




KANSAS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

GLENN L. KOESTER  
VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR

March 18, 1983

Mr. W.C. Seidle, Chief  
Reactor Projects Branch 2  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region IV  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000  
Arlington, Texas 76011



KMLNRC 83-027  
Re: Docket No. STN 50-482  
Subj: Final 10CFR50.55(e) Report -  
Foxboro Modules

Dear Mr. Seidle:

This letter provides the final report concerning the Foxboro modules. This matter was reported by Mr. Otto Maynard of Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E) to Mr. Bill Johnson of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, on February 18, 1983, by telephone.

The attached final report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). If you have any questions concerning this subject, please contact me or Mr. Otto Maynard of my staff.

Yours very truly,

GLK:bb  
Attach

cc: RCDeYoung, w/a

HRoberts/SSchum, w/a

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10CFR50.55(e) Final Report

On

Foxboro Modules

For

Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1

Kansas Gas and Electric Company

March 18, 1983

I. INTRODUCTION

The Foxboro Company recently advised Kansas Gas and Electric Company of a potential deficiency in nine modules supplied to Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS). The suspect component is a holder for controller cards. The advisory described in detail the method for identifying the suspect modules.

Instrumentation and Control personnel at Wolf Creek Generating Station commenced an investigation to verify that the suspect units had been supplied to WCGS. The investigation involved removal of the modules of the suspect types from Foxboro racks and checking the model date codes. Modules in warehouse spare parts were also checked.

The investigation resulted in the location of the nine suspect modules carrying the Foxboro identified model and date codes. Two of the suspect modules were installed in safety-related equipment.

II. DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY

Foxboro's advisory stated that during the period May 1981 to July 1982 certain model code devices were subject to manufacturing damage. This damage would demonstrate itself in an identical manner to a blown fuse (ie, loss of power). Fuse replacement, should the fault occur, would reveal a fracture or a separation of the upper portion of the female jack pin.

## III. ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Two of the suspect modules were used in safety-related equipment. Therefore, rather than performing a safety analysis, the conservative assumption was made that all suspect modules were faulty and could have adversely affected the safety of operations of the plant. Therefore, this matter is reportable under 10CFR50.55(e).

## IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION

The nine modules with the potential defects will be returned to the Foxboro Company for replacement. It is anticipated that three months will be required to complete the corrective action. In any event, the corrective action will be completed prior to fuel load.