

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

011 | F | L | C | R | 2 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 5

011 | L | 8 | 0 | 5 | 0 | - | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

012 | At 1345, on 9/24/82, Florida Power Corp. identified that valve line-ups  
013 | which allow the OTSG Drain lines to be used for blowdown operations also  
014 | allows high energy fluid to be carried by those lines. The OTSG Drain  
015 | Line restraints were not designed for high energy lines. These valve  
016 | line-ups have routinely been used at CR3.

019 | SYSTEM CODE: H I 11 | CAUSE CODE: X 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE: Z 13 | COMPONENT CODE: X XI XI XI XI XI 14 | COMP SUBCODE: Z 15 | VALVE SUBCODE: Z 16  
17 | LER NO REPORT NUMBER: 8 2 | EVENT YEAR: 8 2 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 5 8 | OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 1 | REPORT TYPE: T  
18 | ACTION TAKEN: X | FUTURE ACTION: X | EFFECT ON PLANT: Z | SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z | HOURS: 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y | NRC FORM 256: N | PRIME COMP SUPPLIER: Z | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: Z 1 9 1 9 1 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

110 | Steam Generator blowdown was not considered in the original valve  
111 | line-up or support designs because blowdown during power operation was  
112 | not considered necessary. Operational experience showed that blow down  
113 | during power operation is required. Inadequate review of system design  
114 | prior to using these lines for blowdown is the cause of this event.

115 | FACILITY STATUS: F | POWER: 0 9 1 7 | OTHER STATUS: N/A | METHOD OF DISCOVERY: D | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Design Review

116 | ACTIVITY RELEASED OR RELEASE: Z | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: N/A | LOCATION OF RELEASE: N/A

117 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURE NUMBER: 0 1 0 1 0 | TYPE: Z | DESCRIPTION: N/A

118 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 1 0 1 0 | DESCRIPTION: N/A

119 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE: Z | DESCRIPTION: N/A

120 | PUBLICATION DESCRIPTION: N | N/A | NRC USE ONLY

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## SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

REPORT NO: 50-302/82-058/OIT-0

FACILITY: Crystal River Unit #3

REPORT DATE: October 8, 1982

OCCURRENCE DATE: September 24, 1982

### IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

The OTSG blowdown line was determined to be a High Energy Line with the normal valve lineup. However, the line is not restrained as a High Energy Line. This is reportable under Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.i.

### CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode I, Power Operation, (97%).

### DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1345 on September 24, 1982, FPC concluded that based upon recent information on the OTSG blowdown normal valve lineup, the line constituted a High Energy Line per Reg Guide 1.70 and NUREG-0800. This line is not restrained accordingly. It is seismically restrained and the piping is designed for appropriate temperatures and pressures but no whip or impingement restraints are installed.

### DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE:

The cause of this event is attributed to an inappropriate valve lineup which has existed throughout commercial operation of CR-3.

### ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Engineering evaluation is underway but incomplete to date.

### CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Long term corrective action will be based on the results of the completed Engineering study. Appropriate valves have been temporarily closed to alleviate the immediate concern.

### FAILURE DATA:

This is the second occurrence of this type and the eighth report under this specification.