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March 21, 1983

L. V. MAURIN Vice President Nuclear Operations

W3183-0094 Q-3-A35.07.62

Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012

SUBJECT: Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Significant Construction Deficiency No. 62 "Under ize Welds on <sup>1</sup><sub>2</sub>" Schedule 160 Pipe" Final Keport

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REFERENCE: LP&L letter W3I83-0047 dated February 14, 1983, L. V. Maurin to John T. Collins

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Final Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 62, "Undersize Welds on  $\frac{1}{2}$ " Schedule 160 Pipe."

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours,

L. V. Maurin

LVM/MAL:keh

Attachment

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- cc: 1) Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 (with 15 copies of report)
  - Director
     Office of Management
     Information and Program Control
     U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
     Washington, D. C. 20555
     (with 1 copy of report)

4) Mr. W. M. Stevenson

3) Mr. E. L. Blake

# FINAL REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 62 "UNDERSIZE WELDS ON ½" SCHEDULE 160 PIPE"

## INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes deficiencies relative to inspection and acceptance of undersize field welds in  $\frac{1}{2}$ " stainless steel sampling lines being installed at the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit No. 3 at Taft, La. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). This problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.

## DESCRIPTION

Based on a recommendation from LP&L Construction QA that the Mercury Co. Quality Control reinspect their socket welds on sampling lines using the acceptance criteria for <sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>" stainless steel, schedule 160 piping, the Mercury Co. QC discovered that many socket welds were undersized. These welds had been accepted by Mercury Co. Quality Control based on the acceptance criteria for <sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>" stainless steel .065 wall tubing. The Mercury Co. QC inspectors, therefore had originally used the criteria for 1/8" welds instead of <sup>1</sup>/<sub>4</sub>" welds. Undersized welds were found on sampling lines in the Reactor Coolant System and in the Steam Generator Blowdown System and on sampling lines in the Pressurizer and Quench Tank. In addition, it was also discovered that there were some descrepancies between the heat numbers stamped on the piping and those documented in the Operational Control Records (OCR).

### SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

This condition represents a breakdown in the Mercury Co. Quality Assurance program in that undersized welds previously inspected and accepted could have gone undetected. Some of the welds in question were made on safety class 2 piping which make up part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. If these deficiencies were left uncorrected, the welds could have failed and possible degradation of safety systems could have occurred.

### CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

Mercury Company has inspected all the socket welds in question on  $\frac{1}{2}$ " stainless steel schedule 160 piping. Welds not in compliance with the correct acceptance criteria were reworked and reinspected by Mercury Company. OCR packages were updated to reflect correct heat numbers and traceability.

Nonconformance Report 4410, Rev. 1, 4365, and 4366 were used to identify, disposition, and implement corrective action. Corrective action is completed per disposition and these reports were closed as of March 3, 1983.

Mercury Co. has upgraded their Quality Control Welding Inspection Program to preclude any further recurrence.

This report is being submitted as the Final Report.