

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No. 50-275/82-28

Docket No. 50-275 License No. CPR-76 Safeguards Group \_\_\_\_\_

Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company

P. O. Box 7442

San Francisco, California 94106

Facility Name: Diablo Canyon Unit 1

Inspection at: Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California

Inspection conducted: August 1, 1982 through August 28, 1982

Inspectors: *John D. Carlson* 9/9/82  
John D. Carlson, Sr. Resident Reactor Inspector Date Signed

*Marvin M. Mendonca* 9/9/82  
Marvin M. Mendonca, Resident Reactor Inspector Date Signed

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Date Signed

Approved by: *D. F. Kirsch* 9/10/82  
D. F. Kirsch, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 3 Date Signed

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Date Signed

Summary: Inspection on August 1 - 28, 1982 (Report No. 50-275/82-28)

Areas Inspected: Routine inspections of plant operations, surveillance testing, physical security, and maintenance. The inspection involved 90 inspector-hours by two NRC Resident Inspectors.

Results: Of the four areas inspected one item of noncompliance was identified (Failure to provide continuous fire watch coverage in the Cable Spreading room when the CARDOX system was disabled - Severity Level V - Paragraph 2).

## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

- R. Thornberry, Plant Manager
- \*R. Patterson, Plant Superintendent
- \*J. M. Gisclon, Power Plant Engineer
- \*D. A. Backens, Supervisor of Maintenance
- \*J. A. Sexton, Supervisor of Operations
- \*J. V. Boots, Supervisor of Chemistry and Radiation Protection
- \*W. B. Kaefer, Technical Assistant to the Plant Manager
- \*R. G. Todaro, Security Supervisor
- R. T. Twiddy, Supervisor of Quality Assurance
- \*R. C. Howe, Regulatory Compliance Engineer

The inspectors also interviewed a number of other licensee employees including shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operations personnel, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, quality assurance personnel and members of General Construction.

\*Denotes those attending the exit interview.

### 2. Operational Safety Verification

During the inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facility. The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis.

On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to verify compliance with limiting conditions for operations as prescribed in the facility Technical Specifications. Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operation records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations. The turnover of information on plant status was observed to verify that all pertinent information was relayed.

During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items:

- a. General plant and equipment conditions
- b. Maintenance requests and repairs
- c. Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment
- d. Ignition sources and flammable material control
- e. Conduct of selected activities for compliance with the licensee's administrative controls and approved procedures
- f. Interiors of electrical and control panels
- g. Implementation of the licensee's physical security plan
- h. Plant housekeeping and cleanliness

The inspectors conversed with operators in the control room, and other plant personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other topics aligned with the work activities involved.

The inspectors examined the licensee's nonconformance reports to verify that deficiencies were identified, tracked and resolved by the system. Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the completion of corrective action.

During plant tours the inspectors observed that the cable spreading room was left unattended, for short periods, with the CARDOX system disabled. Technical specification 3.7.9.3.a requires that, when the CARDOX system is inoperable in the cable spreading room, a continuous fire watch must be established within one hour.

At about 10:00 a.m. on August 3, 1982, the inspectors noted that there was no fire watch in the cable spreading room with the CARDOX system disabled. The Plant Superintendent was informed of the apparent noncompliance along with the judgement that in the current plant configuration it only had minor safety significance. This judgement is based on the observation that the equipment required per Technical Specifications is generally seismic and radiation monitors, and that the fuel is unirradiated and stored in dry spent fuel storage racks. The Plant Superintendent appraised the Supervisor of Operations of the situation and on the next day, at about 10:00 a.m., a memorandum from the Supervisor of Operations was generated to inform working personnel that the cable spreading room was not to be left unattended when the CARDOX system is disabled.

On August 4, 1982, at about 12:25 p.m., the inspectors again observed that the cable spreading room was unattended with the CARDOX system disabled. The Plant Superintendent and the Supervisor of Operations were informed of the situation. They responded that perhaps verbal communication with the cognizant managers could be useful to establish a fire watch with the CARDOX system disabled.

On August 5, 1982, at about 12:30 p.m., the inspectors again observed that the cable spreading room was unattended with the CARDOX system disabled.

The review of the alarm typewriter printout showed the CARDOX system was disabled from 7:47 a.m. to 5:51 p.m. on August 3; 6:59 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on August 4; and 6:59 a.m. to 4:24 p.m.

on August 5. The review of the security records for these three (just mentioned) observations showed that on August 3, 4, and 5, cable spreading room was unattended for about 15, 53, and 52 minutes respectively. At this point the licensee established clearances requiring fire watches when the CARDOX system was disabled. This is an apparent violation of Technical Specification requirements. (50-275/82-28-01)

3. Maintenance

Maintenance activities, including both preventive and corrective maintenance, were reviewed by the inspectors during the month. Observations by the inspectors verified that proper approvals, system clearance and tests of redundant equipment were performed, as appropriate, prior to conducting maintenance on safety related systems or components. The inspectors verified that qualified personnel performed the maintenance using appropriate maintenance procedures. Replacement parts were examined to determine the proper certification of materials, workmanship and tests. During the actual performance of maintenance activity, the inspectors checked for proper fire protection controls and housekeeping, as appropriate. Upon completion of the maintenance activity, the inspectors verified that the component or system was properly tested prior to returning the system or component to service.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Surveillance

The surveillance testing of safety-related systems were reviewed by the inspectors. Observations by the inspectors included verification that proper procedures were used, test instrumentation was calibrated and that the system or component being tested was properly removed from service if required by the test procedure. Following completion of the surveillance tests, the inspectors verified that the test results met the acceptance criteria of the Technical Specifications and were reviewed by cognizant licensee personnel. The inspectors also verified that corrective action was initiated, if required, to determine the cause for any unacceptable test results and to restore the system or component to an operable status consistent with the technical specification requirements.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on September 3, 1982. During this meeting, the

scope and findings of the inspection were summarized by the inspectors. The licensee acknowledged the apparent violation of fire watch continuity requirements (Paragraph 2).