



Wisconsin Electric POWER COMPANY
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September 20, 1982

Mr. H. R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Denton:

DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (ESF) RESET CONTROLS
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

In our letters to you dated June 6, 1980 and March 10, 1981, we reported on the completion of measures taken by Wisconsin Electric to ensure compliance with IE Bulletin 80-06 dated March 13, 1980. This Bulletin requested all licensees to review system level schematics to verify that all safety-related equipment remained in its emergency mode upon reset of an Engineered Safety Features (ESF) actuation signal. The Bulletin also required a verification test to prove that instrumentation and controls were consistent with the schematics review. The successful completion of this test for both units at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, was reported in the referenced letters.

Subsequently, in May 1981 we completed wiring modifications to the steam generator blowdown line isolation (SGBLI) valves control circuitry to comply with the requirements of NUREG-0578, Section 2.1.4, and with Mr. A. Schwencer's letter of April 3, 1980 to provide diverse safety grade isolation signals to these valves. A recent detailed review of the modified SGBLI valves wiring schematic revealed that, although the valves are automatically shut as a result of a containment isolation signal (an ESF function), they would also reopen on reset of the containment isolation signal. This is contrary to the direction of IE Bulletin 80-06.

As an interim corrective measure, administrative controls will be implemented on Units 1 and 2 directing the operators to manually close both SGBLI valves prior to resetting a containment isolation signal.


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As a permanent corrective measure, the following action will be taken. As you know, new SGBLI valves have been ordered for installation inside the containments. These new SGBLI valves will be in series with the existing valves outside the containment. The Unit 1 SGBLI valves will be installed during the fall 1982 refueling outage and will be designed to close on a containment isolation signal and to not reopen on reset of the containment isolation signal. Since the new valves inside the containment are in series with the existing valves outside the containment, it is not necessary to modify the control circuitry to the existing valves for Unit 1. Proper operation of the new SGBLI valves will be verified during post installation inspections and acceptance testing. These measures will satisfy all the requirements of IE Bulletin 80-06 and NUREG-0578, Section 2.1.4.

Installation of these new SGBLI valves inside the containment of Unit 2 will not be accomplished until the spring 1983 refueling outage. Therefore, wiring modifications to the existing SGBLI valves control circuitry for Unit 2 will be performed as soon as possible. The control circuitry wiring modifications will prevent automatic reopening of the SGBLI valves on reset of containment isolation. This interim modification to the existing SGBLI valves, while in compliance with all regulations, will only be relied upon until the new SGBLI valves have been installed and tested.

We trust this letter has adequately informed you of our present SGBLI valve situation, as well as our planned corrective actions. If you have any questions regarding our actual plant installation and/or corrective actions, please contact us.

Very truly yours,



Assistant Vice President

C. W. Fay

Copy to NRC Resident Inspector