

LER 83-03/01L-0
EVENT DATE - February 23, 1983

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

GPUNC has been replacing selected fire barrier seals since mid January, 1983. While each seal is being replaced, it is considered to be non-functional. Recovery Technical Specification 3.7.11 requires the performance of an hourly firewatch in the area of the impaired seal(s). A Quality Assurance monitoring of security gate access records and other plant records for the period of February 1 through February 7 showed that while replacing seals in the Unit 2 River Water Pump House, the firewatch was performed, on average, only two (2) or three (3) times per shift during the backshifts (1500-2300 and 2300-0700 hours) and during the weekend shifts.

This event is a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.11 due to exceeding the Action Statement requirements and is, therefore, reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1.8(b).

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

Personnel error was the proximate cause of this event. The root cause involves the assignment of priorities such that proper personnel resources were not applied. The Operations personnel relied on the fire detection system to alert them to a problem in the screen house in lieu of the hourly inspection.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit 2 facility was in a long-term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via loss to ambient. Throughout the event there was no effect on the Reactor Coolant System or the core.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

Immediate

The Shift Foreman was made aware of the situation by the issuance of a Quality Deficiency Report (QDR). The hourly surveillance was implemented and the information was passed on to the remaining shifts via the Shift Foreman's Shift Relief Checklist.

Long-Term

An evaluation is continuing to determine if additional corrective action is necessary.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A