NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | MSGGS1 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 | 1 1 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)

LICENSEE CODE (9-14) | LICENSE NUMBER (15-25) | (26) | LICENSE TYPE (27-30) | CAT (57-58)

CON'T

0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (60) | (6) 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 6 (7) | 0 2 1 1 8 3 (8) | 0 3 1 4 8 3 (9)

DOCKET NUMBER (61-68) | EVENT DATE (69-74) | REPORT DATE (75-80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | On 2/11/83, Division I Battery 1A3 failed to satisfactorily pass an "all

0 3 | cells check" surveillance procedure (Surveillance Requirement T.S.4.8.2.

0 4 | 1.b.3). The Division I DC power source and it's associated diesel

0 5 | generator were declared inoperable. Action statement a of T.S.3.8.1.2

0 6 | was entered. The event had no effect on the health and safety of the

0 7 | public and did not constitute a threat to plant safety. This is being

0 8 | reported pursuant to T.S.6.9.1.13.b.

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE E C (11) | CAUSE CODE D (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE Z (13) | COMPONENT CODE I N S T R U (14) | COMP. SUBCODE S (15) | VALVE SUBCODE Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: EVENT YEAR 8 3 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 5 7 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 | REPORT TYPE L | — | REVISION NO. 0

ACTION TAKEN X (18) | FUTURE ACTION Z (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21) | HOURS (22) 0 0 0 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N (24) | PRIME COMP SUPPLIER A (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER I 0 4 5 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The low battery cell temps. were due to a low room temp. The room temp.

1 1 | was low because the pilot switches for the room heater control circuit

1 2 | were in the "OFF" position. The pilot switches were placed in the "ON"

1 3 | position and room and electrolyte temps. returned to normal. The Div. I

1 4 | Battery 1A3 then satisfactorily passed the surveillance.

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS H (28) | % POWER 0 0 0 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30) Core Alterations | METHOD OF DISCOVERY A (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Surveillance Procedures

1 6 | ACTIVITY RELEASED Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 (37) | TYPE Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39) NA

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41) NA

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z (42) | DESCRIPTION NA

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45) NA

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NRC USE ONLY

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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO
LER 83-057/03 L-0

Mississippi Power & Light Company
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-416

Technical Specification Involved: 3.8.2.2, 3.8.1.2
Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.13.b

Event Narrative:

Plant Conditions:

Mode Switch: Refuel
Reactor Temperature: 90°F
Reactor Power: 0%
Core alterations being performed,
Division II, Division III emergency diesel generators inoperable

During performance of an "all cells check" surveillance on the Division I Battery (1A3) it was observed that the average electrolyte temperature of every sixth connected cell was not greater than 60°F as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.2.1.b.3. This resulted in failure of the battery to pass the surveillance and declaring the Division I D.C. power source inoperable. The respective division diesel generator was also declared inoperable. Since the Division II diesel generator had already been declared inoperable (see above plant status) action statement (a) of Technical Specification 3.8.1.2 was entered. The required actions (suspension of core alterations, suspension of operations with a potential for draining the vessel, and initiation of action(s) to restore the power source immediately) were initiated immediately. The cause of the average cell temperatures being less than 60°F was due to low room temperatures. The low room temperatures were caused by the pilot switches for the battery room heater control circuit being in the "OFF" position. The pilot switches were placed in the "ON" position raising room temperature, thus raising the electrolyte temperature. The surveillance was conducted again approximately 5 hours later and the temperatures were satisfactory.

The system integrated operating instructions (04-1-01-Z77-1) have since been revised to include verification that the heater pilot switches are in the "ON" position as normal electrical lineup for system operation. This is a final report.