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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives Mashington, D.C. 20515 February 14, 1983 COMMITTEE ON

SUBCOMMITTEES: TRADE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING

Honorable Nunzio Palladino Chairman The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am deeply concerned over the latest revelations, provided by a top NRC official, about the safety of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant. My purpose in writing is to request more information about the new position of Mr. James Conran so that I might assess more clearly this recent safety-related issue.

As I understand the concerns raised by Mr. Conran, they center on systems integration and the identification of safety related components. Mr. Conran now believes that the plant should not be allowed to operate until possible adverse systems interactions have been identified and corrected. Indeed, he said that "LILCO truly does not understand what is required minimally for safety."

I am alarmed after reading Mr. Conran's submission that a plant could be 95 percent complete while this type of basic analysis remains incomplete. I read in the 1981 NRC Annual Report (the latest report submitted to Congress) that Tas' Number A-17 of unresolved safety issues is "systems interactions." I also noted that in 1978, NRC had scheduled that a Phase I report would be issued by September, 1979, and that a Phase II report would be issued in September, 1980. To date, NRC has issued neither, nor does it have plans to issue these staff reports on unresolved safety issues. What technical basis then does the NRC or LILCO suggest supports an operating license without a detailed systems interaction study being done?


Additionally, I would like to have the following information as soon as possible:

- 1. a definition of systems interaction
- several examples of the type of systems interaction Mr. Conran, the NRC or LILCO think could have adverse effects on Shoreham along with detailed listings of the consequences and probabilities associated with these interactions

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- a copy of the NRC task action plan for the resolution of the systems interaction unresolved safety issue (A-17)
- 4. a complete history of the original schedule of the resolution of A-17 all delays and the budget and person-years assigned to this issue since its identification in-1978
- if A-17 has been delayed or the resolution schedule extended as Mr. Conran alleges, when was this decision made, by whom, and for what reasons

Again, my interest is in finding the answers Long Islanders need to more clearly understand what the existence of Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant in their community means. I hope you will facilitate my representation of their concern by answering these questions as fully and as expeditiously as possible.



TJD:cb

Enclosure: Table 3. Schedule for Resolution of Current Unresolved Safety Issues, The 1981 Annual Report of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Task No.	Unresolved Safety Issue	Schedule for Issuing Staff Report "For Comment" in 1978 NRC Annual Report	Schedule for Issuing Staff Report "For Comment" as of Nov. 16, 1981 ²	Schedule for Issuing Final Staff Report as of Nov. 16, 1981
A-1	Water Hammer	Dec. 1980	Aug. 1982	Jan. 1983
A-3	PWR Steam Generator Tube Integrity	Early 1980	Nov. 1981	Mar. 1982
4-4	PWR Steam Generator Tube Integrity	Early 1980	Nov. 1981	Mar. 1982
A-5	PWR Steam Generator Tube Integrity	Early 1980	Nov. 1981	Mar. 1982
A-11	Reactor Vessel Material Toughness	July 1979	Complete Sept. 1981	Jan. 1982
-12	Steam Generator and Reactor Vessel Supports	Aug. 1979	Complete Nov. 1979	Jan. 1982
A-17	Systems Interactions	Phase 1 — Sept. 1979		
		Phase II — Sept. 1980		•
-39	SRV Pool Dynamic Loads ¹	Oct. 1979		Jan. 1982
-40	Seismic Design Criteria .	Phase I - 1979 Phase II - 1981	Oct. 1981	Jan. 1982
-43	Containment Emergency Sump	Not Scheduled	June 1982	Nov. 1982
-44	Station Blackout	Not Scheduled	Oct. 1982	March 1983
-45	Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Require-	Not Scheduled		Oct. 1985
-46	Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants	Not Scheduled		Dec. 1983
-47	Safety Implications of Control Systems	Not Scheduled		
-48	Hydrogen Control Measures and Effects of Hydrogen Burns	Not Scheduled		

Table 3. Schedule for Resolution of Current Unresolved Safety Issues

SRV denotes Safety Relief Valve

²See "Unresolved Safety Issues Summary: Aqua Book" (NUREG-0606, Vol. 3, No. 4, Nov. 16, 1981).

comment" for Task A-11, "Reactor Vessel Materials Toughness." The "for comment" reports describe the technical studies conducted by the NRC staff or its contractors and the safety conclusions that constitute the NRC staff's resolution of each of the issues. Public and industry comment is solicited and considered on each, and the final report includes a summary and assessment of all of the comments received.

The present schedule for the completion of work on each of the Unresolved Safety Issues is given in Table 3. Important elements in the implementation of these tasks are: (1) the provision of a public comment period following the issuance of the staff's technical resolution, followed by discussion and disposition of the comments received in a final report; (2) provision for the incorporation of the technical resolution into the NRC's Regulations, Standard Review Plan, Regulatory Guides or other official guidance; and (3) provision for application of the final technical resolution to operating plants.

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