

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | M | D | C | C | N | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 57 CAT 58

CON'T
01 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 8 | 7 | 0 | 9 | 1 | 5 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 8 | 2 | 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
02 | During normal operation at 1330, emergency diesel generator (EDG) #21
03 | was started as part of the engineered safety features monthly logic test
04 | and run for less than 1 minute when it tripped rendering it inoperable
05 | (T.S. 3.8.1.1.b). After troubleshooting of the unit was completed,
06 | EDG #21 tested satisfactorily and this was declared operable at 1500
07 | terminating the event. The remaining EDGs remained operable during the
08 | event. Similar event: 50-317/77-65.

09 | SYSTEM CODE | E | E | 11 | CAUSE CODE | A | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | C | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | Z | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | 16 |
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 2 | 21 | 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 4 | 4 | 24 | 26 | OCCURRENCE CODE | / | 27 | REPORT TYPE | L | 30 | REVISION NO. | 0 | 32 |
18 | ACTION TAKEN | E | 18 | FUTURE ACTION | H | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 40 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | N | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | Z | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | Z | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 26 |
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
10 | The cause was found to be the common low jacket cooling water pressure
11 | switches isolation valve left closed following maintenance. The valve
12 | was opened and the EDG tested satisfactorily. A facility change to add
13 | individual isolation valves will be completed during the next refueling
14 | outage. Instrument technicians will be informed of this event.

15 | FACILITY STATUS | E | 28 | % POWER | 0 | 9 | 0 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | N/A | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | B | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Surveillance Testing | 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46

16 | ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | N/A | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | N/A | 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45

17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 39
7 8 9 11 12 13

18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 41
7 8 9 11 12

19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 43
7 8 9 10

20 | PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION | N | 44 | N/A | 45 | 8210250095 821015 PDR ADOCK 05000318 S PDR
7 8 9 10 68 69

917-926

LER NO. 82-44/3L
DOCKET NO. 50-318
LICENSE NO. DPR 69
EVENT DATE 09-15-82
REPORT DATE 10-15-82
ATTACHMENT

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (CONT'D)

The isolation valve for low jacket cooling water pressure switches was left closed by an instrument maintenance technician after maintenance was performed on switch O-PS-4810 on September 9, 1982. The isolation valve was opened and EDG #21 was returned to service. These switches are bypassed on receipt of an SIAS, therefore the EDG would have operated normally regardless of the isolation valve's position. This feature was satisfactorily tested on August 7, 1982.

A previously approved facility change to add individual isolation valves to each of the three pressure switches will be completed this coming refueling outage. This modification has been done on EDG's #11 and 12. The common isolation valve on EDG #21 is remotely located relative to the switches. The individual isolation valves will be located in the same cabinet as the switches, reducing the chance of maintenance personnel neglecting to unisolate the switch following maintenance or testing. Should an isolation valve be left closed, the EDG jacket cooling water low pressure trip will operate in a one-out-of-two trip logic vice the normal two-out-of-three trip logic.

All instrument maintenance personnel will be informed of this event and the possible consequences.