

September 17, 1982
Docket No. 80-346
License No. DPV-3

TO: AL FARGAZIO, DAVIS-BESSE PROJECT MANAGER
NRC, WDC, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Toledo Edison has exceeded the surveillance period on the Steam Feed
Rupture Control System (SFRCS) Channel Functional Test for the Steam Line
Pressure - Low Switches at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1.
This surveillance period with the 25% allowance ended at 2400 hours on
9/12/82.


To avoid an unnecessary transient due to a shutdown, Toledo Edison
requests the following Emergency Technical Specification change:

On Table 4.3-11, located on Page 3/4 3-30, denote a footnote next to
the "Steam Line Pressure - Low" Channel Functional Test Surveillance
Period (M), and add the following footnote below the existing note:

- + The surveillance period for Steam Line Pressure - Low
Switches is extended by 96 hours to end at 2400 hours
on 9/16/82.

The attached Technical Specification Page (Attachment 1) depicts the
desired change, and a Safety Evaluation is attached (Attachment 2) to
justify this request.

Toledo Edison has determined this to be a Class III request, as per
10CFR170.22. A \$4,000 check will be sent with the Formal Technical
Specification Change Request, to be sent late next week.


Robert F. Peters, Nuclear Licensing Department

9/17/82
Date

RFP:alf
encl.
cc: Walt Rogers, NRC, D-B Site

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Attachment 2
Docket No. 50-346
License No. NFF-3

SAFETY EVALUATION

Davis-Besse has exceeded the Surveillance Test Period on the Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System Main Steam Line Low Pressure Switches. The Technical Specifications require that the switches be tested on a monthly basis with a 25% time allowance. The licensee has exceeded the Technical Specification Surveillance Interval since midnight of September 12, 1982.

Fast history of the switches has shown no tendency for instrument drift such that there is currently no technical reason to suspect that the switches are inoperable. The switches have been recently calibrated during the last refueling outage. A strict interpretation of the Technical Specifications currently requires rapid shutdown. Davis-Besse is presently at about 75% of rated power. To avoid an unnecessary transient on the unit due to a shutdown, Toledo Edison wants to extend the surveillance period for 96 hours to extend the time limit to 2400 hours on September 16, 1982.

The safety function of these pressure switches is to provide a steam pressure input to the SFPCS indicating a rupture in the main steam system. The SFPCS is composed of two actuation channels, each of which will isolate both main steam lines and associated feedwater lines upon the detection of a rupture in either main steam line.

Each SFPCS actuation channel will also initiate the train of auxiliary feedwater and isolate one steam generator. One of the two actuation trains has been completed and satisfactorily tested. Each train picks up pressure indications from both steam lines, therefore, the plant presently has the ability to sense loss of steam pressure and provide subsequent protective action as described above assuming no failures occur in the tested train prior to completing the required surveillance.

We, therefore, agree with the licensee's analysis that the granting of this emergency Technical Specification change is justified.

9/16/82
mls