

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | N | C | B | E | P | 1 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

7 8 | 9 | 14 | 15 | 25 | 26 | 30 | 57 CAT 58 | 9

LICENSEE CODE | LICENSE NUMBER | LICENSE TYPE | 57 CAT 58

CON'T 01 | L | 0 | 5 | 0 | - | 0 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 3 | 9

7 8 | 60 | 61 | DOCKET NUMBER | 68 | 69 | EVENT DATE | 74 | 75 | REPORT DATE | 80 | 9

REPORT SOURCE | DOCKET NUMBER | EVENT DATE | REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | Routine surveillance during refueling operations revealed reactor building HVAC
03 | System exhaust inboard isolation damper, IC-BFIV-RB, had dual open-close position
04 | indication while closed. Performance of Secondary Containment Isolation System
05 | Operability Test, PT-15.4a, revealed the system's two inboard supply and exhaust and
06 | two outboard supply and exhaust dampers isolated in approximately 4.5 seconds versus
07 | the specified requirement of ⁵ 4 seconds. These events did not affect the health
08 | and safety of the public. Technical Specifications 3.6.5.2, 6.9.1.9b

7 8 9

09 | S | D | E | E | I | N | S | T | R | U | S | Z

7 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 18 | 19 | 20

SYSTEM CODE | CAUSE CODE | CAUSE SUBCODE | COMPONENT CODE | COMP. SUBCODE | VALVE SUBCODE

17 | 8 | 3 | - | 0 | 0 | 8 | / | 0 | 3 | L | - | 0

7 8 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | OCCURRENCE CODE | REPORT TYPE | REVISION NO.

X | Z | Z | Z | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | Y | N | X | 9 | 9 | 9

33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 47

ACTION TAKEN | FUTURE ACTION | EFFECT ON PLANT | SHUTDOWN METHOD | HOURS | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | The open limit switch of IC-BFIV-RB was sticking, resulting in the dual position
11 | indication. The switch, Snap Lock Model No. D2400X-R, was adjusted and lubricated
12 | and IC damper indication was returned to normal. The dampers' failure to close
13 | within the specified time is attributed to utilization of needle valves in the
14 | dampers' actuators air supply. The needle valves were removed as per a plant
15 | modification and PT-15.4a was satisfactorily completed.

7 8 9

15 | H | 0 | 0 | 0 | NA | A | Operator Surveillance

7 8 9 | 10 | 12 | 17 | 44 | 45 | 46

FACILITY STATUS | % POWER | OTHER STATUS | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

16 | Z | Z | NA | NA

7 8 9 | 10 | 11 | 44 | 45

ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | LOCATION OF RELEASE

17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Z | NA

7 8 9 | 11 | 12 | 13

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | TYPE | DESCRIPTION

18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | NA

7 8 9 | 11 | 12

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | DESCRIPTION

19 | Z | NA

7 8 9 | 10

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | DESCRIPTION

20 | N

7 8 9 | 10

ISSUED | DESCRIPTION

8303180335 830311
PDR ADOCK 05000325
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER M. J. Pastva, Jr.

PHONE: 919-457-9521

LER ATTACHMENT - RO #1-83-08

Facility: BSEP Unit No. 1

Event Date: February 12, 1983

Routine RTGB surveillance revealed that Reactor Building HVAC System exhaust inboard isolation damper, 1C-BFIV-RE, had dual open-close position indication. A local verification of the damper position showed it was closed. The dual position indication was caused by the damper open position limit switch sticking and remaining picked up, regardless of actual damper position. The limit switch, Snap Lock Model No. D2400X-R, was exercised, lubricated, and adjusted for proper operation, and the operability of the damper position indication was restored.

While performing secondary containment isolation system operability test, PT-15.4a, following completion of the maintenance to the subject 1C damper, it was discovered that the system's two inboard supply and exhaust and two outboard supply and exhaust dampers isolated in 4.5 seconds versus the specified requirement of ≤ 4.0 seconds. This failure to isolate within the specified time requirement is attributed to the use of needle-type valves in the dampers' actuation air supply lines upstream of the dampers' actuators. The use of needle valves in this particular application results in a slower response of the damper actuation due to a restriction of the air supply flow through the valves. Standard design of air supply systems in similar air actuation applications utilizes needle valves. This is generally done as protection for overpressurization of air actuators, and also serves as a means of precise adjustment of air pressure to the actuators.

An assessment of the air supply system to these dampers was then performed. The encountered supply air pressures were found to be well within the actuator drive pressure limits; therefore, the needle valves are not required. An approved plant modification was then implemented which replaced the needle valves on the four subject damper actuators with an unobstructed length of air tubing. In addition, the respective damper actuators on Unit No. 2 were also modified in a likewise manner. Both units' Reactor Building HVAC Systems were then satisfactorily tested in accordance with PT-15.4a.

It is felt this particular failure did not constitute or represent a significant degradation of plant equipment; therefore, further action regarding this event is not required.