

Log # TXX-94156 File # 10200

Ref. # 50.73(a)(2)(i)

June 3, 1994

William J. Cahill, Jr. Group Vice President

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk

Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES) - UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-445

CONDITION PROHIBITED BY THE PLANT'S TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 445/94-002-00

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 94-002-00 for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Unit 1, "Broken Missile Shield Door Latching Mechanism Caused the Door to be Considered Inoperable."

Sincerely,

William J. Cahill, Jr.

Rv.

Roger D. Walker

Regulatory Affairs Manager

OB:clc

Enclosure.

cc: Mr. L. J. Callan, Region IV

T. Reis, Region IV

Resident Inspectors, CPSES

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the applicable action statement of Specification 3.0.3.

Corrective actions were to repair the door, evaluate for potential design changes, preventive maintenance, and to restrict the use of the missile shield doors.

NRC FORM 366A

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC. 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC. 20503.

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DESCRIPTION OF THE REPORTABLE EVENT

A. EVENT CLASSIFICATION

Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

B. PLANT OPERATING CONDITIONS BEFORE THE EVENT

On May 10, 1994. Unit 1 was in Mode 1 with the reactor at 100 percent power, and Unit 2 was in Mode 5 in an outage.

C. STATUS OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, OR COMPONENTS THAT WERE INOPERABLE AT THE START OF THE EVENT AND THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT.

The missile shield door was inoperable and contributed to the event.

D. NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE EVENT, INCLUDING DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES

On May 10, 1994 at 7:20 a.m. a vendor (non-licensed, contractor) exited the control room missile shield door (EIIS:(DR)(NA)). The security guard (non-licensed, contractor) accompanying the vendor noted that the door did not close and was lodged in the open position. The security guard immediately notified the control room staff (licensed, utility) of the event.

Due to the door being in an open position, the control room emergency filtration/pressurization system was in a degraded condition with respect to maintaining a positive pressure. The door was immediately declared inoperable by the control room staff, placing CPSES Unit 1 into the applicable action statement of Specification 3.0.3. Unit 2 was not impacted since it was in Mode 5 in an outage.

On May 10, 1994 at 11:03 a.m., Nuclear Regulatory Commission operations center was notified of this event via the Emergency Notification System pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(2).

E. THE METHOD OF DISCOVERY OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE OR PROCEDURAL ERROR

The security guard noticed that the missile shield door was lodged in the open position and notified the Control Room staff.

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II. COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURES

A. FAILED COMPONENT INFORMATION

Manufacturer:

Overly Manufacturing Company.

Model No.:

E40A

Part Name:

Trigger wire (relatching device).

B. FAILURE MODE, MECHANISM, AND EFFECT OF EACH FAILED COMPONENT

The trigger wire (relocking device) for the missile shield door broke, which caused the door to be incapable of resealing.

C. CAUSE OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE

Excessive wear of the trigger wire due to friction caused the component to wear out.

D. SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS THAT WERE AFFECTED BY FAILURE OF COMPONENTS WITH MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS

The missile shield door was open, thus placing the control room HVAC in a degraded condition with respect to maintaining a positive pressure.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

A. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES THAT OCCURRED

Not applicable - there were no safety system responses associated with this event.

B. DURATION OF SAFETY SYSTEM TRAIN INOPERABILITY

The control room HVAC was considered inoperable for approximately seventeen (17) minutes.

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C. SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVENT

With the control room missile shield door (E40-A) incapable of being closed, the ability of the Control Room HVAC system to provide the control room's positive pressure boundary was negated. In the event of a concurrent radiological release to the atmosphere, the lack of a positive pressure boundary would not guarantee that the control room operating staff's resultant exposure would have been within specified dose limits. However, since there was no actual event, safe operation of CPSES or the health and safety of the public was not impacted.

IV. CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The May 10, 1994 incident occurred due to physical breakage of the door's trigger wire. Excessive wear of the trigger wire due to friction caused the component to wear out.

V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The door was repaired and the control room HVAC system was restored to operable status. Plant management is evaluating potential design changing, preventive maintenance, and is emphasizing precautions with respect to opening and closing of the missile shield doors.

VI. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

There have been no other previous LERs which dealt with missile shield doors.

VII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

All times listed in the report are approximate and central daylight time.