

UPDATE REPORT

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

PREVIOUS REPORT DATE 10/27/82

CONTROL BLOCK:

1

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

1 A L B R F 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5
8 9 14 15 20 21 26 27 32 33 38 39 44 45 50 51 56 57 58 59

ON'T

1 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 C 5 0 0 0 2 5 9 7 0 9 0 2 8 2 8 0 3 1 6 8 3 9
8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

2 During normal operation, while performing SI4.7.A.2.g-3 (Primary Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test) on unit 2, "A" hydrogen analyzer for unit 1 became inoperable (T.S.3.7.H.2). There was no effect on public health and safety. "B" hydrogen analyzer was available and operable. T.S.3.7.H.2 permits operation for 30 days with one hydrogen analyzer inoperable. "A" analyzer was inoperable for about 16 hours.

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19 SYSTEM CODE S A 11 CAUSE CODE A 12 CAUSE SUBCODE C 13 COMPONENT CODE Z Z Z Z Z Z Z 14 COMP SUBCODE A 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16
17 LER NO REPORT NUMBER 8 2 EVENT YEAR 8 2 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 6 8 OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3 REPORT TYPE X REVISION NO. 2
ACTION TAKEN A 18 FUTURE ACTION X 19 EFFECT ON PLANT Z 20 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 HOURS 0 0 0 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 22 NRC 4 FORM SUB Y 23 PRIME COMP SUPPLIER L 24 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER A 1 6 0 2

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

0 Test engineer inadvertently had wires lifted to 1-FSV-76-57. On return to service,
1 hydrogen sample inlet pump "A" power relay contacts were found to have failed. Allen
2 Bradley 700-N400A1 contacts were replaced and successfully tested. Engineer was
3 instructed. Panel was relabeled. Procedure was revised. See BFRO-50-260/82021 R1.
4

5 FACILITY STATUS E 28 POWER 0 9 8 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Surveillance test
6 ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OR RELEASE Z 32 Z 33 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 34 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 35
7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURE NUMBER 0 0 0 36 TYPE Z 37 DESCRIPTION NA 38
8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 39 TYPE Z 40 DESCRIPTION NA 41
9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION NA 43
10 PUBLICITY ISSUED Z 44 DESCRIPTION NA 45
11 8303220179 830316
PDR ADOCK 05000259
S PDR

NAME OF PREPARER

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LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 82068 R2 Technical Specification Involved 3.7.H.2

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2) * Date Due NRC N/A

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was operating at 97 percent power and unit 2 was in a refueling outage. These units were unaffected by this event. With unit 1 operating at 98 percent power, during the performance of SI 4.7.A.2.g-3 (Primary Containment Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test) on unit 2, the unit 1 "A" hydrogen analyzer became inoperable when test personnel inadvertently lifted the power supply lead wires for 1-FSV-76-57 instead of 2-FSV-76-57. The wires involved are located in adjacent panels 1-9-54 and 2-9-54 in the units 1 and 2 control room. FSV-76-57 is a hydrogen-oxygen analyzer "A" sample return valve which closed when the wires were lifted. There was no effect on public health and safety. Technical Specification 3.7.H.2 allows operation for thirty days with one hydrogen analyzer operable. "B" hydrogen analyzer was available and operable. Upon return to service, during the performance of Surveillance Instruction 4.7.H, the unit 1 "A" hydrogen sample inlet pump was discovered to have failed after FSV-76-57 closed. Investigation revealed that the relay R2 contacts had failed. Relay R2 contacts were replaced and Special Maintenance Instruction 176 and SI 4.7.H were successfully completed. The test engineer involved was reinstructed. The panels involved (1-9-54 and 2-9-54) were relabelled to clearly identify each unit. The procedure was revised for clarity.

Refer to BFRO 50-260/82021 R1 for the results of relay R2 contact failure investigation.

* Previous Similar Events:

BFRO-50-259.82031 R2

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP