in the April 8 version. In addition, several minor clarifying changes have been made to the report and the Order, which are reproduced in their entirety for ease of use. Such changes are indicated by a line in the right-hand margin.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "W. Dircks", written over a horizontal line.

William J. Dircks
Executive Director for Operations

Enclosures:

1. Safety Evaluation Report
2. Proposed Order

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NRC SAFETY EVALUATION
RELATED TO PLANT RESTART
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATION STATION
UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2
DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311

Date: April 8, 1983

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SAFETY EVALUATION
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PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
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I. Introduction

On February 25, 1983 an event occurred at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station when the reactor-trip circuit breakers failed to automatically open following receipt of a valid trip signal from the Reactor Protection System (RPS). The manual trip system was used to shut down the reactor. Subsequently, it was concluded by the licensee that the failure to trip was caused by a malfunction of the undervoltage (UV) trip attachments in both reactor-trip circuit breakers. These UV trip attachments translate the electrical signal from the RPS to a mechanical action that opens the circuit breaker.

On February 26, 1983, an NRC team was onsite to conduct initial followup and to collect preliminary information. As a result of NRC inquiries, the licensee determined that both reactor-trip circuit breakers had similarly failed to open upon receipt of a valid trip signal on February 22, 1983. The failure to automatically trip on February 22 was not recognized by the licensee until the computer printout of the sequence of events was reexamined in more detail on February 26. Further evaluation of these events and the circumstances leading up to them revealed a number of issues that require resolution by the licensee and/or the NRC. This safety evaluation report briefly describes the NRC and licensee actions to address and resolve equipment, operator procedures, training and response, and management issues identified by the NRC evaluation of the two events at Salem Unit 1.

An NRC Task Force has been established to conduct a separate generic study of the broader implications of the Salem events which is scheduled for completion by April 18, 1983. All actions identified herein are applicable to Salem but may have generic implications. Any generic actions developed by the Task Force will also be required of the Salem facility, as appropriate.

Actions for Salem as identified in this report fall in two groups: (1) actions that are required to be satisfactorily resolved before plant startup; and (2) actions that could be completed after restart but which were required to complement the pre-startup items. The actions required prior to the restart of Unit 1 will also be implemented on Unit 2 prior to its restart. Salem Unit 2 is presently shut down for refueling and is not presently scheduled to resume operation before Unit 1.

The licensee has met with NRC staff on several occasions to present the results of initial evaluations related to the events. Based on licensee submittals of March 1, 8, 14, 15, 18, 23 and April 7 and 8, 1983 and on the findings of the NRC evaluation of the Salem events, issues were identified and categorized as

(A) Equipment evaluation, (B) Operating Procedures, Operator Training, and Operator Response Evaluation, and (C) Management Evaluation.

II. Evaluation

A. Equipment Evaluation

1. Safety Classification of Breakers

During the initial NRC evaluation of the February 25 event, it was determined that maintenance was conducted on the Salem Unit 1 reactor-trip circuit breakers in January 1983, following a failure of one reactor-trip circuit breaker to trip upon receipt of an RPS signal at Salem Unit 2 on January 6, 1983. The work orders authorizing the January 1983 maintenance identified the maintenance as not associated with safety related equipment and not requiring quality assurance review. As a result, it was not clear on February 26, 1983 what portion, if any, of the reactor-trip circuit breakers was considered safety related by the licensee. The reactor-trip circuit breakers contain both a UV trip attachment and a shunt trip attachment, but only the UV trip attachment is operated by an automatic RPS trip signal. The shunt trip attachment provides for a manual trip of the breaker.

Section 7.2.1.1 of the Salem Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Revision 0, indicates that the Reactor Trip System includes the reactor-trip circuit breakers and the UV trip attachment. The Westinghouse Solid State Logic Protection System Description (WCAP-7488L) also defines the scope of the system as including the reactor-trip circuit breakers and the UV trip attachments. The UV trip attachment and the reactor-trip circuit breaker are safety-related equipment in that they are essential features of the Reactor Trip System, which is necessary to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a design-basis event that could result in exceeding the offsite exposure guidelines set forth in 10 CFR Part 100. The shunt trip attachment of the reactor-trip circuit breakers in the Westinghouse design is not required by present NRC regulations to be safety grade and, although it is provided to perform the manual trip function, no credit is taken for this design feature in the safety analysis (a manual reactor trip also actuates the UV trip attachment). The licensee in a March 1, 1983 letter to NRC concurred in this understanding.

Conclusion: Based on the above findings, we believe there is no dispute regarding the safety classification of the reactor-trip circuit breakers and the issue is therefore considered resolved.

2. Identification of Cause of Failure

The licensee's determination of the cause of the failure of the reactor-trip breakers, as stated in their March 1, 1983 letter, was that there was binding and excessive friction of the vertical latch lever of the UV trip attachment due to a lack of proper lubrication. The basis for this statement, as documented by the licensee, was that immediately following the February 25, 1983 event, tests were conducted which identified that the problem was not in the Reactor Protection System logic, but isolated to the under voltage trip attachment on the breakers.

By letter dated March 22, 1983, (Appendix C) Westinghouse provided to NRC the results of an investigation they performed in order to establish the potential scenarios that might have produced the malfunction of the Salem Unit 1 circuit breakers. Westinghouse performed an inspection of a UVT attachment provided to them by the licensee, and represented by the licensee as the UVT attachment that malfunctioned on reactor-trip breaker B of Salem Unit 1 on February 25, 1983. Findings during the examination included (1) failure of the as-received UVT attachment to latch traced to a bent and deformed leaf spring which, according to Westinghouse, could not have been caused by normal operation or wear, (2) a missing lock washer on the drop-out voltage adjustment screw mechanism and an excessively "turned-in" condition of the adjustment screw, (3) a determination that the as-received UVT attachment was lubricated (the licensee advised Westinghouse that a lubricant was added to the device after the February 25, 1983 event), (4) no excessive wear on the latch and latch interface and no evidence of burns, however excessive frictional force could not be ruled out as a potential malfunction since post-incident handling (manually exercising the device and lubrication) prior to receipt by Westinghouse would have masked a friction force malfunction scenario, (5) no visible evidence of corrosion, or broken or missing parts, other than the lock washer, and no obvious signs of improper manufacture, and (6) a determination that the UVT attachment was capable of providing sufficient force, with margin, to trip a properly maintained circuit breaker. Based on the results of this examination, Westinghouse concluded that malfunction of the UVT attachment was not attributable to design or manufacturing. The postulated malfunction scenarios which could not be eliminated by Westinghouse or which were present during the examination were frictional area anomalies, dirt/contamination, bent or deformed parts, and/or misadjustment. Westinghouse considers these scenarios to fall under one broad category of maintenance related causes.

The NRC and its consultant, Franklin Research Center (FRC) conducted an independent post-event evaluation to determine the cause of the failures. The FRC has completed their Interim Report and a copy is included as Appendix B. Their evaluation consisted of the inspection of a failed UV trip attachment and was based on interviews with cognizant maintenance personnel to describe the maintenance history of the devices. Evaluation of the failure of the reactor trip circuit breakers included review of the operating, maintenance, and surveillance testing history for the DB-50 breakers used at the Salem plant. Since the trip lever of the UV trip attachment must lift the circuit breaker trip bar for opening of the circuit breaker to occur, the evaluation also included the interaction of the UV trip attachment with the circuit breaker trip bar.

The staff and its consultant, FRC, have identified two possible failure modes for the Salem Unit 1 UV Trip attachments. Possible contributors to these modes are (1) dust and dirt; (2) lack of lubrication; (3) wear; (4) more frequent operation than intended by design; and (5) nicking of latch surfaces caused by repeated operation of the breaker. The contributors appear to be cumulative, with no one main cause. One failure mode can occur when latch-to-latch pin binding prevents unlatching of the UV Trip attachment, thereby preventing the trip lever from moving when the device is de-energized. Shortly after the event, all available failed devices were believed to be lubricated and no further failures to operate could be repeated.

The second possible failure mode concerns the increased frictional forces between the latch spring and latch. The latch spring on this device exerts enough force on the latch to reduce the output force from the trip lever resulting from friction. This reduced force could be significant if the force required to lift the circuit breaker trip bar is higher than normally expected. The increased friction results from age related wear and lack of lubrication. As stated previously Westinghouse representatives stated that the expected force required to lift the circuit breaker trip bar at time of manufacture would have a maximum of 31 ounces. The licensee by letter of April 7, 1983 has stated that the force required to trip the breaker using the breaker trip bar has been measured on all four Unit 1 circuit breakers, and that all breakers met the Westinghouse criteria.

Further FRC evaluation concluded that the latch surfaces of the original UV trip attachments appear not to have been honed. Roughness was noted on the latch-to-latch pin face and on the latch-to-latch spring face causing a groove to be worn into the spring. During testing, hesitation during unlatching was observed when voltage was gradually reduced to the coil of the device, further indicating inadequate lubrication causing increased friction in the latch-to-latch pin surface. Corrective actions to preclude the problems of roughness in the mating surfaces of the UV trip attachments have already been implemented. Westinghouse had changed the manufacturing procedure for the latch in 1973 to include hand honing of the latch surfaces that mate with other components. The licensee by letter of April 7, 1983, has confirmed that the new UV trip attachments now installed in Salem Unit 1, and those to be installed in Salem Unit 2 have incorporated all up to date design changes made to these devices.

During the FRC evaluation, manufacturing deviations were noted when comparing the original UV attachments supplied to Salem. These deviations may affect the forces available within the attachments. Discussions with the Licensee indicated that similar deviations had been noted on other attachments not currently available for inspection. These deviations were not identified in the causes of the failures of the attachments, and qualified components have been installed.

The results of the evaluation indicated that while there were possibly multiple contributing and cumulative causes of failure, the failure of the UV trip attachment was accelerated due to improper lubrication and maintenance throughout the life of the device.

Conclusion The staff has concluded that while the Salem Unit 1 breaker failures occurred from several possible contributors such as dust and dirt, lack of lubrication, more frequent operation than intended by design, and nicking of latch surfaces from frequent operation of the circuit breakers, the predominant cause was excessive wear accelerated by lack of lubrication and improper maintenance. To confirm this conclusion, and to provide assurance that degradation of the trip breakers is not occurring, the staff will require additional surveillance testing, and improved maintenance programs which will be implemented after re-start. These programs are addressed in the following sections of this report.

With the maintenance and testing of the new UV trip attachments and the verification testing as discussed in the following section of this Evaluation,

the staff has reasonable assurance that the properly maintained breakers and UV trip attachments will perform their intended function while the following additional actions are completed and evaluated.

Because one of the contributors may be more frequent operation than intended by design, the NRC is requiring the licensee to determine the allowable number of operations of the circuit breakers and establish a replacement interval for the entire unit or components of the unit. This action should be completed within six months of plant startup. In addition, the staff required and the licensee has established a procedure for measuring the force required to trip the breaker using the breaker trip bar and the force output from the UV trip lever. These tests will be performed every six months and are included in the licensee's maintenance procedures. By letter of April 7, 1983, the licensee has committed to these requirements.

Based on these actions and commitments by the licensee, we have concluded that the cause of failure of the original trip breakers have been sufficiently identified for restart.

3. Verification Testing

Testing following reactor-trip circuit breaker maintenance or initial installation should be sufficiently comprehensive to provide reasonable assurance that the circuit breaker will function as needed. Verification testing on the installed breaker provides added assurance that the breaker continues to function properly.

On August 20, 1982, one reactor-trip circuit breaker on Unit 2 failed to operate during surveillance testing. A UV trip attachment was reinstalled on this circuit breaker after replacing the coil. The circuit breaker was reinstalled and subsequent post maintenance testing was performed to establish operability. Similarly, on January 6, 1983, a reactor trip occurred at Salem Unit 2 due to a low-low steam generator level, but one reactor-trip circuit breaker failed to open. The licensee concluded that the circuit breaker failure was due to binding from dirt and corrosion in the UV trip attachment. The UV trip attachment on the Unit 2 circuit breaker, as well as the UV trip attachment on all Unit 1 reactor-trip circuit breakers was cleaned, lubricated and readjusted under supervision of a Westinghouse representative. On February 20, both breakers performed satisfactorily during reactor trip events. Since the circuit breakers again failed on February 22 and 25, adequacy of the testing to ensure circuit breaker operability is an issue.

The licensee has conducted a program to verify proper operation of the reactor-trip circuit breakers prior to returning them to service. The program involved pre-installation testing of UV trip attachments 25 times by the vendor. After installation on the trip breakers, the UV trip attachment and trip breakers were tested ten more times. All tests were completed without failure of the UV trip attachment to trip the breaker. Following this testing, a time response test of the breaker actuated through the RPS was performed. This test data is available at the site for the review and will be used as a baseline in all future testing.

By letter dated March 14, 1983, the licensee stated that he has completed the above program and committed to submit a longer term operational verification program for the reactor trip breakers for NRC review by May, 1983. The licensee has committed to develop and provide the NRC with a detailed test procedure, acceptance criteria and a schedule by May 1983. The intent of the testing is to verify the adequacy of the licensee's maintenance and surveillance program and will also be used in conjunction with surveillance testing results as a basis for determining the replacement intervals for the entire circuit breaker and/or its components. The licensee expects that the test program will be completed by October, 1983. If the licensee proposes a bench test of less than 2000 cycles, the staff will require the detailed justification concerning the acceptability of the number of test cycles.

Conclusion: Based on the successful results of the testing performed on the installed breaker assemblies and on the above commitment from the licensee, the staff concludes that this issue has been satisfactorily resolved to permit restart of the plant.

4. Maintenance and Surveillance Procedures

Maintenance

During the staff review, it was determined that no specific maintenance procedure existed at the Salem facility to conduct preventive or corrective maintenance on the reactor-trip circuit breakers. In addition, the maintenance conducted in January 1983 was not performed in accordance with the latest Westinghouse recommendations, as contained in Westinghouse Technical Bulletin NSD-74-1, amended by technical data letter NSD-74-2. No program of preventive maintenance had been conducted on these circuit breakers since their original installation.

The licensee has now developed maintenance procedures and preoperational verification programs for use on the reactor-trip circuit breakers (including the UV trip attachment), based on all applicable vendor maintenance recommendations, appropriate quality assurance (QA) requirements, and post maintenance testing. The initial NRC staff review of these newly developed procedures and programs identified certain deficiencies. By letters dated March 14, 1983 and April 7, 1983, the licensee submitted Revision 2 to Salem Generating Station Maintenance Department Manual Maintenance Procedure M3Q-2, and other information, that addressed these deficiencies.

Each of the deficiencies identified by the staff for the new recently developed procedures are presented below along with the licensee's resolution.

1. The maintenance procedure originally specified cleaning and vacuuming the equipment. Since dirt in the breaker assembly was believed to be one of the causes of the failures, the staff required that the cabinets and circuit breaker room also be cleaned as part of the maintenance procedure. The licensee, by letter dated April 7, 1983, has stated that the circuit breaker cabinets are cleaned each refueling outage and that the circuit breaker rooms are cleaned on work days, and has modified the procedure to include the requirement to clean the cabinets. The issue is resolved.

- ii. Our review of the maintenance procedure indicated that the new replacement UV attachments that were installed during this outage were not required to undergo cyclic testing that was to have been performed by the supplier (Westinghouse). In response to NRC questions, the licensee's Specification 83-8248 was revised and now requires all replacement UV attachments to have been tested without a failure. For startup the licensee has stated that the new UV attachments currently installed have now completed this testing. This resolves part of our concern and is acceptable.

The maintenance procedure was also revised for the new UV trip attachments to specify a 30-minute time interval between each of ten cycles of testing required. This test interval is in accordance with the staff's recommendation. However, the maintenance procedure had not been revised to specify appropriate acceptance criteria. These criteria, allowing no failures, have now been incorporated into the maintenance procedure. The licensee has stated that the new UV attachments have been successfully tested ten times, utilizing the 30-minute time interval. We find the revised procedures and testing results acceptable.

- iii. The maintenance procedure addresses circuit breaker response times when tripped by the undervoltage trip attachment. The staff required that three timing tests be performed with a high speed recorder and the average response would then be compared to previous test times. A timing test has been performed on the circuit breakers to establish a base line for future comparisons. Revision 2 of the maintenance procedure has been revised to require three timing tests be performed. This satisfies the staff's concern.
- iv. Diagrams included with the maintenance procedure incorrectly showed attachments such as an overcurrent trip device, that are not used in the Salem reactor trip circuit breakers, instead of the shunt trip and undervoltage trip attachment which are used. This has now been corrected to include the applicable diagrams and is now acceptable.
- v. The maintenance procedure contained a caution concerning a self-locking screw in the moving core of the UV attachment. The maintenance procedure has been revised to require, and licensee Specification 83-8248 now requires, that a sealant be applied to the two cover bolts on the movable core cover and the reset lever spring adjustment screw such that field adjustments are not possible without breaking these seals. The licensee has verbally informed the NRC that these seals are in place. The staff will verify this prior to restart. This resolves this issue and is acceptable.
- vi. The maintenance procedure did not specify the acceptance tolerance on the UV trip attachment coil dropout voltage. The maintenance procedure also did not address the action to take if the coil dropout voltage falls below the specified limits. These deficiencies have been corrected by the licensee and are acceptable.
- vii. The staff required that the procedure be revised to include notification of the NRC, prior to taking corrective action, if any acceptance criteria is found to be out of specification. The maintenance procedure has been

revised and the licensee has committed to propose Technical Specification changes within 30 days of plant startup, that require such notification to be made prior to any corrective actions being taken. The above action and commitment is acceptable to the staff.

- viii. The staff required the maintenance procedure be revised to include a trip force measurement be made on the trip bar of each of the four reactor trip breakers and the output force of all four UV trip attachments be measured each time maintenance is performed on the breakers and following installation of a new UV trip attachment. If the measured trip force on any trip bar exceeds the manufacturer's recommended upper limit, or the output force of any UV trip attachment is less than twice the measured trip force the licensee shall declare the breaker inoperable and should immediately notify the NRC prior to any corrective action. These measurements were required to be performed on presently installed breakers prior to plant startup. These measurements have been performed, and the trip force on all trip bars were less than the manufacturer's recommended upper limit. The licensee has verbally informed the NRC that the output force of all UV trip attachments is more than twice the measured trip force. The staff will verify this prior to startup. Technical Specification changes will be proposed by the licensee within 30 days of plant startup to assure NRC notification prior to any corrective action. This resolves this issue.
- ix. The maintenance procedure was not explicit relative to the frequency of UV attachment lubrication. It is the staff's position that the procedure require lubrication each time maintenance is performed. The procedure also specified cleaning the UV attachment with Stoddard solvent. While the staff has no concerns at this time relative to the adequacy of the lubricant, we will continue our investigation to determine any potential adverse effects from the use of Stoddard solvent. The lubrication points in the breaker were also inconclusive in that all friction points were not identified for lubrication. In a March 22, 1983 letter to the NRC (Appendix C), Westinghouse stated that a new Technical Bulletin clarifying the circuit breaker and UV trip attachment lubricants and lubrication points will be issued to the licensee by March 24, 1983. The licensee verified by letter dated April 7, 1983, that the circuit breakers and UV trip attachments have been lubricated in accordance with the recently issued Westinghouse Technical Bulletin. The Technical Bulletin specifies a lubrication frequency of every six months, specifies the lubrication points, and has been incorporated into the maintenance procedure. This resolves this issue for restart.
- x. Regarding the NRC recommendation that testing of the UV trip attachment of the bypass breakers be performed every refueling outage, the licensee has modified his maintenance procedure so that all bypass breakers have their UV trip and shunt trip attachments tested every six months. This satisfies the staff's concern.

Surveillance

Prior to the February events, the licensee conducted a functional surveillance test on one of the two installed reactor-trip circuit breakers every month, so that each circuit breaker was tested once every two months. The surveillance

test involved tripping a circuit breaker by use of the UV trip attachment. The licensee also operated the circuit breakers weekly by exercising the shunt trip attachment. In view of the number of reactor-trip circuit breaker failures at Salem, the staff determined that this surveillance testing program was ineffective for assuring reliability of the reactor-trip circuit breakers.

The licensee initially proposed to revise monthly testing of the main reactor-trip circuit breakers by use of the UV trip attachment and weekly testing of the reactor-trip circuit breakers by use of the shunt trip attachment. The staff did not agree with the weekly testing interval of the shunt trip attachment because of the potential for additional wear. Further, the staff indicated that the associated bypass breakers be tested.

The licensee proposed in his letter of April 7, 1983 a new single test procedure to independently test the UV trip, shunt trip, and manual scram feature, to be performed within 7 days of each reactor startup.

After discussion with the staff on this procedure the licensee has revised his proposal to provide three separate tests in lieu of the proposed single test procedure. These tests do not require lifted leads or jumpers; are previously existing tests which have been checked-out and used successfully in actual plant conditions; and satisfy the staff requirement. The tests are: (1) functional test of the UV trip of each main breaker, using the abbreviated monthly functional test procedure #18.1.010(11); (2) functional test of the shunt trip of each main breaker, using the manual breaker controls on the main reactor control board; and (3) functional test of the manual scram switches. The staff has determined that these three tests are acceptable for plant restart.

The licensee has further revised his proposal such that these three tests will be performed immediately prior to each reactor startup, unless the tests have been completed in the last 24 hours. We find this schedule more desirable and acceptable.

The licensee has committed to these revisions in his letter dated April 8, 1983, and has further agreed to propose appropriate changes to the Technical Specifications to fully document this testing requirement.

The staff required that reactor trip breaker timing tests be performed once each month. The staff also recommended a permanent test panel be designed and used when these tests are performed. However, the licensee has proposed to utilize the events recorder to perform these tests. We have found this to be acceptable. In combination with response time measurements with a high speed recorder every six months, we find use of the event recorder on a monthly basis to be acceptable.

The licensee will submit proposed Technical Specification changes that incorporate all the above surveillance requirements. These proposed Technical Specification changes are to be submitted within 30 days of plant startup.

Conclusions: The licensee has revised his maintenance procedures to address all NRC staff concerns necessary for the restart of Salem Unit 1. Further the licensee has acceptably revised and expanded his surveillance testing programs to provide assurance that adequate functional testing of the reactor trip

breaker will be provided, including testing of the bypass breakers. Finally, the licensee will submit, within 30 days of plant startup proposed Technical Specification changes for incorporating:

- (a) NRC notification requirements for maintenance testing results exceeding any acceptance criteria,
- (b) NRC notification requirements for measured breaker trip forces exceeding the recommended upper limit, and
- (c) the additional surveillance requirements identified by the staff, as identified herein and in Table 1, for the reactor trip and bypass breaker.

The above actions provide reasonable assurance, regarding maintenance and surveillance, for restart of the facility.

TABLE 1

PERIODIC SURVEILLANCE/MAINTENANCE OF REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS

PRE-STARTUP
(< 24 hrs)
(Main Trip Breakers)

MONTHLY
SURVEILLANCE
(Main Trip Breakers)

6-MOS.
SURVEILLANCE/MAINTENANCE
(Main & Bypass Breakers)

1. functional test of UV
(via SSPS)

1. a. SSPS functional of UV.
b. response time testing
of UV/breakers
(event recorders)

1. response time testing (3 times)
(visicorder) trend data

2. functional test of Shunt
(manual controls)

2. functional test of Shunt
(manual controls)

2. trip bar lift force measurements

3. functional manual scram switch
(voltmeters)

3. UV output force measurement

4. drop-out voltage check

5. servicing/lubrication/adjustments

6. repeat testing steps 1-4

B. Operating Procedures, Operator Training, and Operator Response Evaluation

Examination of the circumstances associated with the events of February 22 and 25 identified certain issues relative to plant operations. Our discussion of plant operations is divided into operating procedures, operator training, and operator response. The events at Salem were anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) of the reactor as a result of failures in the reactor protection system (RPS). The adequacy of the RPS to indicate an ATWS is discussed in this report.

The operator's role in responding to an ATWS is to first recognize that an ATWS has occurred and then to take action to manually shut down the reactor and stabilize all systems. Emergency Operating Procedures specifically direct actions to be taken once the event is recognized. Operator training is required to recognize the event and understand the objective of each procedure step. With proper operating procedures and adequate training, the operator's response to an ATWS event should be proper and timely.

1. Operating Procedures

NRC staff personnel conducted interviews with control room operators and reviewed the emergency operating procedure for reactor trip which was used by control personnel during the February 22, and 25 events. This procedure, which included the ATWS procedure steps, is identified as EI-I-4.3, Revision 7. The procedure required a manual trip if an automatic trip did not occur as indicated by reactor power level remaining high or control rods failing to insert. This situation does not mean that a trip should have occurred, only that one has not occurred. In addition, the procedure required a manual trip of the turbine. However, due to a lack of understanding of the procedure steps and/or a lack of adequate training, one operator questioned the appropriateness of the ATWS step to trip the turbine.

The evaluation of plant operations is divided into two sections. The first deals with "positive indication" of a "reactor trip demand." The second addresses the licensee's revised procedures relative to the requirement to manually trip the reactor upon receipt of a positive indication of a reactor trip demand. These procedures are identified as EI-I-4.3, Reactor Trip, and EI-I-4.0, Safety Injection Initiation both dated April 6, 1983 for both Units 1 and 2. The ATWS portion of the licensee's revised procedures relative to the Westinghouse Owners Group guidelines are also evaluated.

a. Positive Indication of Reactor Trip Demand

The staff's evaluation is based on the following definitions of "reactor trip demand" and "positive indication" of that demand. A "reactor trip demand" is the condition of the final output of the logic portion of the reactor protection system calling for an automatic reactor trip. Confidence in the validity of this trip demand is based on the redundancy and reliability of the reactor protection system logic. A reactor trip demand will effect an automatic reactor trip if either reactor protection circuit breaker opens.

"Positive indication" of a reactor trip demand is defined as the information from control room indicators that alerts the operator to the present existence

of a reactor trip demand. The licensee's proposed positive indication of a reactor trip are presence of an alarm on the reactor trip portion of the first-out annunciator panel and concurrent sensor bistable trip indications (sufficient to require a reactor trip) on the solid state protection system (SSPS) status panel. Information from the first-out annunciator panel alone provides a more conservative positive indication because it indicates either that a trip demand currently exists or that such a demand existed in the past. It is possible for the first-out panel to indicate a reactor trip demand after the trip condition has cleared because the annunciator "locks in." The SSPS status panel bistable indications, on the other hand, automatically reset when the associated trip condition clears. Thus, although the first-out panel alone provides the conservative positive indication of a reactor trip demand, the first-out annunciator concurrent with the bistables on the SSPS status panel is required for positive indication that the need for a reactor trip presently exists.

Staff review of the first-out annunciator panel operating sequence showed that a first out signal provides two coding methods to direct the operator's attention to a specific annunciator tile. The first is the auditory signal with a specific pulse rate and frequency variation unique to the first-out panel. The sound draws the operator's attention to the fact that an annunciator is active while the specific pulse rate and frequency is meant to identify the first-out panel.

Identification by auditory coding is useful only if a limited number of different signals must be distinguished by the operator. The recommended limit is nine for all auditory signals located in the control room, including plant evacuation, fire, security, computer alarms, annunciators, etc. Since there are more than twelve different auditory alarms in the Salem control room, the significance of the first-out panel unique auditory alarm is diminished. The separate first-out panel with red demarcation is an adequate reference such that a flashing tile within its bounds provides positive indication that a reactor or turbine trip demand signal has been generated. However, a drawback to the overall annunciator alarm system at Salem is that both the silence and acknowledge functions are accomplished by use of a single control (knee switch).

The second method of coding is intended to identify a specific first-out tile within the first-out panel. This is done by illuminating two red bulbs along with the two white bulbs illuminated on all activated tiles. The net result is a first-out indication that appears pink when viewed under normal ambient control room illumination. This color is not easily discriminated from that of illuminated white tiles on the same panel. Further, NRC color vision testing requirements for operators may not be sufficiently discriminating or uniformly applied to detect a color vision deficiency, thus exacerbating the potential problem of quick first-out tile identification.

The licensee's procedure, EI-I-4.3 "Reactor Trip," dated April 6, 1983, does not depend on identification of a specific annunciator tile on the first-out panel, only on detection of any reactor trip annunciator on the panel. Thus, the deficiencies in auditory and visual coding for identification should not significantly affect operator performance of the emergency procedure. These deficiencies may affect post-event operator actions. The licensee stated in its letter to D. Eisenhut from R. Uderitz, dated April 7, 1983 that modifications are under consideration and that changes will be completed by May 1, 1983.

b. Revised Procedures

Subsequent to the February 25 event, the licensee revised the procedures for reactor trip and safety injection. The procedure revisions upon which this safety evaluation is based are EI-I-4.3 "Reactor Trip," and EI-I-4.0, "Safety Injection Initiation," both dated April 6, 1983 for Units 1 and 2. The staff review of the revised procedures addressed several areas: (1) The operators must be able to carry out the instructions quickly enough to respond successfully to a plant transient; (2) Indicators upon which the operator acts must be sufficiently reliable to evoke proper action when necessary and not lead to improper operator action which may affect safe operation of the plant; (3) Instructions must have an adequate technical basis to provide confidence in their appropriateness; (4) Procedures must be written clearly so that the operator can understand and implement them in a high stress environment. This includes immediate actions that must be committed to memory so that they can be performed before time is available to actually reference the procedure.

(1) Timeliness of Response

To address the issue of how much time is available for operator action, the staff reviewed the analysis of the limiting ATWS event. The limiting concern for this event is reactor coolant system pressure. Results show that if the turbine is tripped within about one and a half minutes after the loss of feedwater, even if the reactor is not tripped, the pressure transient does not exceed design limits. The staff reviewed the reactor trip procedure and visited the Salem Unit 1 control room to look at the indications and controls used in the procedure and to walk through the initial steps of the procedure.

Staff review indicated that the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) status panel in the control room is located and arranged in a manner that should require only a few seconds to recognize a reactor trip demand. The staff walk-through of the Unit 1 control room demonstrated that the operator could perform all the necessary control room actions in less than half a minute. Therefore, based on the small size of the Salem control rooms and the relationship of the main control board and SSPS status panel, the staff has determined that operator scanning of displays necessary for this event and operation of all required controls can be performed adequately.

(2) Reliability of SSPS Status Panel Indications

Based on discussions with Salem personnel, and observations made during the control room walk-through, several issues about status indicator lights were identified. Both the first-out panel and the SSPS status panel are powered from uninterruptible power supplies. Each status panel indicator consists of a light fixture which can contain up to four miniature bulbs. Each indicator appeared to be vertically partitioned so that two bulbs may be placed on each side of the partition. According to operations personnel only two bulbs are used in each indicator, to reduce the heat generated within the indicator fixture. Control room observation from a human factors standpoint indicated that one bulb was sufficient to provide a visible indication of annunciator status.

The bulbs in the indicators are tested once each shift, and both trains of the status panel are functionally tested each month when performing surveillance tests on the reactor protection system. A burned out bulb is detected by observing a dark side on the indicator face.

Concern about reliance on SSPS status panel indication originated in the Unit 1 control room with the staff's observation that a number (at least 10) of the status panel indicators appeared to have burned out bulbs. An additional concern was the placement of bulbs in the indicators. With one bulb on each side of the light fixture, it was apparent when a bulb was burned out. However, with both bulbs on the same side of the partition, it could be difficult to determine that a bulb had failed.

In view of the reliance on status lights for positive indication of a trip demand at Salem, and issues for reliable status indication based on staff observations, the licensee was required to provide the staff with a detailed description of the procedures which will be used to ensure the operability of SSPS status panel indicators. The licensee's April 8 supplement to its April 7 letter provided a description of the power supply for the SSPS status panel and a description of its procedures for ensuring operability of the SSPS status panel indicator bulbs.

(3) Technical Basis of ATWS Procedure

The technical basis of the ATWS procedure is provided by the Westinghouse Owners Group procedure guideline ECA-1, "Anticipated Transient Without Scram," dated September 1, 1981. The licensee's procedure EI-I-4.3, "Reactor Trip," and EI-I-4.0, "Safety Injection Initiation" each dated April 6, 1983 were reviewed using the Westinghouse Owners Group guideline ECA-1 as a basis. Although there are plant-specific differences, no technical deficiencies were noted in the procedure. The licensee's two procedures contain plant-specific, detailed steps to provide operators with more methods of tripping the reactor and the turbine than are identified in the generic guidelines and are therefore more comprehensive than the current owners' group generic guidelines.

(4) Human Factors Review of Procedure

A human factors and technical review was conducted of the ATWS portion of the licensee's "Reactor Trip" procedure, and of the immediate actions of the licensee's "Safety Injection Initiation" procedure. A number of human factors discrepancies were identified, including lack of internal consistency, logical ordering of steps, and convention used for emphasis. None of the discrepancies warranted revision prior to restart. However, many of these discrepancies were corrected in the April 6 revisions to the procedures. The licensee agreed to consider the remainder of the discrepancies in the program for upgrading emergency operating procedures (EOPs). This upgrade program will revise existing EOPs, using the Westinghouse Owners Group Guidelines, as part of the ongoing Three Mile Island Action Plan to upgrade all plants' EOPs. All plants' schedules for the EOP upgrade are due to the NRC by April 15, 1983, in accordance with Generic Letter 82-33.

Conclusion: Staff review covered operating procedures, including positive indication of reactor trip demand and revised procedures. Review of the procedures included timeliness of operator response, reliability of the indications, technical basis of the procedures, and the human factors of the procedures. As a result of our review, the licensee was required to identify the control room indicators that provide positive indication, without operator analysis or verification, that an automatic reactor trip demand is present. In addition, the licensee was required to revise procedures to direct the operators to insert a manual trip whenever positive indication of an automatic reactor trip demand is present, without delaying to evaluate the overall plant status.

Our review of the April 6, revision of the procedures determined that the necessary revisions have been made. Based upon our review, the staff concludes that the revised procedures have been completed and are acceptable and that the reliability of the indications relied upon for manual trip is acceptable for restart.

2. Operator Training

Interviews conducted by the NRC with the licensed operators who were onshift during the two events of February 22 and 25 indicate a lack of familiarity with the functions of the annunciators and indicators associated with the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and control panel. The interviews also revealed that the operators who were on shift during the February 25 event did not recognize that a failure of the RPS had occurred until approximately 30 minutes after the event. Specifically, the operators interviewed were not able to state whether the reactor-trip-indicator light (red) on the RPS mimic status panel indicated a demand for, or confirmation of, a breaker trip action. Interviews also indicated that at least some operators questioned the validity of annunciators until they could be confirmed by independent indication. This perceived need for confirmation of annunciators caused the operators not to take immediate action to manually trip the reactor based on annunciator indication and verification of reactor power level remaining high and/or multiple control rods failing to insert on February 25, 1983.

Following the event, the Salem Nuclear Training Center Staff developed an ATWS Training Program which was conducted for all 56 licensed personnel. Each operator attended one of six training sessions, each approximately 3 hours in duration, conducted on March 10, 11, and 15, 1983. At the conclusion of each session, trainees were evaluated by a written examination. A grade of 80% was required for passing. In addition, 12 operators undergoing their normal re-qualification training were required to take an "upgrade" exam which included the new training on ATWS concerns. The evaluation of this training is addressed below.

As part of this program, the trainees were "talked through" the revised steps of Emergency Instruction EI-I-4.3 (Revisions 8 and 9). The trainees were also given a refresher on the RPS and associated indications and alarms. Definitions of "demand" and "confirmatory" signals were introduced and discussed. ATWS events and the analysis upon which the procedures are based were discussed and the February 22 and 25 events were thoroughly reviewed.

This evaluation is divided into three sections: training on the revised procedures, training on the RPS and associated indications and alarms, and on the administration of this training.

a. Training on Revised Procedures

The trainees were asked to list the 7 steps that an operator is required to perform to manually trip the reactor if an automatic reactor trip has not occurred. While this is a valid question (operators are required to have these steps memorized), a random sampling of 5 test results showed that only 1 trainee listed these steps without error. For the remaining 4 trainees, as well as other trainees, no retesting of this test item was required, and no remedial assistance was provided. The trainees, while they may be able to list the 7 steps of this revised procedure, were not given any opportunity for practice or required to undergo performance testing. The staff considers that the trainees should walk through the procedures in the control room until successful performance is exhibited. Further, this may be done on an individual or a team basis. In its letter to D. Eisenhut from R. Uderitz dated April 7, 1983, the licensee stated that each licensed operator will be required to perform the steps in the procedure in the correct sequence in a control room or simulator exercise prior to April 12, 1983, which is prior to restart of the units.

Our review of operating practices at the Salem station indicate that auxiliary operators will perform trip functions, contained in the last two steps of the ATWS sequence, on direction from the control room. The steps include manual trip of the reactor trip breakers and manual trip of the rod drive MG sets. Training of the auxiliary operators for these tasks is not evident. PSE&G has committed in its letter of April 7 to have each auxiliary operator identify and operate these devices prior to April 12, 1983.

b. Training on RPS and Associated Indications and Alarms

While the trainees were given refresher training on the RPS and "demand" and "confirmatory" trip signals, they were not tested on the source of these signals, nor were they required to list the 5 "confirmatory" signals (as stated in the training objectives). Only one of the tests, the "upgrade" test given to only 12 trainees, required the trainee to explain the difference between these two signals. To measure the operators' understanding and retention of this subject matter, all trainees should have been required to (1) identify the location of these annunciators, (2) explain the difference between the types of signals, and (3) list the 5 "confirmatory" signals. PSE&G stated in its April 7, letter that the trainees have been examined on the location of annunciators, alarms, etc., and the types of signals exhibited.

c. Administration of Training

For the overall training evaluation, one of two versions of the final examination was given to each trainee. These two versions were distributed in an alternate fashion. Upon review, it is apparent that these two versions do not test the same subject matter. While some questions are the same, certain areas, e.g., alarms, are tested on one version but not on the other. Basic educational principles require that if separate tests are to be given, they must be equivalent. All students should be tested on the same subject matter.

As previously stated, the 12 trainees undergoing requalification training were given an additional "upgrade" exam. The scores received on these two different tests were then averaged for a final score (a score of 80% was the criteria for passing). However, in one case, a trainee received a 93% on the first test and 73% on the "upgrade" test for an 83% final score. Thus, the student passed. Two different tests should not be averaged to make one final score. Averaging in this manner does not ensure understanding of all the subject matter. The licensee stated, in its April 7, 1983 letter that individuals requiring remedial training have been retrained and have successfully completed a comprehensive exam.

There were 18 learning objectives given to the trainees at the beginning of the training program; however, the trainees were not evaluated on all of these objectives. To ensure successful achievement of the subject matter, the trainees' performance should have been evaluated against all established objectives. In its April 7, 1983 letter, the licensee stated that they reviewed the course and material determined that all the objectives were covered. Since the training covered all learning objectives and testing was conducted on the most important objectives, we find this acceptable we find this acceptable for restart.

During the staff's audit of the ATWS training program, the licensee was informed that the examinations should be returned to trainees for them to assess their strengths and weaknesses. The licensee reported in its April 7, 1983 letter, that the individual graded exams with answer keys will be returned to the trainees by April 7, 1983.

Our review of the training material and objectives indicated the instructor lesson plan and student handout materials were not referenced or indexed. The licensee stated in its April 7, 1983 letter that student handouts and lesson plans have been cross-referenced to the objectives and the revised handouts will be sent to each operator by April 12, 1983.

Conclusion: Based on the completed training actions and commitments discussed above, the staff concludes that the ATWS training program for the licensed operators and the auxiliary operators is acceptable for restart.

3. Operator Response

Interviews were conducted with the operators involved in the two events that occurred at Salem on February 22 and February 25, 1983, to evaluate the reasonableness of their response to the events. The first event was caused by the loss of a 4160 kva electrical distribution bus (and associated buses) during transfer of bus supply from off-site to on-site power. The loss of the bus caused a loss of the feedwater control system, with a resultant reactor trip demand caused by low-low steam generator (SG) level. The second event was caused by reaching the low-low SG level setpoint while in manual control. The following facts were determined based on interviews with the licensed operators in the control room at the time of the two events.

- i. In both events, the operators took 20 to 30 seconds to evaluate overall plant status, determine the need for and then initiate a manual reactor trip. For the first event, 20 seconds elapsed from the loss of the

electrical distribution bus to a condition requiring a reactor trip, and thus the determination of plant status coincided with the reactor trip demand caused by the low-low SG level. For the second event, evaluation of the plant status commenced with receiving the reactor trip demand caused by low-low SG level.

- ii. The operators do not routinely take action based on the first-out panel indication (low-low SG level) and SSPS status panel indication. Instead, the operators evaluated the alarms received by verifying control room indications of the affected parameters.
- iii. The operators did not fully understand the relationship between the RPS and the first-out annunciator input signals, nor did they fully understand the operation of the SSPS.
- iv. The operators questioned the reliability of the first-out panel based on generalized problems experienced with adjacent panels and based on a previously experienced problem with non-RPS-related annunciator on the first-out panel.
- v. In the first event, when the shift supervisor ordered a manual trip, the operator inadvertently pulled the J-handle off the manual reactor trip switch. The operator then had to reinstall the switch handle to perform a manual trip.
- vi. In the second event, the operators did not recognize that a failure to trip on demand (ATWS) had occurred until the control room instrumentation had been checked, and a determination made that the trip points were set correctly and the breakers did not operate properly.

Based on the operator interviews, the staff determined that:

- i. In the February 22 event, the operators' response was prompt and fully satisfactory from the time the transient started until the time the reactor was manually tripped. However, the control room operators did clear the first out panel without noting the cause of the reactor trip demand, thus eliminating the first out information. In the February 25 event, the operators' response time was reasonable, considering the deficiencies in training that resulted in (1) the operators failing to recognize a reactor trip demand, and (2) the operators failing to understand the control room indications, and considering the procedural deficiencies identified in section B.1 of this report.
- ii. The improper operation of the J-handle switch was caused by the operator's lack of familiarity with the switch, and due to a poor design of the switch for this application in that it was not firmly secured to the switch body.
- iii. In the February 25 event, a manual reactor trip would have occurred earlier if the operators had recognized that a reactor trip demand existed. The operators manually tripped the reactor in response to their evaluation of the plant status and control room indications and not due to recognition of the failure of the reactor protection system to provide the required trip.

Conclusions: The training the operators received prior to the two events was deficient in that they were given incorrect criteria for determining the need for a manual reactor trip, and the operators did not fully understand the RPS or annunciator systems.

The J-handle switch is of poor design for this application, and the operators were not properly instructed on the use of the handle in its current design.

Procedural and training actions to correct the items noted in the interviews are discussed in sections B.1 and B.2. Additional correction actions are discussed below.

- i. Prior to startup, the staff required the operators to be trained on the proper operation of the current design of the J-handle switch. The licensee has satisfactorily conducted this training, and the staff considers this item acceptable for plant restart. (Training for operations personnel on post trip review procedures is covered in Section D.5.)
- ii. In the long term (after restart), the licensee is required to permanently secure the J-handle switch. In its April 7, 1983 letter, the licensee stated that these switches will be replaced with new switches having permanently attached handles during the next outage of sufficient length of complete the work. We find this acceptable.
- iii. As part of the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) required by NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, the licensee is required to reevaluate and address in the DCRDR summary report the design of the first-out panel system to improve the reliability of the information presented to the operators. Resolution of this item is discussed in Section B.1.
- iv. As part of the DCRDR the licensee is required to evaluate the design and operation of its overall annunciator alarm systems (e.g., number of auditory codes used, color coding of annunciator tiles, use of single action switches to perform both the silence and acknowledge functions and the use of knee switches in the control room).

Conclusion:

In summary, the licensee's corrective actions addressing operating procedures operator training, and operator response that have already been accomplished, and the commitments in the April 7, 1983 and April 8, 1983 letters are acceptable for restart.

C. Management Evaluation

The deficiencies identified during the review of circumstances surrounding the February 22 and 25, 1983 events raise the general questions of the responsiveness, practices, and capability of licensee management both at the nuclear plants and at the corporate level of the utility. Additionally, a number of specific management issues related to the failure of the reactor trip breaker events were also identified. The issues discussed in this section are:

1. Master Equipment List
2. Procurement Procedures
3. Work Order Procedures
4. Post Trip Review
5. Timeliness of Event Notification
6. Updating Vendor Supplied Information
7. Involvement of QA Personnel with other Station Departments
8. Post Maintenance Operability Testing
9. Overall Management Capability and Performance

Based on NRC review of information provided by the licensee in letters dated March 14, March 15, March 18, March 23, April 4, and April 7, 1983 and inspections and meetings both at the Salem site and in the NRC Regional and Headquarters offices, all issues are considered resolved for restart.

Evaluations addressing each issue are included in the report. Longer term (i.e., those to be completed following restart), actions remain to be completed and licensee commitment dates for completing these actions are identified under each issue in this report.

1. Master Equipment List

The licensee maintains a Q list that identifies activities, structures, and systems to which the Operational Quality Assurance (QA) Program applies. A Master Equipment List (MEL) is used by the licensee as the reference document for determining the safety classification of individual equipment. The MEL is intended to be a comprehensive list of all station equipment and identifies each item as nonsafety related or safety related. When preparing maintenance work orders, the MEL is consulted to determine if QA coverage of the work is necessary. Licensee and NRC review identified three concerns associated with the MEL. These concerns are: (a) the accuracy and completeness of the document, (b) issuance as a noncontrolled document, and (c) lack of understanding by plant personnel of its proper use.

The MEL was derived from engineering source documents and a construction program document called Project Directive 7 (PD-7) and was provided to station personnel

by the Engineering Department as a reference document in July 1981. Prior to issuance of the MEL, the PD-7 was used as the reference document. The MEL, however, was not issued as a controlled document, therefore verification of its accuracy and completeness on issuance was not assured, and it was not updated in the plant as necessary. Perhaps more significantly, the reactor-trip circuit breakers were not included in the MEL. In addition, some personnel were not familiar with how to use the MEL for determining the classification of a particular piece of equipment that was present on the MEL. Maintenance personnel acknowledged that reference was made to PD-7 on occasion during the January - February 1983 period.

In response to this issue, the licensee reissued the existing MEL on March 12, 1983, under engineering Field Directive S-C-A900-NFD-077 which describes the MEL and its use, cancels PD-7, and issues a new Systems List as a part of the MEL. The following excerpt from this Field Directive describes the utilization of the MEL:

For use in classifying work orders as to safety-related status and QA Program applicability, personnel shall consult the systems list of the MEL, not the component listing. All work on any of the listed systems shall be performed based on the classification of the system as a whole, not the individual component in question.

For use in classifying items on procurement documents, both the MEL systems listing and the MEL component listing shall be consulted. Use of this information shall be as follows:

- if the item is on the MEL component listing and its system is on the system list, the classification on the component list may be used on an MO/IC.
- if the item is not on the component listing and its system is not on the systems listing, the item may be regarded as non-safety related with no QA program requirements.
- if the item is not on the component listing but its system is on the system listing, the Nuclear Engineering Department should be consulted regarding its true classification.
- if an item is found on the MEL component listing as Q-Program applicability "yes" but its system is not on the systems listing, Nuclear Engineering should be consulted for resolution and to effect MEL revision, if necessary....

Although the MEL is not broken down into sub-components, classification of sub-components shall be assumed to be the same as its associated component unless written direction is requested and received from the Nuclear Engineering Department.

Any question concerning a component classification in MEL shall be directed to the Nuclear Engineering Department. Requests for classification of components not in MEL shall be directed to the Nuclear Engineering Department. Licensee Administrative Procedure, AP-9, "Control of Station

Maintenance", has also been revised to reflect the new requirements for the classification of Work Orders.

As part of the action necessary to resolve this issue, the NRC required the licensee to verify prior to restart that the MEL is complete and accurate with respect to emergency core cooling (ECCS) including actuation systems, RPS, auxiliary feedwater and containment isolation systems. The licensee has conducted a verification/updating of the MEL for the above systems by starting with the latest plant piping and instrument drawings and electrical/controls schematics (which included all completed plant modifications and design changes) and verifying that the components shown were included in the MEL and appropriately classified in the categories of Safety Related, Seismic Class, Nuclear/Non-Nuclear, and QA Required. This updating was completed and the revised MEL issued on March 24, 1983, under Field Directive S-C-A900-NFD-080. This Field Directive required that all previous editions of the MEL be discarded.

A staff review of the revised MEL was performed to verify that the Systems List adequately addressed the systems/components in the QA Manual "Q"-List. Staff review identified some discrepancies in the new systems list which the licensee corrected in a revision to the MEL issued on April 5, 1983. Additionally, a sampling review of the component section of the MEL was conducted to ensure that the emergency core cooling systems, RPS, auxiliary feedwater system, and containment isolation system components were listed and correctly classified as "Safety-Related/QA Required". This sampling review revealed no discrepancies. In addition the staff reviewed the training records for the training conducted by the licensee on March 10 and 11, 1983 and concurs that appropriate personnel have been adequately trained in the use of the MEL.

By letter dated April 7, 1983, the licensee committed to verify that the component listing includes all equipment of the remaining Q-list systems. This verification will include an independent review of each data entry on the MEL to verify the proper classification. Additionally a formal procedure for the use, review and periodic update of the MEL will be issued. The above actions will be completed by May 1983. The staff considers these actions acceptable to resolve all concerns with the MEL and the staff will verify their completion.

Conclusion: Based on a review of the licensee's commitment to revise the Field Directive, the staff concludes that the actions required prior to restart concerning the MEL are satisfactorily resolved. The staff will require the licensee's stated actions concerning updating of the MEL for the remaining systems/components and its reissuance as a controlled document and will verify satisfactory resolution of these actions when complete.

2. Procurement Procedures

A review of safety and quality classifications for the reactor trip breakers indicates that the licensee's established management and administrative controls may have allowed the procurement of replacement components for a safety system with a quality less than that of the original design. This is evidenced by procurement activities concerning the purchase of reactor trip breakers and replacement components conducted during the period from June 1, 1981 to March 1, 1983. One example involved the issuance of a purchase order for a spare reactor

trip breaker on June 1, 1981. Contrary to the established administrative controls, the breaker was classified incorrectly, the proper review and approval was not conducted, and no QA requirements were imposed as required for the original equipment. Subsequently, on September 15, 1982, the classification for the same order was changed to an even more inappropriate classification without the required review and approval process. As a result of these activities, the purchased breaker was received and placed into storage, without further use, and without appropriate documentation that would demonstrate suitability for its use had it been required.

All subsequent purchases for reactor trip breaker components consistently utilized the initial incorrect classification. A spare coil for a UV trip attachment purchased in this manner may have been utilized on August 20, 1982. Though the procurement review focused on the reactor trip breaker, the licensee's activities in the area for other safety related components could have resulted in similar circumstances existing for plant safety systems.

In his March 14, 1983 letter, the licensee responded to this issue indicating that the procurement system has been reviewed to assess the effectiveness and adequacy of the procurement procedures and their implementation. Additionally, although not identified as a requirement to be completed prior to restart, the licensee conducted a sampling review of previously issued procurement documents for Westinghouse and other major vendors. Staff evaluation of licensee's response to this issue addresses procurement procedures and licensee's review of procurement documents separately below.

i. Procurement Procedures

Discussions with the licensee and subsequent review and evaluation of this area by NRC has disclosed that part of the perceived issue in procurement was due to a misunderstanding of PSE&G's program (procedures) for procurement of parts or components defined as Commercial Catalog Items (CCI). After further review, NRC has determined that the licensee's definition of CCI and procedures for procuring certain items as CCI are acceptable, if rigorously implemented. Specifically, CCI is defined as an item which complies with all the following requirements:

- (1) The item is not unique to facilities or activities licensed by the NRC.
- (2) The item is manufactured in quantity to published manufacturer's fixed design and quality requirements.
- (3) The item part number is listed in the supplier's catalog as opposed to a manufacturer's bulletin or circular.
- (4) The item requires no supplier documentation.
- (5) The item is identifiable by physical marking, tagging or containerization and is maintained throughout storage.

This definition is only acceptable to NRC when combined with all of the following requirements which are included in the PSE&G program:

- (1) For replacement (CCI) items, a document must exist which identifies the item to be ordered as an authorized replacement-in-kind for the original or existing item. Such documents must include the manufacturer's part list, bill of material, repair, maintenance or instruction manual or a PSE&G engineering list of replacement or interchangeable parts.
- (2) Any proposed substitution for authorized parts requires written engineering approval.
- (3) The classification as CCI for an item used in a safety related application is a procurement item classification only. The receipt inspection, installation and subsequent testing must be subject to the same controls as for any other safety related item.

Thus, procurement of a DB-50 circuit breaker as a CCI could be permissible since it is listed in the Spare Parts Report of recommended spare parts for the Nuclear Steam Supply System furnished by the Westinghouse Water Reactor Division. This report identifies it as an authorized replacement-in-kind.

Although the procurement procedures have been found to be acceptable after further detailed review, a series of problems with implementation of the existing procedures were identified by the NRC fact finding Task Force, as documented in NUREG-0977 dated March 1983, during their review of the procurement actions for reactor trip breakers at Salem since June 1981. These included examples with improper seismic classification, lack of required review by QA and Engineering personnel, circumventing of the normal receipt inspection process, and incorrect classification of under-voltage trip attachments as CCI without any existing documentation to support them as authorized replacement-in-kind. Thus, procurement implementation (practices) rather than procurement procedures (program) is a more correct description of the procurement management issue.

The staff has reviewed various PSE&G recent internal memoranda on procurement practices. These documents emphasize the need to follow existing procurement procedures and in addition, establish interim measures to assure procedure adherence, provide additional assurance that future Purchase Orders will be properly classified and require completion of approval cycle prior to purchase of materials. Additionally, the resolution of the issue associated with the MEL (Section C.2) provides for proper use of an approved master classification listing in the procurement process. Appropriate portions of these interim measures will be the basis for a new Quality Assurance instruction to be issued by July 1983.

ii. Review of Procurement Documents

The PSE&G review consisted of: a selection of 73 major vendors who normally supply most safety related materials and a review for proper classification of all Purchase Orders (POs) which had been initially classified as non-safety related and CCI for these vendors since initial issuance of the MEL. Approximately 325 POs out of a total of 2,707 reviewed had some

type of discrepancy or needed further clarification by the Engineering Department. This secondary review resulted in 14 Deficiency Reports (DRs).

The NRC staff reviewed all of these DRs including their disposition and sampled the other POs sent to Engineering for clarification. The DRs appeared to have appropriate actions necessary to correct the deficiency stated and the deficiencies did not appear to affect redundant components or have more than minor potential safety significance. The DRs were easily resolved by the licensee and they concluded that none of the misclassifications resulted in actual adverse impact on safety. Of the other POs reviewed, no additional misclassifications were noted.

Conclusion: Based on the staff's further review and concurrence that the procurement issue was an implementation problem rather than inherent deficiencies in the program, the licensee's review of past procurement actions which demonstrated a low incidence of misclassifications, the relatively minor potential safety significance of such misclassifications, the successful dispositioning of all procurement related DRs, and increased emphasis and training on proper classification of future procurement actions, the licensee has concluded that the procurement issue has been resolved for restart. As a result of the staff's review and sampling of such actions, the staff agrees that this issue is satisfactorily resolved.

3. Work Order Procedures

NRC review of the February 22 and 25 events identified that the personnel preparing maintenance work orders were not complying with instructions contained in the station administrative procedure. Specifically, for the work performed on the reactor-trip circuit breaker in January 1983, the engineering department was not consulted to verify safety classification, and an erroneous nonsafety determination was made. Such consultation is required if equipment is not listed in the MEL as was the case with the reactor trip breakers. In addition, there was, therefore, no independent review within the maintenance organization, and the Quality Assurance Department was not involved in the work. It should be noted, however, that all other work orders for maintenance or services on the reactor trip breakers were found to be properly designated safety-related.

In his March 14 and March 15, 1983 submittals, the licensee committed to review, prior to restart, all nonsafety related work orders that have been written since issuance of the MEL in order to ensure proper classification. A similar effort will be conducted on Unit 2 prior to Unit 2 restart. Additionally, the licensee developed a revised Administrative Procedure AP-9 and Quality Assurance Instruction QAI 10-6. AP-9 is the administrative procedure for controlling station maintenance and has been revised to ensure work orders will be properly classified in the future. QAI 10-6 has been prepared to provide guidance for QA review of Station work orders.

The licensee has reviewed approximately 15,670 work orders which were classified nonsafety related. This review was conducted by quality assurance (QA) personnel. Of the 15,670, approximately 11,550 were determined to be properly classified nonsafety related without further review. Approximately 4,100 work orders were sent to Engineering for further clarification by the Sponsor Engineer and of these, all but approximately 873 were determined by Engineering

to be properly designated nonsafety related. Deficiency reports (DR) were written on the remaining 873 work orders. Subsequently, documentation of proper classification was found for a number of work orders, which reduced the number of DRs to 689.

The list of DRs was examined by the NRC staff and from that list approximately 300 DRs and work orders were selected and reviewed to determine the safety significance of the misclassified work orders and to determine whether the DRs were properly dispositioned. The staff review emphasis was on work performed on ECCS systems, RPS, containment systems and emergency power supply systems. Our review determined that the vast majority of the DRs involved components of systems with minor safety significance or relatively minor components of more important systems. Many work orders for which DRs were written involved work on components of a safety related system although the components themselves were not necessarily safety related. For example, minor work was performed on control room strip chart recorders which are part of the safety related control room console, yet the recorders themselves do not perform a safety related function since other safety related instrumentation exists which monitors the same parameters. Most DRs were dispositioned by finding the proper documentation or by verifying that a system or component test conducted after maintenance demonstrated operability of the affected component. Based on the staff's review of work orders and DRs to date, there appears to have been no significant impact on safety from misclassifying work orders (other than the reactor trip breakers).

Recently, the licensee examined all work orders which required DRs (873) to determine how many were actually misclassified based on the previous work practice. As noted in section C.1, MEL, the licensee's criteria for classifying work orders has been modified since the February 22 and 25 events and DRs were written for all work orders which were misclassified under the new classification system. In his April 7, 1983 letter, the licensee has indicated that 35 work orders were erroneously classified under previous work practices, although 132 items lacked documentation. Hence, it is apparent that only a small fraction of the total number of work orders involved actual administrative errors in classification.

With respect to the licensee's revised procedures, the staff reviewed the revised AP-9 and QAI 10-6 to determine if they provide the necessary administrative controls to ensure proper work order classification. AP-9 has been revised to require an independent review of all non-safety related work orders by the Quality Assurance Department to verify the classification. If the QA inspector concurs in the classification, he shall affix a Quality Control Inspection stamp to the non-safety related work orders prior to work order issuance. In addition, AP-9 requires the supervisor or planner to contact the sponsor engineer when any clarification of the classification is required.

As noted in the Section C.1 of this report, the MEL now includes a Systems List and for the purpose of classifying work orders, only the Systems List is to be used. AP-9 has been revised to reflect this method of classification. The staff review of QAI-10-6 revealed no discrepancies.

Conclusion: Based on the results of licensee and NRC review of work orders, except for the reactor trip breakers, there has been no apparent significant

impact on safety from misclassifying work orders. Hence, the staff considers this issue resolved for restart.

4. Post-Trip Review

The licensee did not determine that there had been a failure to trip automatically on February 22 until the computer printout of the sequence of events was reevaluated on February 26, as a result of NRC inquiries. Although the licensee conducted a review of each trip, there was no formal procedure for conducting a systematic review. By letter dated March 1, 1983, the licensee made a commitment to develop a post-trip and post-safety injection review procedure. The procedure is to specify the review and documentation necessary to determine the cause of the event and whether equipment functioned as designed. Furthermore, the affected individuals who will be required, by procedure, to review the sequence of events computer printout and other event records will need to receive necessary training in the proper interpretation, understanding and evaluation of these records.

In his March 14, 1983 letter, the licensee provided Administrative Directive (AD) - 16, Revision 1 dated March 13, 1983 entitled "Post Reactor Trip/Safety Injection Review and Startup Approval Requirements". AD-16 provides for a formal post trip and/or post safety injection review to be performed by the Senior Shift Supervisor and the STA qualified shift supervisor. Specific areas to be reviewed and documented include:

- (1) condition of the unit prior to the event,
- (2) personnel assignments,
- (3) evolutions in progress which could have contributed to the event,
- (4) major equipment, protection and control systems out of service or inoperable at the time of the event,
- (5) mode of event initiation (i.e., manual or automatic),
- (6) sequence of events (SOE) computer printout and other alarm printouts,
- (7) control room recorder charts,
- (8) alarms received which were unusual for the event or other expected alarms which were not received, and
- (9) required corrective actions to be completed prior to startup.

The above information, as well as a narrative of the event, will be documented on Form AD-16-A, and the SOE printout, recorder charts and other event records will be included with the report. The procedure also requires the reviewer to document whether the first out annunciator agrees with the sequence of events.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's post trip and post safety injection review procedure to determine that certain key elements have been adequately addressed. The key elements reviewed include:

- (1) that sufficient event review will be conducted to determine the cause of the event and whether equipment functioned as designed;
- (2) that necessary management authorization for restart is specified;
- (3) that debriefing of appropriate personnel is required to be conducted;
- (4) that reporting requirements are required to be completed;
- (5) that a followup review by safety committees is required to be conducted;
- (6) that personnel conducting the review understand information provided by the event records.

Based on the information required to be provided on Form AD-16-A, the fact that two SRO licensed operations personnel (i.e. the senior shift supervisor and the STA qualified shift supervisor) are involved with the review, and the requirement for specific review and attachment of applicable event records (i.e. the SOE printout, control room recorder printouts, and the auxiliary alarm printout), the staff is satisfied that AD-16 specifies a sufficiently detailed review of an event to determine its cause and whether equipment functioned as designed.

With respect to management authorization for restart, the procedure specifies that the Operations Manager (OM) may authorize restart following a reactor trip or safety injection provided that (1) the post trip review has been completed, evaluated and reviewed with the OM, and (2) the evaluation clearly indicates the cause of the event and that all equipment and systems functioned as designed. If the cause of the event has not been clearly determined or there is a question concerning the proper performance of equipment or systems, the procedure specifies that an investigation be conducted and reviewed by the Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) prior to startup. Restart following these more complex events will be decided by the General Manager - Salem Operations only after receipt of SORC recommendations and after a determination that the unit can be restarted safely.

The staff questioned why restart determinations were not always elevated to the General Manager - Salem Operations since he is the individual who is responsible per Technical Specification 6.1.1) for overall facility operation. The staff was informed that in all cases, the General Manager or Assistant General Manager will be kept informed of the circumstances of an event and would be able to redirect the Operations Manager's actions, if necessary. Hence, although specific restart authority is granted to the OM for more clearly understood events, upper level management oversight will exist for all reactor trip and safety injection events.

The staff also noted that the procedure specifies that individuals authorized to assume the OM's responsibilities may authorize startup if the OM is not available. The staff was informed that the Operations Engineer (OE) periodically assumes the OM's duties when the OM is in training. The staff has verified that the qualification requirements for the OE are the same as for the OM per Administrative Procedure -2, which references ANSI-18.1, 1971. Based on the above, the staff is satisfied that the procedure specifies the

appropriate management authorization for restart following a reactor trip or safety injection.

With respect to debriefing of appropriate personnel, the procedure specifies that fact finding sessions are conducted with appropriate personnel to determine the cause of the event, actions taken and observed sequence of events. The fact finding sessions will be conducted as part of the review, prior to restart. The staff is satisfied that this element is adequately addressed.

With respect to reporting requirements, the procedure specifies that a determination be made that the event was properly classified and that with respect to followup review by safety committees, provision is addressed in the procedure to have the onsite safety committee (SORC) review all reactor trips and safety injections. As noted above, for those events where the cause is not clearly indicated or there is any question of the proper functioning of equipment, the SORC will review the event prior to restart. For other events, the SORC will review the event but not necessarily before restart. Additionally, the Nuclear Support Department will also perform an independent review of each reactor trip/safety injection event for the purpose of determining corrective actions to prevent the type of event from reoccurring. Also, the procedure specifies that the original event review report will be maintained on file for future reference. Based on the above, the staff is satisfied that sufficient followup review of these events will be conducted.

With respect to the review personnel understanding the information provided by the event records, the staff notes that the reviews are conducted by SRO licensed personnel who are familiar with the various control room-recorders and alarm printouts. However, as evidenced by the recent ATWS events, these personnel were not as familiar with the information provided on the SOE printout (such as interpretation of the timing of the line entries). The licensee has conducted training for Operations personnel on the SOE printouts for the February 22 and 25 events.

In the opinion of the staff, the training conducted is not sufficient to ensure that these individuals have a satisfactory understanding of other SOE printouts. Additionally, operating personnel may not have a detailed understanding of expected response times of equipment. The licensee has indicated his intention to reevaluate the format and information provided on the SOE printout to make it easier to understand and evaluate, and as other SOE printouts for reactor trips/ safety injections become available, to provide additional training for Operations personnel. The staff agrees these additional measures are useful, but until they are implemented, the staff has requested and the licensee has committed to have an instrument and controls (I&C) supervisor who is knowledgeable on the SOE computer and understands expected equipment response times, personally review SOE printouts for for all reactor trips/safety injections prior to restarting the plants. Subsequently AD-16 was revised to reflect this commitment and hence, the staff is satisfied that personnel conducting the reviews have a sufficient understanding of the event records.

Conclusion: Based on the staff's review of the elements of licensee's post trip and post safety injection review procedures and for the reasons identified above, the staff concludes that the post trip review issue is resolved to

permit restart. In addition, the staff will require that an I&C supervisor review SOE printouts as discussed above.

5. Timeliness of Event Notification

On three occasions between January 30 and February 25, 1983, the licensee notified NRC of significant events belatedly. In each case, the notification was approximately 30 minutes late. Two of these reports were for the February 22 and 25 events. Furthermore, in the February 22 event, the first notification did not contain known significant information regarding actuation of engineered safety features and opening of the power operated relief valves. This additional information was provided approximately 40 minutes later. The notification procedures used by the licensee warrant further evaluation as to the priority assigned for NRC notification.

The licensee in his March 14, 1983 letter, indicated that the importance of adhering to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 has been emphasized to all operating personnel. The licensee's emergency plan procedure EP-I-1, Attachment 4, has been revised to rearrange the priority of notification to the NRC. Additionally, the emergency plan procedures have been revised to require designated personnel to immediately start making the required notifications and reading the initial contact messages upon classification of the event. The licensee has also indicated that training on the revisions to the Emergency Plan procedures was conducted for personnel involved in implementation of the Emergency Plan.

Conclusion: The NRC staff considers the licensee's actions noted above to be sufficient to ensure that the notification requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 will be met in the future. The staff has also verified completion of the above noted training. This issue is considered resolved.

6. Updating Vendor Supplied Information

As a result of the February 25, 1983 event and NRC IE Bulletin 83-01, the licensee indicated not being aware of the existence of two Westinghouse technical service bulletins that provided preventive maintenance recommendations for the reactor-trip circuit breakers. The two documents in question were published by Westinghouse in 1974. The licensee has requested and obtained documentation for all Westinghouse equipment and where necessary, station documents will be revised to incorporate this information by July 1, 1983. While we are not aware of any problems with other vendor documentation, an NRC staff concern is whether a similar situation exists with respect to documentation for other vendor-supplied information.

The licensee in his March 14, March 23, and April 7, 1983 submittals committed to a multiphased program for vendor documentation consisting of a short term review for critical components in major safety related systems, issuance of procedures which will provide methods for controlling this information, and a longer term program to identify and obtain documents for all equipment listed in the Q list. The licensee has agreed to complete all phases of this program by December 1983.

The short term program consists of identifying applicable vendor manuals for critical components in major safety systems including Auxiliary Feedwater, Control Air, Safety Injection, Reactor Coolant, Containment Spray, Reactor Protection, Diesel Generator, Containment Isolation, Service Water, and others. The scope of this program included critical valves, motors, pumps, instruments and control devices for these systems. Licensee completed the audit phase of this program on March 24, 1983 and will ensure that latest known revisions are obtained from the vendor and indexed into the document control system by May 1, 1983. Two hundred and thirty three components were reviewed for the applicable vendor manual and only three manuals were found missing.

The three manuals which could not be located were as follows: (1) The manual for the Service Water Centrifugal Charging Pump Hydraulic Oil Cooler. Discussion with licensee representatives identifies that no repair is normally performed on these coolers but rather, if a problem is identified, they are replaced; (2) Emergency Air Compressor Motor. Maintenance on this motor is governed by a generic maintenance procedure, a technical manual for similar motor is onsite, and the subject motor requires little maintenance; (3) Fire Protection valve FP 10K77. The licensee contacted the vendor and was informed that no technical manual exists. The licensee has the detail drawing identified by the valve manufacturer. Hence it appears that there is no impact on maintenance activities due to lack of manuals for these three components.

The long term portion of the program will cover all safety related equipment included in the Master Equipment List. Files will be audited by June 1, 1983, to identify manual existence and ascertain revision levels. New manuals will be ordered by August 1, 1983 and formal indexing of latest known revisions into the document control system will be completed by December 1, 1983. Administrative procedures will be issued by May 1, 1983 to control the vendor manuals and the procedures will have the following critical elements:

1. Requirements that all vendor manuals (Q and non-Q) be incorporated under the Vendor Document Control System (PSBP).
2. Revision of current PSBP system to provide for controlled, numbered copy issue of vendor manuals.
3. Identification of vendors for Q-equipment who have manual updating programs, and periodic contact with these vendors to assure receipt of most recent applicable information.
4. Review of manual revisions and new manual issues by Station user departments to ensure incorporation of applicable new information into applicable procedures.
5. Review of vendor manuals by Nuclear Engineering to determine applicability to installed equipment.
6. Periodic audit of controlled copy holder files to ensure existence of latest issues.
7. Procedures regarding control of vendor manuals.

8. Identification of manuals to Q-listed equipment.
9. Annual contact with vendors of safety-related equipment to ascertain the availability of the most recent applicable information.

In addition, interim directives have been issued which provide guidance on the use of vendor information including instructions for those cases where the information cannot be located.

Conclusion: Based on the satisfactory completion of the short term review, which identified no significant equipment for which proper vendor documentation is not available, and the licensee's commitment to a long term program which will identify and control vendor information for all safety related equipment, the staff considers this issue resolved for restart. The staff will formalize the licensee commitments as requirements and will follow licensee progress and review portions of the long term program as they are completed.

7. Involvement of QA Personnel with Other Station Departments

The Quality Assurance Department did not review maintenance work orders associated with repair of the reactor-trip circuit breakers in January 1983 because the work was not designated safety related. Further examination determined that the QA Department does not review for proper determination of classification the work orders designated nonsafety related by other departments. Discussion with the licensee indicate that the QA Department has been somewhat isolated from the activities of other departments.

Although no action was required on this issue prior to restart, the licensee in his March 14, 1983 letter responded, delineating actions to be taken over the next several months to improve QA department involvement. As a result of prior decisions, the licensee had initiated steps in January 1983 to relocate the QA Department from the corporate offices in Newark, New Jersey to the site and is taking steps to increase QA Department involvement in other station activities.

The corporate nuclear QA effort was reorganized effective January 3, 1983 to place the Operational Quality Assurance Organization into the Nuclear Department. Those personnel assigned to this organization who formally worked in the corporate offices in Newark, New Jersey are in the process of being relocated to the site. Most of the existing personnel in the site QA/QC organization were absorbed into this new organization. The purpose of this change was to provide for increased involvement by QA personnel in the day-to-day functioning of the Nuclear Department. Such integration of all QA functions into the Nuclear Department is expected to lead to better interface with other plant personnel for problem discussion and resolution. It will enable auditors to be more knowledgeable about operations as compared to the past when QA auditors were more likely to be "generalists". Audit plans are being changed to place more emphasis on system effectiveness (i.e., how it is working?). In describing the objectives of this reorganization to NRC Region I in a January 4, 1983 meeting, PSE&G indicated that increased daily monitoring and overview were being emphasized for Operations QA personnel as a part of this reorganization. To better prepare for such increased involvement, it was indicated

that in the future, some QA personnel would receive operator type training up to and including simulator training.

Since the February 1983 ATWS events, PSE&G has taken further steps to place greater emphasis on QA program implementation through increased observation and monitoring. By policy directive dated March 11, 1983, QA personnel have been instructed to place emphasis on adherence to procedures and review of engineering activities such as design changes, procurement control and work orders. An ongoing comprehensive review of QA Program implementing procedures and any necessary changes is expected to be completed by August, 1983.

To emphasize the existing QA program requirements and recent procedural changes as a result of the ATWS events, an indoctrination/training program was conducted by PSE&G for appropriate personnel. NRC review of the lesson plan for that training shows that it included discussions of Classification, Work Orders and Procurement. Specifically included was use of the MEL system, criteria to be used in the determination of safety classification for proper classification of work orders and procurement documents, and interfaces with Nuclear Engineering to resolve any classification questions. Numerous personnel from all major station departments attended such training sessions as shown in attendance records reviewed by NRC.

NRC staff has verified that procedures have been changed to require QA to review and stamp all non-safety related work orders (for concurrence that it was properly classified) prior to implementation. Administrative Procedure AP-9 (3/10/83) and Quality Assurance Instruction QAI 10-6 (3/11/83) were found to provide for QA review of station work orders and involvement in station maintenance work. The licensee has committed to provide additional detailed training on initiation, processing and closeout of work orders to reemphasize QA and test/retest requirements involving interdepartmental coordination by September 1, 1983. Such training will be monitored by Region I as a part of continuing on-site inspection coverage.

The licensee has committed to have an outside consultant organization perform an independent assessment of PSE&G's QA program and new organization as discussed further under management issue C.9. This assessment is to consist of a review of (1) the QA organizational structure and staffing, (2) the QA program content and procedures, and (3) the effectiveness of implementation of those programs and procedures. This review will, by its nature, include QA department involvement and integration into other plant activities. By letter dated April 7, 1983, PSE&G agreed to prepare an action plan for implementing any appropriate changes by July 1, 1983. NRC Region I will review this proposed plan.

Conclusion: In summary, NRC review of this area has verified that the licensee is accelerating previous plans to more fully involve QA personnel in the day-to-day operation of Salem 1 and 2. Integration of QA personnel into activities covered by work orders such as modifications and maintenance will be required by recently revised procedures. Reemphasis and retraining of appropriate personnel on proper use of existing procurement procedures should assure proper future QA involvement in all procurement actions. The staff has determined that the licensee has recently taken appropriate steps to more fully integrate QA activities into overall Nuclear Department activities. This issue is

considered resolved for restart. The implementation of this QA integration program will continue to be monitored over the long term in the Region I continuing inspection program, including the review of the ongoing diagnostic evaluation being conducted by an independent consultant (refer to C.9).

8. Post-Maintenance Operability Testing

Past practice at Salem for post maintenance operability testing has varied. Such testing may be specified by the preparer of the maintenance work order or left to the discretion of maintenance personnel. For safety-related equipment, post-maintenance surveillance testing is done before returning the equipment to service. Additional functional post-maintenance and repair testing of equipment, such as surveillance testing, may need to be performed to demonstrate operability as an integral part of the larger component or system in which it must function. To resolve this issue, the NRC required the licensee as a long term action to review and revise procedures and practices as necessary to ensure that functional testing of the overall components or system is performed to demonstrate operability prior to returning the equipment to service following maintenance and repair. Additionally, NRC required that as a long term action, procedures be revised, as necessary, to assure that operations department personnel review the testing prior to returning such equipment to service.

Although no short term action was required for this issue, the licensee has responded in his March 14, and April 7, 1983 letters indicating that Operations, Maintenance and Technical Department (I&C) procedures have been revised to increase emphasis on quality assurance and interdepartmental communications in performing post maintenance operability testing. Operations Directive OD-10, "Removal and Return of Safety Related Equipment to an Operable Status", has been revised to require conduct of Technical Specification required surveillance testing, inservice testing or system functional testing as appropriate prior to declaring major safety related equipment operable.

The Maintenance Department has formalized a Maintenance Department Testing manual to enhance determination of test and retest requirements prior to issuance of a work order. The manual provides cross reference listings of safety related and other Q list systems and components with applicable maintenance and surveillance procedures which specify test and retest requirements. Procedure A-21 has been written to require maintenance supervisors to consult this manual for test and retest requirements prior to work order issuance. The testing manual appears to be comprehensive with respect to safety related valves and other major mechanical equipment and the licensee has indicated that an electrical equipment section will be incorporated as a long term action.

In the Technical Department, Instrument and Controls Procedure PD 14.1.001, which is a general equipment troubleshooting and repair procedure, has been revised to ensure completion and documentation of test and retest requirements on safety related instrumentation.

NRC staff review of these procedures reveals some discrepancies which the licensee has agreed to evaluate and correct, as necessary. The licensee will also revise AP-9, "Control of Station Maintenance" to ensure standardization

of post maintenance operability testing throughout the station. Licensee has committed to complete all procedural revisions associated with this issue by July 1, 1983. These procedures appear to provide the necessary administrative controls to ensure proper verification of system operability following maintenance. An examination of a few work orders showed that retest requirements were explicitly specified.

The licensee has committed to conduct a review of vendor and engineering recommendations and current testing procedures. The licensee has indicated that this review will involve a comprehensive review of maintenance and testing procedures to ensure testing required by these procedures is in accordance with vendor and engineering recommendations. Based on this review, changes will be incorporated into departmental documents by January 1, 1984.

Conclusion: Based on the staff's review, the licensee's short term effort of strengthening administrative controls over post maintenance operability testing, combined with the longer term program of updating the testing manual and conducting a comprehensive maintenance and testing procedure review, constitute acceptable actions in response to this issue. Hence, this issue is considered resolved for restart. The staff will formalize the requirements for completion of licensee's long term program. On a periodic basis, the NRC staff will inspect the implementation of licensee's post maintenance operability testing to ensure component and system operability after maintenance is verified.

C.9 Overall Management Capability and Performance

The initial deficiencies identified during the review of circumstances surrounding these events raised questions about the responsiveness, practices and capability of licensee management at the corporate and station level. As noted in the preceding section (C.1 through C.8), a number of specific management issues directly related to the failure of the reactor trip breaker event were identified and have been evaluated. Although each of the specific problems is understood and has been resolved, it is necessary to consider the overall management capability and performance in a broader context. The staff has re-examined the performance of PSE&G over the last few years from a regulatory perspective.

On the one hand, there are several good aspects of the licensee's efforts that are beneficial and are indicative of a licensee that is striving to develop thoroughly satisfactory practices. Some examples include: a computerized tagging program, independent verification program for system lineups, miniaturized control room design, and a computer scheduling system for surveillance testing and maintenance. Our examination generally concludes that the licensee has devoted resources and developed noteworthy programs to support operation of the Salem facility.

Historically, however, PSE&G management has not displayed the expected aggressive effort to self evaluate and redirect efforts to correct internally identified problems. However, the licensee has responded to the specific evaluations conducted by external organizations such as INPO, NRC and consultants.

The 1981 INPO evaluation identified opportunities for improvement in numerous areas including staffing, personnel safety practices, adherence to procedures, control of documents and design changes, availability of technical support, operating practices with respect to inoperable alarms and tagouts, shift turnover procedures, and goals and objectives. Based on continuing observation, the licensee responded positively to selected findings by various actions, although the effectiveness of these actions has been less than expected.

Four SALP assessments were conducted by the NRC during the period October 1980-October 1982. The earlier assessments identified weaknesses in the areas of: design change documentation, engineering support responsiveness, health physics, physical security and overall management followup in numerous areas. The later SALP assessments acknowledge licensee management attention to, and improvements in the areas of design change tracking and documentation and health physics. Physical security, despite several initiatives on the part of the licensee to improve the area, continued to be weak. Very recently, the licensee has dedicated considerable resources to physical security which, if properly implemented, should facilitate a number of hardware improvements and add several managers to the organization to more effectively monitor security activities on a day-to-day basis.

The most visible licensee initiatives are organizational. During the licensing process for Salem Unit 2 in 1981, the licensee made a decision to place all activities, including engineering under a single vice president. Commitments were made to relocate these activities from the corporate offices in Newark, New Jersey to the site located in southern New Jersey. While the licensee was hopeful that such relocation of the engineering staff, including QA personnel, to the site would prove more effective, the process has moved much more slowly than hoped and has resulted in the loss of certain personnel. In January 1983, the QA department was placed in the Nuclear Department, and began moving to the site. The organizational and location changes have been in transition for almost 18 months.

The maintenance, operations and technical departments are led by experienced middle managers. Operational management controls have been progressively strengthened over the past few years and have addressed problems as they are identified. Similarly, maintenance department controls have improved and new initiatives have been instituted for the conduct and planning of maintenance which recently has resulted in more comprehensive review of proposed maintenance activities. In addition, the licensee has reduced the bargaining unit employee to supervisor ratio to 10 to 1 in order to improve direct supervision of work in progress.

However, the support groups, in particular maintenance and engineering, tend to be too isolated from one another and, therefore, their collective efforts are not well integrated in overall station operation. In the staff's view this has resulted in a degree of parochialism. Consequently, the staff's perception is that poor communications among the various departments has hindered the development of a sensitivity within the station staff to identify and resolve problems that are outside their direct sphere of influence.

Over the past two years during which Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) has operated two nuclear plants at the Salem Generating Station, it has developed improved programs and procedures that are consistent with industry standards. This observation is based on an overall review of NRC inspection reports and taking cognizance of INPO evaluations. Notwithstanding such progress, the staff has noted in its SALP reviews that the licensee needs to devote more effort to take steps to make such programs work. A problem which had previously been addressed with the licensee during enforcement conferences and SALP results meetings and has been noted during this evaluation, is one of high level station management and first line station supervision failing to adequately assess the performance of their subordinates, especially with respect to adherence to procedures. Historically, improper performance or violation of station procedures did not result in any adverse actions to the involved individuals. Generally, it has been observed that poor performance was mildly criticized, then rationalized. Also, first line supervisors appear to refrain from raising issues outside of their defined scope of responsibility and their effectiveness is seldom monitored. As a result, department managers may not be cognizant of problems requiring their attention. The licensee has now initiated a training program for first-line supervisors which will include supervisory skills, procedures, programs, quality assurance and systems training. The program will include a discussion of corrective discipline actions available. The training program will be completed for new

supervisors prior to assignment and will be provided to all existing supervisors. The program is expected to start in September 1983. A similar training program for senior supervisors is to be developed by October 1983.

When balancing the various aspects with the issues identified herein, it is clear that some problems remain. One of the purposes of the staff examination was to ascertain whether there were major flaws in the licensee's approach.

During the fact-finding team review during the first week of March 1983 and concurrent analysis of the breaker failure events, licensee treatment of the reactor trip breakers and the circumstances surrounding their failure on February 22 and 25, provided the NRC staff with several indicators suggesting a major breakdown in management and quality assurance program implementation at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station. Subsequent detailed reviews and evaluations by the licensee and the NRC staff have confirmed that the programs in place are basically sound. Two aspects of these programs surfaced as the principal causes of the events discussed in this safety evaluation. The first of these was a perceived lack of resolve on the part of managers and supervisors in enforcing adherence to procedures by station personnel. The second aspect relates to the safety perspective displayed by corporate management in providing policy direction and priorities to the operating staff and the three existing review committees.

It is clear that the numerous initiatives undertaken by PSE&G during the last few years have not yet been fully implemented. In order to assist PSE&G in making the transition successful and to further analyze their difficulties, an independent consultant firm, Management Analysis Company (MAC) has been retained to perform a diagnostic evaluation of both the Quality Assurance Program and the licensee's overall nuclear management program.

The MAC approach relies on interviews and team evaluations to identify causes of management problems. Its process has been observed at other facilities and has been found to be useful. Rather than presume an understanding of the nature of a problem, the MAC diagnostic examines the many aspects of a utility, including the following: organization, management controls, staffing levels and capabilities, training and retraining, intra and inter-departmental communication, commitment controls, station generation, engineering configuration management, Q-list, nuclear operations support and organizational freedom in problem identification and resolution. Based on such reviews, the MAC evaluation focuses on underlying problem areas and recommendations are provided for resolving them. PSE&G has committed to develop an action plan which addresses these recommendations. NRC staff will monitor the MAC and PSE&G effort. Meetings will be held with MAC and PSE&G to review the results of the evaluation, the development of an action plan and subsequent meetings with PSE&G will be held on a periodic basis to monitor implementation of the action plan. The MAC assessment is expected to be completed by May 2, 1983.

In the interim, PSE&G has also retained the services of experienced and qualified individuals from the BETA Company to examine the steps taken to date in preparation for restart of Salem Unit 1. This independent evaluation should provide an additional level of assurance to PSE&G as to the adequacy and completeness of the steps taken to resolve the problems associated with the two ATWS events. The staff will review the results of this overview, along with resolution of any other identified issues, prior to allowing restart.

The licensee has also committed to establish on a one year trial basis an independent Nuclear Oversight Committee comprised of 3 to 5 members, including nuclear utility operations executives, college professors and former regulators. This committee will meet at least quarterly and will provide reports to the Vice President Nuclear evaluating overall management attention to nuclear safety and reporting on progress in resolving open issues relating to NRC commitments and independent evaluations. Consequently, the initiatives taken by the licensee will be monitored by an independent group to assure the safety-related problems are identified to the corporate managers. The NRC will also review the quarterly reports of the Nuclear Oversight Committee.

Conclusion: The management initiatives and improvements described should considerably strengthen existing programs, should add a number of additional reviews of corporate and station management effectiveness, and will provide for independent assessments of management. No evidence suggests that the organizational structure or programs currently defined contributed to the problems identified in this evaluation. The source of the problems appears to be a lack of aggressive implementation of those programs. The collective steps described above are expected to result in an increased awareness on the part of managers and supervisors as to the status of implementation of the many programs and allow more timely involvement to either provide redirection, priority or resources to resolve problems. Accordingly, management programs in place, as modified by the steps described above, are acceptable to support continued operation of both Salem units.

III. Overall Conclusions

Section A of this Safety Evaluation Report discussed and evaluated the NRC staff concerns in the areas of maintenance procedures, verification testing, and surveillance testing programs. The licensee has acceptably revised his maintenance procedures, revised and expanded his surveillance testing programs, provided an adequate verification testing program, and will submit proposed Technical Specification changes for incorporating NRC notification requirements for maintenance testing results that exceed acceptance criteria and for measured trip forces that exceed recommended upper limit. The licensee will also submit proposed Technical Specifications that incorporate the additional surveillance requirements identified by the staff, for the reactor trip and bypass breakers.

Section B addressed staff concerns in the areas of plant operations, operator procedures, training, and operator response, the licensee has acceptably identified reliable control room indicators that provide positive indication of automatic reactor trip demand, without operator analysis or verification, and has revised procedures to direct the operators to insert a manual trip whenever positive indication of an automatic reactor trip demand is present, without delay to evaluate the plant status. The licensee has also acceptably completed training actions and commitments in the areas of training on procedures, training utilizing the Reactor Protection System, and the administration of this training. As such, the licensee's ATWS training program for licensed operators and for auxiliary operators is now acceptable.

Section C addressed staff concerns in various management areas. These management areas were Master Equipment List, procurement procedures, work order procedures post trip review, timeliness of event notification, updating vendor supplied information, involvement of QA personnel with other station departments, post maintenance operability testing, and overall management capability and performance. The licensee has acceptably revised his procedures and conducted acceptable training to ensure that work orders and procurement documents will be properly classified in the future. The licensee has conducted an acceptable review of past procurement documents and work orders to verify that the misclassification problem associated with the reactor trip breakers was an isolated incident. Additionally, the licensee has developed an acceptable post trip review procedure to ensure a systematic and comprehensive review of reactor trips is conducted prior to returning to operation. Finally, the licensee has instituted an acceptable program involving both outside consultants and additional corporate safety committees to further evaluate and upgrade the effectiveness and safety of the licensee's nuclear activities.

The above actions provide reasonable assurance regarding maintenance and surveillance, plant operations and operator actions, and new programs in various areas of the utilities management, for restart of the facility.

APPENDIX A
Description of Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker

The Reactor Trip System at the Salem plant consists of plant process instrumentation (sensors, transmitters, and bistables) that monitors various plant parameters. Typically, there are four redundant instrument channels per parameter. The outputs of these instrument channels are used as inputs to each of two redundant trains of logic circuitry (Solid State Protection System - SSPS, trains "A" and "B"). The output of each SSPS train maintains two undervoltage coils in an energized condition, one for its associated reactor trip breaker and one for the bypass breaker in parallel with the other reactor trip breaker. When the logic of one SSPS train is satisfied, this typically requires that two out of the four instrument channels for a given parameter be in the tripped state (i.e., the parameter has exceeded its setpoint), power is automatically interrupted to the two undervoltage coils associated with that train. This automatically opens the two associated breakers. The bypass breakers are normally open (racked-out) and are only closed during testing. When either of the two series reactor trip breakers opens, power provided from the motor-generator (MG) sets to the control rod drive latching mechanisms is interrupted, causing all control rods to fall, by gravity, into the core.

Manual reactor trip capability is provided by two switches on the main control board in the control room. Each switch, when actuated, will interrupt power to all undervoltage coils (for both reactor trip breakers and their associated bypass breakers), and simultaneously energize all shunt trip devices for these breakers. Thus, diverse means (undervoltage trip devices and shunt trip devices) are used to open the reactor trip breakers on a manual reactor trip signal whereas only the undervoltage trip coils are actuated on an automatic reactor trip signal from the SSPS.

Circuit breakers (such as the types used in Reactor Trip Systems) are closed against a strong spring force and "latched" in the closed position. Opening (or tripping) is accomplished by releasing the latch mechanism and allowing the springs to rapidly force the breaker contacts apart, thereby interrupting the current through the contacts. The latch can be released by either a mechanical linkage or by one or more electro-mechanical devices. The electro-mechanical trip device is actuated electrically. The Reactor Trip Systems open (or trip) the circuit breakers used to supply power to the control rods through electro-mechanical circuit breaker trip devices.

Two particular types of electro-mechanical circuit breaker trip devices are of interest in relation to the Salem events. These are undervoltage trip devices and shunt trip devices.

A circuit breaker undervoltage trip device is energized during normal plant operations, when it is intended that the circuit breaker be closed or remain closed. De-energizing the undervoltage trip device results in the circuit breaker opening or tripping. The undervoltage trip device consists of an

electro-magnet which, when energized, attracts a metal rod, plunger, or lever against the force of a spring. The metal rod, plunger, or lever is connected through a mechanical linkage to the circuit breaker latch mechanism (trip bar). When the undervoltage trip device electro-magnet is de-energized, spring force releases the latch mechanism and the circuit breaker opens or trips.

A circuit breaker shunt trip device is de-energized during normal plant operations, when it is intended that the circuit breaker be closed or remain closed. Energizing the shunt trip device results in the circuit breaker opening or tripping. The shunt trip device consists of an electromagnet which, when energized, attracts a metal rod, plunger, or lever and through a mechanical linkage releases the circuit breaker latch mechanism. Releasing the latch mechanism results in opening or tripping of the circuit breaker.

The shunt trip devices are somewhat simpler mechanically and have more force margin for actuating circuit breaker trip than do undervoltage trip devices. This is the case because undervoltage trip devices are energized for lengthy periods of time and, therefore, heat dissipation considerations limit the design flexibility for obtaining high device forces. There is somewhat more flexibility in the design of the shunt trip devices since they are energized for only the short period of time required to release the circuit breaker latch mechanism. Heat dissipation considerations are less important in the design and operation of the shunt trip devices.

APPENDIX B

INTERIM TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT

EVALUATION OF FAILURE TO TRIP
OF REACTOR TRIP CIRCUIT BREAKERS
ON FEBRUARY 22 AND 25, 1983
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1

NRC DOCKET NO. 50-272

FRC PROJECT C5506

NRC TAC NO. 49795

FRC ASSIGNMENT "O"

NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81-130

Prepared by

Franklin Research Center
20th and Race Streets
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Author: G. J. Toman

FRC Group Leader: G. J. Toman

Prepared for


Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Lead NRC Engineer: P. Shemanski

April 7, 1983

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
Prepared by:



Principal Author

Date: 4/7/83


Reviewed by:



Project Manager

Date: 4/7/83

Approved by:



Department Director (Acting)

Date: 4/7/83



Franklin Research Center

A Division of The Franklin Institute

The Benjamin Franklin Parkway, Phila., Pa. 19103 (215) 448-1000

FOREWORD

This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical assistance in support of NRC operating reactor licensing actions. The technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by the NRC.

INTRODUCTION

This Interim Technical Evaluation Report contains a compendium of the reports issued by Franklin Research Center (FRC), to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and updates to April 6, 1983, FRC's findings concerning the failure of the Salem Unit 1 Westinghouse DB-50 reactor trip circuit breakers on February 22 and 25, 1983. The evaluation centered upon the undervoltage trip attachments of the circuit breakers which were supposed to trip the circuit breakers when deenergized. This is a report on work in progress; thus, the conclusions contained herein may change as new information from the proposed Licensee verification testing becomes available and subsequent evaluation is completed. Table 1 lists the reports and letters transmitted to Mr. V. Noonan, Chief, NRC Equipment Qualification Branch, prior to April 6, 1983.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVALUATION

Mr. G. Toman of FRC accompanied Messrs. V. Noonan and P. Shemanski of NRC Equipment Qualification Branch and Mr. J. Beard of NRC Operating Reactors Assessment Branch to Salem Nuclear Generating Station (Salem NGS) on March 3, 1983. The purpose of the trip was to gather information concerning the Salem Unit 1 events of February 22 and 25, 1983. The information obtained is contained in Appendix A. Appendix A also contains a discussion of initial findings concerning the undervoltage trip attachment (UVTA) that did not operate properly. Failure of the UVTA to operate prevented the reactor trip circuit breakers (RTCB) from opening automatically. Figure 1 contains photographs of the "as-received" state of the Unit 2 "B" UVTA supplied to FRC by Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) on March 3, 1983.

On page 3 of Appendix A, the second paragraph states that Chemical Rubber Company CRC-2-26 lubricant was used on the UVTAs associated with Unit 1. On March 18, 1983, during a meeting with the NRC, Westinghouse personnel stated that the Westinghouse technician's report states that only one RTCB was worked upon at the Salem plant on January 13, 1983 and that the lubricant used was Calfonex 78A. FRC has been unable to find a supplier for this lubricant.

Appendix B contains the review of Revision 1 of Salem NGS Maintenance Procedure MBQ-2. Since the review, Revision 2 has been issued. Revision 2 requires ten successful trippings of the RTCB by a new UVTA prior to returning the circuit breaker to use when the UVTA is replaced. The procedure is titled "Reactor Trip and Bypass ACB Semi-Annual Inspection and Testing"; the title now states the periodicity of testing. Cautions concerning handling of the UVTA and further tests of the RTCB and UVTA were added in Revision 2.

Appendix C describes the "as-received" electrical testing of the Unit 2 "B" UVTA. The device was found to operate at 26% of normal voltage rather than between 30 and 60% of normal voltage as stated in the manufacturer's literature. The evaluation of the device during these initial tests indicated that the device should be compared to the other UVTAs available at the Salem plant to determine visible variations from device to device.

On March 10, 1983, Messrs. G. Toman and R. Cranisky of FRC went to Salem NGS for the purpose of comparing the Unit 2 "B" UVTA to the remaining Unit 1 UVTAs. Upon arrival at the Salem plant, it was found that only one UVTA was available. Comparison showed variations in manufacture and reset lever adjustment spring setting between the two devices. Messrs. Toman and Cranisky also observed operation of a Unit 2 RTCB with the 2 "B" UVTA. When the UVTA was attached to the circuit breaker, power was not applied to the UVTA. Therefore, when the RTCB was closed, the UVTA reset lever was held back manually to prevent a trip-free opening of the circuit breaker. The UVTA reset lever was then released. The UVTA latch released and the trip lever moved up to the trip bar, but the RTCB did not trip. A second attempt also resulted in no trip. Two more attempts at manual operation of the UVTA did trip the RTCB as did subsequent electrical operations.

Appendix D contains the letters of transmittal for microscopic photographs of the latch, latch pin, and latch spring from the Unit 2 "B" UVTA showing roughness and wear on the mating surfaces.

Appendix E contains the FRC findings from the beginning of the evaluation up to March 21, 1983. It discusses two possible failure modes for the UVTA and findings from a March 17, 1983 trip to Salem.

Appendix F is a trip report from a March 31, 1983 visit to Salem to evaluate testing performed by PSE&G on the Unit 1 RTCBs.

FINDINGS

The following is a summary of the significant findings of the evaluation to date:

1. Manufacturing variations existed on the original UVTAs supplied to the Salem plant.
2. Manufacturing variations exist on the four new UVTAs supplied to Salem Unit 1.
3. No lubrication of the UVTAs appeared to have been performed from the time of manufacture (approximately 1972) until January 1983 when a lubricant other than that recommended by the manufacturer was used.
4. The Unit 2 "B" UVTA had its reset lever arm spring adjustment changed some time after installation, possibly to remedy inadvertent openings of the circuit breaker during operation or while attempting to close the circuit breaker prior to operation.
5. Improper adjustment of the UVTA reset lever arm can increase the probability of an inadvertent opening of the circuit breaker (trip free) if the arm is set to overtravel too far.
6. Loosening of the reset lever arm spring reduces the tendency to trip free, but also reduces the force that would cause the UVTA to unlatch when deenergized.
7. Variations in reactor trip bar forces exist among the Salem Unit 1 RTCBs.
8. The mating surfaces of the Unit 2 "B" latch components are rough and appear not to have been honed. Additional wear from operation appears to be significant.
9. Hesitation in lever arm motion when the UVTA is slowly deenergized was noted in the Unit 2 "B" UVTA and the device operated below the expected 30% of nominal voltage point.
10. On March 18, 1983, Westinghouse Switchgear Division personnel also indicated that the UVTA must be replaced some time during the life of the plant. Criteria for determining when to replace the UVTA do not appear to be available.

CONCLUSIONS

It is believed that in the as-manufactured "new" condition, the 1983 UVTA will properly trip a circuit breaker that has a trip bar force requirement within the manufacturing limit of 31 ounces, and would probably consistently trip a circuit breaker with an as-found trip bar force requirement of up to 38 ounces (the force required to trip the Unit 1 "A" RTCB). However, sufficient evidence has not been presented to show that current manufacturing processes for the UVTA, when coupled with maintenance, will eliminate long-term failures that appear to be mechanical, age-related phenomena. The variations from device to device cause concern. The fact that honing of latch surfaces is a hand operation indicates that variations in the surfaces of the latch will remain even though no extreme roughness should be expected.

In addition, the lack of quantitative acceptance criteria for the UVTA adds concern that impending failures might be missed during inspection and maintenance.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Acceptance criteria be set for parameters affecting correct operation of the UVTA.
2. Testing methodology for acceptance tests be prepared for factory and Licensee use.
3. Uniformity of construction be instituted or sufficient testing be performed showing that the variations in the devices are of no consequence to reliable operation.
4. Life testing of the UVTA be performed to show that the device can successfully operate for the intended lifetime with proper maintenance.
5. Criteria be developed to determine a replacement interval for the UVTA such that replacement occurs significantly before end-of-life failure.

6. The baseline testing of UVTA output forces and RTCB trip bar trip forces is a first step in proving the adequacy of the UVTAs for continued use. These test results should be compared with results taken periodically during the life of the UVTAs. In order to allow preventative action to be taken, trending of the variations in the results should be performed to determine if degradation in UVTA and RTCB performance is occurring.


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Table 1. Chronological List of Reports and Correspondence from FRC to the NRC Concerning Failures of Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers at Salem Unit 1 on February 23 and 25, 1983


Appendix

Date/Subject


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|---|---|
| A | March 4, 1983
Initial Report on the Salem Unit 2 Undervoltage Trip Unit |
| B | March 9, 1983
Reviews of Proposed Corrective Action by PSE&G and of Maintenance Procedure MSQ-2 |
| C | March 9, 1983
Report of Initial Testing of the Salem Unit 2 "B" Undervoltage Trip Attachment |
| D | March 21, 1983
Photographs of the Salem Unit 2 "B" Undervoltage Trip Attachment (Transmittal letter and description of views only) |
| E | March 22, 1983
Salem Events of February 22 and 25, 1983; Failures of Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers; Final Report of Initial Investigation |
| F | March 31, 1983
Trip Report: Salem Unit 1 Reactor Circuit Breakers (Transmitted to the NRC for the first time as part of this Interim Report) |



A. Undervoltage Trip Attachment
Top View



B. Undervoltage Trip Attachment
on Circuit Breaker



C. Undervoltage Trip Attachment
Side View



D. Undervoltage Trip Attachment
Side View

Figure 1. Unit 2 "B" Undervoltage Trip Attachment
(A, C, and D are photographs of the as-received condition.)

INITIAL REPORT ON
THE SALEM UNIT 2 UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP UNIT

APPENDIX A



Franklin Research Center
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The Benjamin Franklin Parkway, Phila., Pa. 19103 (215) 448-1000



Franklin Research Center
A Division of The Franklin Institute

March 4, 1983

Mr. Vincent Noonan
Chief, Equipment Qualification Branch
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Phillips Building, MS-P-234/RM P-234D
7920 Norfolk Avenue
Bethesda, MD 20014

Dear Mr. Noonan:

Attached is the initial report on the Salem Unit 2 under-voltage trip unit. I have detailed some possible causes and indicated the initial tests and evaluations to be performed.

Also attached is a request for additional equipment from PSE&G to be used in the investigation.

Should there be any questions, please call me at 215/448-1257. I intend to begin the tests on Monday, March 7, 1983.

Very truly yours,

Gary J. Toman
Section Leader,
Qualification Analysis
and Planning Section,
Nuclear Engineering Dept.

GJT/ih

Encl.

SUMMARY AND INITIAL FINDINGS

Initial inspection of the Unit 2, B under-voltage trip unit indicates a possibility of multiple contributing causes of failure. Possible contributors are (1) lack of lubrication; (2) wear; (3) more frequent operation than intended by design; (4) corrosion from improper lubrication in January, 1983; and (5) nicking of latch surfaces caused by vibration from repeated operation of the breaker. The contributors appear to be cumulative with no one main cause. The initial investigation does indicate that the failure is age related and that a new device would perform properly. Many surfaces of the latch mechanism are worn and the additional friction tends to prevent proper operation. Proper lubrication throughout the life of the device may have prevented the wear that can be seen on the sample.

The tests and examinations FRC proposes to perform will attempt to determine the cause of failure and if possible reproduce it. The following summarizes the initial findings and lists the proposed tests.

DISCUSSION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

1. Initial thoughts from information received prior to March 3, 1983 visit to Salem generating station.

From information received by phone and by telecopier, my initial belief prior to visiting the site was that the under-voltage trip device did not operate because it had not been exercised very frequently, my belief being that dust or dirt accumulation on the device in two months time prevented its operation.

2. Initial evaluation of information received at Salem site on March 3.

When I arrived at the Salem site, I met with Vince Noonan, Paul Shemanski, and J. T. Beard, all of the NRC. We were given a walk-around inspection of the plant by an operator named Ray McCarthy. We inspected the Unit 2 Reactor Trip circuit breaker area and visually examined the circuit breakers which were laying on the floor near their cubicles. The under-voltage trip devices were removed from each of these circuit breakers. The shunt trip coils were in place. The circuit breaker trip bar moved freely. We then went to the Unit 1 Reactor Trip circuit breaker area. These breakers had been removed and brought to the electrical maintenance area. It was noted that an inverter which was approximately 4 ft from the circuit

breaker compartment was blowing hot air into the room, and into the circuit breaker compartments, and that the general area temperature was well above 80°. We then were taken to the electrical maintenance area, where we interviewed Mr. Ketchum, an electrical maintenance supervisor, who discussed the circumstances of the removal of the circuit breakers that were involved with the incident on Unit 1. We were also introduced to Mr. Leo Roland, another electrical supervisor, who had also worked on the circuit breakers in question in August of 1982. The information received was that the circuit breakers and their under-voltage trip device had been operated frequently and had operated within a few days prior to the incident. This dispelled my initial concern that the devices had not been exercised often enough.

I requested that Salem management provide one of the under-voltage trip devices, and a shunt trip coil, for testing at Franklin Research Center. They did so. It appears that new under-voltage trip coils are not readily available. This will be investigated at a later date.

RESULTS OF INITIAL EXAMINATION; SOME POSSIBLE CAUSES

Since receipt of the under-voltage device, which is the Unit 2 B trip under-voltage device, I have noted roughness in the operation of the trip latch. There is some dragging of the mechanism, and portions of the latch mechanism have obvious signs of wear. Possible contributing factors to the failure to operate are a lack of lubrication, wear, jarring of the under-voltage device from the circuit breaker operation and more frequent operation of the under-voltage trip device than was intended during design. My belief is that under most industrial applications, the under-voltage device would be used very infrequently, and probably would only be operated during test sequences at perhaps yearly or longer intervals. Therefore in industrial applications, the device would operate only a few times, perhaps 20 or 30 during its lifetime, and would not be a normal tripping mechanism for the breaker. However, in its use at Salem, it is the prime tripping device for the circuit breaker, and as such is called upon to operate on the order of 50 times per year. That would mean, at its current age, in 1983 there would be possibly 400 to 500 trip operations on this device.

During the investigation, it was noted that the shunt trip coil has been operated since August, 1982 once every 7 days rather than at longer intervals. This means that the circuit breaker is now tripped and closed

every 7 days, causing the jarring of the entire mechanism of the circuit breaker and its attached relays and coils due to the normal operation of the breaker. This may or may not be significant in that the under-voltage relay would stay energized during these trippings and its latch mechanism would be jarred somewhat by operation of the breaker. This could possibly add to the friction which is building up in the latch mechanism from normal operation by causing the latch mechanism to just slightly nick the surface that it rides on thereby tending to prevent operation. Further investigation will try to determine whether this is indeed a contributor to the mis-operation. It would appear from initial inspection of the device that wear and roughness of mating surfaces in the trip latch are contributing causes. Proper lubrication may have prevented the current situation or could reduce this roughness to the point where proper operation could occur.

FRC will attempt to determine whether the CRC-2-26 lubricating, cleaner spray added to the problem by either causing corrosion or removing all residual lubrication from initial construction. It appears that from the time of initial construction of the under-voltage trip units, up until January of 1983, no lubrication whatsoever had been performed, and then in January of 1983, lubrication was performed by the maintenance personnel in conjunction with a Westinghouse technician. At this time, CRC-2-26 lubricant cleaner was sprayed on all four trip devices associated with Unit 1. This lubricant is being procured by FRC for testing purposes.

LISTING OF EXPECTED INVESTIGATION

1. The first test will be to perform various de-energizations and energizations of the under-voltage trip unit and monitor the device under various conditions.
2. The second test will be to disassemble the latch mechanism to observe the surfaces of the various parts of the latch, and photograph these surfaces through a microscope to determine various levels of wear in these surfaces.
3. The third test is to determine the effects of CRC-2-26 spray on the various types of metals used in this device. An attempt will be made to use metals other than those in the actual device. If possible, we will determine the chemical consistency of this spray, hopefully through the manufacturer.
4. The fourth test is only possible if the spare circuit breaker can be obtained from Salem. The under-voltage trip device and the shunt coil

would be mounted upon the breaker, and the breaker would be operated repeatedly to determine the effect upon the under-voltage trip unit. It is surmised that while the device is energized and the breaker trips and closes a number of times, additional friction of the trip latch may occur from the vibration. This test would primarily determine whether such additional friction occurs from operation.

To prove that the sample under-voltage trip unit is identical to the Unit 1 devices, a visual inspection of all existing Salem Unit 1 and 2 under-voltage trip units should be performed. This can take place at Salem. No disassembly is needed. The devices can be mounted on the CB's or loose. This should be done as soon as possible. Tuesday March 8, 1983 is recommended.

Further tests will be determined upon the basis of these initial tests. All tests will be non-destructive tests such that the device will be able to be used for further testing and possible return to the utility.

ADDITIONAL REQUESTS FOR SALEM GENERATING STATION MANAGEMENT

1. For use in investigation of the incident, FRC requests that the spare DB-50 circuit breaker be made available for use at FRC for a period of 2 weeks. Delivery is requested as soon as practical. Hopefully no later than March 9, 1983.
2. FRC would like to visually inspect all of the remaining undervoltage trip devices from Salem 1 and 2, including those at the NRC Headquarters. It would be beneficial to have these all in one place to speed the review. There would be no disassembly and the devices could be on the circuit breakers for this inspection. It is hoped that this could be done on Tuesday March 8, 1983.

REVIEWS OF PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BY PSE&G
AND OF MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE M3Q-2

APPENDIX B



Franklin Research Center

A Division of The Franklin Institute

The Benjamin Franklin Parkway, Phila., Pa. 19103 (215) 448-1000



Franklin Research Center
A Division of The Franklin Institute

March 9, 1983

Mr. Vincent Noonan
Chief, Equipment Qualification Branch
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Phillips Building, MS-P-234/RM P-234D
7920 Norfolk Avenue
Bethesda, MD 20014

Dear Mr. Noonan:

Attached are the reviews of the proposed corrective action by Public Service Electric & Gas Co. of New Jersey as detailed in the letter from Mr. Richard A. Underlitz to Mr. D. G. Eisenhower dated March 1, 1983, and of Maintenance Procedure M3Q-2. These documents were previously transmitted to you on March 9, 1983, at approximately 11:00 am, by telecopy.

Very truly yours,

Gary J. Toman
Section Leader,
Qualification Analysis
and Planning Section,
Nuclear Engineering Dept.

GJT/ih

Encl.

cc: M. Carrington
P. Shemanski

REVIEW OF LETTER FROM MR. RICHARD A. UNDERLITZ,
VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR, PSE&G CO.
TO MR. D. G. EISENHUT, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF LICENSING, NRC,
DATED MARCH 1, 1983.

Subject: Reactor Trip Breaker Failure,
No. 1 Unit, Salem Generating Station,
Docket No. 50-272.

The following are results of the review of the referenced letter. This review is restricted to statements concerning the "shunt trip" and "undervoltage trip" attachments of the Reactor Trip Breakers.

Page 1 of the letter states that the sole reason for the failure of the undervoltage trip attachment is lack of proper lubrication. FRC continues to evaluate this possibility and makes no final determination at this time. FRC is also evaluating other possible related conditions such as, improper application of the device, dust and debris in the moving coil section of the device, binding of the latch pin, and residual magnetism in the core. FRC's findings will be forwarded to the NRC on or before April 1, 1983.

FRC has no comments on Page 2 of the letter.

On Page 3, in Item 2, a new maintenance procedure M3Q-2 is described. However, no periodicity for maintenance and no other method of invoking this procedure are stated. (Note: the M3Q-2 procedure also does not contain this information.) Since lack of maintenance is indicated by PSE&G Co. and Westinghouse as the probable cause, the periodicity for maintenance must be addressed.

On Page 4, Item 7 describes new testing of the Reactor Trip Breaker. One test requires timing of the circuit breaker operation when tripped by the undervoltage trip attachment. FRC recommends that this test be performed 3 times and that the average time be compared to previous tests (as test data accumulates). This would provide a means of determining variations in the trip attachment and circuit breaker response. Increasing time lag would be indicative of an impending problem.

On Page 4, Item 10, FRC agrees that moving the undervoltage trip attachments from one circuit breaker to another is inadvisable and agrees with the Licensee's proposed action.

On Page 5, the Licensee does not define whether the shunt trip is safety related or not. Since this device proved to be highly important when the undervoltage trip attachment did not work, it would seem very important to consider the shunt trip as safety-related. In addition, the shunt trip is in series with the circuit breaker auxiliary switch thereby requiring the auxiliary switch to be safety related.

Prepared by G. J. Toman 3/8/83.

REVIEW OF PSE&G CO. PROCEDURE MQ3-2,
TITLE: REACTOR TRIP AND BYPASS ACB
INSPECTION AND TEST. REV. 1. 3/4/83.

The copy of this procedure received by FRC contained an additional one page document labelled "Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Reactor Switchgear, Operational Verification Program."

FRC has the following comment on the Operational Verification Program. Item 2 states that MQ3-2 requires 10, 40, then 50 trips of the circuit breaker depending upon the number of failures of the undervoltage trip attachment. MQ3-2 does not contain such a requirement. Allowing any failures during testing is wholly inappropriate for the undervoltage trip unit and maintenance procedure MQ3-2 should not be modified to allow the undervoltage trip attachment to fail, no matter how many successful operations follow.

Failure to operate once during a sequence of trippings of the attachment indicates severe problems in the mechanism and places the reliability of its function in doubt. Item 2 of the document also states that the 10, 40, then 50 trip test system is statistically sound for the application. This is incorrect for the application. As described, the test method would allow 2 failures in 100 tests. This would be a 0.02 probability of failure. There are two reactor trip circuit breakers in series. Assuming independence of failures (i.e., no common mode mechanism) the probability of simultaneous failure of the two circuit breakers would be 0.02×0.02 or 0.0004. This indicates that a failure of both reactor protection systems would occur once every 2500 trips. For Salem Unit 1, which is said to have 50 trips per year, a failure to trip would occur at least once per 50 years. The allowance of any failures to trip during testing is totally unacceptable.

Review of MQ3-2

1. No statement of the period between maintenances is made. No method of invoking this procedure is given.
2. Page 10 of 23, Item 9.7.2.2 indicates that lubrication could do some good, but does not indicate how to determine when to lubricate the undervoltage trip attachment. FRC has found that the Unit 2 trip attachment trip lever hesitates when depressed. It is suggested that maintenance personnel slowly depress and release the trip lever to determine if it binds during operation. If it does hesitate or bind, and lubrication does not remove this binding, replacement should be performed. Also, the procedure should indicate a required interval between lubrication. The Manufacturer's Technical Bulletin, NSD Data Letter 74-2, suggests starting with a 6 month interval between lubrication.

The second paragraph of Item 9.7.2.2 indicates the portions of the undervoltage trip attachment to be lubricated; however, no mention is made of the latch to latch spring (the copper alloy flat spring) surface, the bearing points of the latch spring pin, and the bearing points of the reset lever arm. All of these, especially the latch to latch spring surface, are friction sources that could prevent correct operation and should be considered for lubrication.

3. Section 9.8 discusses timing of the circuit breaker when tripped by the undervoltage trip attachment. FRC suggests that three timing tests be performed and the average time be compared to previous tests as successive tests are performed. This would allow degradation in performance to be determined.

Note: If the trip times are known to be consistently near the trip limit of 4 cycles, trending of the trip times would not be useful. However, if a new breaker starts with lower trip times such as 2 cycles, trending could be indicative of degradation.

4. Enclosure 1 of M3Q-2 was taken from the Westinghouse Low Voltage Metal Enclosed Switchgear Manual. This diagram incorrectly shows attachments such as the overcurrent trip device that are not used in the reactor trip circuit breakers and does not show the shunt trip or undervoltage trip attachments. FRC suggests that an applicable diagram be included in the procedure.
5. In accordance with 3 above, FRC suggests that Enclosure 7 be modified for three timings of the circuit breaker rather than one.

Prepared by G. J. Toman 3/8/83.

REPORT ON INITIAL TESTING OF THE SALEM UNIT 2
"B" UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP ATTACHMENT

APPENDIX C



Franklin Research Center

A Division of The Franklin Institute

The Benjamin Franklin Parkway, Phila., Pa. 19103 (215) 448-1000



Franklin Research Center
A Division of The Franklin Institute

March 9, 1983

Mr. Vincent Noonan
Chief, Equipment Qualification Branch
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Phillips Building, MS-P-234/RM P-234D
7920 Norfolk Avenue
Bethesda, MD 20014

Dear Mr. Noonan:

The attached document describes initial tests of the Salem 2 B Undervoltage Trip attachment. Please note the finding on Page 2, Item 3. The as-found condition of the device is very disturbing. When energized and de-energized the device does not operate within the specified voltage range and hesitation was noted in the latch to latch pin operation.

Very truly yours,

Gary J. Toman
Section Leader,
Qualification Analysis
and Planning Section,
Nuclear Engineering Dept.

GJT/ih

Encl.

cc: M. Carrington
P. Shemanski

REPORT OF INITIAL TESTING OF THE SALEM 2 "B"
UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP ATTACHMENT, 3/9/83

1. Described Operation

- a. The UnderVoltage (UV) Trip Attachment operates at 60 to 30% of normal voltage per the instruction manual.
- b. Normal voltage on this device is 48 Vdc.

Note: The manual is describing an undervoltage trip attachment with an ac coil designed to operate on line voltage. The device supplied for Salem has been modified by replacing the ac coil with a 48 Vdc coil.


2. As-Found Tripping Point

The Salem 2 "B" UV trip attachment consistently tripped at 12.6 ± 0.4 Volts dc when voltage was gradually reduced from 48 Vdc. This is 26% of normal operating voltage. It was noted that the reset arm moved partially towards unlatching a few volts before unlatching occurred indicating binding of the latch to latch pin.

3. The adjustment for spring tension for the reset lever spring was found on the Salem 2 "B" UV Trip attachment to be approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ turns below the surface of the locking nut. The adjustment was brought to the condition shown on Fig. 17 of the Westinghouse Manual, "Instructions for Types DB-50, DBF-16 and DEL-50 Air Circuit Breakers," which is approximately 6 turns beyond the surface of the locking nut. (See attached drawing.) The UV trip attachment then operated at 25.8 Vdc, which is 54% of normal voltage. When tension was reduced to the lowest limit (1 to $1\frac{1}{2}$ turns below the as-found condition) the device operated a 6.3 Vdc or 13% of voltage.

This indicates that the setting of the reset arm spring tension is critical to correct operation and that the as-found position of the adjustment is definitely below the desired level.

UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP ATTACHMENT



The moving core is normally held magnetically against the stationary core to hold the Micarta rod and consequently the reset lever, in the reset position. When the coil voltage is reduced sufficiently, the reset lever spring overcomes the magnetic attraction of the cores and rotates the reset lever clockwise. As the reset lever rotates, it carries with it the latch pin which rotates relative to the latch until the latch is released. When the latch releases, the trip spring rotates the trip lever counterclockwise to trip the breaker. The latch is reset by the cross bar moving the adjustable reset lever as the breaker opens.

PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE SALEM UNIT 2
"B" UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP ATTACHMENT

APPENDIX D



Franklin Research Center

A Division of The Franklin Institute

The Benjamin Franklin Parkway, Phila., Pa. 19103 (215) 448-1000



Franklin Research Center
A Division of The Franklin Institute

March 21, 1983

Mr. Vincent Noonan
Chief, Equipment Qualification Branch
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Phillips Building, MS-P-234/RM P-234D
7920 Norfolk Avenue
Bethesda, MD 20014

TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY

Dear Mr. Noonan:

Enclosed herewith are the photographs of the Salem Unit 2 "B" Undervoltage Trip Attachment showing the rough surfaces of the latch, latch pin, and latch spring. Also enclosed is a description of the pictures and a drawing of the undervoltage trip attachment with the photograph numbers indicated.

Very truly yours,

Gary J. Toman
Section Leader,
Qualification Analysis
and Planning Section,
Nuclear Engineering Dept.

GJT/ih

Encl.

cc: P. Shemanski)
M. Carrington) without attachments

SALEM UNIT 2 "B" UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP UNIT

Photographs of Latch, Latch Pin, Latch Spring, and Latch Retention Pin Surfaces

<u>Picture Number</u>	<u>Description of Picture</u>
1	Side view of latch showing roughness of latch area
2	Front view of latch showing latch notch area
3	Front view of latch with slight angle to right showing face and slight mushrooming of latch edge
4	Latch looking up into the latch surface showing irregularities and mushrooming of edge
5	Latch spring showing wear and abrasion from rubbing on latch surface (between arrow)
6	Inside of latch loop showing surface that rides on latch spring retention pin
7	Latch spring retention pin showing point of contact of latch inside loop edge (between arrows)
8	Latch pin showing surface and edge wear from latch
9	Top view of latch pin showing wear

Pictures taken March 18, 1983

Description prepared March 21, 1983

SALEM EVENTS OF FEBRUARY 22 AND 25, 1983;
FAILURES OF REACTOR TRIP CIRCUIT BREAKERS;
FINAL REPORT OF INITIAL INVESTIGATION


APPENDIX E



Franklin Research Center

A Division of The Franklin Institute

The Benjamin Franklin Parkway, Phila., Pa. 19103 (215) 448-1000



March 22, 1983

Mr. Vincent Noonan
Chief, Equipment Qualification Branch
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Phillips Building, MS-P-234/RM P-234D
7920 Norfolk Avenue
Bethesda, MD 20014

Subject: Salem Events of February 22 and 25, 1983; Failures of Reactor Trip
Circuit Breakers

Dear Mr. Noonan:

As you requested, enclosed is the final report of the Initial
Investigation of Failure of Salem Unit 1 Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers to Trip
on February 22 and 25, 1983.

Yours truly,



Gary J. Toman
Section Leader,
Qualification Analysis
and Planning Section,
Nuclear Engineering Dept.

GJT/jg
Enclosure

cc: P. Shemanski
M. Carrington

Initial Investigation of Failure of Salem Unit 1
Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers to Trip
on February 22 and 25, 1983

Prepared by Franklin Research Center
March 21, 1983

Evaluation

Investigation of the failure of the Salem Unit 1 reactor trip circuit breakers to open when the undervoltage trip attachments (UVT) were de-energized by the solid state protection system on February 22 and 25, 1983 included review of the operating, maintenance, and surveillance testing history for the DB-50 circuit breakers used at the Salem plant.

The initial investigation centered upon the UVT attachment; however, subsequent efforts included the interaction of the UVT attachment with the circuit breaker. The trip lever of the UVT attachment must lift the circuit breaker trip bar for opening of the circuit breaker to occur.

To date, two possible failure modes have been determined for the Salem Unit 1 UVT attachments. The first was observed by the Licensee and by NRC personnel the day of and the day after the February 25, 1983 event. This failure mode apparently occurs when latch-to-latch pin binding prevents unlatching of the UVT attachment, thereby preventing the trip lever from moving when the device is de-energized. Shortly after the February 25 event, all but one of the failed devices were lubricated and no further failures to operate could be repeated. The remaining failed UVT attachment was subsequently damaged and was not available for inspection.

The second possible failure mode was recognized from inspection of the UVT attachment provided to Franklin Research Center (FRC) by the Licensee. The latch spring on this device exerts enough force on the latch to reduce the output force from the trip lever as the friction increases between the latch spring and latch with age and lack of lubrication. This reduced force could be significant if the force required to lift the circuit breaker trip bar is higher than normally expected. On March 18, 1983, Westinghouse Switchgear Division representatives stated that the expected force required to lift the

circuit breaker trip bar at time of manufacture would have a maximum of 31 ounces and a normal range of 20 to 28 ounces. On March 17, 1983, FRC personnel measured 28- to 30-ounce lift force requirements on five of six Salem reactor trip circuit breakers made available for inspection by the Licensee. These were the four Unit 2 circuit breakers and the Unit 1 "B" bypass circuit breaker. The sixth circuit breaker, the present Unit 1 "A" trip, required 38 ounces of lifting force for operation, indicating that reduced output force from a UVT attachment coupled with a high trip bar lift requirement is a possible condition.

During the investigation, variations in construction were noted among the original UVT attachments supplied to the Salem plant. The device given to FRC had a tight latch spring. The remaining device that was made available to FRC for inspection had a much looser latch spring that exerted no force on the latch except during actual latching operations. No reset lever spring adjustment lock washer was found on the device provided to FRC, whereas the remaining Salem device had the lock washer. Discussions with NRC and Licensee personnel indicated that similar variations were noted in the other UVT attachments that were no longer available for inspection by FRC.

The latch surfaces of the original UVT attachments were found to be in the as-stamped state. Roughness was noted on the latch-to-latch pin face and on the latch-to-latch spring face. On the device provided to FRC, this roughness on the latch spring side of the latch had caused a groove that is also rough to be worn into the spring. Irregularities on the latch-to-latch pin surface of the latch were noted on the FRC device and the device tested by the Licensee. During testing of the FRC device, hesitation during unlatching was observed when voltage was gradually reduced to the coil of the device, further indicating friction in the latch-to-latch pin surface. Photographs of the latch, latch pin, and latch spring surfaces taken on March 18, 1983 show the irregular nature of the mating surfaces.

Subsequent to the manufacture of the Salem UVT attachments, Westinghouse changed the manufacturing procedure for the latch to include hand honing of the latch surfaces that mate with other components.

On March 17, 1983, FRC personnel examined the new UVT attachments supplied for Salem Unit 1. These devices were found to have the latch-to-latch spring surface honed. Other surfaces could not be examined because the devices were mounted on the circuit breakers. Variations in latch spring force were noted, and one UVT attachment had spring forces similar to the original device supplied to FRC for evaluation.

On March 18, 1983, Westinghouse Switchgear Division personnel indicated that quantitative acceptance criteria have not been set for the UVT attachments. No output force requirement has been set and no quantitative requirement for mechanical unlatching capability exists. In addition, no such requirements have been set for field testing UVT attachment operation and circuit breaker trip bar lifting force.

Conclusions

FRC believes that in the as-manufactured "new" condition, the 1983 UVT attachment will properly trip a circuit breaker that has a trip bar force requirement that is within the design limit of 31 ounces, and would probably consistently trip a circuit breaker with as-found trip bar force requirement of up to 38 ounces. However, sufficient evidence has not been presented to show that current manufacturing processes for the UVT attachment when coupled with maintenance will eliminate long-term failures that appear to be mechanical, age-related phenomena. The variations from device to device cause concern. The fact that honing is a hand operation indicates that variations in the surfaces of the latch will remain even though no extreme roughness should be expected.

In addition, the lack of quantitative acceptance criteria adds concern that impending failures might be missed during inspection and maintenance.

On March 18, 1983, Westinghouse Switchgear Division personnel also indicated that the UVT attachment must be replaced some time during the life of the plant. Criteria for determining when to replace the UVT attachment do not appear to be available.

FRC recommends the following actions:

1. Acceptance criteria be set for parameters affecting correct operation of the UVT attachment.
2. Testing methodology for acceptance tests be prepared for factory and Licensee use.
3. Uniformity of construction be instituted or sufficient testing be performed showing that the variations in the devices are of no consequence to reliable operation.
4. Testing of the UVT attachment be performed to show that the device can successfully operate for the intended lifetime with proper maintenance.
5. Criteria be developed to determine a replacement interval for the UVT attachment such that replacement occurs significantly before the possibility of failure.

Data and information provided to date indicate that the long-term reliability of the UVT attachment has not been proven to be adequate. The reliability of the UVT attachment appears to be significantly below that of the DB-50 circuit breaker to which it is mated.

Prepared by G. J. Toman

TRIP REPORT: SALEM UNIT 1 REACTOR CIRCUIT BREAKERS

APPENDIX F



Franklin Research Center

A Division of The Franklin Institute

The Benjamin Franklin Parkway, Phila. Pa. 19103 (215) 448-1000

Trip Report

To: Salem Nuclear Generating Station (NGS)

Date: March 31, 1983

Subject: Salem Unit 1 Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers

Purpose of Trip:

At 10 am on March 31, 1983, Mr. V. Noonan of NRC, EQB NRR, requested that Mr. G. Toman of FRC proceed to Salem NGS to evaluate testing of the reactor trip circuit breaker (RTCB) trip bar force requirement and the undervoltage trip attachment (UVTA) output forces performed at the Salem plant. Initial reports of the testing received by Mr. Noonan from the NRC Region 1 Resident Inspector for Salem indicated that the devices were not operating within the force requirement ranges dictated by the NRC staff.

Mr. Noonan asked Mr. Toman to represent NRR on this trip to Salem and to request the following:

1. Who performed the tests? (Company affiliation and names of supervising personnel)
2. What test methodology was used? (FRC to evaluate adequacy of method)
3. Licensee is requested to provide pictures of methodology (non-mandatory).
4. Licensee is requested to provide a copy of procedures used for testing.
5. Licensee is requested to provide a copy of the data taken on all four Salem Unit 1 RTCBs and UVTAs.
6. Did Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) Quality Assurance personnel witness the testing?
7. What is the proposed corrective action?
8. NRC will approve corrective action prior to implementation.

All of the discussions with PSE&G by Mr. Toman were to be in the presence of an NRC Resident Inspector from Region I.

Report:

Upon arrival at Salem NGS, Mr. Toman met with Mr. W. Lazarus, NRC Resident Inspector, Region I. With Mr. Lazarus, Mr. Toman met with the following PSE&G personnel in the Salem NGS General Manager's office:

Mr. R. Uderitz - Vice President, Nuclear
Mr. E. Midura - General Manager, Salem NGS
Mr. J. Boetger - General Manager Nuclear Support
Mr. Gore - (title not known)
Mr. V. Pavincich - Principal Engineer
Mr. Gallagher - Manager, Maintenance

Mr. Toman relayed Mr. Noonan's requests to this group. PSE&G indicated that the testing was completed on March 25, 1983 and that the test equipment and personnel had returned to the PSE&G's Maplewood Energy Lab. However, Mr. Pavincich, who had witnessed the tests, described them through use of color photographs. PSE&G indicated that the tests were performed to obtain baseline data on the RTCBs and UVTAs and to fulfill NRC requirements concerning UVTA output forces and circuit breaker trip bar force requirements.

Mr. Pavincich described the force measurements, which used a load cell in compression or tension depending on the test requirement and a Visicorder graphical recorder. PSE&G provided a copy of the procedure, Maintenance Procedure T-94 Revision 0, which was performed on March 24 and 25, 1983. The procedure contains all of the data taken during the tests and each step is marked with a PSE&G Quality Assurance Division stamp.

Mr. Toman asked if Westinghouse was party to preparation or performance of the tests. PSE&G answered that the tests were prepared and performed by PSE&G personnel. However, Westinghouse, East Pittsburgh, personnel were expected on site at Salem NGS during the afternoon of March 31, 1983 to review and comment on the results of the testing.

With regard to the photographs of the test setups, Mr. Boetger stated that the photographs being shown were the only copies at the Salem plant and that they would be needed for the review by Westinghouse. Mr. Toman asked if Xerox copies could be supplied and new prints sent at a later time. Mr. Boetger agreed to this.

The main tests of interest were trip bar static lift force tests, trip bar impulse lift tests, and UVTA impulse output tests. The requirement that the static trip bar lift force be 31 ounces or less was met only upon Bypass Breaker "B". However, all of the RTCBs tripped upon impulse forces of one pound or slightly less, and all of the UVTAs exerted impulse forces of 3.325 pounds or more.

For the static pull test on the trip bar, the load cell was set up in tension with the pull point as close as possible to the point at which the UVTA trip lever would hit the trip bar.

For the trip bar impulse lifting force, the load cell was used in compression. The trip bar was carefully given a manual impulse with the load cell in the area of the UVTA's trip lever. Several attempts were made so that a range of impulses bracketing the trip/no-trip point could be recorded.

Note: The impulse that was manually applied during the test may or may not approximate the impulse output of the undervoltage trip attachment. No comparison data are available to show that the accelerations, strike velocities, and pulse widths are similar between the manually applied impulse and that applied by the UVTA.

For the UVTA impulse output tests, the load cell was placed 0.090 inches above the trip bar so that the force imparted to the trip bar by the UVTA could be determined indirectly.

Note: The method of testing the output force of the UVTA used in these tests may include additional forces generated by the trip bar during unlatching of the circuit breaker trip mechanism. These forces may add to or subtract from the UVTA output force and could be the explanation for the wide range of readings from 3.325 to 6.50 lb.

FRC agrees with PSE&G that, due to the variations between the UVTAs and the RTCBs, testing the UVTAs on the RTCBs is more useful than testing the devices separately. PSE&G has attempted to take as much baseline data as possible during these tests for comparison with future test data.

A copy of the PSE&G completed test procedure is attached.

PSE&G stated that comparison of required impulse trip bar force to UVTA impulse force output shows adequate margin and indicates that no corrective action is required. However, PSE&G wishes to have Westinghouse review and concur with the test results. FRC makes no judgment concerning the value of the data (see notes, above).

With regard to personnel performing the tests, Mr. Pavincich witnessed all tests, Mr. B. Hicks supervised the load cell tests, and Mr. Romanosky supervised the timing tests of the RTCBs.

Prepared by G. Toman
April 1, 1983

GT/jg

MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE A-11
ENCLOSURE 1
PROCEDURE APPROVAL COVER SHEET

PROCEDURE NUMBER: T-94 TITLE: SPECIAL DATA ACQUISITION OF THE #1 UNIT REACTOR TRIP AND BYPASS BREAKERS

REMARKS: THIS PROCEDURE IS SAFETY RELATED.
ALL DOCUMENTATION SHALL BE MAINTAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (AP) 11.

THIS PROCEDURE HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND DETERMINED TO BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

REV. NO.	0								
SUBMITTED DATE	<i>[Signature]</i> 5/21/83								
ECD APPROVED DATE	N/A								
MGR. QAD APPROVED DATE	N/A								
NDE LEVEL III APPROVED DATE	N/A								
AI REVIEWED DATE	N/A								
SQAE REVIEWED DATE	<i>[Signature]</i> 3/23/83								
MAINT. MGR. APPROVED DATE	<i>[Signature]</i> 3/23/83								
S.O.R.C. MTG. NUMBER DATE	83-38B 3/23/83								
GEN. MGR. - SALEM OPS. APPROVED DATE	<i>[Signature]</i> 3-23-83								

SALEM GENERATING STATION
MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT MANUAL
MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE T-94

1.0 TITLE

Special Data Acquisition of the #1 Unit Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers.

2.0 PURPOSE

The purpose of this Procedure is to allow for certain data acquisition on the #1 Unit Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers. Data is to be collected by the PSE&G Research Corporation under the direction of the PSE&G Nuclear Engineering Department.

3.0 APPLICABILITY/SCOPE

This Procedure is applicable to Salem Unit #1 only.

4.0 REFERENCES

- 4.1 Administrative Procedure (AP) 15 - Tagging Rules.
- 4.2 Administrative Procedure (AP) 9 - Control of Station Maintenance.
- 4.3 Westinghouse Electric Corporation Instruction Bulletin 32-100-1A, Low Voltage Metal-Enclosure Switchgear.

5.0 ENCLOSURES

- 5.1 Enclosure 1 - Breaker Position and Serial Numbers.
- 5.2 Enclosure 2 - Breaker Position "As Found" Condition.
- 5.3 Enclosure 3 - Breaker Position "As Left" Condition.

6.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

As delineated in this Procedure.

7.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

- 7.1 When Maintenance Procedures require working around electrical equipment, safety precautions and work habits specified in the Electric Production Department Safety Manual shall be observed by all personnel involved in the accomplishment of those Procedures.
- 7.2 When slings must be used to accomplish Maintenance Procedures, they shall be used in accordance with the requirements of Maintenance Procedure M2Q.
- 7.3 When Maintenance Procedures require working on stainless steel components of the primary system, the following items shall not be used:
 - 7.3.1 Carbon steel wire brushes and scrapers.

7.3.2 Chlorinated solvents, e.g. trichlorethylene.

7.3.3 Unapproved masking tape, other than for use on protective clothing.

7.4 In addition to the normal precautions taken when working around electrical equipment as specified in the Electric Production Department Safety Manual, care must be taken to stand clear of the various mechanical mechanisms associated with these breakers.

7.5 Before any Maintenance work is performed, make certain that all control circuits are open and that the breaker is removed from the metal-clad unit.

7.6 Prior to applying solvents to electrical components, verify components are immune to the solvent. On W-2 switches, no solvent cleaning is required or authorized. Clean with dry cloth only.

8.0 PREREQUISITES

8.1 Calibration data:

	<u>EQUIPMENT NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT SERIAL NUMBER</u>	<u>CALIBRATION DATE</u>	<u>CALIBRATION DUE DATE</u>
(1)	<u>Vacoport</u>	<u>FL-7446</u>	<u>11/27/82</u>	<u>11/27/83</u>
(2)	<u>Instron Weights</u>	<u>PE-008 Set #1</u>	<u>3/4/82</u>	<u>3/4/85</u>
(3)	<u>Schmitt Load Cell</u>	<u>5247</u>	<u>Prior to use</u>	
(4)	<u>Schmitt Load Cell</u>	<u>2150</u>	<u>Prior to use</u>	

Continued on Pg 11 of 11

8.2 Enter the "As Found" serial numbers of all four (4) Reactor Trip and Reactor Trip Bypass breakers on Enclosure No. 2 before removing any breaker from its cabinet. Compare serial numbers to those listed in Enclosure No. 1. Notify your Supervisor of any discrepancies.

8.3 Notify the Senior I & C Supervisor that all four (4) Reactor Trip and Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers will be removed from their cubicles and that I & C testing will be required after completion of the Procedure. Notification is required due to the I & C Department's requirement to perform the Reactor Trip Master Response Time Testing.

A. O'Connell
Senior I & C Supervisor Signature

3/24/83
Date

9.0 PROCEDURE

9.1 MEASUREMENTS - UNDERVOLTAGE ATTACHMENT

Physical distance from front of trip latch face to trip bar.

Reactor Trip Breaker "A" .2850"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

[Signature]
(SW)
(IHP)
3/24/83

Reactor Trip Breaker "B"

~~.2865~~ ".2595"

90
PSE&G
VERIFIED
3/25/83
(SW)
3/24/83
(IHP)

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Reactor Bypass Breaker "A"

.2510

PSE&G
90
VERIFIED
(SW)
3/25/83
(IHP)

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Reactor Bypass Breaker "B"

.2865"

PSE&G
90
VERIFIED
(SW)
3-24-83
(IHP)

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

9.2 Clearance between trip lever and trip bar.

Reactor Trip Breaker "A"

.1290"

PSE&G
90
VERIFIED
(SW)
3/25/83
(IHP)

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Reactor Trip Breaker "B"

.075"

PSE&G
90
VERIFIED
(SW)
3/25/83
(IHP)

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Reactor Bypass Breaker "A"

.030

ccr 3/24/83
PSE&G
90
VERIFIED
(SW)
3/25/83
(IHP)

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Reactor Bypass Breaker "B"

~~.109~~ ".089"

PSE&G
90
VERIFIED
(SW)
3/25/83
(IHP)

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

9.3 Distance from Center of Trip Bar (Breaker Mechanism) and Strike Point of Undervoltage Trip Lever.

Reactor Trip Breaker "A" 8.625"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

BAH
PSE 65 (SW) (IHP)
3/24/8

Reactor Trip Breaker "B" 2.4375

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

BAH
PSE 06 (SW) (IHP)
3/24/8

Reactor ByPass Breaker "A" 8.500"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

BAH
PSE 90 (SW) (IHP)
3/24/8

Reactor Bypass Breaker "B" 8.5625"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

BAH
PSE (SW) (IHP)
3/24/8

9.4 Measure Force Required to begin to Compress Latch Spring (Flat Phosphore Bronze Spring)

Reactor Trip Breaker "A" 400 grams

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

BAH
PSE 65 (SW) (IHP)
3/24/8

Reactor ~~Trip~~ ^{By Pass} Breaker "B" 2.00 lb, 2.25 lbs

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

BAH
PSE (SW) (IHP)
3/24/8

Reactor Bypass Breaker "A" Unable to obtain repeatable data.

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

BAH
PSE 06 (SW) (IHP)
3/24/8

CD-324183

Reactor ^{Trip}Bypass Breaker "B" Unable to produce repeatable data
SUPERVISOR/WITNESS
INSPECTION HOLD POINT

PREP BY (SW) 90 MW 3/25/83
VERIFIED (IHP)

9.5 Record Apparent Condition of Latch Surfaces (Polished or Not)

Reactor Trip Breaker "A" Polished - Bearing edge of latch. Die stamp markings removed.
SUPERVISOR/WITNESS
INSPECTION HOLD POINT

PREP BY (SW) 65 MW 3/24/83
VERIFIED (IHP)

Reactor ^{Bypass}Trip Breaker "B" Bearing edge of latch appears to be polished. Die stamp markings seem to have been removed
SUPERVISOR/WITNESS
INSPECTION HOLD POINT

PREP BY (SW) 65 MW 3/24/83
VERIFIED (IHP)

Reactor Bypass Breaker "A" Polished - Bearing edge of latch appears to have been polished removing die stamp markings.
SUPERVISOR/WITNESS
INSPECTION HOLD POINT

PREP BY (SW) 65 MW 3/24/83
VERIFIED (IHP)

Reactor ^{Trip}Bypass Breaker "B" Polished - Bearing edge of latch appears to have been polished removing die stamp markings
SUPERVISOR/WITNESS
INSPECTION HOLD POINT

PREP BY (SW) 90 MW 3/25/83
VERIFIED (IHP)

REMARKS:

MEASUREMENTS - SHUNT TRIP ATTACHMENT

9.6 Physical Distance from Shunt Trip Lever Pin to Trip Bar.

Reactor Trip Breaker "A" .8740
SUPERVISOR/WITNESS
INSPECTION HOLD POINT

PREP BY (SW) 65 MW 3/24/83
VERIFIED (IHP)

Reactor Trip Breaker "B" .8360

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

90 (SW) MWS/2/24
VERIFIED (IHP)

Reactor ByPass Breaker "A" .8545

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

CEL 9/24/83
CEL 9/24/83

06 (SW) MWS/3/25/83
VERIFIED (IHP)

Reactor Bypass Breaker "B" .8347

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

CEL 9/24/83
VERIFIED (IHP)

9.7 Clearance from S.T. Lever to Trip Bar.

Reactor Trip Breaker "A" .1120 "

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

CEL 9/24/83
VERIFIED (IHP)

Reactor Trip Breaker "B" .056

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

90 (SW) MWS/3/25/83
VERIFIED (IHP)

Reactor Bypass Breaker "A" .038

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

90 (SW) MWS/3/25/83
VERIFIED (IHP)

Reactor Bypass Breaker "B" 0

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

CEL 9/24/83
VERIFIED (IHP)

S.T. Lever.

Reactor Trip Breaker "A"

4.6425"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

1-24Y7269B

Reactor Trip Breaker "B"

4.500"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

2-24Y7269B

Reactor Bypass Breaker "A"

4.500"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

3-24Y7269B

Reactor Bypass Breaker "B"

4.5175"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

4-24Y7269B

3/24/83
 06
 3/25/83
 90
 3/25/83
 65
 3/24/83
 90
 3/25/83
 90
 3/25/83

BREAKER MEASUREMENTS

9.9 Travel of Trip Bar required to Trip Breaker.

Reactor Trip Breaker "A"

Trip Breaker	Full Movement caused
① .12"	① .22" by Trip Lever
② .11" Avg	② .22" Avg
③ .10" .102"	③ .24" Avg
④ .10"	④ .22" .24"
⑤ .08"	⑤ .22"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Reactor Trip Breaker "B"

Trip Breaker	Full Movement caused
① .09"	① .24" by Trip Lever
② .07" Avg	② .21" Avg
③ .10" .088"	③ .215" .221"
④ .10"	④ .23"
⑤ .08"	⑤ .21"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Reactor Bypass Breaker "A"

Trip Breaker	Full Movement caused
① .13"	① .20" by Breaker
② .05" Avg	② .245" Avg
③ .05" .07"	③ .21" .2407"
④ .05"	④ .20"
⑤ .06"	⑤ .34"
⑥ .08"	⑥ .25"
⑦ .07"	⑦ .24"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Reactor Bypass Breaker "B"

Trip Breaker	Full Movement caused
① .16"	① by Trip Lever
② .08" Avg	② .20" Avg
③ .10" .088"	③ .20" .202"
④ .08"	④ .21"
⑤ .08"	⑤ .21"
⑥ .08"	⑥ .19"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Reactor Trip Breaker "A" 2.375 4.375 lb 2.625 lb 3.625 lb 3.125 lb

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

Push Avg. of 5 = 3.225 lbs

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Pull 3.0 lb, 2.625 lb, 2.75 lb, 2.625 lb, 2.625 lb
Pull Avg of 5 = 2.725 lbs

[Signature]
(SW)
HB
(IHP)
3/21/83

Reactor Trip Breaker "B" Pull 2.50 lb, 2.125 lb, 1.875 lb, 2.000 lb, 1.875 lb

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

Avg of 5 = 1.975 lb.

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

[Signature]
(SW)
4h/3/25/83
(IHP)
90 VERIFIED

Reactor Bypass Breaker "A" Pull 2.125 lb, 2.25 lb, 2.125 lb, 2.25 lb, 2.25 lb

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

Avg of 5 = 2.20 lbs

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

[Signature]
(SW)
MM 3/25/83
(IHP)
90 VERIFIED

Reactor Bypass Breaker "B" Pull 1.5 lb, 1.5 lb, 1.5 lb, 1.5 lb, 1.5 lb

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

Avg of 5 = 1.500 lb.

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

[Signature]
(SW)
PR - 3/25/83
(IHP)

9.11 Force Required (Impulse) to Operate Trip Trip Bar.

Reactor Trip Breaker "A"

Test 1	1.0 lbs Release	Test 5	.75 lbs No Release
2	.75 lbs Release	6	1.00 lbs Release
3	.75 lbs Release	7	.50 lbs Release
4	.75 lb No Release		

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

[Signature]
(SW)
HB
(IHP)
65 VERIFIED

Reactor Trip Breaker "B"

1	.375 lb Release	2	.25 lb Release. No
3	.75 lb Release	4	.25 lb Release No
5	.50 lb Release	6	.50 lb No Release
7	.50 lb Release		

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

[Signature]
(SW)
MM 3/25
(IHP)
06 VERIFIED

Reactor Bypass Breaker "A"

1	.75 lbs Release	2	.4375 lb No Release
3	.50 lbs Release	3	.250 lb. No Release
4	.625 lbs Release	4	.375 lb. No Release
5	1.000 lb Release		

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

[Signature]
(SW)
MM 3/25/83
(IHP)
90 VERIFIED

Reactor Bypass Breaker "B"

1	.75 lbs Release	2	.375 lbs No Release
3	.75 lbs Release	3	.375 lbs No Release
4	.5625 lbs Release	4	.250 lbs No Release
5	.50 lbs Release		

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

[Signature]
(SW)
PR - 3/25
(IHP)

Static Pull.

9.12 Force Generated by Undervoltage Trip Lever on the Trip Bar.

Reactor Trip Breaker "A" 4.50 lb, 4.00 lb, 3.75 lb, 4.25 lb, 4.00 lb.

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

Aug. of 5 = 4.10 lb.

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Gap of .09" between top of Trip Bar and Transducer

PSE 44
65
VERIFIED
3/24/83
JAH
(SW)
(IHP)

Reactor Trip Breaker "B" 6.25 lb, 5.875 lb, 6.625 lb, 6.5025, 7.1875 lb

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

Aug of 5 = 6.50

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Gap of .09

PSE 44
90
VERIFIED
3/25/83
JAH
(SW)
(IHP)

Reactor Bypass Breaker "A" 3.25 lb, 3.125 lb, 3.375, 3.625, 3.25 lb

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

Aug of 5 = 3.325 lbs

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Gap of .09"

PSE 44
90
VERIFIED
3/25/83
JAH
(SW)
(IHP)

Reactor Bypass Breaker "B" 3.50 lb, 3.375 lb, 4.00 lbs, 3.50 lb, 3.625 lb

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

Aug of 5 = 3.60 lbs

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Gap of .09"

PSE 44
90
VERIFIED
3/24/83
JAH
(SW)
(IHP)

9.13 Force Generated by Shunt Trip Lever on the Trip Bar.

Reactor Trip Breaker "A" 9.25 lb, 9.25 lb, 9.25 lb, 9.75 lb, 9.75 lb.

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

Aug of 5 = 9.25 lb.

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Gap of .09"

PSE 44
65
VERIFIED
3/24/83
JAH
(SW)
(IHP)

Reactor Trip Breaker "B" 9.0625 lb, 9.375 lb, 9.625 lb, 9.25 lb, 9.25 lb

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

Aug of 5 = 9.3125 lb.

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Gap of .09"

PSE 44
90
VERIFIED
3/25/83
JAH
(SW)
(IHP)

Reactor Bypass Breaker "A" 10.0 lb, 10.0 lb, 10.0 lb, 10.125 lb, 10.5 lb

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

Aug of 5 = 10.325 lbs

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Gap of .09"

PSE 44
90
VERIFIED
3/25/83
JAH
(SW)
(IHP)

Reactor Bypass Breaker "B" 7.125 lbs, 8.125, 7.750, 8.625, 8.500

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

Aug. of 5 = 8.025 lbs.

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

Gap of .09"

PSE 44
90
VERIFIED
3/24/83
JAH
(SW)
(IHP)

9.14 Time Breaker Main Contact Parting from 0 Volt Signal to Undervoltage Device.

TEST	0A	0B	0C
1	.072	.072	.071
2	.071	.071	.071
3	.071	.071	.071
4	.071	.071	.071
5	.073	.073	.075

} Trip Time in Seconds

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

COL
(SW)

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

TEST	0A	0B	0C
1	.078	.078	.078
2	.076	.076	.076
3	.076	.075	.075
4	.075	.074	.074
5	.074	.075	.074

} Trip Time in Seconds

Reactor Trip Breaker "B"

COL
(IHP)

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

COL
(SW)

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

TEST	0A	0B	0C
1	.066	.066	.066
2	.066	.066	.066
3	.065	.063	.063
4	.065	.061	.062
5	.059	.059	.061

} Trip Time in Seconds

Reactor Bypass Breaker "A"

COL
(IHP)

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

COL
(SW)

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

TEST	0A	0B	0C
1	.071	.071	.071
2	.071	.071	.071
3	.071	.071	.071
4	.071	.071	.071
5	.071	.071	.071

} Trip Time in Seconds

Reactor Bypass Breaker "B"

COL
(IHP)

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

COL
(SW)

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

COL
(IHP)

9.15 Time Breaker Main Contact Parting From Shunt Trip Initiate.

TEST	0A	0B	0C
1	.034	.034	.033
2	.033	.033	.033
3	.032	.032	.032
4	.034	.034	.032
5	.034	.034	.033

} Trip Time in Seconds

Reactor Trip Breaker "A"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

COL
(SW)

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

TEST	0A	0B	0C
1	.031	.031	.031
2	.033	.033	.032
3	.032	.033	.033
4	.032	.033	.031
5	.033	.033	.033

} Trip Time in Seconds

Reactor Trip Breaker "B"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

COL
(IHP)

COL
(SW)

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

TEST	0A	0B	0C
1	.031	.031	.033
2	.031	.031	.033
3	.033	.031	.033
4	.031	.031	.033
5	.031	.031	.033

} Trip Time in Seconds

Reactor Bypass Breaker "A"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

COL
(IHP)

COL
(SW)

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

TEST	0A	0B	0C
1	.032	.032	.032
2	.032	.032	.031
3	.032	.032	.032
4	.031	.031	.031
5	.031	.031	.031

} Trip Time in Seconds

Reactor Bypass Breaker "B"

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

COL
(IHP)

COL
(SW)

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

COL
(IHP)

9.2 Reinstall all four (4) Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers in their respective cubicles as indicated on Enclosure #1. Record on Enclosure #3.

10.0 FINAL TESTING

SUPERVISOR/WITNESS

(SW)

INSPECTION HOLD POINT

(IHP)

10.1 Notify the I & C Senior Supervisor that Maintenance has been completed on all four (4) Reactor Trip Breakers and Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers on # _____ Unit. I & C Department can proceed with their required time response testing.

Senior I & C Supervisor

Date Time

11.0 CLOSEOUT AND FINAL REVIEW

11.1 Procedure completed: _____ Satisfactory _____ Unsatisfactory

11.2 Remarks: _____

11.3 Test performed by: C. J. [Signature] _____
Signature Date

11.4 Reviewed by: _____
Maintenance Supervisor Date

Quality Assurance Date

Calibration Date Cont from 2.011

Equipment	Serial No.	Calibration Date	Cal. Due Date
5. Schaevitz SCM	741	Prior to Use	-
6. Schaevitz SCM	740	"	-
7. Brown & Sharpe Calipers	PE-003	3-8-83	9-8-83
8. Schaevitz LVDT	621	Prior to Use	-
9. Schaevitz SCM	862	Prior to Use	-
10. Honeywell Visicon	PS 7378	Prior to Use	-
11. Hatway Revision Box GC-P	-	Prior to Use	-
12. Beckman DVM 3020	PS 7244	9/18/82	9/18/83

MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE T-94
ENCLOSURE 1

BREAKER SERIAL NUMBERS AND POSITIONS

SERIAL NUMBER:

124Y7268B

124Y7269B

224Y7268B

224Y7269B

324Y7268B

324Y7269B

424Y7269B

424Y7269B

NORMAL POSITION:

UNIT #1

A TRIP
124Y7269B

A BY-PASS
324Y7269B

B TRIP
224Y7269B

B BY-PASS
424Y7269B

MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE T-94
ENCLOSURE-3

BREAKER POSITION AS LEFT CONDITION

UNIT #1

A TRIP

A BY-PASS

B TRIP

B BY-PASS

Entered By: _____

Reviewed By: Maintenance Supervisor

Quality Assurance

APPENDIX C



Westinghouse
Electric Corporation

Nuclear Reactor
Divisions

Box 252
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230

NS-EPR-2737

March 22, 1983

Mr. H. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Phillips Building
7920 Norfolk Avenue
Bethesda, MD 20014

Dear Mr. Denton:

The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the latest information on the Westinghouse investigation into the malfunctions of the Salem Plant reactor trip switchgear. Our investigation, along with analyses performed for the Salem Plant, demonstrates that the Westinghouse plants with this equipment can continue to operate without undue risk to public health and safety.

Test and Inspection Results

On March 20-21, 1983, Westinghouse performed a detailed, procedurally controlled inspection of the undervoltage trip (UV) attachment that was provided to Westinghouse and was represented by PSE&G as the UV attachment that malfunctioned on Reactor Trip Breaker B at Salem Unit 1 on February 25, 1983. Photographs and an audio tape recording of the March 20-21 inspection are available at Westinghouse for your review. A detailed written inspection report is being developed from this evaluation. To our knowledge, this is the only such detailed inspection conducted to date of a UV attachment represented as one of the two that malfunctioned on February 25, 1983, at Salem Unit 1. In preparation for this inspection, Westinghouse developed a list of postulated malfunction scenarios for this device (see Table 1). This inspection was conducted in order to establish which of these potential scenarios might have produced the malfunction of the Salem Unit 1 devices. The following is a summary of the key findings in this examination.

1. As received from PSE&G, the UV device would not latch. There was also a history of breaker closure problems on Reactor Trip Breaker B as reported in the NRC Task Force Report NUREG 0977. As a result, the test circuit breaker on which this device was installed could not be closed either electrically or manually. This inability to

latch the UV device was traced to a bent and deformed phosphor-bronze leaf spring which would not maintain the proper force against the traveling latch mechanism. The deformation observed on the leaf spring could not have been caused by normal operation or wear of this device. Had this UV device been installed on Salem Unit 1 Reactor Trip Breaker B in the condition as received by Westinghouse, it would have been difficult to close the associated circuit breaker. It should be noted that, had this particular leaf spring been excessively deformed against the traveling latch, the UV device could have been prevented from unlatching automatically thus preventing the breaker from opening. A Westinghouse representative sent to the Salem site on February 27, 1983, noted that a leaf spring was deformed on at least one UV device shown to him at the site by PSE&G personnel. This device was described to him by PSE&G as one of the UV attachments that malfunctioned on February 25, 1983, at Salem Unit-1.

2. The examination at Westinghouse of the UV device disclosed a missing lock washer on the drop-out voltage adjustment screw mechanism. The adjustment screw was excessively "turned-in", a condition which reduces the unlatching force available when the UV device is deenergized.
3. In the as-received condition, a visual examination performed by Westinghouse revealed that the device was lubricated. PSE&G has advised Westinghouse that a lubricant was added to this device after the event of February 25, 1983. Westinghouse is currently analyzing this lubricant in order to determine its type.
4. Wear on the latch and latch interface was not excessive and there was no evidence of burrs. However, excessive frictional force cannot be ruled out as a potential malfunction scenario since post incident handling (manually exercising the device and lubrication) prior to receipt by Westinghouse could have masked a friction force malfunction scenario.
5. No visible evidence was found of corrosion or broken or missing parts, other than the previously mentioned lock washer. There were no obvious signs of improper manufacture. A check of each part against specified dimensions and tolerances is being made. Functional tests demonstrated that the device was capable of performing its electrical function.
6. Artificial restraint of the UV device reset arm was required to measure the trip lever forces generated by the UV device. The test breaker was tripped normally by the UV attachment on several attempts with normal trip bar load of 1.6 pounds and with an increased load to 2.3 pounds. A further increase in trip bar load to 3.3 pounds resulted in erratic breaker tripping by the UV device. The maximum expected force required to actuate the trip bar

on a normal DB-50 breaker is 31 ounces. Hence, it was concluded that the UV attachment was capable of providing sufficient force, with margin, to trip a properly maintained DB-50 circuit breaker.

Based on the above information, this examination appears to rule out the postulated malfunction scenarios 1 through 6 of Table 1. The effects of dirt/contamination (mechanism 8) could not be evaluated due to the lubricant applied to the device after the events on February 25, 1983. Evidence of misadjustment of the drop out voltage adjustment screw (mechanism 9) was present and may have been a contributor, but was not, in Westinghouse engineering judgement, the sole reason for malfunction.

Based on the results of this examination, the malfunction of the UV attachment was not attributable to design or manufacturing. The postulated malfunction scenarios which cannot be eliminated or which were present in the examination fall into four categories: 1) frictional area anomalies, 2) dirt/contamination, 3) bent or deformed parts, and/or 4) misadjustment. These four categories are considered to fall under one broad category of maintenance related causes.

Salem Restart

New UV trip attachments have been installed at Salem Unit 1. These devices were recently built by Westinghouse and certified as manufactured to current Westinghouse specifications, including lubrication. They were subjected to 25 consecutive operations without malfunction at the Westinghouse Switchgear Division and, after installation at Salem Unit 1, were subjected to at least 10 additional operations also without malfunctioning.

Westinghouse has sent a complete package of Technical Bulletins and Data Letters to PSE&S. A new Technical Bulletin clarifying the circuit breaker and undervoltage trip attachment lubricants and lubrication points will be issued to all Westinghouse plants, including Salem, by March 24, 1983. Westinghouse has evaluated the recommended lubricant in that bulletin and has determined that it does not produce corrosion of the undervoltage attachment materials given the equipment operating environments and lubrication specifications for the Westinghouse-supplied DB-50 reactor trip switchgear.

Westinghouse analysis of the Salem events, transmitted to you on March 14, 1983 and included as Attachment 1, concluded that the public health and safety would not have been affected had the event of the February 25, 1983 occurred at full power. Additionally, if one of the two normally operating main feedwater pumps were lost at full power, and if the operator action to manually trip the reactor did not occur for five minutes, the resultant primary system pressure would have been below the pressurizer relief valve setpoint. Furthermore, for the less likely case of loss of all main feedwater pumps, operator action at 30 seconds would have resulted in primary system pressure reaching only the relief valve setpoint. Operator action at five minutes, upon loss of both feedwater pumps, and with a realistic moderator coefficient, would have resulted in a primary system pressure which approximated the ASME Code

Service Level C limit of 3200 psia, the established acceptance criteria for this event. This sequence would have required the operator to ignore seven major trip demand alarms. Even if the reactor trip breakers were not able to be tripped manually from the control room, there are other diverse means available for the Salem operators to accomplish a reactor shutdown as prescribed in their ATMS procedure.

We, therefore, conclude that even if the highly unlikely event were to occur at full power, there would be no effect on public health and safety.

Given the results of this analysis, other measures imposed by the NRC, while not necessary, provide additional margin and should provide further regulatory confidence that Salem Unit 1 can be restarted safely. For example, manual reactor trip from the control room after an automatic trip demand exercises both the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of the DB-50 reactor trip switchgear. Westinghouse has conducted recent tests on a shunt trip attachment and has determined the device generates a force at least 300% greater than the force necessary to trip the breaker. In response to NRC IE Circular 81-12, Westinghouse is preparing a Technical Bulletin giving recommendations for independent testing of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments for manual reactor trip. This Technical Bulletin will be issued to all Westinghouse plants, including Salem, by March 25, 1983.

UY Trip Attachment Design:

At the Commissioners' meeting of March 15, 1983 the NRC Staff expressed uncertainty over the UY trip attachment design lifetime and the inherent margin between the trip force generated by the undervoltage trip attachment and the force required to lift the breaker trip bar. We believe these uncertainties have been resolved by further information. Tests conducted by PSEG, Franklin Research Center, and Westinghouse indicate a normal trip force margin of 100-200 percent. Also, in 1972 an undervoltage trip attachment, modified as a result of 3 reported UY malfunctions at Robinson Unit 2, was successfully tested for more than 6000 operations without malfunction. Modified undervoltage trip attachments were subsequently sent as replacements to all operating plants with DB-50 reactor trip switchgear at that time. All subsequent Westinghouse manufacture of undervoltage trip attachments has incorporated the modifications made in 1972.

A review of available LERs on Westinghouse UY trip attachment malfunctions since the 1972 modification indicate that approximately two-thirds of the malfunctions appear to be maintenance related.


The overall data for malfunctions per demand on Westinghouse DB-50 circuit breakers has been applied in plant PRA studies and has not shown an undue contribution to total public risk.

In view of the above, the current design of the DB-50 reactor trip switchgear is a proper application for nuclear power plant protection systems when properly installed, tested, and maintained.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, my letter to you of March 1, 1983 committed to a thorough evaluation and testing program of the UV trip attachment to be completed by June 2, 1983. Test objectives and program definition are expected to be completed by March 25, 1983. Furthermore, we intend to do an in-depth analysis of DB-50 reactor trip switchgear malfunctions which have occurred on operating nuclear plants to provide additional data to further demonstrate its reliability. This review will be based on historical LER data and any definitive data which we can obtain from our operating plant customers relative to total number of reactor trip demands and malfunctions recorded. We will advise you of the estimated completion date of this review.

Please contact me if you would like to discuss this matter further.

Very truly yours,



E. P. Rahe, Manager
Nuclear Safety Department

Attachment(s)

Table 1

Postulated Malfunction Scenarios

1. Corrosion
2. Missing Parts
3. Broken Parts
4. Electrical Failure
5. Manufacturing Anomalies/Defects
 - a. Out of Tolerance Parts
 - b. Misassembly
6. Insufficient Trip Force
7. Frictional Area Anomalies
 - a. Wear
 - b. Burrs, Hang-ups
 - c. Lubrication
8. Dirt/Contamination
9. Misadjustment
10. Bent or Deformed Parts

ATTACHMENT I

Analyses of the Salem Nuclear Plant for
Postulated Feedwater Malfunction without
Automatic Reactor Trip

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION

M. P. Osborne
Transient Analysis
Nuclear Safety Department

Approved:

J. Little 2/13/83

J. Little, Manager
Transient Analysis
Nuclear Safety Department

SCOPE

In light of the recent failures of the reactor trip breakers to automatically function at the Salem plant, the purpose of this study is to realistically predict the consequences of a failure to trip for limiting plant transients while the plant is at full reactor power. The transients analyzed, specifically for the Salem plant, are a partial loss of steam generator main feedwater flow due to the trip of a single main feedwater pump and also a complete loss of main feedwater flow due to the loss of both main feedwater pumps. The latter, less probable, event is that presented in the Salem plant FSAR. As stated previously, the purpose of this study is to realistically predict the response of the plant to these events and, as such, the plant systems are assumed to function normally, with the sole exception being the common mode failure of the reactor breakers to automatically function as was experienced on February 22 and 25, 1983. It should be noted that the spurious steam generator level trip generated on 2/25/83 was as a result of normal expected feedwater control system difficulties experienced at low (11%) power levels. It also should be noted that the loss of a feedwater pump on 2/22/83 was due to a normal maneuvering of an electrical bus while configuring the plant in preparation for a power escalation. Both of these events are not normally expected at full power and thus one should consider more credible events such as a feedwater heater dropout rather than the more limiting and much less frequent feedwater pump malfunctions.

The study considers a thirty second operator response time for a manual reactor trip following the automatic protection system demand signal, a simulation of the actual response time of the February 25, 1983 event. The study also considers a more conservative operator response of five minutes in order to determine the sensitivity of the plant response to operator action.

DESCRIPTION OF TRANSIENT EFFECTS

Generic studies (WCAP 8330 Westinghouse Anticipated Transients Without Trip Analysis) of failure to trip events previously submitted to the NRC have identified the limiting full power events to be malfunctions affecting steam generator main feedwater flow. The reduction in main feedwater flow affects the overall heat removal capability of the steam generators and, as a result of the mismatch between the primary side heat generation and the secondary side heat removal produces a heatup of the primary system coolant. If the reactor is tripped promptly, the auxiliary feedwater system provides sufficient heat removal capability to remove decay heat. However if feedwater flow to the steam generators is reduced or terminated without subsequent reactor trip the secondary system will be unable to remove all of the heat that is generated in the core. This heat buildup in the primary system is a function of the amount of the feedwater reduction and is indicated by rising reactor coolant system temperature and pressure, and by increasing pressurizer water level due to the insurge of the expanding reactor coolant. Water level in the steam generators drops as the remaining inventory in the steam generators is boiled off due to inadequate supply of feedwater. When the steam generator water level falls to the point where the steam generator tube bundle is uncovered and primary to secondary heat transfer is reduced, reactor coolant system pressure and temperature

increase at a greater rate. This greater rate of temperature and pressure increase is maintained as the pressurizer fills completely and water is discharged through the pressurizer relief and safety valves. Reactivity feedback, due to the high primary system temperature, reduces core power. As a result the system pressure begins to decrease and a steam space is again formed in the pressurizer.

The limiting criteria for the postulated transients is that reactor coolant pressure be maintained sufficiently below the pressure corresponding to the ASME Code Service Level C (Emergency) stress limits. For the reactor coolant system, the corresponding pressure is 3200 psia.

CONTROL ROOM INDICATIONS AND MITIGATING ACTIONS

Although the reactor is prevented from tripping automatically by the common mode failure of the reactor trip breakers, there are many control room indications and alarms which are generated during the transient which would serve to alert the operator that the event has taken place. These indications in addition to emergency procedures, which require the verification of a successful reactor trip before all other actions, would support the mitigation of the consequences of the transient.

For a loss of normal feedwater event, in addition to normal process control alarms (pump trip, temperature, pressure, level and flow deviation alarms for both primary and secondary systems), the following audible alarms would be generated:

1. Steam/feedwater flow mismatch and low level (each steam generator)
2. Overtemperature Delta-T turbine runback
3. Overtemperature Delta-T reactor trip demand
4. Overpower Delta-T turbine runback
5. Overpower Delta-T reactor trip demand
6. High pressurizer pressure reactor trip demand
7. High pressurizer level reactor trip demand
8. Steam generator low-low level reactor trip demand
9. Low steam pressure safety injection (in coincidence with high flow)
10. Low reactor coolant loop flow reactor trip demand

Tables 1 and 2 show the time sequences for these alarms.

As part of the procedures the operator is required to exercise following any reactor trip demand, the operator is required to first verify the successful accomplishment of the reactor trip by observing rod position indicators, rod bottom lights, neutron flux, or reactor trip breaker position indications. The following actions are available to the operator in the main control room if an unsuccessful reactor trip occurs:

1. Manual reactor trip (with subsequent automatic turbine trip)
2. Manual turbine trip
3. Manual turbine runback (200%/min.)
4. Manual safety injection
5. Manual control rod insertion.

Outside the obvious benefit of an immediate reactor trip, the turbine trip or turbine runback action is the most important, if a reactor trip cannot be obtained manually, to terminate the steam flow demand from the steam generators to preserve steam generator inventory. Steam pressure and hence primary system temperature will be controlled by means of the steam dump control system, steam generator relief and/or safety valves. Other means outside the main control room are available:

1. Local manual trip of any reactor trip breaker
2. Local manual trip of the rod-control system motor-generator sets
3. Local manual trip of the turbine

TRANSIENT SIMULATION

Analyses were performed to simulate both a partial and complete loss of main feedwater. These analyses are based upon previous models consistent with previous submittals to the NRC by Westinghouse on ATWS (NS-TMA-2182, T. M. Anderson to Dr. S. Hanauer, 12/30/79) but also are modified to more accurately model the Salem Plant.

The following conditions were assumed for both analyses:

1. Initial normal full power operation at beginning of core life. This corresponds to the current condition of the Salem Plant and is also the limiting condition since the moderator temperature coefficient is at its least negative value. A value of $-8 \text{ pcm}/^\circ\text{F}$, which is valid for 95% of core life, was assumed.
2. Both the pressurizer relief and safety valves are assumed to function. There are two relief and three safety valves. Pressurizer heaters and spray also function automatically.
3. The automatic turbine runback on either Overtemperature or Overpower Delta-T signals is operable. The runback setpoint is 3% below the trip setpoint. The turbine runback operates on a 30 second cycle. Turbine load is first reduced 5% in 1.5 seconds. If at the end of the 30 seconds the runback signal still exists, the load is further reduced another 5% and so on. The load reduction has a mitigating effect on the transient and helps reduce peak primary system pressure.
4. The rod control system is assumed to be in the manual mode consistent with actual practice. Automatic action of the rod control system would cause rod insertion when primary temperature increases and would be less conservative.
5. The steam dump control system is available. The capacity of the steam dump is 50% of nominal steam flow at full power.
6. Auxiliary feedwater flow (1760 gpm) begins at 10 seconds following receipt of the low-low steam generator level signal. This response time is based upon actual test data from the Salem Plant.
7. Operator action is assumed to initiate a successful manual trip. Turbine trip is initiated via the reactor trip breaker opening.

8. For the complete loss of feedwater transient, the main feedwater pumps are assumed to coastdown to zero flow in five seconds. For the loss of a single pump, one pump is assumed to coastdown to zero flow in five seconds; however, the remaining pump has rated flow capacity of 70% of nominal full power feedwater flow. Therefore, the second pump (the Salem Plant has two pumps) will increase its flow to 70% flow. The response time for the second pump is 20 seconds.
9. Nominal control and protection system setpoints were assumed.

TRANSIENT RESULTS

1. Loss of a Main Feedwater Pump

The sequence of events for both a 30 second and 300 second delay of manual reactor trip are shown in Table 1. The transient primary pressure calculations are shown in Figure 1. The low-low steam generator level setpoint is reached at 99 seconds; auxiliary feedwater is automatically initiated. Ten seconds later, auxiliary feedwater begins to be delivered to the steam generators.

30 Second Delay

For the case where there is only a 30 second delay, there are no subsequent reactor trip signals generated. There is no large heatup of the reactor coolant because the steam generator tube bundle does not uncover. Thus there is always adequate secondary side heat removal. The peak pressure of 2286 psia which occurs at 30 seconds, is only slightly above the pressure at which the pressurizer sprays are actuated.

For this transient, the reactor coolant system integrity is not challenged.

5 Minute Delay

For the case where operator action is delayed 300 seconds (5 minutes), the reactor coolant system temperature increases, reaching the Overpower Delta-T setpoint for turbine runback at 190 seconds. This signal is maintained and thus turbine power continues to reduce 5% every 30 seconds until the turbine load is at 75%. At this point, the sum of the main feedwater flow from one pump plus the auxiliary feedwater flow is equal to the turbine steam flow. Therefore, steam generator level does not continue decreasing and stabilizes. The operator initiated reactor and turbine trip at 399 seconds occurs after the steam and feedwater flow have matched. The peak primary system pressure of 2330 psia at 267 seconds occurs before the steam and feed flow are matched. This pressure is below the relief valve setpoint (2350 psia). The pressurizer sprays, combined with the effect of reduced turbine load prevent any significant overpressurization. Again, reactor coolant pressure stays below service Level C limits of 3200 psia.

2. Loss of All Main Feedwater

The sequence of events for this transient are presented in Table 2. The transient pressure calculations are depicted in Figure 2.

The low-low steam generator level setpoint is reached at 33 seconds; 10 seconds later, auxiliary feedwater is delivered to the steam generators.

30 Second Delay

An automatic turbine runback due to an Overpower Delta-T is initiated at 43 seconds and turbine load is reduced 5%. The pressurizer relief valves open and maintain pressure at the setpoint value (2350) until the operator trips the plant at 63 seconds. Steam dump is initiated and reduces the primary temperature to the no load value of 547°F. For this transient the reactor coolant system pressure is well below 3200 psia.

5 Minute Delay

As in the previous case, the heatup of the primary coolant caused a turbine runback initiated by an Overpower Delta-T signal. The turbine load is reduced twice in 5% increments until the load is 90% of nominal load. Steam pressure starts to drop due to the boil off of water in the steam generators, generating a low steam pressure alarm. At this time primary pressure starts to increase and there is an insurge into the pressurizer, causing both pressurizer high level and pressure trip alarms to be actuated. The steam generator tube bundle begins to uncover, causing a larger rate of increase in primary pressure and temperature. The pressurizer fills and the peak pressure reached is 3491 psia. Nuclear power has decreased at this point to about 30% of nominal due to the negative moderator temperature reactivity feedback. As the relief rate of water through the relief and safety valves increases, the primary system pressure starts to decrease and the safety and relief valves close about 30 seconds after the time of peak pressure. The operator trips the reactor manually at 333 seconds.

CONCLUSIONS

Loss of a Main Feedwater Pump

The results presented here demonstrate that for the loss of one main feedwater pump, there are at least six major alarms in addition to others generated to alert the operator to the fact that a malfunction has occurred. Furthermore, even for the event with a five minute delay in reactor trip automatic turbine runback reduces steam flow to match the capability of the auxiliary feedwater. For this event there is no threat of overpressurization in that the pressurizer relief valve setpoint is not even reached.

Complete Loss of Main Feedwater

For the complete loss of feedwater, operator action consistent with the action time taken at the plant on the February 25, 1983 event is sufficient to prevent overpressurization of the reactor coolant system. Peak primary system pressure results only in pressurizer relief valve actuation without the actuation of pressurizer safety valves. Furthermore, there are 3 major alarms which are actuated in addition to the steam generated low-low level alarm to alert the operator to take action.

As discussed earlier, it is a major reduction in primary to secondary heat transfer capability which causes the primary system heatup and pressure increase. A turbine trip reduces the amount of steam flow and the rate at which the level in the steam generator drops. If the turbine is tripped before there is a significant loss of steam generator inventory, the tubes will not uncover and the primary system will not overpressurize. Based upon the results discussed in the previous section, operator action to trip the turbine at or before one to one and a half minutes following the low-low level trip and alarm would prevent overpressurization of the reactor coolant system beyond 3200 psia.

It should be noted that the core nuclear characteristics (a moderator reactivity coefficient of $-8 \text{ pcm}/^\circ\text{F}$) used are not representative of the actual core design for the Salem Plant. Previous ATWS analyses have shown the peak pressure to be a strong function of the coefficient and there is a 100 psi reduction for every 1 pcm decrease in the coefficient. The Salem core is designed to operate such that by the time the plant reached full power it would have a coefficient of $-10.5 \text{ pcm}/^\circ\text{F}$ or 2.5 pcm less than the coefficient in the study. This coefficient would be reduced even further by approximately $2 \text{ pcm}/^\circ\text{F}$ per month of operation (see Figure 3). The 10.5 pcm coefficient results in a peak pressure for the limiting case of five minute operator action of 3241 psia (a 250 psia reduction from 3491 psia) which is within the calculational band of the ASME Stress Level C limit. Therefore, the case represented in Figure 2 would not exceed the acceptance criteria.

Summary

In conclusion, this study has demonstrated the ability of the Salem Nuclear plant to withstand the effects of postulated gross feedwater malfunctions without reactor trip at full power with an artificially long delay for operator action. The results show acceptable response which is within calculational uncertainties of the ASME Stress Level C limits. These results are further affected by the low probability of these events occurring at full power in addition to the expected increasingly beneficial nuclear characteristics of the plant over core life.

TABLE 1

Sequence of Events
Loss of One Feedwater Pump

<u>Event</u>	<u>Time¹</u>	<u>Time²</u>
Loss of one pump (alarm)	0	0
Remaining pump delivers maximum flow	20	20
Low-low SG level setpoint (alarm); auxiliary feedwater signal (alarm)	99	99
Auxiliary feedwater begins	109	109
Operator trips reactor and turbine	129	---
OP Δ T runback setpoint (alarm) turbine load reduced 5%	---	190
Turbine load reduced 5%	---	233
OP Δ T trip setpoint (alarm)	---	220
Turbine load reduced 5%	---	250
Peak Pressure Occurs	---	267 (2330 psia)
Turbine load reduced 5%	---	280
Turbine load reduced 5%	---	310
High pressurizer level setpoint (alarm)	---	311
Operator trips reactor and turbine	---	399
	<u>3 alarms</u> prior to trip	<u>6 alarms</u> prior to trip

(1) 30 second delay before manual trip

(2) 300 second delay before manual trip

TABLE 2

Sequence of Events
Complete Loss of Main Feedwater


<u>Event</u>	<u>Time¹</u>	<u>Time²</u>
Loss of main feedwater pumps (alarm)	0	0
Low-low SG level setpoint (alarm); auxiliary feedwater signal generation	33	33
OPΔT runback setpoint (alarm) turbine load reduced 5%	34	34
OPΔT trip setpoint (alarm)	43	43
Auxiliary feedwater begins	43	43
Pressurizer relief valves open	55	55
Operator trips reactor/turbine	63	---
Turbine load reduced 5%	---	64
High pressurizer level trip setpoint (alarm)	---	85
Low steam pressure SI (alarm)	---	85
High pressurizer pressure setpoint (alarm)	---	88
SG tubes begin to uncover; steam flow drops		
pressurizer safety valves open	---	92
Pressurizer fills	---	95
Peak pressure	---	114 (3491 psia)
Pressurizer safety valves close	---	142
Pressurizer relief valves close	---	155
Low RC flow setpoint (alarm)	---	159
Operator trips reactor/turbine	---	333
	4 alarms prior to trip	7 alarms prior to trip

(1) 30 second delay before manual trip

(2) 300 second delay before manual trip

FIGURE 3


MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT DURING CYCLE 5
-- AT HFP, ARO, EQUILIBRIUM XENON CONDITIONS *




*WCAP 10242, "The Nuclear Design of Salem Unit One Power Plant Cycle 5"

FIGURE 2
Pressure Transient - Loss of All Main Feedwater

30 Seconds Delay Before Trip




300 Seconds Delay Before Trip




Temperature Consistent - 10000 of the "equivalent" time

10 Seconds Delay Before Rise



300 Seconds Delay Before Rise



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of)
)
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC) Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311
AND GAS COMPANY) License Nos. DPR-70 and DRP-75
)
(Salem Nuclear Generating)
Station, Units 1 & 2))

ORDER MODIFYING LICENSE EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY

I.

Public Service Electric and Gas Company (the licensee) holds License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 which authorize operation of Units 1 and 2 of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station. The facilities are Westinghouse pressurized water reactors (PWRs) located at the licensee's site at Hancock's Bridge, Salem County, New Jersey.

II.

On February 25, 1983, an event occurred at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station when the control rods failed to insert when the reactor-trip circuit breakers failed to automatically open following receipt of a valid trip signal from the Reactor Protection System (RPS). The manual trip system was used to shut down the reactor. Subsequently, it was concluded by the licensee that the failure to trip was caused by a malfunction of the undervoltage (UV) trip attachments in both reactor-trip circuit breakers. Evaluation of the event of February 25, 1983 revealed that a similar failure had occurred on February 22,

1983, at Salem 1. There had also been a previous event at Salem 2 involving a failure of one reactor trip circuit breaker to trip on January 6, 1983.

The malfunction of the undervoltage device on February 25 was determined by the licensee to have resulted from lack of proper lubrication on the latch of the UV trip attachment. It appears that no preventative maintenance had been conducted on the Salem 1 DB-50 circuit breakers until January 1983. Additionally, the recommendations of a Westinghouse 1974 Technical Bulletin and Data Letter (NSD DATA LETTER 74-2) were not implemented during the January maintenance since the personnel who performed the maintenance were not aware of the bulletin recommendations. The specific details of the event and the licensee's response are contained in the staff's Safety Evaluation Report, which is hereby incorporated by reference.

The NRC review of the event revealed a number of significant deficiencies relating to management supervision and control of the procedures governing the classification of the reactor trip breakers as safety-related, management supervision of maintenance techniques, and management attention to the safety implications of system malfunctions. This review is set forth in NUREG-0977, "NRC Fact-Finding Task Force Report on the ATWS Events at Salem Nuclear Generating Station. Unit 1, on February 22 and 25, 1983," March 1983, which is hereby incorporated by reference.

If there were a potentially severe transient, from a worst case set of initial conditions, and the reactor shutdown system did not function, an extremely severe accident could occur in the absence of timely operator action. Therefore,

the aforementioned failures are technically very significant. When coupled with the cause of the challenge to the reactor protection system, i.e., a feedwater system transient, and the frequency of past feedwater system transients¹ at the Salem facilities, the event raises serious safety questions regarding the continued safe operation of the Salem facility.

III.

Analysis of the event described in Section II reveals operational and management issues at the Salem facilities which are discussed in the staff's Safety Evaluation Report.

By letters dated March 14, April 4, April 7, and April 8, 1983, the licensee submitted its Corrective Action Program related to the reactor trip breaker failures. This program includes short-term remedial actions to be completed prior to startup of the unit and a number of longer term items which have not been completed but for which the licensee has established completion dates. These items are summarized in the attached Table, "PSE&G Corrective Action Report, Short and Long Term Items." (Attachment 1)

The various remedial actions involve equipment, operational and management issues. The equipment issues involve (1) safety classification of breakers,

¹Of primary concern to the NRC is the ATWS (anticipated transient without scram) event initiated by a loss of feedwater transient. In 1981 and 1982, Salem 1 experienced about 11 and 5 feedwater transients, respectively, while Salem 2 experienced about 14 in 1981 and about 11 in 1982. This results in an average of about 10 transients per unit year of operation for each unit.

(2) identification of cause of failure, (3) verification testing and (4) maintenance and surveillance procedures. The operational issues involve (1) operating procedure for reactor trips and anticipated transients without scram (ATWS), (2) operator training, and (3) operator response. The management issues involve (1) master equipment list, (2) procurement procedures, (3) work-order procedures, (4) post-trip review, (5) timeliness of event notification, (6) updating vendor-supplied information, (7) involvement of QA personnel with other station departments, (8) post-maintenance operability testing and (9) overall management capability and performance. The NRC staff has reviewed the corrective action program as discussed in the staff's Safety Evaluation Report, and determined that the licensee's actions, as modified below, are necessary to assure continued safe operation of the facility. In addition, I have determined that because of the history of the Salem facility described above, the need for further long-term actions to increase the reliability of the mitigation features of the Salem facility must also be addressed.

Accordingly, I have determined that the public health, safety, and interest require that the actions set forth below be required by an immediately effective order.

IV.

In view of the foregoing, pursuant to Sections 103 and 161(i) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Parts 2 and 50, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY THAT:

1. The licensee shall implement and/or maintain the items specified in Attachment 1 to this Order, as more fully described and in the manner described in the licensee's submittals dated March 14, April 4, and April 7, and 8, 1983, no later than the dates specified in Attachment 1, with the following modifications:
 - (a) The Nuclear Oversight Committee shall, in addition to the actions described in the licensee's April 7 and 8, 1983 submittals, provide copies of its reports to the Executive-Vice President and to the NRC Regional Administrator at the same time they are submitted to the Vice President-Nuclear.
 - (b) Within 60 days of receipt of the appraisal performed by Management Analysis Company (MAC), the licensee shall provide to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, an analysis of each recommendation made by MAC, the action to be taken in response to each, and a schedule for implementation.
 - (c) Prior to return to power, engage Beta Corporation, an outside consultant, to review the PSE&G investigation of the events of February 22 and 25, 1983, including the corrective action program. The consultant will make an independent evaluation of the action plan and advise on the adequacy of the program to insure that Salem Unit 1 can be safely returned to power.

2. Within 60 days of the date of this Order, the licensee shall submit to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation a detailed report describing either how and on what schedule the following actions will be accomplished, or why any of these actions should not be taken.

- (a) Implementing at the Salem facility (Units 1 and 2) the following feature of the proposal by the Industry Group on ATWS submitted on April 23, 1982, on Docket PRM-50-29 (page 10 of Appendix C): provision of automatic initiation of turbine trip and auxiliary feedwater independent of the reactor protection system;
- (b) Providing at the Salem facility diversity in activating (tripping) the reactor scram breakers, for example, by incorporating the breaker shunt trip function into the automatic trip circuits of the reactor protection system;

Any schedule submitted shall be subject to approval by the Director and shall be implemented following such approval. The Director may modify the approved schedule in writing for good cause.

V.

The Licensee may request a hearing on this Order. Any request for a hearing shall be submitted to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. A copy of the request or answer shall also be sent to the Executive Legal Director at the

same address. ANY REQUEST FOR A HEARING SHALL NOT STAY THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS ORDER.

If a hearing is held on this Order, the Commission will issue an order designating the time and place of hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered at such a hearing shall be whether this Order should be sustained.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION:

Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland
this day of April 1983.

ATTACHMENT 1

PSE&G CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORT
SHORT AND LONG TERM ITEMS

ITEM	COMPLETION
A. EQUIPMENT ISSUES	
A.1 Determination of Safety Classification of Breakers	Complete
A.2 Identification of Cause of Failure	
a. Short-Term Actions	
1. Confirm that new U/V trip attachments on Salem Units 1 & 2 incorporate all design changes made to these devices.	Complete
2. Measure and confirm the force required to trip the breakers using the breaker trip bar and that the breakers trip with an output force from the U/V trip lever of ≤ 31 ounces.	Complete
b. Long-Term Actions	
1. Submit a test program to determine the life cycle & replacement interval for the UTAs & to verify the adequacy of the new maintenance & surveillance programs used on the reactor trip circuit breakers	May 1983
2. Establish a procedure for periodically measuring the force required to trip the breakers.	Complete
A.3 Verification Testing Program	
a. Short-Term Actions	
1. Manufacturer will electrically test U/V trip attachment on Test CB 25 times.	Complete
2. After installation, U/V trip attachment tested 10 times.	Complete

ITEM	COMPLETION
3. After installation in appropriate breaker compartment, Response Time Test.	Complete
4. Test for independent operation of UV and shunt within 24 hours of restart from each shutdown.	Complete
b. Long-Term Actions	
1. Provide detailed test program	May, 1983
A.4 Maintenance and Surveillance Procedures	
a. Short-Term Actions*	
1. Resolve breaker cabinet/switchgear room cleaning deficiency.	Complete
2. Revise maintenance procedure and/or other documents to require all replacement U/V attachments to have been successfully tested 25 consecutive cycles.	Complete
3. Provide acceptance criteria in Maintenance Procedure M3Q-2 for ten cycle test that allows <u>NO</u> failures for acceptance. There will be a 30-minute interval between each test.	Complete
4. Modify Maintenance procedure M3Q-2, Section 9.8 to include three timing tests and an average time computed for comparison to previous tests.*	Complete
5. Revise Maintenance Procedure M3Q-2, Section 9.7 & other appropriate procedures to require that a sealant be applied to the head of the self-locking screw on the U/V attachment.	Complete
6. Specify in Maintenance Procedure M3Q-2, Enclosure 7 (Ref. Section 9.7) U/V coil dropout voltage acceptance tolerance & actions to be taken if out of specification.*	Complete
7. Lubricate the circuit breakers and UV trip attachments in accordance with <u>W</u> Technical Manual.*	Complete

*See attached Table 1.

ITEM	COMPLETION
8. Perform a trip force measurement on the trip bar of each breaker.*	Complete
9. Modify maintenance procedure to test bypass breakers every 6 months.*	Complete
10. Provide functional test procedures for UV trip, shunt trip, and manual scram.*	Complete
11. Perform monthly reactor trip breaker timing test.*	Complete
b. Long-Term Actions	
1. Propose Technical Specifications	Within 30 days of Unit S/U
B. OPERATOR PROCEDURES, TRAINING, AND RESPONSE	
B.1 Operating Procedures for ATWS	
a. Short-Term Actions	
1. Identify indications in control room providing positive identification of reactor trip demand.	Complete
2. Review the basis for ATWS procedure steps and order of priority, revise procedures, as necessary, and train operators.	Complete
b. Long-Term Actions	
1. Provide detail description of procedures to ensure operability of SSPS status panel indicators.	Complete
2. Provide schedule for the upgrade program for Emergency Operating Procedures	April 15, 1983
B.2 Operator Training	
a. Short-Term Action	
1. Conduct training for operators on revised procedures.	Complete
2. Conduct practical exercise in Control Room of revised procedures.	April 12, 1983

*See attached Table 1.

ITEM	COMPLETION
3. Conduct walkthrough on alarms & RPS indicators.	April 12, 1983
4. Conduct training for auxiliary operators	April 12, 1983
5. Evaluate trainees' performance against established objectives	Complete
6. Review training material and ensure it is current and properly referenced	Complete
B.3 Operator Response	
a. Short-Term Action	
1. Caution operators in use of J handle control.	Complete
b. Long-Term Actions	
1. Replace Reactor Trip Switch	Next outage of sufficient duration
2. Modifications to clarify First Out Annunicator Alarms	May 1, 1983
C. MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY AND PERFORMANCE	
C.1 Master Equipment List (MEL)	
a. Short-Term Actions	
1. Verify MEL is complete & accurate with respect to ECCS, including actuation systems, RPS, Aux. Feedwater and containment isolation systems.	Complete
2. Instruct appropriate personnel in purpose & use of MEL.	Complete
b. Long-Term Actions	
1. Verify completeness & accuracy of MEL for remaining Q list systems and re-issue as a controlled document.	May 1983

ITEM	COMPLETION
C.2 Procurement Procedures	
a. Short-Term Actions	
1. PSE&G Sampling review of past procurement documents	Complete
b. Long-Term Actions	
1. Evaluate & modify procurement procedures to ensure appropriate classification of items/services important to safety.	July 1983
C.3 Work Order Procedures	
a. Short-Term Actions	
1. QA Department review all nonsafety-related work orders prior to starting work.	Complete
2. Implement a program & training to ensure that work orders are properly classified.	Complete
3. Review work orders written since issuance of the MEL for proper classification & evaluate safety consequences of those found improperly classified.	Complete
C.4 Post-Trip Review	
a. Short-Term Actions	
1. Develop and implement AD-16	Complete
C.5 Timeliness of Event Notification	
a. Short-Term Actions	
1. Assign dedicated communicator to each shift.	Complete
2. Review importance of reporting requirements with supervisors	Complete

ITEM	COMPLETION
C.6 Updating Vendor-Supplied Information	
a. Short-Term Actions	
1. Update existing documentation on safety equipment and ensure that vendor documentation is under a controlled system.	
a) Audit Station files for manuals existence, revision level, and date.	Complete
b) Audit Nuclear Engineering files for manuals existence, revision level, and date.	Complete
c) Compare Station & Nuclear Engineering; Audit and use latest manual revision	Complete
d) - Contact vendors to confirm that manuals are technically current	Complete
- Request updated copies (*where identified as more recent)	*
2. Review Westinghouse Technical Bulletins and Data Letters	Complete
b. Long-Term Actions	
a) Audit Station files for manuals existence, revision level, & date	June 1983
b) Audit Nuclear Engineering files for manuals existence, revision level, and date.	July 1983
c) Compare Station & Nuclear Engineering; audit and use latest manual revision	Aug. 1983
d) - Contact vendors to confirm that manuals are technically current	Dec. 1983
- Request updated copies (*where identified as more recent)	
e) Revise Station procedures where appropriate	July 1983

ITEM	COMPLETION
f) Index & control new/revised manuals received	May 1983
g) Develop procedures for controlling vendor manuals	May 1983
C.7 Involvement of Quality Assurance Personnel With Other Departments	
a. Short-Term Actions	
1. Retain outside consultant to assess QA program	Complete
2. Modify QA organization policy to more fully integrate with overall nuclear activities	Complete
b. Long-Term Actions	
1. Provide additional detail training on processing work orders to re-emphasize QA test/retest requirements	September 1983
C.8 Post Maintenance Operability Testing	
a. Long-Term Actions	
1. Review and revise AP-9 and other station procedures	July 1983
2. Complete review of vendor and Engineering recommendations and incorporate necessary changes into departmental documents	January 1984
3. Incorporate items identified into Inspection Order System	Aug. 1983
4. Complete Managed Maintenance Program	Jan. 1984
C.9 Overall Management Capability & Performance	
1. Complete staffing of Nuclear Assurance & Regulation Department	Jan. 1984
2. Independent assessment of QA Operations	July 1, 1983

ITEM	COMPLETION
3. Implement training program for first-level supervisors	Sept. 1983
4. Develop training program for senior supervisory level	Oct. 1983
5. Develop program for periodic or regular training for supervisory and management personnel	Spring 1984
6. Develop Technical Training Program for non-Station personnel	Spring 1984
7. MAC management diagnostic - final report	May 30, 1983

TABLE 1

PERIODIC SURVEILLANCE/MAINTENANCE OF REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS

PRE-STARTUP
(< 24 hrs)
(Main Trip Breakers)

MONTHLY
SURVEILLANCE
(Main Trip Breakers)

6-MOS.
SURVEILLANCE/MAINTENANCE
(Main & Bypass Breakers)

1. functional test of UV
(via SSPS)

1. a. SSPS functional of UV.
b. response time testing
of UV/breakers
(event recorders)

1. response time testing (3 times)
(visicorder) trend data

2. functional test of Shunt
(manual controls)

2. functional test of Shunt
(manual controls)

2. trip bar lift force measurements

3. functional manual scram switch
(voltmeters)

3. UV output force measurement

4. drop-out voltage check

5. servicing/lubrication/adjustments

6. repeat testing steps 1-4

BASIC
ENERGY
TECHNOLOGY
ASSOCIATES, INC.

ROSSLYN CENTER, SUITE 825
1700 N. MOORE STREET
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22209
(703) 243-4600

April 14, 1983

Mr. Richard M. Eckert, Chairman
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
80 Park Place
Newark, New Jersey 07101


Dear Mr. Eckert:

In accordance with your request of April 5, 1983, BETA began an independent review of the adequacy of the actions being taken by PSE&G as a result of the recent reactor breaker trip incidents at the Salem Generating Station.

We have completed the preliminary phase of this review and, as you directed, we are attaching herewith our report covering the work performed to date.

We intend to continue our review of the adequacy of the long term actions and will provide you a report upon completion of that effort.

Sincerely,


W. Wegner
Associate

Attachment

A REPORT ON

A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS
COMPANY CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM RELATED TO REACTOR
TRIP BREAKER FAILURES AT SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1

CONDUCTED BY

BASIC ENERGY TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATES, INC.
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

APRIL 14, 1983

I. BACKGROUND

On April 5, 1983, Basic Energy Technology Associates, Inc. (BETA) was contracted by Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) to conduct an independent evaluation of the corrective actions taken or planned by PSE&G as a result of the events surrounding the reactor breaker trip incidents of February 22 and 25, 1983.

BETA was requested to initially concentrate its efforts on the short term actions taken by PSE&G as they would apply to the restart of Unit 1 and to provide an interim report outlining its findings and recommendations by April 14, 1983. Due to this tight time constraint, BETA in its initial review, has focused its effort on those short term actions taken by PSE&G as outlined in its Supplement I Report dated April 8, 1983.

This phase of the review was performed by two BETA associates, Robert S. Brodsky and William Wegner. In addition, BETA engaged the services of Jack C. Grigg, an independent consultant with over thirty years of reactor electrical control and instrumentation experience and specifically with reactor trip breakers, to assist in the performance of this evaluation.

This report provides recommendations resulting from the BETA review to date. A more comprehensive report will be provided to PSE&G upon completion of the final review.

II. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the limited review conducted by BETA as previously described, the following summary of findings and recommendations are provided. Section III provides more detailed findings and recommendations.

1. The identification of the known and probable causes leading to the breaker failures as outlined in the April 8 Supplement I Report appears to be reasonable. At this time BETA has not identified any additional problem areas that have not already been identified by PSE&G or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission relating to this problem. BETA also considers that the actions listed as being short term (prior to restart) are adequate. Two additional short term actions, as outlined in Section III of this report, are recommended.

2. The short term actions taken by PSE&G as outlined in the April 8, 1983 Supplement I Report are appropriate and should, along with the two short term actions recommended by BETA, provide reasonable assurance that the immediate problems associated with the events leading to reactor breaker trips on February 22 and 25, should not recur prior to completion of the long term actions.

3. Interviews conducted by BETA of 16 PSE&G people at the site indicate a good understanding and appreciation of the problems which lead to the breaker trip incidents. The scope of the longer term actions would indicate there is also an appreciation for how these problems reflect on broader issues of the plant's overall operation. At this point, BETA is not in

a position to comment on the adequacy or completeness of the long term actions or on how deeply into the organization these understandings prevail. There is some concern by BETA that the majority of corrective actions taken so far have concentrated specifically on problems directly associated with the breakers rather than on some of the broader aspects. This is an area that BETA will pursue in greater detail in subsequent evaluations.

4. While post-incident investigations correctly identified a number of weaknesses throughout the PSE&G operation, BETA is of the opinion that there still exists a possible generic problem with breakers of this design and used in this application. Specific recommendations relating to additional long term improvements with respect to the breakers themselves are contained in Section III of this report.

III. DETAILED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Short Term Findings and Recommendations

1. PSE&G should obtain confirmation in writing from the reactor trip breaker vendor that the installed breakers are satisfactory for plant operation and that Salem Maintenance Procedure M3Q-2 will provide the necessary basis to assure continuing operational reliability.

2. PSE&G's Station Operations Review Committee and the Nuclear Review Board should complete their reviews of the short term aspects of the trip breaker failures. Written reports should be available documenting their concurrence with restart.

B. Long Term Findings and Recommendations (Interim)

1. The manual trip switch trips both the under voltage and shunt trips. In order to provide a greater assurance of breaker action, it is suggested that the automatic trip also use the shunt device. The automatic trips use only the under voltage trip. A safety grade battery power supply will be required to support the shunt trip. It is understood that PSE&G is investigating the feasibility of providing a shunt trip.

2. In order to further decrease the possibility of a common mode failure, consideration should be given to replacing one of the two sets of installed breakers with breakers or contactors of another design or manufacture. If possible, the breaker design should incorporate a molded case. If an alternate device is selected it should be included in the PSE&G and NRC test programs.

3. The Salem breaker maintenance procedure, M3Q-2, will use periodic measurements of trip and release forces to identify degradation of breaker performance. As another indicator of possible breaker degradation, PSE&G should consider the use of the periodic data obtained from the voltage drop-out measurements which are also in the breaker maintenance procedure (step 9.7.3.10).

4. The PSE&G specifications for trip breakers should be modified to indicate that mounting brackets for over current trips should not be installed.

5. Additional experimental data is necessary to confirm that maintenance procedure M3Q-2 testing will provide a satisfactory indication of breaker degradation. This data should be obtained from the planned PSE&G and NRC testing.

6. Breaker maintenance procedure M3Q-2 will result in the trip breakers undergoing a large number of cycles. The PSE&G, NRC and vendor test programs should confirm that these tests will not result in the breaker exceeding breaker design cycle limits. In addition, the number of breaker cycles should be determinable and recorded.