

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
THE HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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March 11, 1983
MP-4768

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes
Regional Administrator, Region 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Office
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA. 19406

Reference: Provisional License DPR-21
Docket No. 50-245
Reportable Occurrence RO 83-07/3L

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence RO 83-07/3L required to be submitted within thirty days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'E. J. Mroczka'.

E. J. Mroczka

Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM/TST:mo

Attachment: LER RO 83-07/3L

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D. C. (30)
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control,
Washington, D. C. (3)
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch,
Washington, D. C. 20555

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ATTACHMENT TO LER 83-07/3L
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1
PROVISIONAL LICENSE NO. DPR-21
DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Reactor protection signal was not generated from a Main Steam Isolation Valve ten percent closed.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to occurrence the unit was increasing power from 90 percent of rated.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On February 16, 1983, at 0100 hours, while performing Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Closure Functional Test, 1-MS-2C, the outboard isolation valve, failed to de-energize relay 590-102D at the ten percent closed position. Operations personnel immediately pulled fuse 590-702D. This de-energized relay 590-102D and placed the 1-MS-2C input to the 'B' reactor protection system (RPS) logic in a tripped, more conservative condition. Technical Specification, Table 3.1.1 requires a main steam isolation valve closure scram signal when the MSIV is less than or equal to ten percent from full open.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

Presently, plant conditions prevent inspection of 1-MS-2C. Therefore, the cause is unknown. A followup report will be submitted when the cause and corrective action are known. Until then the 1-MS-2C input to the 'B' RPS logic will remain in the tripped condition.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The Main Steam line isolation valve closure scram is set to scram when the isolation valves are ten percent closed from full open in three out of four lines. This scram anticipates the pressure and flux transients which occur during normal or inadvertent isolation valve closure. By scrambling at this setting the resultant transient is insignificant.

The occurrence provided no decrease in protection, only decrease in redundancy. Each valve has a switch/relay system in each protection system logic channel. Although one logic channel for the 'C' switch did not trip, the other logic channel did trip and would had initiated the required trip had the valve actually closed ten percent from full open.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

At the next scheduled cold shutdown, 1-MS-2C will be inspected and reworked as necessary. A followup report will be submitted at that time.

Similar Occurrences: 81-16/3L, 79-11/3L.