

PDR 03/083
CT-1552



Franklin Research Center
A Division of The Franklin Institute

Z. ZUDANS, PH.D.
Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer

RECEIVED
REACTOR SAFEGUARDS DIVISION

50-397
50-522

FEB 1 1983

2,019, 2011 January 15, 1983

Mr. Anthony J. Cappucci, Jr.
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Skagit/Hanford Nuclear Project

Dear Tony:

Overall impression of the Skagit/Hanford applicants presentation was good. The individual presentors were well prepared and could either answer all questions in satisfactory manner directly or came back with answers at a later time.

Skagit/Hanford site appears to be ideal, no civilian population to speak of within the LPZ, however, about 5,000 nuclear related workers within the Hanford Reservation need to be factored in. The only structural aspect that is novel is the 7.5 mi long, 36", raw water supply pipe and the intake structure on the Columbia River that is quite a ways away from the plant site. Whether or not this structure needs some special disposition in terms of safeguards depends on the acceptability of 30 day water reserve in the ultimate heat sink (UHS). Also the site is some 50 ft above the water level at the intake, however, potential for inadvertent drainage of the UHS is prevented by an appropriate placement of the pipe discharge end at or slightly below the UHS water surface.

The foundation of Skagit/Hanford is on soil unlike the original site where it was on the rock. If one factors in the problem with the backfill experienced at the Midland site, it is appropriate to review the backfill procedures carefully, in particular with respect to the compacting.

Skagit/Hanford management appears to be well structured and experienced in their functions. It was, however, not stated how much of their accumulated experience is derived from other than Skagit scenario. Top managements attitude and policy with respect to the quality assurance is sound and encouraging in particular as it was conveyed by Mr. Myers during his presentation. Apparently applicants strategy is to obtain CP for Skagit/Hanford, and then by consideration of the regional power requirement projections, the state of the economy and with the "regulatory ratched under control," to make the decision to construct or not to construct the plant. During the construction an independent Safety Engineering Group will be brought into existence at about the time of preoperational testing. For training, Black Fox simulator will be used (managed by GE).

BLR

Mr. A. J. Cappucci, Jr.
ACRS


- 2 -

January 31, 1983

Mark III pool dynamic loads were discussed. Applicant understands the phenomena and follows the design methodology used by others (NTOLS). Cross quenchers are used on the SRV discharge, rams on the RHR relief valve discharge. For H₂ control, a distributed igniter system is planned, similar to that used in Grand Gulf.

In summary, this applicant appears to know its plant well, follows the imposed requirements strictly, has a constructive policy with respect to the QA at the top of the management structure and with the assistance of Bechtel and NESCO should be able to construct a sound Skagit/Hanford plant.

Very truly yours,


Zenons Zudans

ces