

Telephone (412) 393-6000

June 3, 1994 ND3MNO:3579

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334, Licensee No. DPR-66 LER 94-004-00

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Appendix A, Beaver Valley Technical Specifications, the following Licensee Event Report is submitted:

LER 94-004-00, 10 CFR 50.73.a.2.i.A, "Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Inoperable River Water Header."

Audre Mulica FOR

L. R. Freeland General Manager Nuclear Operations

JWM/clp

Attachment

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cc: Mr. T. T. Martin, Regional Administrator
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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King of Prussia, PA 19406

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Director, Safety Evaluation & Control Virginia Electric & Power Co. P.O. Box 26666 One James River Plaza Richmond, VA 23261 NRC FORM 366 (5-92)

#### APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXFIRES 5/31/95

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NAME L. R. Freeland, General Manager Nuclear Operations								TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code) (412) 643-1258								
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On 5/6/94, at 2120 hours, with the Unit operating at 100 percent power, a decision was made to shutdown due to an inoperable Reactor Plant River Water Header. The "A" River Water Header had been declared inoperable on 5/4/94, at 1340 hours, and Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4.1 entered. Water had been discovered leaking at a pipe penetration during a routine inspection and was later confirmed to be River Water. The Shudown was initiated on 5/6/94 when it was determined that the River Water Header would not be returned to operable status within the 72 hour time frame allowed by TS 3.7.4.1. The Nuclear Regualtory Commission was notified in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(i)(A), via the Emergency Notification System, at 2152 hours on 5/6/94. The plant entered Mode 5 at 1122 hours on 5/8/94. At 1230 hours the leak was located on the Emergency Diesel Generator "A" Train River Watersupply line. While the unit was shutdown, non-destructive examinations were performed at various points on the associated piping. Following Code repairs and engineering analysis, it was determined that the remaining River Water piping structural integrity would be maintained until the next Refueling Outage. Plant heat-up was then initiated and the plant was returned to service and synchronized to the system grid on 5/20/94, at 1452 hours.

#### NRC FORM 366 (5-92)

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 3664) (17)

# DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On May 4, 1994 at 1050 hours, during a routine High Energy Line and Emergency Core Cooling System Inspection, water was found leaking from a pipe penetration in the East Trench of the Primary Auxiliary Building. The penetration carried a six inch line that branches off of the "A" River Water Header, which supplies cooling water to the Emergency Diesel Generators. The branch line can be used if needed for emergency make-up to the Spent Fuel Pool. At 1340 hours, the "A" River Water Header was declared inoperable and Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4.1 was entered. On May 5, at 2223 hours, the leak was confirmed to be River Water by injecting dye into the suspect piping. A plant shutdown was initiated on 5/6/94 at 2120 hours due to the status of the ongoing efforts to determine the source of the River Water leakage. Plant management determined at this time that the "A" River Water Header could not be returned to operable status within the time allowed by TS 3.7.4.1. The event was reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission within one hour, at 2152 hours, via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) as the initiation of a plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications. The plant entered Hot Standby, Mode 3, on May 7, 1994 at 0918 hours (approximately 10 hours earlier than required by TS 3.7.4.1) and was cooled to Cold Shutdown, Mode 5, by 1122 hours on May 8, 1994.

On May 8, 1994, at 1230 hours, following continued excavation, approximately a one-half inch diameter hole was found leaking on the Emergency Diesel Generator, "A" Train River Water supply line, and not on the emergency Spent Fuel Pool make-up line as originally suspected. An ASME Section XI Code Replacement was performed on approximately a two foot section of the affected piping. A sample of the cut out piping was sent to a laboratory for analysis. In addition, a Temporary Modification was initiated to cut and cap the emergency supply line to the Fuel Building and utilize a fire hose connection for emergency make-up, if needed. A satisfactory hydrostatic test was performed on the repaired and capped piping in accordance with ASME Section XI. Five areas were excavated and inspected on each River Water Header. The condition of the affected portions of the Train A and B River Water Headers was evaluated by using Ultrasonic Non-Destructive Examination. Following the inspections, an engineering analysis was performed, verifying that the integrity of the piping pressure boundary could be maintained for power operation until the next Refueling Outage. A 10CFR50.59 safety evaluation was performed for the excavation *c* ad back50 of the River Water piping. The open piping was covered with a minimum of six feet of sand, to previde for missile and seismic protection. Plant heat-up was commenced on May 18, 1994 and the Reactor was critical on May 20, 1994 at 0548 hours. The Main Unit Generator was synchronized to the system grid at 1452 hours the same day.

### CAUSE OF EVENT

Preliminary results from the sample of piping sent out for laboratory analysis indicate corrosion in the form of pitting, most likely caused by Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC), was responsible for this leak on the affected section of pipe.

### CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The exact location of the leakage was determined by excavation. A two foot section of pipe was replaced at the location of leakage and the emergency River Water supply line to the Fuel Building was cut and capped. A satisfactory hydrostatic test was performed on this piping following repairs. Five areas on each River Water Header supplying the Diesel Generators were uncovered and Ultrasonic Non-Destructive Examinations (NDEs) were performed. An

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engineering analysis was performed, based on the NDE, verifying the pressure boundary integrity and structural integrity of the system. Various long term corrective actions are being evaluated.

# REPORTABILITY

This event was reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission within one hour, via the Emergency Notification System, in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(i)(A), as the initiation of a plant shutdown required by plant's Technical Specifications. This written report is being submitted inaccordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), as the completion of a plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.

# SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

There were minimal safety implications as a result of this event. The "A" River Water Header was declared inoperable on May 4, 1994 when it was first suspected that the observed leakage was from the River Water System. The plant shutdown was initiated when it was determined that the leak would not be located and repaired within the time allowed by plant Technical Specifications. The River Water piping excavation and backfill activities were reviewed by the plant staff to be safe via a 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation. A Temporary Modification was approved for the River Water emergency supply line to the Fuel Building to permit cutting and capping of the piping. The cut and capped pipe, along with the two foot section which was replaced, was performed in accordance with the ASME Section XI Code and included hydrostatic testing.

An engineering analysis was performed, following Ultrasonic Non-Destructive Examination of the affected piping, and it was determined that plant operation may continue until the next Refueling outage with the integrity of the piping being maintained. The engineering analysis concluded that based on the observed pitting at the sample points inspected, that overall structural integrity of the piping will be maintained, even if localized through wall propagation would occur.

## PREVIOUS SIMILIAR EVENTS

There have been no previous similar reportable events.