LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

Elocitoce event nei on i
CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
0 1 M A P P S I 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 6 57 CAT 58 5
CON'T O 1 SOURCE L O O O O O O O O O
EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) On 2/13/83 during a shutdown condition, offsite power was lost. The emergency
diesel generators immediately started as designed. The station safety-related
0 4 equipment functioned as intended during and after the switch over to the diesels.
This event created no threat to the public health and safety. LER 82-051 reported
0 6 a similar event. The NRC was notified via ENS.
0 7 (See Attachment)
08
SYSTEM CAUSE SUBCODE S
TO REPORT NUMBER 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
ACTION FUTURE COMPONENT METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMPONENT MANUFACTURER X 18 Z 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 N 24 Z 25 Z 9 9 9 26 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
While the insulators on the isolated portion of the switchyard were being washed
down, offsite power to the startup transformer was lost when the inservice breakers
opened as a result of a sensed ground fault due to salt accumulation. Power was
restored after the insulators were washed down.
1 4 6 80
FACILITY % POWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 1 5 G 28 0 0 0 29 NA A 31 Operational Event
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASE OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA NA NA
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7 0 0 0 37 Z 38 NA
7 8 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 41) 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 8 9 11 12 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43 TYPE DESCRIPTION NA NA
7 8 9 10 80
PDR ADDCK 05000293
NAME OF SPENARER G.G. Whitney PHONE 617-746-7900

BOSTON EDISON COMPANY PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION DOCKET NO. 50-293

Attachment to LER 83-009

On 2/13/83, at 1025, during a shutdown caused by a load reject scram that had occurred at 0039 the same day, a loss of offsite power occurred when switchyard instrumentation sensed an off-normal condition and automatically opened the air controlled breakers (ACB) for the 345 KV supply to the start-up transformer. The station emergency diesel generators started as designed and station safety-related equipment functioned as intended during and after the switch over to the diesel generators. The secondary off-site power source via the shutdown transformer was still available as a back up to the preferred emergency source (diesel generators) during this event.

The scram occurred when a heavy ocean storm caused a salt build-up on the switchyard insulators creating arcing to ground which subsequently caused the opening of ACB's 104 and 105. While the isolated section of the switchyard was being washed down, melting ice and salt deposits on the remaining in service portion of the switchyard created a separate ground that eventually caused the opening of the inservice breakers and resultant loss of offsite power to the startup transformer.

Following the washdown of the switchyard, the power was restored to the start up transformer and preparation for startup commenced.

/dlw