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MEMORANDUM FOR: Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch 1
Division of Licensing

FROM: L. G. Hulman, Chief
Accident Evaluation Branch
Division of Systems Integration

SUBJECT: STATUS OF MULTI-PLANT ISSUE B-24

AEB has reviewed the information supplied by Ed Reeves in response to generic containment purge memo dated December 8, 1982. The status is summarized separately for PWR's and BWR's as follows:

PWR's

Assuming that the isolation signal circuitry and purge valves were reliable, there were two remaining conditions which needed to be satisfied for plant-by-plant resolution; valve closure times that either meet the SRP Section 6.2.4 criteria, or are limited to the range investigated in the Generic Safety Evaluation, and Standard Technical Specifications (STS) on primary coolant activities. All the PWR's remaining to be reviewed for B-24 have acceptable valve closure times. In addition, nine of these PWR's also have STS on primary coolant activities and, therefore, the generic evaluation is applicable. The nine plants are:

Crystal River 3
Ginna
Indian Point 3
Millstone 2
Robinson 2
Salem 1, 2
San Onofre 1
Trojan

The remaining B-24 PWR's are:

Indian Point 2
Kewaunee
Oconee 1,2 and 3
Point Beach 2
Rancho Seco
Three Mile Island 1
Turkey Point 3, 4
Zion 1, 2

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AEB's review of the technical specifications for Point Beach 2 indicates that no purging is allowed and following the guidance of SRP Section 6.2.4, Branch Technical Position 6-4, no dose calculation is required. The remaining PWR's listed above do not have STS and the generic evaluation is not applicable. Implementation of STS on all PWR's is currently being considered as a Ginna Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) lessons learned requirement. Should the STS be implemented for all PWR's as the Ginna requirement, no plant specific analyses for the remaining B-24 PWR's would be necessary. We recommend, therefore, that the B-24 evaluations for these plants reference the Ginna lessons learned recommendations, and that the findings state that resolution of the SGTR are also expected to resolve B-24 deficiencies.

BWR's

The generic evaluation is only applicable to three (Brunswick 1 & 2 and LaCrosse) of the twenty-four BWR's listed for B-24. In addition, based on the information supplied by G. Rivenbark, the Project Manager for Hatch 1 and 2, no dose calculation is required for these two plants because purging and venting are restricted to less than 1% of the time (acceptable without a dose assessment per the SRP). As a result, nineteen BWR's will require plant specific analyses to determine the contribution of the purge doses to LOCA. These plants are as follows:

Big Rock Point
Browns Ferry 1, 2 and 3
Cooper Station
Dresden 2 and 3
Duane Arnold
Fitzpatrick
Millstone 1
Monticello
Nine Mile Point
Oyster Creek
Peach Bottom 2 and 3
Pilgrim 1
Quad Cities 1 and 2
Vermont Yankee

Ken Dempsey of AEB will contact E. Reeves concerning schedules and any additional information that will be needed for each of these plants to complete B-24 purge dose assessments.

Original signed by:
L. G. Hulman

L. G. Hulman, Chief
Accident Evaluation Branch
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DATE ▶	W. Butler G. Rivenbark	3/9/83	3/9/83		