

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received without verification or evaluation and is basically all that is known by IE staff on this date.

FACILITY: Southern California Edison Company San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 & 3 San Clemente, California Docket No. 50-361/362	Licensee Emergency Classification: <input type="checkbox"/> Notification of Unusual Event <input type="checkbox"/> Alert <input type="checkbox"/> Site Area Emergency <input type="checkbox"/> General Emergency <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
SUBJECT: PROMPT REPORT - FAILURE OF REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS TO OPEN WHEN TESTED USING THE UNDER-VOLTAGE COIL - (UPDATED INFORMATION)	

Licensee and NRC staff investigation into the failures of the under-voltage trip mechanism during testing is continuing. Testing of the breakers on March 13, 1983, was able to demonstrate improper operation of the breaker. The exact cause is still under review, but may be due, in part, to resistance in the mechanical latching mechanism associated with the under-voltage trip device. In addition to the failures which occurred during surveillance testing in March 1983, it has been determined that there were similar failures in March and July 1982. These earlier failures had not been reported to the NRC. This situation is under review by Region V.

At San Onofre the plant protection system is designed such that a reactor trip signal activates both the under-voltage and shunt trip functions. All tests of the breakers using the shunt trip mechanisms were satisfactory. Accordingly, it appears that the shunt trip mechanism would activate the Reactor Protection System upon receipt of a reactor trip signal. IE Bulletin Number 83-04 has been issued to holders of operating licenses requiring them to test their Reactor Protection System breakers (not covered by a previous Bulletin, No. IEB 83-01), review their breaker maintenance program, and review their emergency operating procedures dealing with a "failure-to-trip" event.

Region V has issued a Confirmation of Action letter to the licensee assuring that both units will stay shut down until the breaker concerns have been resolved to the satisfaction of the NRC staff. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has assumed lead responsibility in assessing the adequacy of licensee corrective actions.

Media interest has occurred. NRC Headquarters issued a news release on March 11, 1983. This updates information provided in PNO-V-83-11, issued 3/11/83. This information is current as of 11:00 a.m. on March 14, 1983.

CONTACT: D. F. Kirsch
463-3723

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REGION V: FORM 211
(revised 3/14/83)