NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

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PUBLIC S	SERVICE	COMPANY	OF	7	NEW	HAMPSHIRE	)				
SEABROOM	K STATIO	ON UNITS	I	&	II		)	DOCKET	NOS.	50-443	

DATE: July 15, 1982 PAGES:255 thru 501

AT: Portsmouth, New Hampshire

Distribution Sype: TR-01

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## 255 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 3 In the matter of: 5 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE Docket Nos. SEABROOK STATION UNITS I & II 50-443 OL and 7 50-444 OL Thursday, July 15, 1982 9 2nd Floor Courtroom Portsmouth District Court 10 Portsmouth, New Hampshire 11 Second Prehearing Conference in the above-entitled 12 matter convened, pursuant to Notice, at 9:45 a.m. 13 BEFORE: 14 HELEN F. HOYT, Chairman Administrative Judge 15 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 16 DR. EMMETH A. LUEBKE, Member Administrative Judge 17 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 18 DR. OSCAR PARIS, Member 19 Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 20

## APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Applicant:

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3	Office of Chief Hearing Counsel Nuclear Regulatory Commission
4	Washington, D. C.
	On behalf of Sun Valley Association:
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13	Assistant Attorney General
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16	GEORGE DANA BISBEE, Esq.
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18	On behalf of the State of Maine:
19	PHILIP AHRENS, Esq.
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22	On behalf of Coastal Chamber of Commerce:
	BEVERLY HOLLINGWORTH, Esq.

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On behalf of the New England Coalition of Nuclear Pollution: WILLIAM JORDAN and DIANE CURRAN, Esqs.

Harmon & Weiss Washington, D. C.

On behalf of Seacoast Anti Pollution League:

ROBERT A. BACKUS, Esq. Manchester New Hampshire

On behalf of Society for the Protection of the Environment of Southeastern New Hampshire:

ROBERT L. CHIESA, Esq. 95 Market Street Manchester, New Hampshire

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## PROCEEDINGS

JUDGE HOYT: The hearing will come to order. This is the second special Prehearing Conference called in the case of The Public Service Company of New Hampshire, Seabrook Station Units I & II, Docket Nos. 443-OL and 444-OL.

In order to have this record for this morning be as accurate as possible, I will take the appearances of counsel so that we can indicate on this record who was present at each of the hearings. Let us take the Applicant first. Mr. Gad.

MR. GAD: Madam Chairman, Members of the Board, my name is Robert K. Gad, II. I am an attorney. I practice with the firm of Ropes & Gray, 225 Franklin Street, Boston, Massachusetts

With me, to my right, is Mr. John A. Ritsher of the same firm.

Also appearing with us, but unavoidably prevented from being here this morning is our partner, Mr. Thomas G. Dignan, Jr. Together we appear for the Applicant.

JUDGE HOYT: You will represent the Applicant this morning, however?

MR. GAD: Yes, indeed.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you.

For the Staff, Mr. Lessy?

MR. LESSY: May it please the Board, my name is
Roy P. Lessy, Jr. I am Deputy Assistant Chief Hearing Counsel.

Also on behalf of the NRC Staff, to my left is

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Robert G. Perlis.

JUDGE HOYT: Let us start over here, sir.

MR. EDELMAN: Madam Chairperson, Members of the Board, my name is Lawrence M. Edelman. I am with the Hampton Law Firm of Sanders & McDermott Professional Association and I represent Sun Valley Association.

JUDGE HOYT: Good morning, sir.

MR. MCDERMOTT: Good morning, Madam Chairman.

I am Edward J. McDermott. I am from the same Firm of Sanders & McDermott. I represent the Town of South Hampton.

Our Offices are located in Hampton, New Hampshire.

MS. SHOTWELL: May it please the Board, my name is Jo Ann Shotwell. I am an Assistant Attorney General. I represent the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in this proceeding.

JUDGE HOYT: Sir?

MR. AHRENS: Good morning. My name is Philip Ahrens.

I am Assistant Attorney General for the State of Maine. We are
here as an interested State.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you. Sir?

MR. BISBEE: Good morning. My name is Dana Bisbee.

I am from the New Hampshire Attorney General's Office, representing the State of New Hampshire and its Attorney this morning.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Kinder is not with you today?

MR. BISBEE: That is correct.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you. Sir?

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MR. JORDAN: William Jordan with the Washington Firm of Harmon and Weiss representing the New England Coalition of Nuclear Pollution.

With me to my left is my Associate, Diane Curran.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you. Mr. Backus?

MR. BACKUS: I am Robert A. Backus of Manchester.

I am here to represent the Seacoast Anti Pollution League.

JUDGE HOYT: Ma'am?

MS. HOLLINGWORTH: I am Beverly Hollingworth. am here to represent the Coastal Chamber of Commerce.

JUDGE HOYT: Ms. Hollingworth, we asked you for the list of members of your association by telegramming. You very graciously replied expeditiously. However, in that wire I merely asked you to reply to the NRC Staff and to the Applicant. I wonder if you would be able to make copies of that list of members to the other parties that are available here?

MS. HOLLINGWORTH: I certainly would be glad to.

JUDGE HOYT: I think they may be interested in doing so. The reason that I did not ask that the list be circulated to all of the parties, the potential Interveners in this case, is that we had so many remarks last time is that the expense of all this was unbearable. We thought that this would be an easy way to do it and everybody would still be able to

Thank you, Ms. Hollingworth.

have the information at the appropriate time.

Anyone else? Sir? I'm sorry, sir, I did not see you there.

MR. CHIESA: My name is Robert Chiesa. I am an Attorney and I represent the Society for the Protection of the Environment of Southeastern New Hampshire.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you, sir.

Are you people through with the NRC Staff?

MR. LESSY: This is Mr. Wheeler, your Honor, Project
Manager for the Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Regulation
and to his left is Mr. Claude Scott, Summer Intern with the
Office of the Executive Legal Director. Thank you.

JUDGE HOYT: We want to do some work here in this
Prehearing Conference to see if we can wind up everything as to
the contentions and get some feel of the parties' various
positions.

I think the last time it was simply a too protracted discussion that we had. This time we would sort of like to limit it down and get some sense of where we are going with these things.

I do not think that we are going to need to do too much more with the contentions filed by the State of New Hampshire. At least I thought that way until they apparently have revised your contentions pretty drastically from the first time. So we will take any argument that the Staff and the Applicant may wish to submit on that basis at this Hearing but let us limit it down to that.

As soon as Counsel has completed their work with us, insofar as their contentions are concerned, that their interest in this particular Prehearing Conference may cease at some point, this Board will be happy to entertain a Motion for the party to be excused, and it will get everyone out a little bit quicker and hopefully we will not be going on so long.

There is a method here; that is, the less people we have in the room the less likelihood we will go too long into the discussion. That may help a little bit.

We have noticed also that the date for the completion of the Plant has slipped considerably from our last Prehearing Conference in which we were advised that it was going to be completed in November of 1983, I believe. Mr. Gad, could you give us some help on that?

MR. GAD: Madam Chairman, to what you refer is a pronouncement by the Staff---

JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting.) Yes, that is correct; but since it is your Plant, maybe you can go one better and give us an actual.

MR. GAD: Well, as I think has been communicated by the Company to the Staff, the Company is a little bit disappointed at this change having been made at this point. There is a Session Plan for, I think it is, October or November where the Caseload Forecast Panel will come up and review the schedule with the Company, at which time the question of whether or not

adjustments which need be made will be finally determined at least for the time being.

Therefore, I feel that the Staff's position may

be not unfairly characterized as a tentative one at this point

to which the Company's response is not intended to be forthcoming

until that Caseload Forecast Panel meets in October.

In terms of what impact the Staff's present position,

I think the emphasis cught to be on the word present, ought to

have on the scheduling on these proceedings is a subject that

I think all parties are prepared to address. I do not know if

you want to take that up in all of its detail right now. I am

not sure that I give any more guidance than that.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Am I hearing correctly, you are sort of saying that it is unofficial?

MR. GAD: Not all, Dr. Luebke. The Staff has made a proposal and it says, as we look at things we ought to recognize this change. The Company's response is, we would not have made that change now. We are not prepared to sit down and go through this thing definitely until the session that is already planned for October or November. So there is no response from the Company.

JUDGE LUEBKE: So what you are telling me is from the Company's point of view it is unofficial, I think.

MR. GAD: I think it is even one notch below unofficial.

JUDGE LUEBKE: All right, less than that.

JUDGE HOYT: On a scale of 1 to 10---

MR. GAD: (Interrupting.) I hesitate to get into

quantitative analysis to determine it.

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JUDGE HOYT: That Panel -- I am sorry. I didn't understand the date.

MR. GAD: I believe it is October or November of 1982. Frankly, though, I can't recall whether I was told the precise date, but it is in the mid-Fall of 1982.

JUDGE HOYT: I'm sorry. Is that correct, Mr. Lessy? MR. LESSY: My understanding, your Honor, is that the Company is doing a detailed revaluation of their progress and construction, and that is due sometime early in the Fall, perhaps at the end of the month of September, and then after the Staff has a chance to take a look at that, then there will be a physical Plant Site Tour, and that should take place within a month or two months after the Applicant's study is completed.

JUDGE HOYT: Putting it somewhere around December?

MR. LESSY: I'd say November. The final Prehearing Paragraph 4 of the Board's Prehearing Conference Order asked that the parties be prepared to discuss scheduling further, and we are prepared to do that. In fact, considering the comments of the parties to the Proceeding at the last Prehearing, as well as some of the scheduling adjustments, in addition, some discussion we had with F.E.M.A. concerning their input, we do have a proposed revised schedule to pass out. If you would like me to do so, I could do it now. I don't know in which order you want to take this. At the last Prehearing we did it last, but if the Board prefers to have parties who are completed to be able to go, maybe we

ought to do it at the beginning. I'll leave that up to the Board.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, that's the reason that I brought

MR. LESSY: I could pass this tentative proposal out.

JUDGE HOYT: Sure. Thank you.

it up at this time, so we could get --

On the schedule that you gave us before, Mr. Lessy, I think the word is not operative.

MR. LECSY: I'll respond, your Honor, when he finishes passing this out so that everyone will have a copy in front of him.

I never had a course in scheduling in law school, so in this area I rely on the input that I get from the Division of Licensing and we discuss these matters.

Based upon the knowledge that I have today concerning this matter, as Mr. G. has said, nothing is cast in concrete. I think at the last Prehearing we discussed with the Board the fact that there was approximately a twelve or thirteen doubt or difference between the forecast that the Staff had sort of in mind with respect to construction and completion at Seabrook, vis-a-vis, what the Applicant had in mind, and we've been trying to deal with this.

We also said that at the Seabrook site our Resident Inspectors reported upwards of 8,000 men working three shifts.

My understanding is that the schedule which I have here would be

accurate from the Staff's standpoint. I think there is enough flexibility in this schedule to consider any adjustments which may be required and if the Public Service Company of New Hampshire, which if possible could catch up on some of the time, that has been indicated that has not been made, this gives them an opportunity to do that. If there is any further slippage, I think the schedule can be adjusted in that regard.

JUDGE HOYT: That last Discovery Request which you show as December 15 of 1982, is that a sufficient discovery time?

MR. LESSY: Well, the discovery period would start roughly 8/15/82 and run, if that were an interrogatory request, the rules provide -- or a document request -- the rules provide 30 days to provide documents; 15 days for interrogatories as a matter of practice when document requests are coupled with interrogatories. People just assume that they have 30 days.

This would give the parties from 8/15/82 until the Prehearing Conference, which would be almost 5 months.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, the N.C.R. though, is not scheduled until November 8th of 1982.

MR. LESSY: Yes, that's one of the dates which has been changed. The F.E.S., the Final Environmental Statement -- there is no change in that. That's still the original date for the issuance of that.

JUDGE HOYT: If it's going to hold.

MR. LESSY: Yes, that's right. The S.E.R., the

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date has moved two months with the agreement with the Applicants with respect to that, as I understand it.

JUDGE PARIS: So you are talking about January 3 for the S.E.R. ?

MR. LESSY: No, the S.E.R. is 11/08/82. The date is on the bottom left hand side of the --

These are revised dates. I'm sorry. It should have said that.

What I'm saying is that the F.E.S. would come out right in the middle of the discovery opportunity. The S.E.R. would come out also in maybe the back third of that period, certainly within five weeks or six weeks of the opportunity to file the discovery request.

The other thing that this does is that if you look at the fourth line from the bottom, we have had discussions with F.E.M.A., Region I, which is responsible, as the Board knows, for off-site planning with respect to sites, nuclear power plant sites, and I think in the last Prehearing there was considerable discussion about the input from F.E.M.A. and how that would gel with the proposed schedule and the fact that this was something that neither the Board nor the Staff had any control over and it was a very iffy date.

We have had discussions with F.E.M.A. in that regard and they have promissed to us to make their findings and testimony available in accordance with this schedule; in other words,

May 5th, and as this schedule works out, all the schedules, all the testimony would come in together, and therefore, there would be not delay or biforcation necessitated as a result of having F.E.M.A. testimony come in during the pendency of an ongoing operating license proceeding.

The one thing that this schedule does that I wanted to point out to the Board was that it does two things. Under the schedule which we had previously discussed, the hearing was to begin in February or March of 1983, and the estimates in the construction completion have approximately been revised backwards for 22 weeks, which if you figure it out in terms of workdays, is roughly six months.

of just advancing the Hearing date or postponing the hearing date for six months all the way across the board, this only postpones the hearing date for approximately three months.

The affect of that is twofold.

JUDGE HOYT: Wouldn't that be four months?

MR. LESSY: Four months, yes. The affect of that is that it gives us an additional two months for available hearing time. The Bevill Schedule only allowed approximately two months the the hearing. This would make it approximately four and one half months which gave us a lot more flexibility in terms of continuation.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you think we are going to need that

much hearing time?

MR. LESSY: It depends on the schedules or the parties and the Board and the availability of witnesses and things of this nature. It gives us the opportunity to do that. In addition to that, this schedule here also gives us from June until April with respect to the requirements -- the Commission's requirements, for the Licensing Board's decision.

If the Hearing is over more expeditiously, and in fact the Applicant studies and the Staff's review indicates that catch-up progress has been made with respect to this Unit, that amount of time between the Hearing start date and the Licensing Board's initial decision date, permits us to at least make and probably beat the the Commission Decision, the Licensing Board's Decision Date.

JUDGE LUEBKE: In view of this meeting you are going to have in October or November, is there really any point of trying to be very accurate about things beyond?

MR. LESSY: Only in the sense, your Honor, that with a lot of parties, and certainly a lot of proposed contentions, our feeling is -- the Staff feeling is, and we hope the Board would agree that it would be prudent to get the proceeding going now.

There are a lot of issues in the proceeding that don't need to await the final estimate of construction completion date to get started on.

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In my experience at least, in nuclear power plant licensing proceedings, is that the best way to have a long, big delay which is going to have a deleterious affect on everyone is to have a lot of little delays.

Our feeling here was that we would like to get the proceedings started and this did provide for, I think, a fair amount of time for discovery. It also provides a date for January 12 and that should, obviously, be 1983, an opportunity for the Board and the parties to deal with any schedule adjustments, either positive or negative at that point in time, any extensions of discovery which might be required, as well as resolving any discovery disputes that sometimes arise in these cases at that time.

After the results of the Staff aseload orecast anel would be out in January 12, 1983, under this proposed schedule, we would not have only issued the Safety Evaluation Report in the Final Environmental Statement, but we would have had the opportunity for good discovery. I think we would have a running start on what ever else is to come.

As I say, I'm not --

JUDGE LUEBKE: Excuse me. A running start -- I read the discovery would be practically over.

MR. LESSY: That's right.

JUDGE HOYT: Hold on, Mr. Lessy. We have to change

tapes.

JUDGE HOYT: Go ahead.

MR. LESSY: The last discovery requests, it would about over at that time but that would afford the parties almost five months for discovery. Now in operating licensing proceedings that is generous from the dates that I have seen.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Then we ought to hang tough to really get the discovery over.

MR. LESSY. We would have to look at that in

January but my feeling would be that at that point in time any

discovery that was not over with, there would have to be a good

reason for it.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Exactly.

JUDGE HOYT: I believe Ms. Curran had some input in a schedule. There seems to be a considerable difference.

MR. JORDAN: Well, actually, your Honor, I am struck that in a sense it is not as different as it might seem.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well. Then let us dwell on the agreements that we have.

Your hearing schedule start, of course, is October and the Staff is proposing June?

MS. JORDAN: Correct. That is four months. We are basically off by three or four months in the whole thing.

In my experience, the four months that is provided for, for discovery is simply not adequate for the scope on the premise that we will get the contentions that we expect to get.

Assurance contentions. My experience is that we really need a six month Discovery Period in order to handle that adequately. If we are able to do it as we expect to, it involves discovery in analysis of massive amounts of documents, documents involving, again if we have the capacity to do it, virtually all of the nonconformances that have occurred on that site, trend analyses, an enormous number of things to look at. That is just in the area of Quality Assurance.

own experience in the last two or three months at Comanche Peak Site, helping out down there, it was 30,000 pages of documents discovered in a couple of month. You can imagine they have not had much time to assimilate that material very well and that was only part of the information available.

So just fundamentally I am concerned that we really do need six months.

JUDGE LUEBKE: This morning we are not really ready to show cause. In other words, you are imagining this?

MR. JORDAN: I am postulating it, I guess I prefer.

At any rate, that is the kind of concern that I have. I recognize that there is a desire to move operating license proceedings along but this is substantial lititgation about a very, very complicated machine.

JUDGE HOYT: You know, Mr. Jordan, if we hold onto

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the schedule proposed by the Staff with some flexibility, if you could show cause you need additional time, would not we be in a better posture than just tossing out time so free handed? I feel, and I am speaking for myself on this, I just feel that discovery is a very overworked term. You may get 30,000 pages of documents, you may get 3 and you may get none. Until you get the 30,000 let's not talk in terms of what we need to assimilate that kind of material. Let's talk in terms of what the bare mimimum would be and if you need to get some extra quarters from this Board to get discovery on a particular matter, then let's meet it individually, point by point, rather than by such broad approach.

MR. JORDAN: I think my feeling on that, your Honor, in fact I think raised a concept similar to what Mr. Lessy has in here at the last Prehearing Conference, and that is I think it is a reasonable approach to set what I would refer to more as an essentially tentative discovery deadline by which the Board looks to us and says, okay, have you been doing your job? Have you been taking the discovery you could take? Tell us where you are and what do you need? In a sense my concern would be just how the Board is viewing this as to whether we have an enormous threshold to get over to proceed or just exactly what we further need to show.

At any rate, the concept of sort of a tentative deadline with showings to justify another two or three months,

whatever is necessary, is to me a reasonable one.

I guess in this case if it is something along the lines of this January Prehearing Conference that Mr. Lessy suggests, at which point to take stock in effect and see if we need to go to the two more months to the March discovery close that we have in our schedule, is a reasonable concept.

I would say by the way, with respect to ours, there is a date to have should have included after 3/15/83 which we put for last discovery requests, not including depositions. The purpose there is to close off in effect, interrogatory document discovery and to give us another month to take any further depositions that we might we want to take, based on what we had received in those materials so that you understand where that is.

I guess I would run the discovery, in Mr. Lessy's case, through January and then we would come to the Prehearing Conference and find out if it was closed or not based on the arguments we would make to the Board. That concept is reasonable.

JUDGE HOYT: How about that, Mr. Lessy? Let's take that last discovery request into January? Realistically I do not think you are going to find too many people working themselves to death over the Christmas Holiday.

MR. LESSY: What that means, your Honor, is simply that the last interrogatory or document request should have been filed prior to the Prehearing Conference and the last deposition scheduled prior to it. At that point in time when we go to the

Prehearing Conference in the second week in January, we should know two things.

We will know, one, that the parties have engaged in good faith efforts to discover each other or at least have had the opportunity to and the only thing that will be left will be unresolved issues or matters that cannot be settled or matters that, as sometimes happens, need the Board's intervention.

I know that the Chairman indicated she does not like motions to compel. I do not like to file them or answer them but sometimes these things come up.

JUDGE HOYT: Let me put that in its proper context,

Mr. Lessy. I want to say I do not like motions to compel where
the motion is needed because we have had an unwilling party.

The word compel has a nasty connotation. I hate to use it unless
it is absolutely necessary.

MR. LESSY: Right, I agree. What I am saying, I guess we are saying the same point. A certain percentage of these matters can be resolved amicably between Counsel. Sometimes there is a certain percentage that need the Board's intervention and that gives the opportunity for that.

JUDGE HOYT: That is recognizable. That is not the type of motion to compel that is unpleasant to have to rule on.

MR. LESSY: The other thing that this Prehearing
Conference gives an opportunity for here is if there are any
hangover items from the discovery period, the period will go up

to the completion date of responses from 12/15/82. Responses to document requests would not be due until 1/15/83 if they were made on 12/15/82 under our Rules.

It also gives us the opportunity to see exactly where we are in terms of Plant construction. If there is a little bit more time allotted because of Plant Construction Schedules, the Board at least would have the opportunity of considering that.

If, however, the Plant Construction Schedules, the Applicant Studies and the Staff Review indicates that we better get cracking because there has been a lot of progress made and we have a very short timeframe, then the Board should consider that also at that point in time and have the opportunity to compress the Schedule.

I view this date as kind of an accordian date, if you will, but one in which the overall timeframes for proceedings should be set. I am really starting to feel just a little bit nervous about not having something like this in front of us at this point in time in order to have an expeditious completion.

I do not want to see us compel to be in hearing every weekday of every month over next summer, as nice as it is up here. I would like a little flexibility and I think that was the aim here and also to consider a lot of the comments we got last time.

MR. JORDAN: Your Honor, if I may?

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, Mr. Jordan.

MR. JORDAN: With respect to the Staff's proposed

schedule, it does seem to me quite unrealistic in a couple of areas that could have a significant impact. One, of course, is the issuance of the SER and the treatment of the SER not coming until November. There may well be some treatment of that once it comes out.

Perhaps more obvious and of concern, I think to virtually every party here, is Emergency Planning. There is an awful lot that is not out on Emergency Planning. There is the FEMA information that we are going to need to get into discovery and also the state and the local plans, to my understanding are not available yet.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Jordan, that is a matter that neither the Staff or the Applicant can control. That is the local authority and we have no jurisdiction over that whatsoever to compel them. That is where a motion to compel might be handy but we do not have that available.

Therefore, I do not think we should use the Emergency Plan as an excuse to hold up the hearings.

MR. JORDAN: All I am saying is that that is a matter that will be litigated, I assume, in the hearing and we should simply look ahead realistically. I do not know that it controls anymore.

I think your point that your point as to we do not know whether we will get 30,000 documents or 3 is very well taken.

JUDGE LUEBKE: At which case we will Phase I and

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Phase II. We will go ahead with the Hearing, Phase I. Phase II is what is left over.

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JUDGE HOYT: I think we've explored this as far as we need unless there is some other party here who would like to make a contribution.

You are?

MR. BISBEE: I'm Mr. Bisbee. With start of discovery, I have one concern. If discovery begins the day that your order is issued, that might not allow sufficient time to fully understand which issues have been allowed and which ones haven't, to investigate them in time to properly respond to discovery request. May it be submitted to us immediately upon issuance of your order.

JUDGE HOYT: Let me advise you that when we issue our next order, you will know what your contentions are, because we will deal with each one of them. We are going to deal with them all in that one order. The quicker we get back to Washington, the quicker we can draft this.

MR. BISBEE: You didn't understand my concern. If discovery was to begin immediately, if interrogatories were served upon us, for instance, we would have 14 days under the rules to respond to them and we would not have had much notice of which issues had actually been admitted for us to investigate further.

JUDGE HOYT: Your point is made, sir.

Anything else?

MR. AHRENS: Even though I admit that I'm not a party, I had a concern that maybe that the other parties are

not going to stay right not, but the S.E.R. is due in November,

I notice that Mr. Jordan's schedule has a timeframe for contentions based on those and I see none of those in Mr. Lessy's
schedule.

I don't know whether that's an assumed contention based on those in the Discovery might go beyond the mid-January date or not. I just thought I'd raise that.

MR. LESSY: The Commissions Rules of Practice Control -- let's assume that you have contentions based upon the S.E.R. in November. Since the opportunity for filing contentions would have been over by that time, you are going to have to file contentions under the Commissions Rules of Practice. I don't particularly like to address the five factors for late file contention.

Certainly, if you couldn't have filed the contention because it eminated from the S.E.R. exclusively, that's good cause. What I am saying is, yes, if contentions eminate from these documents, they are going to be contentions in which you are going to have to address why you didn't file them previously. If the Board admits those contentions later and if the Board remits those contentions during Discovery Period, we can engage in Discovery on those contentions.

If the Board admits those contentions later than that, then the Board will have to discuss it at Prehearing

Conference whether or not we want to have a little bit additional

limited Discovery for the purpose of new-filed contentions which weren't filed because they eminated exclusively from the S.E.R.

That's the way the rules are and the Board as well as the Staff is obliged to follow the Commission's rules. That's all I can say.

MR. AHRENS: Your Honor, I understand the rules.

My comment was that Mr. Lessy's schedule has Last Discovery Request and since that seems to be very narrowly worded, I thought there should be an understanding that deals with those contentions that have already been admitted.

JUDGE HOYT: I think his explanation is complete.

Moving right along, if there is nothing else on that issue, I

wonder if we would be well advised to dispose of some of the

lessened numbered contentions, that is in weight of the contentions
as far as numbers are concerned.

I believe that the state of Massachusetts has only four Contentions. All four of those Contentions are based upon Emergency planning. Since we don't have emergency planning and you want to get in on the basis of those contentions, it seems like one of the dilemmas that the rules give us, get us into in this thing is the problem of getting the parties in with one good contention in the beginning so they can participate in Discovery.

Since we don't have emergency planning, I'm reluctant to see the contentions. I think the Board has discussed this among ourselves on several occasions, and we are reluctant

to just take those contentions and let you tentatively -- a plan actually being filed.

What I would like to ascertain if the Applicant and the Staff would have any objection to proceeding somewhat along these lines; to admit the state of Massachusetts as an Intervenor in this, based upon the fact that their contention will be that of Emergency Planning and to defer the admission of their contention until such time as the final version of their contention, until such time as the plan is actually before it.

Do you have any thoughts on that, Mr. Gad?

MR. GAD: That would be very similar to what we had suggested in our written document -- the Applicants do not --
JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting.) Probably where I got it.

MR. GAD: We have no opposition to admitting

Massachusetts on a single contention framed in the following terms:

The Applicants have not complied with 10 C F R, S. 50.33 (g),

10 C F R, S. 50.47, 10 C F R, part 50, appendix (e) and I'm

just picking up from the written document that we filed.

JUDGE HOYT: What was the first one on that?

MR. GAD: 10 C.F.R. S. 50.33 (g)

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you. Number 54 and 47 are appendix (e).

MR. GAD: And we have no objection to admitting Massachusetts on that basis.

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as your contention at this point, and subject to your advising that contention upon the submission of the emergency plan, the point being let's get you in. Let's get your show on the road and get the thing out of the way so you can go ahead and participate in the discovery when the plan is available.

How does that sound?

MS. SHOTWELL: Well, that last phrase was of interest to me. I was going to ask for a matter of clarification in terms of what this would mean in terms of discovery.

Our Contentions don't really go to aspects of offsite plans. The fact that those plans aren't available yet, in my opinion, doesn't make the Contentions premature.

The Contentions go to the question of the feasibility of any emergency plan. In other words, the question of, assume that you are going to have the ideal plan.

JUDGE HOYT: We are not going to be litigating just any plan; we are going to be litigating, in this case, if anything---

MS. SHOTWELL: (Interrupting.) That is true, your Honor, but the Commission's Emergency Planning REgulations require this Board to determine whether there is reasonable assurance that in the event of an accident, the Public can and will be adequately protected. I believe that I am quoting the language from the Rule.

what that says to me is that there has to be evidence that an Emergency Plan, that adequately, perhaps subject what to judgment about/adequately means, but that provides some degree of protection that the Board feels is adequate.

One of our Contentions goes to certain evidence that is available as of this time and is asking the Board to inquire into the question of whether any plan, given the location of this particular plant and many particular features of the site and this location, is going to adequately protect the public.

That contention is not in any way dependent upon these off-site plans that haven't yet been prepared.

JUDGE LUEBKE: As I listen to your comment, I do have the feeling of the word "anticipate".

MS. SHOTWELL: Well, I don't believe so in the sense that certainly there may be additional evidence. There will certainly be additional evidence that will come out that will bear on this question. I think there is no doubt about that.

JUDGE LUEBKE: You said you don't expect there is going to be a good plan.

MS. SHOTWELL: No, I didn't say that at all.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Then I misunderstood.

MS. SHOTWELL: I think that there are two separate issues when we talk about emergency planning. There is the question of the mechanics of the Plan -- how mechanically you are going to use people or shelter people -- the details of that.

People may have contentions that relate to aspects of those plans once those plans are available. In other words, they may say, We don't think these particular mechanics will work. We don't think you've looked at this particular detail that bears on this mechanic.

At this point we have four Contentions. One is simply the fact that there are no off-site plans submitted as of yet. And the Contention doesn't go into ---

JUDGE LUEBKE: (Interrupting.) That's just a statement -- that's not really a contention. That's not argumentative. Everybody agrees.

MS. SHOTWELL: It's conceivable, your Honor, that the off-site plans would never be submitted. It is conceivable. Until they are, the Commissions Regulations are not satisfied. That's what our contention says.

Obviously, at the point where they are submitted --
JUDGE LUEBKE: (Interrupting.) Yes, but why don't

you say that when the time comes?

MS. SHOTWELL: Well, we are saying it at the time now and there are none. That is true as of this date. It could remain true forever, at which point there could never be the issuance of a license.

JUDGE PARIS: How would we litigate such an act?

MS. SHOTWELL: I think it would be a summary

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disposition matter.

JUDGE PARIS: Okay. That's way down the road. At this point, I don't see how we could litigate a contention that says there is no emergency plan in existence right now. When we come down the road and we've done everything and still there is no Emergency Plan in existence, then we may very well need to litigate.

MS. SHOTWELL: But I don't think I'd be allowed to.

Perhaps you are saying that I would be. My view of the Regulations was that I would not be allowed to introduce the contention at that point.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I think that if we came down to the end of the road and there was still no Emergency Plan in place, you would have good cause for filing a late contention.

MS. SHOTWELL: In that case, I will withdraw our first Contention if that is the concensus of the Board, because we have no problem with that.

Obviously once the Plans are out, we would have to revise this Contention to deal with any aspects of the Plan. If you would prefer the approach of simply not having that Contention at all, with the understanding that once the Plans are available, that would be a proper subject for the introduction of contentions, we have no problem with that.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I think that's what it said in the very beginning.

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MS. SHOTWELL: Well, I think that the Chairman's suggestion would prevent the Commonwealth from doing Discovery as I understand it at this point in time.

JUDGE HOYT: We are trying to get you into a posture where you can participate in Discovery. It was not to prevent you from exercising your rights to Discovery. It was to get you into a posture where you could exercise Discovery.

MS. SHOTWELL: Perhaps I misunderstood, your Honor.

JUDGE HOYT: I'm afraid you did.

MS. SHOTWELL: You say, then, as of this point if we were to have this one generally worded contention that the Commonwealth would be in a position to conduct Discovery, then on the matter of Emergency Planning ---

JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting.) I think that's what I said. If you misunderstood me, I think we may be spinning our wheels a little bit and not go any further.

JUDGE LUEBKE: You might ask questions, but you might not get many answers.

MS. SHOTWELL: Our questions don't relate to the Plans is what I'm trying to say. We have the Applicant's Emergency Plans. That's already on file. One of our contentions deals with aspects of that Plan. We have the FSAR on file which presents certain evidence about the consequences of an accident at this particular site. We would want to conduct Discovery on that because that bears on the question of the feasibility of

Honor.

evacuation and other protective action.

If it is understood that we will be in a position then to do Discovery on the issue of Emergency Planning, we do not object to the introduction of the generally worded contention that has been suggested by the Applicant as our contention in this matter.

MR. LESSY: Unfortunately I hate to be the one who breaks up a beautiful dance, but we would. We don't feel that Massachusetts in its contention here has merely cited the NRC Regulations and then merely made the blanket statement that they haven't been met. As we said at the previous Prehearing Conference, in order to satisfy the controlling regulation, we need to be told how the regulations are not met and the basis for that statement.

JUDGE HOYT: The problem that we are getting into --MR. LESSY: (Interrupting.) If I may finish, your

JUDGE HOYT: All right.

MR. LESSY: In response to the Board's question, even though the theme of testimony and filings or file testimony won't be available until May 5, 1983, the draft plans will be made available, my understanding is, sometime next fall or late next fall, during the Discovery period -- the draft state and local plans, the off-site plans. It may not be the final plans but it will be an indication of -- there will be specific docu-

ments by which Massachusetts can focus it s. attention and attempt to litigate the problems or the issues which are of concern to it.

So my feeling would be, rather than be -- I am more or less in agreement with the Board's proposal rather than the Applicant's. The Applicant's proposal is a statement that says -- a generalized contention which says these contentions don't need the Regulations.

We litigated a contention like that. The NRC Staff did that in another proceeding. There are 16 requirements for Emergency Planning contentions and a couple NuRegs. With a contention as broad as that, it means you have to address each of those 16 requirements and all the NuRegs in the hearing never ended as far as I'm concerned. I don't think that kind of contention meets the requirements of the Regulation.

What I suggest we do is admit them as a party as having identified the specific aspect of the proceeding. In addition to that, let them frame a specific contention when the draft plans are available. If you have specific concerns, however, if Massachusetts has specific concerns about Applicant's plan which has been submitted, then that specific contention -- there is no reason that has to await until next November, December or January. That can be done now.

JUDGE PARIS: How do you react to that, Ms. Shotwell, conducting Discovery now on the Applicant's plans which are available, and then as soon as something is available on the off-

site plans, proceed with Discovery on that. That is what you are suggesting, Mr. Lessy?

MR. LESSY: Yes.

MS. SHOTWELL: I feel that what is prompting me to say that Discovery could commence now on the Applicant's plan is equally true of the other Contetnions of the Commonwealth in the sense that none of our Contentions depend in any way on what's going to come out in those off-site plans.

If I could just discuss very briefly what the Contentions are, I think it might help to clarify things. I think for a moment that we can ignore the first one and proceed directly to the second, which says that the Applicants have failed to account for local emergency response needs and capabilities in establishing boundaries for the two emergency planning zones that the Rules require them to establish—the plume exposure pathway, EPZ, and the ingestion pathway, EPZ.

This Contention does not relate in any way to what is going to come out in off-site emergency plans. The Commission's Regulations say, Applicant, you must examine local factors that relate to local emergency response needs and capabilities and determine what the boundaries of the zones should be for this particular facility. The Rule says generally those will be about ten to fifty miles, but it puts a burden on the Applicant in consultation with State and local officials to examine all relevant factors and to come up with what the boundaries should be

for this site and this plan. They have not done so. That's that Contention. Nothing that comes out of the off-site plans is going to change that.

The third Contention that we submitted --
MR. LESSY: (Interrupting.) Excuse me. Maybe we ought to do it contention by contention if we could. Could we respond to the second contention?

JUDGE HOYT: I think that might be helpful, particularly when we have to read these records. Go ahead.

MR. LESSY: I think what we said about the second

Contention on our pleading which we filed on May 19, 1982, is

that certainly a proper contention could be framed on this subject

matter, but the way this is framed, this contention merely

challenges the EPZ Emergency Planning Zone boundary selected by

the Applicant. While these boundaries aren't inflexible,

Massachusetts hasn't supplied any reason to support its belief

that those boundaries are not inappropriate for Seabrook. It

fails to meet the specificity requirements.

If you can tell us how and why those boundaries are unacceptable for Seabrook, then you may have the genesis here of an acceptable contention -- just the broad statement saying those boundaries -- I think your contention says that the Applicants have failed to account for local emergency response needs and capabilities in establishing boundaries. Low? Give us an example. If you can do that, you've got a contention.

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MS. SHOTWELL: Could I respond to that? What this amounts to then is that the burden is on the Intervenor to say what local factors would have an affect on the boundaries and how. I think that's simply wrong.

JUDGE LUEBKE: After the you read the documents that have been written.

MS. SHOTWELL: What I'm saying is that the Commission Regulations very clearly place that burden on the Applicant. They say that the Applicant has to conduct a study -has to examine these factors. They haven't even begun to examine them. Once they do, obviously, and they indicate their views on what the boundaries should be in their opinion, then we will be in a position to specify more particularly whether we agree or disagree with them.

But to say that the Intervenor has the burden in the first instance to conduct that kind of study is not consistent with the Commission's Regulations. The Commission's Regulations very clearly say that the Applicant can start with these approximate generic zones, but that it has to determine Emergency Planning Zones for this facility with respect to local conditions, and it has not done so. It hasn't begun to even look at local factors, so that we are really not in position yet to say you haven't properly accounted for this factor or this factor, because in fact, they haven't accounted in any way whatsoever for any factors.

We have in our list of bases, we have indicated a number of the local factors that we feel ought to be examined. At this point we are not in a position to conduct the initial examination that the licensee is obliged to conduct with state and local officials to ascertain exactly what that Emergency Planning Zone is ultimately going to look like.

JUDGE HOYT: I'm sorry: Mr. Gad.

MR. GAD: This is exactly the reason why we had proposed what we had proposed. I think a little explanation is in order as to why the Applicant differs from the Staff on this. It is not because we don't agree with the Staff about what specificity ordinarily requires with respect to a contention. It is because one is Emergency Planning, and with a certain sense of resignation, we have no doubt that anyone wants to litigate the Emergency Planning in the Seabrook case is going to get litigated, and there wasn't much point in spilling a lot of ink over precise contentions at this point.

Not only is there not much point, but there is a vice to the problem. The vice to the problem is that you get into precisely this kind of a discussion. The implicit in the contention that Ms. Shotwell has picked out of the air is a poor instance -- implicit in that is an assertion that goes as follows:

If you assume that the minimum EPZ will be a perfect circle concentric with the center of the reactor core, but it may go outside of that, then there is an infinite number of

possibilities. If you go inside of that, then there are twice the infinite number of possibilities and the legal implications of what the Commonwealth is asserting here, and what they are asking the Board to rule is that the Applicant has to go out and somehow do a study on each one of those possibilities which will be an infinite number of books, and in an infinite number of libraries.

In our judgment, what the Rules say is: We are going to give you a default position. Here is when you start unless somebray funds a good reason, and it really doesn't matter who comes up with the reason. Ultimately it will be this Board's judgment. Here is what you take unless someone has got a good reason to take something different. If there is no evidence whatsoever, if nothing tilts the scale, then this is what you take. That's what the Rules say.

Someday, maybe -- frankly we doubt it, but someday, maybe, this Board will have to decide whether the Commonwealth view of what the Rules tell us is correct or whether our view of the Rules say is correct. It was to avoid this kind of argument and necessity of making these kinds of find distinctions at the very threshold of the case that we have made the suggestion that we did. On that basis, I urge you.

JUDGE HOYT: Excuse me.

(Off the record.)

MR. GAD: I did not mean to get wound up and go faster than the machinery. I apologize.

JUDGE PARIS: It sounds to me as though you are saying our position is that we take the center of the reactor core and with a protractor we draw a circle around that without any regard to where that circle falls. If it goes through the middle of a town, so be it unless somebody says we need to take in the whole town. Is that the Licensee's position?

MR. GAD: That the legal of the Licensee's Lawyers is and what the Rule means is, is that you have null position or this default position in the absence of coming up with some reason to the contrary, then, yes. You do precisely that and if it is between Units you have two circles and you get something that really does not look like a perfect circle.

Now, you may make adjustments for local boundaries, you may make adjustments for anything else if you can come up with a good reason for it.

The position of the Commonwealth is that you have to go out and do an evidenciary study and presumably mark all of that evidence into this fortroom to disprove each and every other one of the alternatives. That would take an infinite number of hearing dates.

My purpose is not to litigate this morning which view of this correct or to demonstrate that we have no need to do that this morning and there is good reason why we ought not

to do that this morning.

JUDGE LUEBKE: What you have just described, does it now exist in a plan of document?

MR. GAD: Yes, it does, Dr. Luebke and if you ask me the page number I cannot give it to you.

JUDGE LUEBKE: That is a plan that the Petitioner's could read and make specific objections to if they cared?

MR. GAD: It is at least in the FSAR. It may be in another Applicant issued document and I could probably find the DES.

JUDGE LUEBKE: If I hear you correctly then, there is no need to talk about generalities, it is possible to talk about specifics. That is Mr. Lessy's concern.

MR. LESSY: Did the Chairman have a question of me first?

JUDGE HOYT: Go ahead.

MR. LESSY: This is not the first time this matter has been considered. It was considered by the Licensing Board in the Three Mile Island Decision. The exact same question, Licensing Board Panel Decision 81-59, 14 NRC, 12/11/81. It was almost the exact same contention.

What the Licensing Board said in that opinion is something that I think is a well reasoned opinion. It said that the Board noted in the TMI Restart Decision that it had "No jurisdiction to challenge as a matter of policy whether the

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approximately ten and fifty mile EPZ's are too small or too large." The Board in the TMI Case placed a burden on the Intervenors to contest the configuration of the EPZ contained in the Emergency Plan. The State Agency in that Case was Pennsylvania in the TMI, initially drew a circle with a radius of ten miles around the Plant. The boundaries of the circle were then moved to a close recognizable marker by considering political boundaries, geographical features, roads, or other easily recognizable landmarks. The Board stated that no party brought to their attention any particular boundary line in which it believes is ambiguous, not well defined or otherwise inappropriate, and that the requirements of the regulation in the Applicant's Plan had been met.

So the burden is on the Intervenors to object and under that Decision, to show why the listed boundary does not satisfactorily place the public on notice as to the Zone's boundary.

I am going to do something I very rarely do, to show you how to do a contention just to save time. You have a contention which says that the boundary markers are inappropriate. That is your contention, the contention that the Applicants have failed to account for local emergency response needs and capabilities in establishing boundaries for the Plume Exposure Pathway. The only thing you would have to do is take a look at that map.

Now if that ten mile radius cuts through a town and

one half the town is inside the boundary, the EPZ, and one half go on the outside, your contention is that you have to/through the circle and you have list the towns that are cut in half. If you feel that the entire town should be in or that the entire road should be in, you make your contention. The Applicant has failed to account for local emergency response needs and capabilities in establishing boundaries for Plume Exposure because the town of X Massachusetts is cut in half. State road 128 is cut in half, that is all you have to do. It is not our job or the Applicant's job since they have submitted the plan to do that for you and it is not the Board's job to rewrite that contention for you. It is a simple thing to do.

The burden is on the Intervenors to look at the line, look at the radius and decide exactly what it is that you do not like about it. Then tell us and we can litigate it.

JUDGE HOYT: Let me follow through on one thing you brough up, Mr. Lessy. That is, this particular Board has no intention of rewriting Intervenors' contentions. You will stand and fall on your own wording.

With that in mind, let me suggest to you,

Ms. Shotwell, that we get your contention in your words, the

way you want it because you are either going to get in our out

of this based upon that.

MS. SHOTWELL: Fine, Your Honor.

If I may respond to Mr. Lessy's comments, I think

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that his example is very important because our contention is very different and this situation is very different from the one that he just gave you as an example, in the Three Mile Island Case.

In that Case, the Applicants had drawn boundaries that were not the exact ten and fifty generic zones that is supposed to be the starting point for drawing boundaries. As he indicated they had drawn boundaries so as to take into account certain jurisdictional boundaries, certain access roads, matters of that sort. At that point I agree that the burden is on Intervenors to say that we disagree with that because you did not look at this factor or you improperly accounted for this other factor.

I disagree that when what you are dealing with is a situation where the Applicants have not even looked at those factors, any of them, and they have simply taken the ten and fifty mile boundaries. It is an important point to have the burden on this. He has picked the easiest example to imply that I can very easily look at this and determine without much review what the boundaries should be.

JUDGE PARIS: It sounds to me like you are saying the same thing.

MS. SHOTWELL: No, he is saying very different things. He is saying I have to tell you now exactly what the Commonwealth of Massachusetts thinks these boundaries should be.

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Applicants that they have complied with the requirement in the Rule and looked at the local factors that can have an impact on that boundary, told us how they feel those factors affect the boundaries and why, and some of these will require some detailed studies. They are not as simple as just looking at jurisdictional boundaries. You have to look at tomography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, jurisdictional boundaries. We would suggest that meteorological conditions peculiar to this area would also have to be considered.

What I am saying is that once we have from the Applicants their indication of their review of these factors and their affect, we will then be in position with our experts to review that and be more specific.

JUDGE PARIS: If they have not done that, what you have to do is look at what they have done and say they have not done this because---and site what you think is wrong with the Plan that they now---

MS. SHOTWELL: (Interrupting.) I believe that is what we have done in our contention. We have said that they have not examined local factors---

JUDGE PARIS: (Interrupting.) You just said they have not examined local factors. Name two or three local factors that they---

MS. SHOTWELL: (Interrupting.) We do, not in our

contention but in the specification of the contention. If I can direct your attention to the supplement to our Petition. The contention itself is on page three, but that was perceived for several pages, specifically beginning on page five, to discuss the particular local factors that we feel have to be considered.

JUDGE HOYT: Ms. Shotwell, let me put in this fashion on behalf of the Board.

Perhaps your contention with the specificity that

Mr. Lessy has suggested to you, gives us a copy of it after lunch.

If that is what you want to have your case stand on. I am not

going to reword your contention for you. You will submit it to

us. We will vote it up or down on this Board, based upon what

you give us.

In the present form we do not feel that we want to commit ourselves to it but I would strongly urge that you make the additions. If you do not want to accept---

MS. SHOTWELL: (Interrupting.) I have indicated that I will accept that. It is the Staff that has indicated they will not take that approach.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, I beg your pardon. You are quite correct.

Mr. Lessy, we are going to have to go one way or the other on that.

Let me ask you, Ms. Shotwell, if you will draft that perhaps you can work it out with Counsel over the noon hour

hour if you wish, resubmit it and we will see if we can get some consensus on it.

I really do not normally indicate that we demand you that you get some consensus on it. We are simply trying to get your wording as to how you want it in or out of this particular case.

MS. SHOTWELL: If I can have a point of clarification.

I am understanding Mr. Lessy not simply as asking us to identify
the local factors that we think should be considered but actually
to indicate what affect we feel that would have on boundary.

JUDGE HOYT: Why don't we do this, Ms. Shotwell.

Why don't you discuss that in the recess period with Mr. Lessy with more detail. I think we are simply burdening this record in taking up a great deal of time. I think it would be more productive is what I am really driving at.

JUDGE PARIS: I think Mr. Lessy is trying to give you some advice and perhaps the two of you could get together and talk about it some more.

JUDGE HOYT: Let us move along. Do you want to go into Contention No. 3 or No. 4? Why don't we have you just do the same things with Contentions No. 3 and 4 that you will be doing with Contention No. 2?

MS. SHOTWELL: Nos. 3 and 4 will be very simple in that they do have an outline.

JUDGE HOYT: Good. As I indicate to you, Ms. Shotwell,

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we want your wording of your contention because when we memorialize this contention in our order, it will be stated in your words. We are not going to reword any contention of any Intervenor.

MS. SHOTWELL: We certainly are not asking you to do so. The way that we have submitted our contentions, as you know at this point we have fairly diametrically opposed positions between the Applicants and the Staff. The Applicant is saying let's have one general contention that incorporates your four separate ones and the Staff saying, no, we want all of your detailed specifications actually included in your contentions. We can go either way. We have the specificity there I feel, and it is simply a matter of incorporating it in the contentions or we can collapse the four into the one generally worded contention that the Applicants have suggested.

JUDGE HOYT: Maybe I should ask Mr. Gad if we would like to participate in, I was going to say negotiations but the word has a weird connotation in this day and age. Perhaps get together in a discussion group would be better.

MR. GAD: If the questions is would I be willing to,
Madam Chairman, the answer is, of course, yes. I think that
loops the question of whother or not I would like to.

JUDGE HOYT: Let's go ahead and see where we can go from here. I think with that spirited discussion, I would like a five minute recess. Let's go off the record.

(Off the record.)

JUDGE HOYT: Let the Hearing come to order.

Let the record reflect that all parties who were present when the Hearing recessed are again present in the Hearing Room.

I think we have, and I do not mean to put this in an unpleasant sounding wording, but we have disposed of Massachusetts at least for the moment, Ms. Shotwell. You will advise us later of the result of your conference.

I think the next we would like to move into is the largest group of contentions which is yours, Mr. Jordan, if you are ready. If you would rather wait until after the noon hour, you may. If you would like to begin now, we would like to go ahead with those contentions that you filed since yours is the largest number.

MR. JORDAN: I think that is fine, your Honor. It may make some sense dovetailing our Emergency Planning Contentions together with the resolution of the Massachusetts situation as well after lunch. That is a good idea.

JUDGE HOYT: We will go off the record for a moment. (Off the record.)

JUDGE HOYT: Back on the record. The record should reflect that during that off the record period, the Board had a housekeeping matter concerning the temperature of the room discussion. Having resolved that, we now resume our position on the record.

Mr. Jordan, did I understand that you want to go ahead at this point?

MR. JORDAN: Yes, ma'am. We can certainly proceed at this point.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well. I think up front, Mr. Jordan, with your contentions, one of the problems that this Board has had is that you had used the Regulatory Guide in the wording of the contention. We do not want to admit contentions with the Regulatory Guide wording in it. You may want to consider that in your discussion.

The problem that we found with that is that the Regulatory Guides themselves specifically, usually the cover sheets on the Regulatory Guides indicate the status that they have in this Commission and I think there is ample Case Law on the point as well. We wanted to give you that as a basis of our thinking in the beginning so that we could perhaps aid you and expedite you in handling the contentions that you may wish to pursue here.

MR. JORDAN: I think, your Honor, we do not have a particular problem with leaving out the reference to the Regulatory Guide as such in the contention. We do not hold to the Regulatory Guide as a Regulatory Requirement that the Applicant has suggested. I think we have explained our point. It is in general that often the Regulations do not give you a very precise benchmark. The Regulatory Guide explains a threshold

which would constitute compliance with the Regulations.

JUDGE HOYT: We understand that and you are quite correct in what you are saying, Mr. Jordan. Our feeling was that the benchmark, if you use the Regulatory Guide, you have to demonstrate that, that you have no other benchmark against which can attest your standard.

Any problem with that?

MR. JORDAN: I am not sure that I understand what you are saying. Our approach is in many cases, for example, the FSAR discussion of a Regulatory Guide will say, the Applicant does not do this, this, or this according to the Regulatory Guide. They do not have an alternative suggestion or approach that they take that would provide the protections that those matters in the Regulatory Guide would have provided.

So if that is a response to what you said, we do not see that the reading of that benchmark, if we do not see another benchmark around---

JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting.) Mr. Jordan, what we are saying is that you must demonstrate that there is not another benchmark around.

MR. JORDAN: I guess I am little unclear as to how we demonstrate that another benchmark does not exist.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, if the Regulation does not have the Standard then you are using the Regulatory Guide. Are you not using it because there is not one in the Regulation, that is

1	the	Standard	. Therefore,	you	should	tell	us	that.	You	should
(	iemo	nstrate	that.							

MR. JORDAN: Yes. That is what we are doing. All we can say is there is no other benchmark that we can find. I do not know of a way to demonstrate the negative.

JUDGE HOYT: I think we are getting into confusion on it and it is really not worth that effort. Go ahead.

MR. JORDAN: Our First Contention relates to, and I would say that our first several contentions---

JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting.) Are these in your original contentions or are these your supplemental?

MR. JORDAN: It will depend upon whether they have been revised or not.

JUDGE HOYT: All right.

MR. JORDAN: I believe that these were not reworded, the Environmental Qualification, at least the first one, has not been reworded so the language itself is in our original dialect.

JUDGE HOYT: That is the filing of April 21st?

MR. JORDAN: Yes.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. We are looking at the Contention that you have described on page five, is that correct, the Environmental Qualification?

MR. JORDAN: Yes, ma'am.

JUDGE HOYT: Technical Safety Contentions and Environmental Qualification?

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MR. JORDAN: Yes, ma'am. Electrical Equipment being the first under Environmental Qualifications.

JUDGE HOYT: Go ahead.

MR. JORDAN: The responses are, I think this is fairly simple. The Applicant argues that we not go beyond CLI-80-21, a Commission Decision on the matter in Requirements in particulary in raising Requirements related to Three Mile Island.

The Staff goes somewhat further in saying that in effect, the TMI Lessons are all in NuReg 0737 and that nothing need be required beyond what is in 0737. The nub of both of those arguments is that we do not raise a Regulatory Requirement for going beyond CLI-80-21. We disagree. We think it is a criteria for Appendix A, Part 50 which states, "The structure systems and components important to safety shall be designed to accomodate the affects of and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance testing, postulated accidents, including the loss of cool in accidents." We feel the occurrence of the accident at the Three Mile Island criterion for, by itself, regardless of 0737 and regardless of CL-80-21 requires that the Environmental Qualification extend to the affects caused by the accident TMI, in this case with respect to Electrical Equipment. Accordingly we stand on Criterion 4 as the applicable Regulatory Requirement.

JUDGE LUEBKE: You essentially translate postulated

accidents as being TMI?

MR. JORDAN: I think in essence that is correct.

JUDGE LUEBKE: That is what I heard you say and disagreed any modifications or improvements that this Applicant or other people have made in their plans?

MR. JORDAN: We take Three Mile Island, at this stage at least, we have not seen any that would prevent.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Then I would ask Mr. Lessy, does that put him in argument with Commission Policy?

MR. LESSY: Yes.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Perhaps you could clarify that for the record?

MR. LESSY: We have addressed that, your Honor, at pages 17-19 of our latest reply by cover letter of July 1, 1982. I think in this instance the Commission itself has spoken in the TMI Decision, CLI-80-21 at 11 NRC 705.

What NECNP said in its response on page two of its refiled contentions, the second sentence under Environmental Qualification, "However, as noted by the Commission in that Decision, CLI-8-21, does not incorporate the lessons learned at Three Mile Island, etc." What the Commission said at 11 NRC at 716 was that they did say that, in this order we have not attempted to apply the lessons of Three Mile Island to Environmental Qualification but then they had another sentence which NECNP did not. "This issue is addressed in the NRC Action Plan

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(NuReg 0737)." The TMI Action Plan, NuReg 0737, does not require the action requested by NECNP in its Contention. In this proposal NECNP would impose Requirements beyond that required by the Regulations and the Action Plan.

The Commission did have a revised statement of policy at 45 Federal Register 85236 on December 24, 1980. It did allow previously forbidden challenges to the sufficiency of the supplementation of the Regulations and the Action Plan but that supplementation does not relieve a proponent of an additional Requirement, in this case NECNP, of the burden of demonstrating that compliance with the Commission's Regulations is not a sufficient basis upon which to grant a license. There are two cites for that.

NECNP has not met its burden and we object to the Contention. I think it would be helpful, and maybe my answer is broader than your question, if the Board please, let us go back to the Contention. In NECNP's response they did not restate or refine the Contention but merely offered legal arguments to justify it. The Contention is, "Seabrook cannot be licensed because it does not meet the Commission's Standard for Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment under 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4." In light of Three Mile Island, GDC 4 requires more rigorous environmental qualification testing than was previously the case in order to provide reasonably assurance that electrical equipment will function for the entire time period

for which it was meant. That is a contention which not only raises the question of going beyond the Commission's own Requirements which it has defined but which completely fails to meet the basis of specificity Requirements or Regulations.

If I have answered it too broadly and you have any further questions, I would be answer them. That is our position on it.

JUDGE HOYT: Go ahead, sir.

MR. JORDAN: First of all, the Applicant suggested on page five of its response to us dated June 28, that we should word to the effect that it does not comply with GDC 4. In other words, the contention that GDC 4 itself requires that the Applicant---we ought to be satisfied with the contention stated in terms of GDC 4 alone. I am sorry for wandering.

Mr. Lessy I think just quoted to you from our contention where we cited GDC 4, the fact that we cited CLI-80-21 in addition, does not really damage that it seems to me. We would indeed stand on GDC 4 here.

The fact that the issue is not addressed in CLI-80-21, the fact that this particular matter in 0737 does not change the extent of the Requirements of Criterion 4. That is the Regulation. The 0737 cannot narrow the Regulation, neither can it fit Commission Policy Statement and narrow the Regulation. The Regulation is what requires Environmental Qualification to meet those conditions.

MR. GAD: Madam Chairman, if I can jump into this spray and I do so because if we spend a little time on this one, we spend a little less later on.

The whole legal argument on NECNP Contention 1Al comes down and it can be encapsulized in a single sentence. That sentence appears on page two of NECNP's reply, a document filed June 17, 1982.

That sentence reads as follows, "Both the Applicant and the Staff would restrict NECNP's Environmental Qualification to a claim of noncompliance with GDC 4." Now that sentence is right as rain. If the Contention is so limited then we have no problem with it---

JUDGE LUEBKE: You would put a period after 4, GDC 4?

MR. GAD: That is correct or as implemented by CLI-80-21.

JUDGE LUEBKE: So you would take the entire sentence?

MR. GAD: They really are different. The reason why that must be the contention is because that and that alone is the ruler against which this application can be measured. The problem with taking the wording in NECNP's original filing, either the 14th or the 21st of April, is that it wanders all over the place and includes such things as a statement, Furthermore, and I elipsizing a little bit, the accident at Three Mile Island showed that the Commission Standards are

inadequate. That is not an admissible contention.

We did not, as we have in other places, suggested the precise form of wording because after a while you get tired of doing that. The contention ought to be in terms about like this, the Application's description of the Environmental Qualification of the Electrical Equipment does not satisfy the Requirements of GDC 4. The end. That is the ruler the Board will ultimately apply. If it turns out that those things do not require what NECNP really wants, and they do not, then the contention will fail after trial.

JUDGE HOYT: Did I understand you in the beginning to say that you would include CLI-80-21 and now you are saying not or did I misunderstand you?

MR. GAD: CLI-80-21, Madam Chairman, is a Decision of the NRC. So that Decision, whatever it does, it must tell us what is in GDC 4. GDC is the published Regulation. That is what we have to live up to.

JUDGE HOYT: I am with you. I was just confused as to whether or not I understood to mention that. Thank you.

MR. LESSY: Perhaps simply for clarity and to respond to some degree at least the Applicant's concerns, we can reword the contention with the language that is already on page five that you have in front of you. It seems to me that in responding to these concerns, the rewording would begin at the fifth line and the contention would read as follows: NECNP contends that

the Seabrook Facility cannot be licensed because it does not meet the Commission's Standards for Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment under 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion, GDC 4.

I would delete the next sentence and the contention would continue: The FSAR's discussion of Environmental Qualification is deficient in four respects. One, the parameters of the relevant accident environment have not been identified. Two, the length of time the equipment must operate in the accident environment has not been included as a factor. Three, the methods used to qualify the equipment are not adequate to give reasonable assurance that the equipment will remain operable. Four, the effects of aging and cumulative radiation exposure on the equipment have not been adequately considered. Those, it seems to me, give substantial specificity to what might otherwise be an unworkably broad charge of noncompliance with the Regulation.

MR. LESSY: The problem with that, your Honor, is what Dr. Luebke started with. As I understand it, this Contention, although beginning to be properly framed in terms of 2.714, is now going beyond the Reguirements of Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment as delineated by the Commission in its Decision and in NuReg 0737 and because of that, it can constitute an impermissible challenge to the Regulations. Therefore, under <a href="Peach Bottom">Peach Bottom</a> it would be an unacceptable contention unless NECNP can comply with the Maine Yankee Decision

and the judicial decision of demonstrating first why those additional requirements, at least in the contention stage, should be required.

Unless you can get under that hurdle, then you are in the area of impermissible challenge to a regulation. In other words, this contention, if admitted, would be a challenge to the Regulations. There are certain limited challenges to the Regulations which are usually completely prohibited, permitted as a result of CLI-80-21. The Commission permitted limited challenges to the Regulations.

There is one caveat to that. That caveat is, the proponent of such a contention has the burden of demonstrating the compliance with the Commission's Regulations which in this case is CLI-80-21 and the NuReg is not a sufficient basis upon which to grant a license.

The contention does not even address, as I read it, the insufficiency of the NuReg. It just lists what any NECNP's views of what it would like the Regulations to be. Again, under <a href="Peach Bottom">Peach Bottom</a> that is prohibited. So you are half there and you are half out the way I look at it.

JUDGE HOYT: Let us go ahead. Is there anything else?

MR. LESSY: We disagree that it is a challenge to the Regulations. We think it is required and we will stand on the knowledge that I have just read into the record with the

deletions.

JUDGE LUEBKE: You will stand on the form of the writing in your submission of 4/21 or the writing of June 17th, I guess it is.

MR. JORDAN: Your Honor, I would stand on the language. It is in our submission of April 21 at page five.

JUDGE LUEBKE: We read this and we like it or we do not like it.

MR. LESSY: He deleted a sentence.

MR. JORDAN: Read it into the record with essentially deleting the first sentence and the third sentence, then we stand with the second and fourth sentences.

MR. LESSY: I have one further comment. That is the legal objection to this.

The other objection is already stated on page two of our 5/19/82 response to that contention. That is, we are not given an idea of any equipment or any category's equipment that NECNP wishes to litigate. GDC says and I paraphrase, all equipment important to safety. I should think that NECNP should give us a little bit more specificity should be required as to what it means. Do you mean all equipment, what particular categories of equipment, what particular systems. The next contention is a particular category of equipment, electric valves but certainly the general contention relating to all equipment "important to safety" would be a hopelessly vague

contention. That is my second objection and we have already filed. I will just rest on it.

MR. JORDAN: We have responded to it in writing.

JUDGE HOYT: I think we have unless the Applicant wants to make any mention on it?

MR. GAD: We joined in the written fray so we will join in the demur.

JUDGE HOYT: Let us go off the record.

(Off the record.)

N	MR. JORDAN	: Unless my	colleag	ues war	nt to di	scuss
I.A.2, my view	is the ar	guments are	the same	and we	e have o	overed
them, although	Mr. Lessy	suggests we	have be	en a l	ittle bi	t more
specific here,	otherwise	the argumen	ts are t	he same	е.	

JUDGE HOYT: But you stand on the contention as is written on page 8?

MR. JORDAN: That is correct.

JUDGE HOYT: Fine.

MR. GAD: Which is fine with us, as long as it is understood that the otherwise ambiguous phrase "Commission Standards" means GDC4 and that any CNT is backing away from the language in it's June 17th document, which said ---

JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting.) GDC4 contains the standards for the ---

MR. GAD: (Interrupting.) I believe it does.

JUDGE HOYT: How about that, Mr. Jordan. Would you take that as a change on the Phase Commission Standards?

MR. JORDAN: I am trying to get clear on what Mr. Gad would have us back away from.

JUDGE HOYT: Top of page 8, the Applicant has not complied with Commission Standards and he wants to substitute GDC4 for the words, "Commission Standards."

MR. JORDAN: That's fine with me.

MR. GAD: Well, just to be fair to Mr. Jordan, that is not what he was willing to do in his written document of

June 17th.

JUDGE HOYT: Let's keep going forward.

That disposes of I.A.2. Let's go on to I.A.3 before we have a change.

MR. JORDAN: The issue in I.A.3 again is Environmental Qualification. Here it relates to qualification to withstand a hydrogen burn. The Applicant and the Staff in essence, argue that there is no regulation establishing such an Environmental Qualification requirement. Also that the issue is governed by 10 CFR 50.44 which is Hydrogen Control Provision. We have addressed the matter, I think, adequately in writing. The point is that this is not Hydrogen Control. This is Environmental Qualification. It is a different purpose that 50.44 does not govern, just as it does not govern in another example we give related to the ECCS.

Again, the Regulation in question is GDC4. We are not trying to create some other Regulation. That is what we stand on as the Requirement and we stand on the language of the Contention.

MR. PARIS: Your Contention on page 9 doesn't really say hydrogen burn. It just says hydrogen release. Do you mean hydrogen burn?

MR. JORDAN: I think we can make the word "release" into "burn."

MR. PARIS: Release-Burn?

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MR. JORDAN: Release and burn would be acceptable to us.

MR. LESSY: I guess our point, your Honor, is that there is no Regulatory Requirement for that which NECNP seeks to hang on GDC4. GDC4 does not require that.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Is it not also true, Mr. Lessy, that the Commission has a statement about hydrogen release and burn?

The thing that was used in the McGuire Operating License Proceeding?

MR. LESSY: Yes, and I believe -- NECNP is arguing that that statement, as I understand it, does not apply.

MR. JORDAN: That is hydrogen control.

JUDGE LUEBKE: They cannot make contentions about disagreeing with the Commission.

MR. LESSY: Exactly. I don't think we are disageeing with the Commission. This is what the Commission holds to -- that is not an Environmental Qualification consideration. That is a hydrogen control consideration. What do you do to make sure there is not too much hydrogen getting out? There is already another Regulation that has a different figure for handling hydrogen once it is released.

The ECCS Regulation, as we say on page 4, has a 17% assumption of hydrogen release. The point is clearly, the Commission is -- the Hydrogen Control Regulation does not govern the amount of hydrogen relrease to be assumed for other purposes

than hydrogen control.

MR. LESSY: All right. The fact that the Commission has a different hydrogen generation assumption for purposes of the Emergency Core Cooling Regulation, in our view, does not provied an adequate basis for NECNP adding an extra regulation relating to the hydrogen aspect of Environmental Qualification.

It's a different matter. It is apples and oranges.

MR. GAD: There is an additional problem. You admit Contention I.A.3 with the words on -- I can't read the page number, but in the NECNP filing, then the Board is, at least implicitly making a ruline that as a matter of law, GDC requires the effects of a hydrogen relrease/burn such as occurred, which really means of the quantities at Three Mile Island Unit II.

That is what is part of what is wrong with this

Contention. The Contention ought to be written: NECNP contains

that the electrical equipment is not environmentally qualified

for that circumstance, and that such qualification is required by

the Rules. If we have got to buy all the other problems, the

Board could admit that Contention without making a ruling as

to what or what is not required by the Rule.

A Contention in those terms is very easy to deal with and indeed, could go out on a Summary Disposition Motion strickly on the law, when the time is appropriate.

Part of the problem with this Contention here is that it assumes, therefore asks this Board to assume, a legal

requirement concerning which there is at a minimum, considerable doubt, and in our opinion, it is plainly wrong. So the wording of this just doesn't fly.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Then you would propose to postpone the legal argument until a later time

MR. GAD: Yes indeed.

MR. LESSY: That would be prudent, your Honor. There is a proposed rule out. The Commission is considering adding a rule on hydrogen control. If that rule were passed, this might be a good contention. That rule has not been passed and nobody knows if it will. Therefore, if the Board rejects this contention, which the Staff believes it should, it should give NECNP leave to refile it in the event that rule were passed.

MR. JORDAN: I would follow that with one further, which is I do not have a particular problem with Mr. Gad's reformulation, although it seems to me that he can make his Summary Disposition Notion on the Contention as it is written. This is not the point, really, where you make that final ruling on the substance of the Regulation, but where you determine the sufficiency of the Contention to get it in for litigation. Then we will have the filings and the detailed argument on Summary Disposition. Of course we can do that. I don't think that you are admitting the Contention results inability then, to rule on a Summary Disposition Motion.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I guess what we need to do now is,

shall we rule on the wording as you have it on page 9, or are you thinking about rewriting it?

MR. JORDAN: No, I am not thinking about rewriting it. All I am saying is that it can be treated in the way that Mr. Gad would treat it with the language as we have it.

JUDGE HOYT: I think you have got the wording in the record, haven't you?

MR. GAD: I think not, because the point is, as rewritten, it cannot be admitted because the law does not require what follows the phrase, "in that" in the words that are on this unnumbered page. It is as if this Contention said the Applicant has not complied with the Regulations because it has not complied with Reg. Guide II. That is an easy one to rule on. You do not have to comply with Reg. Guide II.

JUDGE LUEBKE: The Petitioner has answered my question and he says for us to rule on it as written, and we will.

JUDGE HOYT: Let's move on. Let us go on to I.B,

Environmental Qualification Mechanical Equipment.

MR. JORDAN: I.B.1 relates to the Environmental Qualification of Mechanical Equipment. The language that we would use, which in our filine of June 17th, we did reword this one on page 6. The Staff apparently has no objection. The Applicant would limit this Contention to the equipment that we have mentioned, particularly steam imp valves, turbine valves and steam dumping system, in our view, the Contention is

sufficient for litigation at this point, and it should not be limited to particular mentioned equipment. We are at the point at which we cannot possibly know everything that has not been environmentally qualified. The best that we can do is give some examples.

I refer the Board to a Licensing Board Decision of June 30, 1982 in the matter of Duke Power Company, Catawba

Nuclear Station, No. 50-413. This was actually a decision overruling objections to a Prehearing Conference Order in which the

Board states; how else, but through Discovery, is an Intervenor
going to find out, for example, about possible defects in equipment or lapses in Quality Assurance at a nuclear power plant?

Such things will not be reported in the FSAR.

Our point is that we have given examples of things that are not environmentally qualified in the area. The FSAR is not going to give us a nice list of everything that is not environmentally qualified that ought to be. We have enough now to take Discovery to determine if there is anything else.

At least under the Catawba Decision I have just referred to, the Contention should be admitted as written or as reworded on June 17th.

MR. LESSY: Your Honor, the Staff did not object to this Contention. They not only identify certain kinds of mechanical equipment, steam dump valves, turbine valves and the dumping system, but they link them all into a function, which is

residual heat remove. Now we have something that we can litigate and we don't object to that.

JUDGE HOYT: That Contention would then limit litigation on any other system other than steam dump valves, turbine valves and the entire steam dumping system.

MR. LESSY: If I heard you correctly --

JUDGE HOYT: I'm sorry. You would not be limited to the systems that he has just listed here as examples.

MR. LESSY: They would be. Yes. They would be limited to residual heat removal. Those matters are examples of the residual heat removal function. We are saying that that is sufficient. This is Environmental Qualification Mechanical Equipment. This is specifically what we want to litigate and we do not object to that.

If they want to litigate the Environmental Qualification of other mechanical equipment that does not have the
residual heat removal function, they have not proposed that and
nothing else ---

MR. JORDAN: Yes. That is correct and that is the way we read it, your Honor. It is limited to residual heat removal. It would not limit it to the systems given as examples of residual heat removal, but we could not go beyone residual heat removal.

JUDGE HOYT: That answers my question. Do you have anything?

MR. GAD: No.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. Let us go on to the duration of environmental qualification, which is your Contention, 1.B.2.

MR. JORDAN: Yes. As I understand it, there is no objection to that Contention as reworded. I think it is as worded in our original filing of April, 1982. We must have been all right in wording and satisfied the Staff on other matters. There is no problem here.

JUDGE HOYT: Then I.C., which is Environmental Qualification, Emergency Feed Water Pipe, HVAC valve.

MR. JORDAN: In this area, your Honor, the Staff has agreed to the Contention, as I understand it, for the purpose of Discovery, based on the position of the cables being unqualified, the Applicant would restrict it to the cables. The argument is the same as on I.B.1

The cables are the example of the problem of lack of Environmental Qualification. The subject matter would be restricted to the Emergency Feedwater Pump House. We would then take Discovery in that area to determine what we have got beyond the cables that are not environmentally qualified.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well.

MR. GAD: If I may, not to tread too far from what we have said in our written document, the situation here is a little bit different from the situation in the other ones.

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The Applicant has a list of equipment that it says is important. The thrust of this Contention is that NECNP wants to argue that some frazmus that is not now in our list ought to be added to the list. Beyond electrical cables, this doesn't tell us what it is that they contend is important to safety and is not on our list of items that is important to safety.

It doesn't tell us what you want to litigate about.

If you want to figure that out later on in the case of something like this, which I think is a very different matter from Emergency Planning, so be it. This Contention just does not tell us what it is that they are contending ought to be upgraded from non-safety related to safety related.

JUDGE LUEBKE: When Staff says to admit for Discovery only, I think I read that it was your intention that this would help to identify any of these anonymous items?

MR. LESSY: That is right. Our position is that this is pretty specific environmental qualification of heating, ventilating and air conditioning in the Emergency Feedwater

Pump House with respect to the cables in that pump house system.

That is specific. The Contention, therefore, at this point in time, would be limited to that. If NECNP, duirng the Discovery phases of the proceeding, hopefully not on January 12, 1983, but prudently during the Discovery phases, feels that there is something else that they want to litigate, then the Staff would not object to a timely ammendment to this Contention.

If they don't, they are limited to this specific cable in the pump house.

MR. JORDAN: As I understand it, it seems to be that we can take Discovery that we need in order to know what is in that Feedwater Pump House. Our problem is that we do not have the design of that plant. We are not out there looking at it.

We do know that the cables are there and they are not environmentally qualified and we need the rest of it. I think that responds to Mr. Gad's point. We need to know what is there and have our experts be able to tell us about it.

My question is whether under the Staff's position we have the right as the Contention would be admitted, even under their interpretation, to take the discovery necessary to determine whether there are other matters.

MR. LESSY: Yes.

JUDGE HOYT: I think it is going along with the other case that you cited earlier. We've got to get to Discovery in order to find out. I think that is the way we understood your position.

MR. LESSY: That is satisfactory to us.

JUDGE HOYT: You do understand it ---

MR. GAD: As I understand it now, we are all in agreement to the Contention as presently framed. It goes only to the cables and if it is to be enlarged later, we will enlarge it later and I think everybody is in perfect sinc.

JUDGE HOYT: Good show. Let's move along.

MR. LESSY: And he can have Discovery going beyond the cables with respect to the Emergency Feedwater Pump House.

JUDGE HOYT: Fine.

MR. JORDAN: We are now at Contention I.D which has four Contentions. I guess we are at the point where we will talk about Reg. Guides. I'll start with I.D.1.

I'll note that Staff appears to accept all the

Contentions of I.D.1 through I.D.4. The Applicant, beginning with

Contention I.D.1 objects with the argument that NECNP has

attempted to raise the Reg. Guide to the point of a Regulation,

which is not the case.

The Board, however, has indicated that it would not want the reference to the Regulatory Guide itself in the Contention.

If I may look at it for a second, perhaps we can solve that problem.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well.

MR. GAD: We have suggested some wording on page 8 and may assist in the matter.

JUDGE HOYT: On page 8 of your document?

MR. GAD: Of our document of June 28, 1982.

MR. JORDAN: We can accept that language.

This is for I.D.1. I will read it into the record. NECNP would insert the following Contention:

The Applicants have not complied with GDCl with

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respect to ultrasonic testing of reactor vessel wells during
pre-service and in-service examination.

This seems to be the kind of Contention, I must say, that Mr. Lessy does not like, but when he goes back to our earlier reading, he then, I guess, sees the specificity related to the Reg. Guide. That should solve that kind of problem.

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JUDGE HOYT: Thank you. Is that 1 D 2? Mr. Jordan, do you have problems with that?

MR. JORDAN: I just want it to be clear from the Staff that their position has not changed?

MR. LESSY: That is right. We have no objection to that reworded contention.

MR. JORDAN: We have another rewording here, if I can get a look at it.

JUDGE HOYT: Is that the one on page nine?

MR. JORDAN: Yes. I think we propose wording as follows: The first sentence would be the Applicant's sentence on page nine of its filing of June 28th. The Applicant's proposed testing of protection systems and actuation devices fails to meet the requirements of GDC 21 and NuReg 0737, Task II.D.1.

In particular, the Applicant does not provide for the testing at full power of twelve safety functions (see FSAR at 1.8-9), justify that omission or provide for other reliable means of testing them.

Then I believe we could it stop it there. So we would propose as I just read it.

MR. LESSY: No objection to that reworded contention.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you have anything on that?

MR. GAD: As long as it is perfectly clear that no one is ruling now as to whether or not any of the twelve are in

fact required, then I think it is innocuous.

JUDGE HOYT: The only thing we are really ruling on is the contentions to get the discovery started. That is what the whole exercise is all about I think.

Let us take up the I.D.3?

MR. LESSY: The I.D.3 our contention was reworded according to the wording on which stand is at page ten of our June 17th Filing. I notice that it does have Reg. Guide references in there which I can try to take care of in a moment. Let me first speak to the Applicant's complaint that we must specify the respect in which the Leakage Detection System or testing of the System does not comply. Our specificity is that the Applicant has not met the language or the guidance, if you will, of Reg. Guide 1.22 or provided an alternative means of achieving the same goal.

That being the case, it seems to me that we at least need to have discovery to determine whether in fact there is some other way that the Applicant has provided the protection that the Reg. Guide 1.22 would provide. At this point we cannot say and all we know is that they have not done that.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you want anything on this one, Mr. Lessy?

MR. LESSY: We did not object to the reworded contention by any NECNP. I think the ball is in Mr. Gad's court.

MR. GAD: We have objected on two grounds. Madam

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Chairman, one, the reference to the Reg. Guide as a legal standard and which I think Mr. Jordan is excising surgically while I speak.

The second is the attempt to use the Reg. Guide for the same thing as his specificity requirement. I cannot say it any better than we said it in our written document so I will not try to do it except to say that what we have to meet is the Regulation, not a document that proports to state one way of meeting the Regulation.

The specificity that ought to be required is some articulation of why we missed the boat on the Regulation, not why we missed the boat on the Reg. Guide which, of course, they just got out of a table some place. Whether or not you missed the boat on the Reg. Guide logically does not tell you whether or not you have missed the boat on the Regulations.

I think that striking the reference to the Reg. Guide is required here. We do not think that that satisfies the specificity requirement, apparently the Staff does.

MR. JORDAN: To respond, your Honor, to you concern about language actually referencing Reg. Guide, I think we can simply delete the second sentence of the contention as it worded on page ten of our June 17th Filing. So the contention would read without that sentence—if you would like me to read it into the record I will.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, please?

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MR. JORDAN: The contention would read as follows:

The Applicant has not provided a reasonable assurance that the

Leakage Detection System for the Seabrook Reactor will operate

when needed because not all of the System is to be tested during

Plant operation as required by GDC 21. Only the Airborn

Radioactivity Detector has the capacity to be tested during

power operation, FSAR at 1.8-17. The Applicant thereby also

fails to satisfy GDC 30 which requires the development of

adequate Leakage Detection Systems. That would be the contention.

Again, on the specificity matter, what we are able to read from the FSAR and from the information available to us is here is a Regulatory Guide that the Staff considers to be sufficient to comply with the Regulation. What we read is, the Applicant does not do what the Regulatory Guide suggests, what the Staff considers sufficient as set out in the Regulatory Guide. We are not saying that the Applicant cannot do something else, that the Regulatory Guide itself is a requirement. What we are saying is, the Regulatory Guide indicates at least a means of complying which the Applicant on table says they did not do and we do not have the Applicant saying, well, we did not do something else. We do not have them telling us we did not comply with it in some other way also. It seems to me we have enough there to raise a question, that we need discovery to answer.

If we get on discovery that there is this wonderful system that in fact is more than an alternative to Reg. Guide 122

or is an alternative or is not even as good but still complies with the Regulation, my question is answered. There is not enough there now for us to know that.

JUDGE HOYT: Let us quickly do I.D.4 which would get us well into your contentions.

MR. JORDAN: Again, the Staff has no complaint. I think that in this case I will try to give you rewording without the Regulatory Guide Reference. The wording would be as follows:

JUDGE HOYT: If you want to work that a little bit further down, Mr. Jordan? I do not want to hurry you.

MR. LESSY: He can do it now.

MR. JORDAN: I might be able to refine it better over lunch.

JUDGE HOYT: I would rather because I can see it might be straining. Why don't we do that because we have reached that time.

Let us adjourn the morning session and we will meet this afternoon at 1:30 P.M. Is that agreeable?

MR. LESSY: That ought to be fine, your Honor.

JUDGE HOYT: If in the event you do not get enough nourishment to carry you into the afternoon session, maybe we could extend the lunch hour but we will not hold you.

(A noon recess was taken.)

JUDGE HOYT: The Hearing will now come to order.

Let the record reflect that after the noon recess, the parties to the Hearing are all present in the Hearing Room and that we are ready to proceed again.

We will take the Contentions of the New England Coalitic on Nuclear Pollution and take it up with, I believe we went as far as ID 4; is that right?

MR. JORDAN: Yes, Ma'm.

JUDGE HOYT: Then ID 4 is where we will begin, the Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems.

MR. JORDAN: Your Honor, in order to respond to your concerns about the language of the Regulations, not in the NuReg Guide, we will reword it as follows: The Applicant has not complied with GDC 21 in that the Applicant indicates compliance with an outdated standard, IEEE 338-1975, which has been superseded by IEEE 338-1977.

Furthermore, for the rest of the Contention remains as it is on Page 11, or June 17th.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Perhaps for completeness; it is just two sentences.

MR. JORDAN: Okay, do you want me to read it?

JUDGE HOYT: Yes.

MR. JORDAN: Fine. The Contention would continue; Furthermore, the Applicant improperly asserts that he does not comply with IEEE 338-1975 whenever the standard states that an

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action should be taken or a requirement should be met. All the provisions of the IEEE standard should be treated as mandatory unless the Applicant can show an alternative means of acheiving the same level of safety.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. Any comments from the Staff?

MR. GAD: The attempt to elevate an IEEE standard

or doctrine to a level of a regulatory measure against which this

application is to be tested is, if anything, compounding the felony

that we think in attempting to do that with a regulatory guide.

This is a contention that I will ask the Board to rule that the application should be denied because it doesn't meet one particular addition, one particular document published by IEEE. That we do not think is an admissible or litigable contention in NRC licensing proceedings. The contention ought to be that the application does x, and for that reason it does not comply with y, where y is one of the NRC Regulations in this case, GDC 21.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I think that the Petitioner wishes us to rule on this as now is different.

JUDGE HOYT: Let me ask you out of total ignorance, haven't you, since you raise the standard in your Pleading of IEEE 338-1975, why would you complain that we really should not take advantage of that?

MR. GAD: I am not entirely certain of what the Chair refers to.

JUDGE HOYT: Let me put it this way; I can understand your argument against the use of the reg guide. Now, the standard which you yourself have raised, the IEEE standard, you say the Intervenor shouldn't use that as a measure of testing.

MR. GAD: My difficulty is that we have not raised the IEEE standard and our Contention is that the IEEE standards are one notch below the regulatory guide. For the same reason that you cannot convert a regulatory guide into a Regulation that has never been published by the Agency, it is an a fortiori proposition that you cannot take an IEEE standard, convert it into an unpublished Regulation and treat as if it were a regulation that has never been promulgated, and then use that as a Rule against which you would measure this application.

JUDGE PARIS: Are you saying that your documents do not indicate compliance with IEEE 338-1975?

MR. GAD: The FSAR discusses at various places whether or not the proposed piece of equipment or proposed system or proposed testing methodology or proposed something else in the judgment of the Applicant complies with, although I don't like the term complies with, a regulatory guide; an IEEE standard where the IEEE standard is referred to in the regulatory guide, and ASTM standard, where perhaps that is referred to in a regulatory guide, or as is traditionally used, for piping.

The point is that the License Application stands or falls on the Regulations. Now, if a particular characteristic

or set of affairs is both in noncompliance with a reg guide or an IEEE standard and noncompliance with the Regulation, the application will be denied, but it will be denied because it doesn't comply with the REgulations, not because it doesn't comply with the IEEE doctrine or the regulatory guide. Moreover, in a Contention like this, it equates the Regulation with the IEEE standard, and therein lies the vice. We do not have to meet an IEEE standard. We do have to meet the approved Regulations.

We contend they are different. Apparently any
NECNP contends they are the same. Whether or not that is true,
I think will be determined when the evidentiary hearing takes
place, but if the license application doesn't meet the GDC that
is referred to here, then NECNP wins and it will be denied. If
it does meet the GDC, then the application must be approved without
regard to what the IEEE standard is.

JUDGE HOYT: Didn't you in your application say that in conformance with the GDC 21 standard, you have done it by complying with IEEE 338-1975?

MR. GAD: I cannot answer you precisely as what it said.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, in general terms. You do admit, though, that you raise that in your FSAR?

MR. GAD: I don't believe that the Applicant in any case say we comply with the regs because we comply with an IEEE standard. We may very well have tables address various IEEE

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standards or ASTM standards and various regulatory guides, because the inclusion of the tables is at least traditional and perhaps even required.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Would it help any if I said that these IEEE and ASTM things are part of your Engineering procedure and how you do engineer it?

MR. GAD: I think the standard answer to that is not, becuase, once again, the license application is not tested against some general notion of how you do engineering.

JUDGE LUEBKE: That is what I mean.

MR. GAD: And I understand that these IEEE standards are widely accepted among Engineers as defining whatever it is that they have to define. The point that we are making is a little bit different. We are not urging that the plan is good or bad because it meets or it doesn't meet with what the Engineers have said, the IEEE has said. What we are saying is that the legal standard that governs this application, and frankly governs the applications of the Intervenors and the Board, the legal standard is the Rules and Regulations of the NRC period. And if it turns out that there is something that ought to be in those Rules and REgulations that isn't in those Rules and Regulations, then the lament must be addressed somewhere else than this particular Board that the war is that if you meet the Rules and Regulations, then the thing must be approved, even if you are all in concensus that the Rules and Regulations aren't any good.

Now, I don't know if I am complexing it or am answering your question.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I think the Contention as it was read into the record argues with the Commission's Regulation.

MR. GAD: It equates the Regulation with an IEEE standard, and that is not the function of the Contention for the ruling on the Contention.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Which we heard before.

MR. GAD: Indeed, the same as a reg guide.

JUDGE HOYT: Let 's see if Mr. Lessy wants to have a word in here.

MR. LESSY: We didn't oppose the rewording on the grounds that the legal framework for it was essentially the GDC 21. Having taken the reg guide matters out of there, the question of whether or not the Applicant's testing systems complied with GDC 21; that is the general Contention. The subpart of that Contention is that "a particular Applicant indicated compliance with an outdated standard, IEEE 338-1975, which NECNP alleges has been superceded. It doesn't say whether the standards were raised or lowered. But I think we have enough in this Contention to ask the question of whether or not Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems is consistent with the general design criterea.

The Staff's way of looking at the Contention and the question as to the IEEE matter are a corollary to that, but

not a necessary part of it, and therefore we felt we had enough to litigate.

JUDGE HOYT: Well put. That is what I was aiming for. Do you have anything else?

MR. JORDAN: Simply taking what Mr. Lessy said, I agree with him or a large portion of it. We do not assert the IEEE standards as the standards to be met, GDC 21 has to be met; no question about it. I agree with what Mr. Lessy says.

JUDGE HOYT: All right, let's move along then into lE, which is Reactor Cooling Pump Flywheel Integrity.

Any problems with that?

MR. JORDAN: Again we have the reg guide reference that we have deleted. Accordingly I would propose the following Contention. This is reading from deletions from Page 19 of our April filing. The Applicant has not complied with GDC 4 in that the Applicant will not perform post-inspections of the flywheel, has not identified the design speed of the flywheel and tested it at 125 per cent of that speed and has not specified the cross roll and ratio. Furthermore, the flywheel should be environmentally qualified under GDC 4 because it constitutes equipment important to safety.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Gad, do you have anything on that?

MR. GAD: It is a little bit difficult to assess

without seeing it in writing, but it sounds to me like if it didn't

land in the okay zone, it was pretty close.

MR. LESSY: Our view would be that everything up to the furthermore statement would be acceptable; the statement "furthermore, the flywheel should be environmentally qualified under GDC 4" seems to go beyond the Commission's Regulations and therefore would not have an adequate basis. The first part of the Contention up to the "furthermore" statement would be acceptable.

MR. JORDAN: On that point, your Honor, it seems to us the flywheel is the source, a potential source, of damaging missiles. It is also equipment that itself is important to safety. as I understand it, in providing interia to the pumping of the water, and that as being important to safety, it must then be primarily qualified under GDC 4.

MR. LESSY: Let me understand; is it your understanding that the Commission requires environmental qualification of the Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel?

MR. JORDAN: That is what the sentence is.

MR. LESSY: What is the reference?

MR. JORDAN: GDC 4 is the reference.

And also I do not know if the Commission's Regulation says x piece of equipment must be environmentally qualified. That is why we have all these difficulties; you are not aware of all the Regulations.

MR. JORDAN: I am not aware of any requirement that that particular piece of equipment has to be environmentally qualified. I realize that NECNP believes it should be. In the absence

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of a reference to that, we object to that as a lack of basis.

MR. JORDAN: Your Honor, finally, I guess I raised it here and probably in a number of other places, it seems to me that that is something that we obviously disagree on the interpretation of. That isn't a matter appropriate for summary disposition. The Board can have more focus and legal argument on the language of Regulations. But it seems to me that the appropriate thing is to leave the Contention in that Mr. Lessy believes it must allow on summary disposition grounds, and he may do that.

MR. LESSY: I wouldn't agree to that. It has to have a regulatory basis. You are stating that the particular equipment must meet the environmental qualifications requirements of the Commission in your view. Since it was done orally, we have to do it—I am aware of no pending requirement that the piece of equipment be environmentally qualified. Until you point to it there has been no basis established and we are not going to wait eight months before we move it out on summary disposition. That is the Staff's view.

JUDGE LUEBKE: In which case the Contention argues with the Commission.

MR. LESSY: That is right.

JUDGE LUEBKE: And the Petitioner has to argue with the Commission and not with us.

MR. LESSY: In an individual licensing proceeding, that is correct.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you have anything to report to us to sustain the position of Staff on the flywheel that it should be environmentally qualified other than your reading it.

MR. JORDAN: I think what this gets down to really is a question of fact, not a question of misinterpretation or challenge to the Commission Regulation. I mean, we do not intend any such challenge. The question of fact is whether the flywheel is equipment important to safety. If it is important to safety, no question, the criterion 4 applies. I would think a relatively straight Board affidavit of the position to show that that flywheel to the pump is somehow imvolved in the operation of those pumps is not important to safety.

MR. LESSY: As to legal basis, the only basis that is in the record for any NECNP proposition that the Reactor Cooling Pump Flywheel need be environmentally qualified is a reg guide 1.14. We have been through that. In the absence of any other basis, I object as lacking in adequacy.

JUDGE HOYT: I find that that is all the argument that we will take on that particular Contention. Let's move on to Contention IF, Desiel Generator Qualification.

MR. JORDAN: We have again the regulatory guide.

From here I gather that the Staff does not object to the Contention.

We would reword the Contention as follows: taking this from Page 21 of our April filing, the second sentence of that: NECNP contends that the Desiel Generators cannot be

do not meet the requirements of IEEE 3.3-1974.

JUDGE PARIS: And you are deleting the first sentence altogether?

MR. JORDAN: Yes, and I just reword the second and third sentences to put them together so that they make sense in light of the deletion of the first one.

JUDGE HOYT: And I take it that it is your position, Mr. Gad, that you object to that rewording because it raises the IEEE to the standard of a regulation.

MR. GAD: It in substitution for the real standard, yes, indeed.

MR. JORDAN: I'm sorry. I got a little off track.

I may have given the wrong impression of what the Staff had

agreed to. We did reword this Contention. I was incorrect where

I was reading from.

The reworded language is on page 12 of our June 17th filing. That is the language I understand the Staff agreed to.

JUDGE PARIS: Are we discarding what you have just read?

MR. JORDAN: Yes.

JUDGE PARIS: All right.

MR. JORDAN: Yes. We would discard what I had just read. I will use what we just reworded. I think it is clear and it does include the Regulation Citation.

JUDGE HOYT: We will strike all of the above and we are looking at the wording that you have on page 12 of the June 17th filing.

MR. JORDAN: Yes. It is as follows with the deletion:

The Applicant has not met the requirements of GCD17 or Criteria III, App. (b) in that it has not indicated compliance with 1EEE, 323-1974.

MR. PARIS: In that it has not indicated compliance with, and so on. Is that right?

MR. GAD: Because there is not a jot in GCD17 or Criteria III, App. (b) that purports to manifest a commissioned

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policy decision and that IEEE, 323-1974 is a Regularoty Standard against which this thing must be met. Such a Contention is not admissable.

JUDGE HOYT: Anything from you, Mr. Lessy? MR. LESSY: My understanding is that GCD17 does apply to the generator qualification and since that is the criteria from which the Applicant's generators were reviewed, we found it to be an acceptable Contention.

JUDGE HOYT: Let's look at I.G. on Pressure Instrument Reliability and I guess your new wording is on the bottom of page 12 and the top of page 13 on that one.

Mr. Jordan, anything you want to change on that one? MR. JORDAN: No. I understand the Staff and Applicant have accepted that wording.

JUDGE HOYT: I think that is a milestone in this case.

Now we will go into I.H, Decay Heat Removal Capacity, and I take it that you do not have any additional new wording on that but you stand on the wording of the Contention of April 21, is that right?

MR. JORDAN: Yes, we do.

JUDGE HOYT: And that would be found in the middle of page 23. Is that it?

> MR. JORDAN: I have it at the top of page 23 JUDGE HOYT: Right. Go ahead.

JUDGE HOYT: Where does the wording start? Are you just saying that whole paragraph at the top of the page is your Contention?

MR. JORDAN: I would not have reworded it from this language.

JUDGE PARIS: In essence, your Contention is contained in the last two sentences, is that right?

MR. JORDAN: Actually, the Contention as to what is wrong and what should be done could be the last sentence.

JUDGE PARIS: Okay.

MR. JORDAN: It says, "The Applicant should be required to install additional heat exchanger capacity to allow for more rapid cooldown of the facility in the event of an accident."

JUDGE HOYT: I can see what the objection to that is going to be. Do you want to tell us what it is that they should install?

MR. JORDAN: Well, we are unable to say that, but we are able to do is to say that the adequacy of heat exchanger capacity is an unresolved safety issue. It is a new one under NuReg. 0705.

What has happened here is that the FSAR indicates that the heat exchanger capacity for Seabrook is indeed less than the heat exchanger capacity for, I believe, at least two older plants.

If the issue is already an unresolved safety issue with respect to existing plants, we have Seabrook having a lesser capacity than two of those. The issue needs to be resolved. We have a Contention on it. We do not know whether they are going to be able to resolve it or not.

JUDGE LUEBKE: It is my recollection that the Staff puts out a supplement to the SER at some time which addresses the unresolved safety issues and presumably they would include this on the list?

MR. LESSY: Yes. Staff had a problem with this

Contention because of the lack of basis. The basis for the

Contention was NuReg. 0705 which is a document entitled, "Identification of New Unrevolved Safety Issues Relating to Nuclear

Power Plants," dated May of 1981.

The way we read the document, that unresolved safety issue, which will be addressed in the Staff's SSER, there is no shelling in NuReg. 0705 or not discussion that the reference applies to inadequacies in the size of the heat exchangers.

This Contention goes to the size of the heat exchanger as opposed to its designed pressure. We objected to this Contention on the grounds of a lack of adequate basis. Unless Mr. Jordan is able to qualify that, he is in the right church, but the wrong pew.

JUDGE HOYT: Would not this be a more timely filing of a Contention of that nature after the SER is out?

MR. JORDAN: I have two or three responses. Our Problem is that we have what we view to be a basis for it now, and accordingly it would be untimely for us to raise it later after the SER comes out.

which the information arrives, then I do not have a problem in raising the Contention after we find out the resolution. I would have no difficulty with that at all, if I could be assured now that I will not have a timeliness objection if we have a Contention to raise when the SER is issued on this subject, I can withdraw the Contention. Without that, I must hold to it because we do believe we do have a basis for it.

JUDGE PARIS: So you are proposing that the Contention lie fallow until the SER comes out, at which time you will either withdraw it or you would like it to become activated?

MR. JORDAN: I would be willing to do that. Yes.

If that is all right, I'll get to the rest of it.

JUDGE HOYT: We will go on. Let's go on to the Inadequate Provisions for Achieving Cold Shutdown. Again, we want to word your Contention and what language you want to use in it.

MR. JORDAN: I think the Staff has done that for us.

I have in front of me the Staff's response to various supplements,

including ours dated July 1, 1982, page 21, in which in effect,

the Staff ppears to propose some language.

Let me see if I can give us a Contention based on it. The following Contention is NECNP Contention I.I.

NECNP contends that the Applicant must identify and environmentally qualify one path to cold shutdown as per I and E Bulletin 79-01B, Supplement 3.

MR. LESSY: What is the basis for that Contention?

MR. JORDAN: In fact, the basis for the Contention is the I and E Bulletin itself, in which the Staff takes the position that that must be done and the fact that we have not found, I believe -- let me clear my thoughts.

Based on the FSAR, the Applicant has not identified an environmentally qualified such a one path to cold shutdown, but has provided the capability to place and maintain the Plant in a hot standby position. You cannot just go down the path to cold shutdown; you may have to reach a standby condition and then do something else to recover from an accident; then get to cold shutdown.

MR. LESSY: The Staff does not object to that

Contention, your Honor. An I and E Bulleting is not a Regulation

of the Commission, but it is a mandatory document which requires

a response from the Licensee and we feel that this particular

Contention is admissible.

JUDGE HOYT: As worded here on this record?

MR. LESSY: Yes.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you.

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MR. GAD: I hate to disagree with Mr. Lessy and I do so with a fair measure of trepidation, but it seems to us that when, as and if the policy judgment is made that there must be one environmentally qualified path to cold shutdown as a operating license standard. When that policy judgment is made, it has to be made in a different fashion in which it has not yet been made before it can be used as a ruler against which you are going to measure this application.

> JUDGE LUEBKE: Are you saying it is a pending matter? MR. GAD: Not to my knowledge.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I heard Mr. Lessy say it exists.

MR. GAD: I want to be careful here. I think what Mr. Lessy said is it is the Staff's opinion that this thing ought to exist and that they have issued a document calling for a response by the Applicants.

JUDGE LUEBKE: So it is a matter in process. not completed.

MR. GAD: Well, my point was intended to be a little more general. I am not sure that there is even a Notice of Proposed Rule Making on the point. My point is this: A contention must related to the NRC Regulations, a contention, the basis of which is, well, in our judgment what the standard ought to be is "X" is a contention that is looking to NRC policy decision making that has not yet taken place. We cannot be denied a license on the basis of the failure to meet a standard that has

not been imposed yet.

MR. JORDAN: I must add, we have cited in our original filing on page 25, the April filing, a number of GDC from which this, what we view as a requirements derives, we would serve specifically GDC34 and we will stand on that JUDGE HOYT: We have in the record the wording you want.

JUDGE PARIS: Mr. Gad, is it your position that a contention cannot be based on Applicant's failure to comply with an I and E order or directive?

MR. GAD: I think the answer to the question is yes.

But before a say so, I would like a chance to consider my plea

over night. I think that the application cannot be denied because

of the non-existence of something, the requirement to have which.

is not traceable to an NRC Regulation. Yes, Doctor, that will

be our position.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, put in those terms, I suppose anything I and E does can be traceable to a Regulation.

MR. GAD: I have a little bit of trouble with this. If someone came out with an I and E or an IEEE Bulletin or an ASDN that said that all nuclear power plants shall be blue and we came in here with an application for a red one and someone tried to deny it on that basis, we would have trouble with it.

There are various categories of issuances from the Office of Inspection in Portsmouth. There is an I and E Infor-

mation Notice which puts applicants and others on notice of certain technical requirements, but is not mandatory upon them. An I and E Bulletine, however, is a mandatory document and, whereas Mr. Gad notes, it does not have the precise status of a Commission Regulation from the Staff's standpoint. It is a mandatory document and there is no holding to the effect that compliance with an I and E Bulletin does not form the basis for a valid contention. There is no commission law to defect the compliance with an I and E Bulletin.

The other thing I might add, there is one piece of information and it is the matter of a cold shutdown is something that has been discussed at the Commission level.

There is not a proposed rule on it but it is something that is being very actively discussed in connection with some other things and I would expect to see Commission Regulations coming out in the next couple of years to deal precisely with that; maybe even sooner. So it is an active matter at the Commission level and it is a mandatory matter at the Staff level and unfortunately the Board has to issue a couple of sentences ruling upon the admissability of this Contention.

Our position is that it is a valid Contention.

JUDGE HOYT: Now, returning to I.J. Sabotage.

Mr. Jordan, I want to tell you in advance that I had some trouble with this one. Give me a pretty good explanation on it.

MR. JORDAN: Let me take a shot. Fundamentally,

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the point is that Seabrook is vulnerable to sabotage, largely
because of the complexity of the design. Our advice from Mr.
Pollard of the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Nuclear Enginee
who was formally with the NRC, is that there are innumerable
aspects of the Plant that can be relatively easily be tampered
with in a way that he would expect could not be detected. He
is not an expert on whether it could be detected.

JUDGE HOYT: Would he be your witness, though?

MR. JORDAN: He would be one witness. Yes.

JUDGE HOYT: Can you tell us some of the concerns that he has on those. I'm trying to understand where you are going with this.

MR. JORDAN: Okay. As best I recall, he explained to us, for example that valves could be faced in a permanently open position. I believe a permanently opened position as he explained it to us.

MR. GAD: I hate to interrupt, but if we are going to get a lesson on how to sabotage a nuclear power plan, then I think we ought to do it in a slightly different form.

MR. JORDAN: I am certainly not going to go into any more detail than I have just told you. I don't know it.

JUDGE HOYT: I did not intend that my question would generate that type of thing, Mr. Gad.

MR. GAD: I was reacting to the answer I was starting to hear, not necessarily the question. 300 7TH STREET, S.W., REPORTERS BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024 (202) 554-2345

JUDGE HOYT: I know that the answer was in response to my question. I want you to understand that I did not intend on that.

Let me ask any people who wish to use their cameras be advised that we ask you not to use a light that would shine in our eyes. It is rather unpleasant. We would appreciate it if you would abide by that. We do not want to impose any restrictions upon the press, but it is very difficult if you have to have that in your eyes.

All right, Mr. Jordan. The idea that I was coming to was how you could perhaps word the Contention that would make it as to Seabrook. I am sure that if you have Valve No. 22 in every other plant in the country, Valve No. 22 could be just as subject to sabotage in those plants as it would be in the Seabrook Plant. What makes Seabrook unique as to sabotage is what I am really probably asking.

MR. JORDAN: That is the other side of the coin that I had not gotten to yet. I assume they are all virtually susceptile in essentially the same way. What you get to is the question of whether the Security Plan for the Plant protects against the potential sabotage.

There may be a Plan that is adequate at Plant No. 1 and Plant No. 2 may have a different Plan that is not adequate. That is the point.

JUDGE HOYT: Let me stop you there and say my con-

cern is how can you word that Contention to indicate the missing link at the Seabrook Plant?

MR. JORDAN: Okay. That is when we get to the question of the Security Plan. You cannot tell until you have an expert look at the Security Plan. It is impossible for us to know that.

MR. GAD: May I volunteer a way out of this?

JUDGE HOYT: Go ahead, Mr. Gad.

MR. GAD: I would not put it quite in those terms.

NE CNP is very candid in its latest filing and I am talking about page 15 of whatever date it was.

JUDGE HOYT: June 17th.

MR. GAD: Yes. They are quite candid when they say they cannot frame a proper Contention at this time. I think the Applicants are in agreement that they have not and cannot; I think the Staff is, and I think that disposes of the issue of whether or not we have a Contention at this time.

NECNP also takes the position they would like to take a crack at looking at the Security Plan. There seems to have evolved in NRC practice, a pre-established procedure which is unique to getting a look at the Security Plan. NECNP has not trod down that path yet, and when they do, we are ready to respond to it.

I think the issue that is on the table today is limited to whether or not there is an admissible Contention today.

I think there is no disagreement that today there is none.

MR. LESSY: That is right, your Honor. The NECNP has stated that they are not able to frame a contention because they have not reviewed the Plan, which is true, and therefore, such a contention would be inappropriate at this time.

The litigation of Security Plan matters, the procedures, are different from the procedures on almost any other Contention. Perhaps the leading discussion is the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plan Units I & II, ALAB 410, cited that 5 NRC 1398, 1977, NECNP cannot frame a contention until its experts review the plan.

However, before its experts can review the Plan,
they have to first demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Licensing
Board that they possess the technical competence to evaluate it.
That is accomplished by one of two ways. The burden of demonstrating expertise is upon the parties sponsoring the expert
witness. That would be on NECNP.

The two ways that are available is the Licensing Board decision, Licensing Board 78-36, also Diablo 8NRC 567, 1978. The two methods available a voir dire examination before the Board under appropriate circumstances with respect to the background and technical competence of the experts.

Generally, the background has to be usually for Security Claim issues, is an expert in sabotage or terrorism with respect to nuclear power plants.

The other method other than the <u>voir dire</u> examination which is used is a deposition method. We would take the deposition of certain of the experts and then submit the deposition to the Board under appropriate circumstances with appropriate legal arguments.

In the Security Plan issue, all of that has to be done before you get to the question of framing Contentions. We are just at the point now where frankly, when I was packing my bags, getting ready to go to the plane, I got a letter from Mr. Jordan's associate setting forth the qualifications of two proffered experts.

I guess the Board, in conjunction with NECNP has to decide if we are ready to proceed using that method of approach at this time, or whether or not NECNP wants to wait. That is exactly the status of where we are right now.

JUDGE HOYT: You are referring to Ms. Curran's letter of July 9th?

MR. LESSY: That is right, your Honor. I got it as I was packing my bag Tuesday night.

JUDGE LUEBKE: There was a time when we didn't use the word "sabotage." When did we start using it?

MR. LESSY: I thought I used the word "terroism."

JUDGE LUEBKE: I guess you used both words. I

have the notion that sabotage was not a thing we litigated.

MR. LESSY: I think that you may be referring to

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international sabotage. That is the ruling of the Siegel case, as opposed to industrial sabotage.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I was thinking there might be a milder word.

MR. LESSY: Well, security issues.

JUDGE LUEBKE: That's fine. I think sabotage is an exaggeration of the language.

MR. LESSY: That is their Contention.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I don't think there should be a subtitle of Sabotage.

MR. LESSY: Anyway, we are in that procedural mode here, which is unique to this subject matter.

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MR. JORDAN: I agree with Mr. Lessy. I think he has been very helpful in laying out what goes in the litigation of the Security Plans. I do not see that is probably helpful to pursue it here at the moment.

I would tell the Board and the parties that in addition to those individuals indentified in the letter from Ms. Curran, we all are in contact with and hope will be able to obtain the assistance of two further experts, Dr. Forest Frank and Dr. Peter Zimmerman of the ZF Corporation, both of whom are Ph.D.'s, Zimmerman in Physics and who have experience in this field. I will not get into arguing their qualifications here.

I think as next week begins, we can enter the process of the Security Plan Contention and see if we go through the routes that Mr. Lessy is talking about. Then we will frame the contention when that point comes.

JUDGE HOYT: Do I read that to mean that you are withdrawing at this time?

MR. JORDAN: Mr. Gad is correct. We have said that we cannot frame a contention now because we do not have the Plan.

JUDGE HOYT: I just want to get it on the record that you are withdrawing it.

MR. JORDAN: No problem.

JUDGE HOYT: Does that also mean that you withdraw the request for a protective order set out in Ms. Curran's letter of July 9th?

	MR. JORDAN:	In any event	, we are not	at this time
requesting	a protective o	order, that is	the process	that we then
eventually	use, I gather.			

JUDGE HOYT: I can conclude this letter is being withdrawn?

MR. JORDAN: Yes. The request for a protective order, to the affect there was one, would be withdrawn.

MR. AHRENS: Your Honor, may I be excused?

JUDGE HOYT: Certainly. Are you withdrawing for

a purpose?

MR. AHRENS: No, your Honor.

JUDGE HOYT: Just for a call, surely.

Then I take it we can move on into Solid Waste

Disposal?

MR. JORDAN: I think we are on Item K, Instrumentation. Ms. Curran will address the next several contentions.

JUDGE HOYT: Ms. Curran, if you will?

MS. CURRAN: Thank you. In this contention NECNP challenges the Applicant's failure to submit a Post Accident Monitoring System. In response to the Applicant's and Staff's objections, we propose two alternative means of dealing with the fact that PAM System has not yet been submitted by the Applicant.

First we offer to leave the contention as is to be amended or withdrawn and then the PAM System is submitted or else

we will withdraw the contention now with the option of resubmitting it at a later time when the PAM System is submitted. It appears to us that both the Applicant and the Staff would prefer the second alternative. That is fine with us.

Our major concern here is that we not have to suffer the prejudice of meeting the late filed Contention Standard if we do so. We feel that it would be unfair to us to penalize us for the failure of the Applicant to complete the FSAR on time.

have to meet that. I think that one of the problems that the Board has had and I think this is because of the way that this Commission's Regulations are framed, and that is when you have got a contention that is going to come out on a document that is substantially in the future, you cannot have an Intervenor framing a contention against something they have no idea what it is all about. As far as this Board is concerned, the way we want to lookat it inthat the contention can only be right for framing when the document against which the contention will be aimed has been framed for the proceeding. I think that is a fair and equitable manner in which to proceed.

MR. LESSY: In other words, there would be good cause for their filing at that point in time.

JUDGE HOYT: Exactly. It would meet one of the four or all of the late filed contentions but in order to remove that obstacle of having to go across all those and ritualistically

reciting them, that we just make that ruling up front and let it go. Then we would take the contentions at the time at which the documentation on which the Intervenor is basing the contention has been filed.

Does either Applicant or Staff have any problems with that?

MR. LESSY: The only suggestion that I would have in that regard, your Honor, is that the framing of the contention follow fairly quickly after the availability of the document to that party.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, I think that would have to be understood that that would be the policy of the Board, to expect it immediately upon the submission of the document or within a reasonable length of time. I think that you do not want to shoot from the hip.

Mr. Lessy had something else. Let's get him up.

MR. LESSY: We had suggested in the case of the Instrumentation Contention that the Licensing Board require NECNP to submit the contention within twenty-one days of its receipt of the information on Applicant's Instrumentation selection. Anything within that timeframe or whatever timeframe that the Board ordered would be a contention which would meet the late filed Contention Requirements. Anything outside of that, you would start getting back into weighing those factors.

MS. CURRAN: Judge Hoyt?

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, ma'am.

MS. CURRAN: We would like to respond to that. We feel that the PAM System description may be a very extensive document that we would really require at least thirty days in which to respond adequately to that which would give our experts an opportunity to review and come up with very specific contenttions.

JUDGE HOYT: So you are saying thirty days and you are saying twenty-one?

MR. LESSY: The twenty-one was a rule of thumb, it was not a precise time.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. Let us consider then that you will withdraw I.K. at this time with the assurance that you may file it at the time in which the PAM document will be needed. All of the above will be applicable.

Let us move along into Contention I.L., PORV Flow Detection Monitoring System.

MS. CURRAN: I believe we may have resolved our disagreement about this contention this morning. As long as Mr. Gad would still agree, I would like to read the version that we discussed this morning into the record.

MR. GAD: I have not changed my mind.

MS. CURRAN: Applicants have not provided for a direct indication of Power Operated Relief Valve Positions and therefore, have not complied with NuReg 0737, Item II.D.3.

A safety grade environmentally qualified system in compliance with GDC 4 should be installed.

JUDGE HOYT: Anything from you, Mr. Lessy?

MR. LESSY: The Staff agreed with that rewording.

JUDGE HOYT: Let us move along into Contention I.M.

Fire Protection.

MS. CURRAN: The Staff accepts this contention provided it is limited to the component and systems described in our reply to their objections. We are willing to agree with that and we will limit the contention to those components.

The Applicant has responded that CLI-80-21 does not make the Branch Technical Position or the proposed rule that we cited enforceable with regard to Fire Protection.

I think the best way to clear that up is for me to read the Commission's Decision, the sentence in CLI-80-21 which we believe makes the standards cited in our contention enforceable with regard to Fire Protection. That is, the combination of the Guidance contained in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 and the requirement set forth in the proposed rule to find the essentially elements for an acceptable Fire Protection Program at nuclear power plants docketed for construction permit prior to July 1, 1976, for demonstration of compliance with General Design Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, we believe the words of the Branch Technical Position and the proposed rule define the essential elements of

Fire Protection make them enforceable standards.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Gad?

MR. GAD: The point here I think is best illustrated by comparing the grammar of the sentence quoted and then the sentence immediately following there of argument because the argument left out the words, an acceptable. An acceptable, indefinite article, one acceptable.

The position of NECNP is that the documents referred in CLI-80-21 are the only way to meet GDC 3. If they are correct about that then their contention need be framed in terms of GDC 3 alone. We contend that the materials that are in AD-21 are one acceptable way of satisfying GDC 3. If we are correct about that then all that you may refer to is GDC 3 and not something that serves a function akin to a Regulatory Guide. Who is ever right about the Law, the only thing that need be referred to in the contention that is admitted and the only thing that we think may properly be referred to in the contention that is admitted, is the GDC, the General Design Criterion.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Then it also follows that the basis must be consistent with that limitation?

MR. GAD: That is correct.

JUDGE HOYT: Anything else? Do you want to input in this, sir?

MR. PERLIS: The only input I would like to make is the official NRC Cite, which I guess we should apologize, the

Staff miscited in its first response to NECNP is 11 NRC 707. It was a different number earlier. I believe the cited passage was at 11 NRC at 718.

JUDGE HOYT: Is this on page twenty-one?

MR. PERLIS: .No. This is on page thirteen of our May 19th Filing. This is our original response to NECNP's contentions.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Your position is that the contention was okay?

MR. PERLIS: Our contention is that I do not think we paid quite as much attention to the wording as the Applicant did. We would agree to the Applicant's suggestion or to NECNP's. We think a contention dealing with prior requirements is acceptable.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I guess I am a little puzzled because which one are we accepting? There is one version here, it has a two page listing of items. Is that the one we are accepting. There is one version here, it has got a two page listing of items. Is that the one we are on?

MR. LESSY: The contention proferred by NECNP now is limited to those items.

Our suggestion in our May 19th pleading, your Honor, was that we would not object to a contention to the affect that Applicant's Fire Protection System does not meet the requirements of GDC 3 as interpreted by the Commission in CLI-80-21 provided

they were limited to the two pages of items. They have limited to that so our objection is satisfied.

JUDGE LUEBKE: You will make some specifics?

MR. LESSY: Yes, that is right.

MS. CURRAN: If you would like we can just change the wording of the contention to say, looking at page sixteen of our reply brief that says the Applicant does not meet the requirements of GDC 3 as implemented by the Commission in CLI-80-21 with respect to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A regarding the following items. Then following that, the list of items that we have identified as not complying with the Branch Technical Position, if that would clarify things.

JUDGE HOYT: I seem to have misplaced your original filing. Is that the one of the 21st?

MR. LESSY: The 17th.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well. I have it. Thank you.

MR. LESSY: Our recommendation is that we would end GDC 3 as interpreted by the Commission and CLI-80-21. That was our suggestion.

MS. CURRAN: That is fine.

JUDGE PARIS: What are we doing here? Are you accepting what Mr. Lessy has just proposed and dropping the long list of particulars?

MS. CURRAN: No.

MR. LESSY: She is including the list of particulars.

The only question is the legal framework for the contention and our suggestion was that if the legal basis for the contention is that Applicant's Fire Protection System does not meet the requirements of GDC 3 as interpreted by the Commission in that order, CLI-80-21, limited to those particular items, we have no objection to such a contention.

JUDGE LUEBKE: All right, then I am still not certain as to what the language of the contention is going to be. Is it going be that sentence, the Applicant Fire Protection and so on, with respect to and then that list of particulars? Something like that?

MS. CURRAN: Yes.

JUDGE LUEBKE: All right. After CLI-80-21 we will put comma with respect to colon, how about that?

MS. CURRAN: Fine.

JUDGE HOYT: I have a feeling that everyone is just a little bit weary as we our tripping over our words here.

Let us have a very brief recess. Please do not get too far away from the Hearing Room.

(Off the record.)

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JUDGE HOYT: Back on the record. The Hearing will come to order.

All parties to the Hearing with the exception of Counsel for the State of Maine, who has been over the recess period excused, are here present in the Hearing Room.

Let us go ahead with NECNP's Contention IN on Solid Waste Disposal System. Mr. Jordan, are you ready on that one, sir?

MS. CURRAN: I am.

JUDGE HOYT: Go ahead.

MS. CURRAN: There was no objection from the Applicant or the Staff to our Contention 1N on Solid Waste.

JUDGE LUEBKE: That is the reworded version in your June 17th Filing?

MS. CURRAN: That is correct.

JUDGE HOYT: Let us go into Contention IO, Emergency Feedwater.

MS. CURRAN: The Staff has accepted our Contention 102 but objects to Contention 101. The Applicant continues to object to both Contentions.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes. I think there are two contentions in this area, 1 and 2, and both are objected to by both Applicant and Staff and you still stand on submission of the Contention as is phrased in your original filing April 21st?

MS. CURRAN: Actually, Contention 101 was not

rephrased but Contention 102 was rephrased.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, I am trying to get through 101 first.

MS. CURRAN: I am sorry.

JUDGE HOYT: So 101 is as you had phrased it on page 34 of the April 21 submission?

MS. CURRAN: Uh hum.

JUDGE HOYT: Now on 102 if you have reworded it in the June 17th pleading and that is contained on page twenty.

Is there anything else on that?

Let us see what the Applicant wishes to submit on that at this time? Anything different from what you had previously stated?

MR. GAD: The answer is no, Madam Chairman, we would rely on our written submission.

MR. LESSY: The Staff found the resubmitted Contention 102 to be acceptable.

MS. CURRAN: I would like to make one comment.

JUDGE HOYT: Please?

MS. CURRAN: On Contention 101, the Applicant responded that there was no regulatory requirement that a single failure in the Common Discharge Header be considered. We believe that the preamble to Appendix of Part 50 does provide a regulatory basis for our Contention and that is equal to any other part of the regulations.

MR. LESSY: Which part of the preamble are you referring to?

MS. CURRAN: I am referring to footnote 2 to
Appendix A which says that the conditions under which a single
failure of passive component in a Fluid System should be
considered in designing a System against a single failure are
under development.

Applicant from considering these matters in the design of a specific facility and satisfying the necessary requirement. These matters include consideration of the need to design against single failures of Passive Components in Fluid Systems important to safety. They require consideration of redundancy and diversity requirements for Fluid Systems important to safety. They require consideration of possible breaks in the Components of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary in determining design requirements to suitably protect against postulated loss of coolant accidents.

They require the consideration of the possibility of systematic nonrandom concurrent failures of redundant elements in the design of the Protection System and Reactivity Control Systems.

We believe that this is a very specific Regulatory
Requirement that a single failure in a system so important to the
safety as the Common Discharge Header be considered.

Our concern in both of these Contentions springs from the fact that in this particular plan design, all of the Steam Generators rely on a single Emergency Feedwater Pipe, the Common Discharge Header for Feedwater Flow. Therefore, a break in that System is particularly dangerous to the entrie system.

JUDGE HOYT: Where were you reading from just a moment ago?

MS. CURRAN: I was reading from both the Introduction and Footnote 2 to the Preamble to Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50.

JUDGE PARIS: Mr. Perlis is looking at the same version of the 10 CFR that I am looking at. Did you find what she is reading?

MR. PERLIS: I think you are reading from a subparagraph, there is a separate footnote.

MS. CURRAN: First I read from the Footnote. That was the first sentence that I read, actually the first two sentences. Then I followed that with part of the third paragraph of the Introduction to Appendix A.

JUDGE HOYT: Starting with the development of these General Design Criteria is not yet complete?

MS. CURRAN: That is correct.

JUDGE HOYT: That is on page four and five in the book and then the footnote is on page four of six.

MR. LESSY: Your Honor, we did not say anything about the Discharge Header in the Preamble to Appendix A and it

is the first time I have head of a Preamble being used to the
Appendix. We objected to the Contention as not having a basis.
There is still not a Regulatory Requirement for the design change
which NECNP is advocating. Because of that, Contention 101 is
unacceptable because it does not have an adequate basis and
because of Peach Bottom. You cannot litigate a design which
NECNP is advocating if it is not a Commission Requirement.

MS. CURRAN: We simply disagree that the single Failure Criterion does apply to these passive Fluid Systems important to safety and that the Common Discharge Header is a piece of equipment which is extremely important to safety.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Well, this is a matter which the Staff must have considered in its regular review of the engineering design and come to some conclusion about it, it seems to me.

Has the Petitioner seen the SER?

MR. LESSY: It is not out yet.

JUDGE LUEBKE: It is not out yet?

JUDGE HOYT: Not until the latter part of the year.

JUDGE LUEBKE: So until they read what the Staff engineeringwise says about this thing, it is a little hard to go further, isn't it?

MR. LESSY: It is accept that I am not aware that the Discharge Header had been classified as NECNP classifies it or seeks to have it classified. That is the key to their argument.

JUDGE HOYT: There are other plants in operation

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with that same type of Header, are there not?

MR. LESSY: Yes, there are other Discharge Headers. I am not familiar with a Discharge Header being categorized in the category that NECNP seeks to place it in. That is simply our argument that that part of the contention lacks basis.

JUDGE HOYT: Anything else, Mr. Gad?

MR. GAD: Again, at the risk of oversimplifying, I think that NECNP is contending that the Appendix A, and they do not find in any of the specific criteria in the back, imposes a legal requirement that I think this Board will find has never been imposed on any other plant before. So the Board is going to have retire and take a look at what they are saying the legal requirement is, take a look at the regulation that they are saying imposes that requirement, see if you can find it any other case and decide whether or not they are right.

Our position is that Appendix A does not impose this requirement as heretofore never been thought to impose this requirement, and the fact that somebody might very earnestly think that such a requirement ought to be imposed, and indeed maybe they are right about it, is simply not an issue for this litigation.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well. Let's move along then. I think we have taken care of both Contentions in 10, have we not?

Very well, that brings us down to IP, Human

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Engineering.

MS. CURRAN: The Applicant's objection to this

Contention is that there is no Regulation requiring the relocation

of the Multi Point Recorder.

The Staff has said that we have not shown the location of the Multi Point Recorder is a significant problem under the Standard of NuReg 0737. T

Recorder that records temperatures from 0 degrees to 2300 degrees. As far as we can tell from FSAR, the placement of that Recorder would be require the person who is at the control panel to get up from his our her position and go around the back on the control panel to look at the monitor. That would require that person to leave the other monitoring functions that he or she was performing.

We think that on the face of it, this is a violation of GDC 19 which requires that a control room be provided from which the plant can be run safely under normal and accident conditions and of NuReg 0737, Task 1D1, implementing the lesson of Three Mile Island which calls for the re-evaluation of control room design and the correction of design deficiencies.

JUDGE HOYT: What Criteria did you cite?

MS. CURRAN: That is General Design Criterion 19.

JUDGE HOYT: Has there been any change in the Control Panel Design since this Plant has been designed starting of

construction? We are much too early as to the actual placement of it.

Could you give us some help on that, Mr. Gad, after consultation?

MR. GAD: As I understand your Honor's question, it is what has been the evolution of the Control Room Design?

There was a simulator built, it was tested. A number of things were identified that ought to be changed in order to improve it. Those changes have been incorporated into the design of the actual Control Room and they are now in the process of being incorporated into the simulators so that the two will look the same. The description of that process in the FSAR is reasonably if not perfectly up to date. As I say, the FSAR may lag a little bit behind but not by much.

JUDGE HOYT: Have you had an opportunity to examine the FSAR? I think you are stationed in Washington?

MS. CURRAN: Uh hum.

JUDGE HOYT: You can use our Files there in Washington so there is no problem in your examination of this application.

MS. CURRAN: Yes, that is where we got our contention from the FSAR. We could not have clarified it any further from the FSAR. What we would like is an opportunity for discovery in order to really identify what exactly the location is and how the person might or might not have to move to read it.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you have anything on this?

MR. PERLIS: No, I just wanted to point that GDC 19 which has been mentioned in regard to this contention for the first time today, relates merely to whether the Plan can be operated safely from the Control Room. As I read the Contention, the Contention does not address safe operation of the Plant. It is not alleging that it cannot be operated safely but merely that from a human factor and from the community standpoint, it might be nicer to just locate it somewhere else.

I am not sure that the General Design Criterion 19 applies. If it does apply, I do not see much of a factual basis for that statement.

JUDGE HOYT: Very well. I think the record on that is sufficient.

Let us move on now to Contention IQ, Systems Interaction.

MS. CURRAN: For that, your Honor, my colleague will take over again.

MR. JORDAN: On this subject, your Honor, I think we probably have as much argument useful to the Board in writing as on any of the others. I do not want to belabor it here. The Staff has suggested, I believe in its most recent response to us, that we are currently unable to particularize objections to the Systems Interaction Analysis. We should, perhaps, refile after we receive the Staff's discussion in the SER. It is indeed the

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case that the Staff must address the matter in the SER.

However, we do not believe at this point that you can escape the problems that exist with respect to Systems

Interaction. The matter is an unresolved Safety Issue. We have cited the Board a Study which concludes to the effect that there is no adequate methodology or means of performing Systems

Interaction. That citation is on page forty of our April 21st

Filing to Brook Haven National Laboratory Study.

So we have a situation where an unresolved Safety
Issue and apparently an authoritative study that says in effect,
it cannot be resolved. We are at the operating license stage
as opposed to construction permits so we must resolve it now and
not simply demonstrate how it could be resolved.

It seems to me that the issue gets down to here
whether this is really a contention requiring that every
conceivable Systems Interaction be examined at Seabrook and
be probably examined. Whether I agree with the rulings or not
I think that it is correct that the Applicants and Staff have
found rulings, at least through the Licensing Boards, and I believe
that
perhaps the Appeal Board as well, such a contention cannot be
admitted, a contention that all systems must be analyzed for
their interaction.

I think, however, that given the existence of the Brook Haven Study that we have cited which questions the underlying ability to do this adquately, you do end up at the Shoreham

Contention, the Contention that was admitted in the Shoreham Proceeding which Mr. Dignan quite properly identified for the parties and the Board the last time around, and which challenges the methodology for the Systems Interaction Analysis. The problem with having a poor Systems Interaction Analysis is not simply that you do not know how the Systems work. It is simply that you then cannot be certain what the design basis for the Plant actually is because you do not if Systems are going to operate the way that you think they are. So in effect, you do not know what the size of the balloon is that you are dealing with to limit your design basis.

Accordingly, while we would press our Contention as written and indeed, we think it gets to methodology, we would at this time based on the contentions that we have seen, we would adopt a contention of the language that is in the Shoreham Decision which I we have here but I do not have in front of us. In fact, we said in our last Filing that we would do so if the Contention as written was rejected.

JUDGE HOYT: That is your June 17th Filing?

MR. JORDAN: Yes, we said that in our June 17th
Filing.

I think really what I am doing is trying to make it clear that we are getting at the methodology. Our original Contention, page thirty-eight of our April Filing says, the Applicant has not demonstrated that his adequately evaluated

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We believe that really gets to methodology and is not saying you must examine every potential one. In order to avoid worrying about how you interpret our Contention, we would assert the Contention that was approved in the Shoreham Decision.

We have the Decision here and if you like I can--JUDGE LUEBKE: (Interrupting.) What is that,

Shoreham?

MR. JORDAN: Yes.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I do not think we would be particularly influenced.

MR. JORDAN: I am sorry?

JUDGE PARIS: Well, he wants to adopt the language that is in the Shoreham Record.

JUDGE HOYT: He wants to use their methodology?

MR. JORDAN: That is right.

JUDGE PARIS: Why don't you read into our record the language you want to use.

MR. JORDAN: I will do that.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Is that going to be your proposed

contention?

MR. JORDAN: Yes, sir. It would be the proposed

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contention and I do want to make clear that we did say in our June 17th Filing that we would press that one, although I had not previously developed the language for Seabrook. I will do it now.

The Applicants and the Staff have not applied an adequate methodology to Seabrook to analyze the reliability of System, taking into account Systems Interactions and the classification and qualification of systems important to safety to determine what sequences of accidents should be considered within the design basis of the Plant, and if so, whether the design basis of the Plant in fact adquately protects against every such sequence.

In particular, Proper Systematic Methodology such as the fault tree and event tree logic approach of the IREP Program or a Systematic Failure Modes and Effect Analysis has not been applied to Seabrook, absent such a methodological approach to defining the importance to safety of each piece of equipment. It is not possible to identify the items to which General Design Criteria 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 35 and 37 apply. Thus it is not possible to demonstrate compliance with these Criteria.

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MR. LESSY: Your Honor, if I might, not only does NECNP want us to litigate all the TMI Issues under NuReg 0737, but they want us litigate Shoreham and Seabrook.

I am going to let Mr. Perlis who is on the Shoreham Proceeding address part of that and I am going to address part of it. I think that the Diablo Canyon Licensing Board Decision, which we cited in Page 13 of our response to New Hampshire who also asked for the same Systems Interaction Analysis is controlling. In Diablo Canyon the Intervenors raised a Contention involving Systems Interaction and the Board stated at 14 NRC at 331, they the Intervenor then conclude that no license should be granted to Diablo until all adverse interactions between Safety and Non-Safety Systems are identified and remedied.

The Board is not aware of any requirement in the Regulations for this kind of comprehensive study. Those special circumstances have been established by the Joint Intervenors and no specific interactions have been identified.

As we said with respect to New Hampshire's

Contentions, here no special circumstances have been established and no specific interactions have been identified to form a basis of a proper contention. There is no regulatory requirement for the type of time consuming and expensive study that this kind of contention requires.

In addition, in terms of the criteria used by the Diablo Board, NECNP has not been able to particularize its

objections to the Systems Interaction Analysis. They say they disagree with the methodology and, of course, the Staff will be addressing this matter, a specific issue, directly in the SER.

Now, Shoreham is kind of a special case. So not only do I oppose as without any regulatory base and without any specificity as under 2.714, the proposed contention of NECNP, Staff also opposed relitigating the Shoreham Contention here. The reason is, is that the Shoreham Contention is a combination of three contentions done at the end of that proceeding altogether in order to get that proceeding going. Since Mr. Perlis is involved in that proceeding, I am sure he can explain it better than I.

MR. PERLIS: If you look at the Shoreham on Pages 2-4, you find what the Licensing Board did there was combine three separate contentions.

One, very similar to the contention originally promulgated by NECNP dealing with Systems Interaction, one dealing with Probablistic Risk Assessment and a third dealing with Safety Equipment Classification.

of the Shoreham Order, the one that was just read into the record, you find that what the Board did and what he would now have this Board do is combine the three contentions. Whereas, if we look at the original NECNP Contention, we find that it addresses itself to Systems Interaction and only to Systems Interaction.

Now he would have us do what they are doing in Shoreham which is Systems Interaction, PRA and Safety Equipment Classification.

MR. LESSY: All without a Commission Requirement to do so. They are going to be litigating for Shoreham for the next year. I can see no reason, unless one is given, why this Board should relitigate Shoreham at Seabrook.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Mr. Lessy, I would like to ask the Staff for a little more background going back a little farther.

In my recollection I have never seen a Chapter

Heading in SER's or other reports that sound like Systems

Interaction. When did this happen? How did this come about?

MR. LESSY: The question of Systems Interaction is

MR. LESSY: The question of Systems Interaction is an unresolved Safety Issue---

JUDGE LUEBKE: (Interrupting.) Excuse me. Did the ACRS make it so?

MR. LESSY: I believe so. I think it is the Divsion of Safety Technology of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, sent a special report to Congress. I believe this is one of the new, unresolved Safety Issues, so called.

In any event, it is a requirement for the Staff to address in the Staff Documents.

JUDGE HOYT: Has it ever been litigated in any case other than Shoreham, Mr. Lessy? Do you know?

MR. GAD: The issue of whether or not this Contention

is proper has been ruled upon in Diablo Canyon and if I can just take an opportunity, I think I see this Issue a little bit simpler than maybe some other people do.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, I do not want to cut Mr. Lessy's lines of thought off there. Let him finish and then perhaps--
JUDGE LUEBKE: (Interrupting.) He was on this unresolved Safety Issue. If it is a new one it is probably far from being solved.

MR. LESSY. Yes. I am not aware of the litigation of this Contention in any other proceeding. I am aware that the Disablo Board refused to consider it as being without a Regulatory Base. I am aware that the Shoreham Board has decided to tackle this in connection with two other contentions. That tackling is going to take a long, long time. It requires a lot of money and a lot of analysis. I come back to the very basic point under 2.714 that there is no requirement that it be done but a specific Systems Interaction Analysis is analyzed by the Staff in its documents.

Now, I will turn over to Mr. Gad.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Excuse me. Analyze the Staff in its

SER?

MR. LESSY: Yes, sir.

JUDGE LUEBKE: That is a recent activity?

MR. LESSY: Yes, sir.

JUDGE LUEBKE: You have not been doing this for a

long time?

MR. LESSY: Yes, sir. That is correct.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Last month? Two months ago.

MR. LESSY. My understanding is that it is the recent vintage of SER.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Very recent.

MR. LESSY: Yes, very recent.

JUDGE LUEBKE: That is the point I wanted to make.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you for being patient. Go ahead.

MR. GAD: There has been two votes on this issue, one by Diablo Canyon, one by Shoreham. To be blunt about it, this Board is going to have line up with one or the other. It cannot line up with both. One was right and one was wrong.

Now, Diablo Canyon says that this Contention is not admissible—let me back up a bit. The Contention is you cannot license the machine without a certain study. Diablo Canyon says that the Contention is not admissible because there is no requirement that you have that condition as a precedent to licensing. That is one of the votes.

The other one is Shoreham. Shoreham says we will admit this Contention. Interestingly enough, and I will say on its own if Counsel for the Staff is not willing to because I do not have to go down and appear in front of the Shoreham Board, the Shoreham Decision does not say that we will admit this Contention because we have found a regulatory requirement

of such a study. The Shoreham Decision is a little bit hard to read because they mix these three things together and frankly, they treat them as one and the same through at least Pages 9-14 or so as you go from the front to back. They seem to be saying well, we acknowledge that there is no requirement of such a study but we are going to admit the Contention. Now that just flies in the face of Vermont Yankee and I will give you a Court cite in a moment. You cannot admit a contention that says that you cannot license a plant until you have an X, if you are willing to acknowledge that there is no regulatory requirement that you have the X first.

The votes are split one on one as to whether or not we will admit the Contention. I submit to you that the votes are two zip, two to nothing, that there is no licensing requirement that such a study be done the condition preceding in receiving an operating license.

I further submit to you that in the absence of such a requirement, there may be one five years from now but there is not one today, I submit to you that in the absence of such a requirement, you cannot hold up the license on that account, you cannot measure the application against that standard and you may not and there is no purpose in admitting such a contention. We see it just as straight forward as that.

JUDGE HOYT: Is there any requirement in the Regulations that the individual systems, however, be put through

the same sort of a study?

MR. GAD: I respectfully submit that I cannot answer that question and I am not sure the question can be answered without specifiying the particular system and the kind of analysis you want to submit it to.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I would like to go back to Mr. Lessy.

In origin of this concept was there any reasoning that you are

familiar of that would help the Board?

MR. LESSY: My recollection is that this first arose in NuReg 0510. I do not have NuReg 0510 with me and I do not recall—It is such a new item that I do not even recall a discussion of it in an SER.

JUDGE LUEBKE: That is my recollection.

MR. LESSY: That does not mean that there is not but I cannot recall having seen one. As a result of that NuReg Systems Interaction was labeled an unresolved Safety Issue which the Staff, therefore, will address in its SER.

There is no requirement, however, that the Applicant, as I understand it, perform a Systems Interaction Analysis. This contention, if admitted, would have the effect in order to litigate, of requiring Applicants to do that.

Therefore, there is a split between two Licensing

Boards and there is a threshold in the Diablo opinion which we

feel is a reasonable one and that is one of special circumstances.

In order to put the parties to this kind of burden, there has to

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be a fairly high threshold. There is not even an allegation of special circumstances.

In the absence of that, our position was that we would let NECNP read what the Staff has to say about it as an unresolved safety question in its analysis. Of course, the Board would also be provided with a copy of that. At that point in time, it would be an opportunity to file a contention with respect to it. As something that another Licensing Board did, it is an awfully broad, wide avenue to litigate without any reasons to do it and without any regulatory requirement to do that, given specifically the number of contentions and types of physical science contentions that we have got in here.

For these reasons we object to it at this point in time.

JUDGE PARIS: Mr. Lessy, you said that the Staff has not in the past discussed this in the SER's but is doing so now or is going to start doing so?

MR. LESSY: My understanding is that is right. The very recent SER's or perhaps the ones that will come out this fall will discuss this. I have not seen it myself. It does not mean that there are not one or two that have not discussed it.

JUDGE LUEBKE: When was the Diablo Canyon Ruling on this matter given?

MR. LESSY: That is a fairly recent ruling. I know that the legal cite is 14 NRC. My recollection is that the

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Diablo Canyon Ruling came out after NuReg 0710 if that is your question.

JUDGE PARIS: Diablo Canyon is ahead of Shoreham.

MR. JORDAN: We have a date here, your Honor, of August 4, 1981.

MR. LESSY: Is that 14 NRC?

MR. JORDAN: 14 NRC 325.

MR. LESSY: Yes, that is it.

JUDGE HOYT: 325?

MR. JORDAN: Yes.

JUDGE PARIS: 1981 and when was the Shoreham Decision or Ruling made?

MR. JORDAN: March 15, 1982.

JUDGE PARIS: Does the difference between these two Boards relate to historical factors? It seems to coincide with the sudden Staff Decision to start putting this in the SER.

MR. LESSY: I do not think it does, your Honor, and
I want to be very specific about Shoreham, more specific than
I was in the beginning.

The Licensing Board took three dangling contentions.

There was a shift of the Chairmanship from Judge Carter to

Judge Brenner on the eve of Hearing. There was some bunch of

contentions that were not ruled upon. Shoreham is an impacted

Plant in terms of timeframe.

What happened there was that the Licensing Board

right as the Hearing was about to begin, came out with this

Order and put all these brand new contentions on the floor and

made some new Law.

However, for the impacted Plant and the Staff resources and having to go to Hearing, my information was the Staff and the Applicant in addition, would have appealed that Order. I do not feel personally, and I cannot speak for the Staff because it is such a recent Order, consider that to be good Law. I think when the Shoreham Licensing Board is through with that, they are going to come to the same conclusion. Due to the timing and the impacted Plant, everyone said let's just go and litigate contentions.

Therefore, my understanding is, the issuance state of NuReg, and I maybe incorrect and we can check on that because I do not have a list with me, that the NuReg which made this an unresolved Safety Issue, preceded both the Diablo and the Shoreham Decision.

JUDGE PARIS: I went out to the Shoreham Board at the same time that change was made so if they made bad Law there probably was a reason for it. That is a helpful explanation I think.

MR. LESSY: Mr. Perlis might have some input.

MR. PERLIS: I might just try and answer your question a bit further. If the Shoreham Decision was meant to reflect some historical change in position, that Board was

certainly silent on that and in fact, it has not tie whatsoever to Diablo Canyon.

JUDGE PARIS: Actually behind all of this is the treatment of unresolved Safety Issues. I get the impression that some effort is being made to treat this one differently than the way we treat others.

MR. LESSY: Why would that be? I am not sure I follow.

JUDGE PARIS: We do not litigate other unresolved Safety Issues, do we?

MR. LESSY: Well, an Intervenor is always free to attempt to file contentions with respect to the Staff's discussion of those.

I agree with your perception, your Honor. I think that the Systems Interaction Issue should be treated no differently from any other unresolved Safety Issue. Maybe I have not been clear about it but that is basically the position we are advocating here. I did not want to retry Shoreham at Seabrook.

JUDGE PARIS: That puts it very simply.

MR. LESSY: Yes.

JUDGE PARIS: Treat it the same as any other unresolved Safety Issue.

JUDGE HOYT: Let me ask you this, Mr. Lessy, and then let us close the argument out on this unless there is some startling new piece of information they want to put in. That is,

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are you going to discuss this in the SER in this case?

MR. LESSY. Yes.

JUDGE HOYT: Would then it not be better, Mr. Jordan, that this Contention be filed at the time at the time the documentation would be available to you from the Staff? We are going to have a tape change. Off the record.

(Off the record.)

MR. JORDAN: Your Honor, we believe in this Contention as we have now restated to be a valid Contention at this point. In effect, it does go beyond systems interaction as we originally raised it, but largely because it gets to the core of what the problem is when the systems interaction failure exists, which is that you cannot tell what the design basis of the plant ought to be.

We would, I think, stand on the Contention as we have proposed earlier this morning. If the Board does not accept the Contention, we would then address whatever the Staff has to say, but we think it litigatable at this point. We don't think that this history of Shoreham has relevance to the Board's decision. I don't think you can rely on that.

We think the reasoning is good in the Shoreham decision and we will stand on it.

JUDGE HOYT: If there is not anything else, let us close this section up and move on to Contention IR Hydrogen Control.

MR. JORDAN: In this Contention, IR, we have the following approach. We believe the Contention as stated on .

Page 42 of our April filing is and should be a valid Contention.

We recognize the decisions of the Commission and its subordinate bodies. We recognize the arguments of the parties contrary to that Contention.

However, we seek a ruling from the Board on that Contention, as stated on Page 42 of the April filing. I must say

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JUDGE LUEBKE: In which case we are not the Board to hear.

MR. JORDAN: Well, we need a ruling from you so that we can take it elsewhere.

JUDGE LUEBKE: You mean if we rule negative on this --

MR. JORDAN: If you were to rule negative on our language on Page 42 of the April decision, we need that to take it elsewhere if that is to be your ruling.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I see.

MR. LESSY: If you are granted party status, you could only appeal a denied Contention at the end of the Proceeding.

MR. JORDAN: Of course. I have not raised the question of when we would appeal. We would appeal at the appropriate time.

JUDGE HOYT: The interlocutory appeals?

MR. LESSY: Not generally.

MR. JORDAN: As a general matter, no.

MR. LESSY: Unless the party is completely denied intervention status and its Contentions are all denied, then there is an appeals as a matter of right. Anything else would be interlocutory until the end of the Proceeding.

MR. JORDAN: I am not sure that matters to our discussion, but my understanding is that we would do it later; to us, it is an important point of law that must be addressed at some point.

However, while we seek that ruling, we assert the Contention that we have restated on Page 24 of our June 17th filing which asserts a credible scenario based on this Contention. It is based on the so-called Parry Decision, as we have discussed in our June filing.

JUDGE HOYT: Is that it?

MR. JORDAN: I think that covers it.

JUDGE HOYT: All right.

MR. GAD: I am not sure whether I heard NECNP acknowledge that on the existing state of the juris prudence this one had to be denied or otherwise. In a nutshell, NECNP cites a Commission Decision in 1980 and then believes that subsequently the Commission---

The acknowledged a Commission Decision in 1980 that would preclude litigation of this Contention. They then contend that a 1981 and subsequent Commission Decision relieve them of that burden that would preclude litigation of this Contention.

They cite for this metamorphasis a Licensing

Board Decision in 1982, however, we have cited to you a subsequent

decision of the Appeal Board rejecting the idea that there has

been a metamorphasis and stating the Appeal Board's view that the

original Commission Decision is in place. In a contest between an Appeal Board Decision and a Licensing Board Decision on a point of law is kind of lopsided for purposes of further rulings, and therefore, this Contention must be denied.

As far as the so-called credible accident scenario is concerned, it is lacking in basis. It is simply speculation.

You take a piece out of here and a piece out of there and put them together.

MR. JORDAN: I don't know exactly what Mr. Gad meant. I think that the Appeal Board Decision that he is referring to was McGuire ALAB 669.

JUDGE PARIS: I have 675 in front of me.

MR. JORDAN: Number 675 was an Appeal Board Decision in the Perry Case.

Through the Board, I will ask Mr. Gad, you were referring to ALAB 669 in the McGuire Decision, were you not?

All of the cases to which I was referring are in our written response and I was referring to 669.

MR. JORDAN: With respect to ALAB 669, whatever that Decision gets to, it does not get to the language that we have proposed on Pages 24 and 25 of the June 17th order. If it has a bearing, it has a bearing with respect to the language that we had proposed as our original version of the Contention.

MR. PERLIS: If the Staff agrees with NECNP to the

MR. GAD: I was. It is in our written response.

point where it accepts the scenario as credible for the purposes of the Contention, for the purposes of litigation, the Staff is not accepting that that in fact, is a credible scenario. In fact, it would result in hydrogen generation to the degree alleged by NECNP.

For the purposes of the Contention, we accepted the scenario on Pages 24 and 25 as a good one.

JUDGE PARIS: I don't understand your position,
Mr. Paris.

MR. PARIS: As to their original Contention, I think this is the same as the Applicant's. The law is very clear on that. A credible scenario is required.

As to their second filing, we think that scenario is credible for the purposes of getting the Contention in at this point of the Proceeding. At the hearing, the Board will have to make three findings: One, that that scenario is, in fact, credible in that it could generate whatever amount of hydrogen is alleged by NECNP; the second finding the Board would have to make is that the hydrogen control measures could not be successful in controlling that amount of hydrogen; and the third finding that you would have to make is that off-site releases will then exceed their guideline values of .100.

The Staff, in conceding that the scenario is crediable at this stage, does not concede that that amount of hydrogen would be generated by such a scenario in the event of an accident.

So we are conceding this credibility only for the purposes of getting the Contention admitted, not for trial.

JUDGE PARIS: I have another approach to this. As

I understand it, there is outstanding and advanced notice of

proposed rule making regarding degraded cores. Degraded cores

involve hydrogen generation. Hydrogen generation involves hydrogen

control and thereafter, safety.

MR. PERLIS: When and if a rule comes down, depending upon what plants the rule applies to, and I would assume it would apply to all plants, then that may change things.

In the absence of the rule making, at this point, we don't have anything further than the Commission guidance that we have had in the past. We have to go with the Commission's policy statements.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Well, my understand is that nothing has superseded this announcement in the Federal Registry.

MR. PERLIS: That is correct. It is something in the future and when, in fact, the rule does come down, then it may change matters.

JUDGE LUEBKE: And in the meantime, we do not litigate.

MR. PERLIS: No, in the meantime, we can litigate it as per the Commission policy statements of the past. They are referred to in Staff filings. It was the Commission's

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McGuire Decision; it is TMI Decision and I believe there is a policy statement as well.

I did want to summarize our position. We do oppose to the original Contention, the one that was filed back in April or May.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Wasn't that the one that the Commission is now saying was his main contention?

JUDGE PARIS: It wasn't clear to me what you wanted us to do. You want us to rule on the original Contention and rule on this ammended Contention?

MR. PERLIS: Exactly. The Staff position was that the original Contention is invalid for the reasons that have been discussed here, but the second Contention that they filed, with the credible scenario, is acceptable for litigation purposes.

MR. LESSY: I do not think it would be unreasonable for the Board to require NECNP to say which hydrogen Contention it wants to offer. I think the Board has the choice. They can either require NECNP to say which hydrogen Contention they want to offer, or the Board can give the alternative rulings that NECNP is requesting. That is a matter of discretion of the Board.

That is the first time I have heard that. It is an alternative offer. The Board can treat it whichever way it likes.

JUDGE PARIS: You are, in effect, taking no position on whether the Board should rule on both of them?

MR. LESSY: If I were the Board Chairperson, I

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would ask them which contention they want me to rule on because we have a lot of contentions to rule on and tell us which one to look at. They are asking for an alternative ruling for subsequent Appellant purposes. It is a matter of discretion for the Board.

JUDGE HOYT: Let me see if I can approach it in this way. Is the accident scenario that you set forth on Page 24 necessary to the litigation of the Contention that you have on Page 42 of your April 21 filing?

MR. JORDAN: In our view, it is not. That is the reason that we pressed the Contention as stated in the April filing and we want a ruling on that. We believe the problem is that we are very concerned about the whole hydrogen issue, both as a legal matter and as a fact of what happens at Seabrook.

We think it is very important that we have a ruling on the Contention as stated in our April filing in order that we can take it to the Court of Appeals if we are able to do so and try and get a change in the way the Commission is dealing with hydrogen control.

The problem is that if we simply give you that one and you rule against it, as I assume you would do, I think, on the basis of Commission precedent, then we are in a position of being unable in this hearing to get to hydrogen control at all.

Given the importance of the issue, we still want to press the credible scenario Contention as stated in the June

filing on Page 24 and 25.

MR. LESSY: I think the answer to your question, your Honor, is the Commission Decision on Three Mile Island, CLI 80-16, 11NRC 674. The Commission determined that such a Contention would be litigatable only upon a prior showing that there is a credible scenario for the generation of hydrogen in excess of the 50.44 design basis. Isn't that the answer to his question; the question as to whether or not that scenario is an integral part of your Contention.

MR. JORDAN: I think I answered the question. We do not believe as a matter of law that it needs to be.

MR. LESSY: So you are challenging the Commission's Decision with regard to CLI 80-16?

MR. JORDAN: I think that is what I just said.

JUDGE HOYT: I think we have got what we need.

Let's have about a five minute break at this point in time.

(Off the record.)

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JUDGE HOYT: The Hearing will come to order.

Let the record reflect that all the parties who were present are again present in the Hearing Room, except those parties previously indicated as having been excused.

Sir, do you have something to add?

MR. EDELMAN: I would like to add two parties to that, Mr. McDermott from the Town of South Hampton and Mr. Chiesa for the Society of the Protection of the Environment of Southeastern New Hampshire are no longer here.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you very much. All other Counsel are present.

Very well. I think we have exhausted lR. Let us look at 1S. This is a Contention dealing with Loose Parts

Detection Systems.

MR. JORDAN: The Applicant objects on the grounds that it elevates the Regulatory Guide to the requirement. The Staff had a language objection.

MR. GAD: A need for power.

JUDGE HOYT: That is no longer a litigation for this Commission. That shall be a memorable moment. Let us see if we can reprieve this one. Excuse us, Mr. Jordan. Go ahead, sir.

MR. JORDAN: I think we resolved the language matter with the Staff and I will read the Contention into the record, also to speak to the Board's earlier concerns.

This is NECNP's Contention 1S. The Applicant has not yet designed or developed a Loose Part Detection System for the Reactor's Primary System and therefore, does not satisfy Criteria 1 & 13 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, 10 CFR 50.36, or 10 CFR 20.1. (c), nor does it provide an adequate alternative to satisfy the requirements.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Lessy, do you want to go on this?

MR. PERLIS: The Staff has no objection to this as
it has been stated. I wonder if the last clause adds anything
to it.

MR. JORDAN: As I look back through it I think the Staff is correct. I was trying to have their language correction and your language correction and it did not work.

The Contention would end with the reference to 10 CFR 20.1 (c). Do you want me to reread it?

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, I think that is better.

MR. PERLIS: The Saff has no objection to that Contention.

JUDGE HOYT: How about the Applicant?

MR. GAD: I think the Applicant will stand on what it has written which I do not see is corrected by this. What is sought here is to impose a new requirement, the source of which is in the Regulatory Guide. There is a right way to do it and a wrong way to do it and this is the latter.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you. Let us go along to T?

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MR. JORDAN: NECNP's concern in Contention 1T is with Steam Generators for Seabrook. It is a Westinghouse Steam Generator. We are concerned largely with the history of problems with Westinghouse Steam Generators.

We have at Seabrook at new Model F Westinghouse Steam Generator. As a result of the fact that there is a new design, the Staff and the Applicant say you cannot raise a contention because we have not found any failed Model F's.

The problem with that is that if you go through the history of Westinghouse Steam Generators, you see consistent failures and problems arising. So it is a little bit up in the air to me. It seems as though the history of Westinghouse Steam Generators is enough basis to give us a basis to get in and look at this one. Otherwise, if Westinghouse makes a new Steam Generator every year and there is never basis to litigate it because you never a history of that particular one, although you likely have a history of failures of each of the models as time went on.

It seems to me that the fact, and this by the way is detailed in our discussions in Pages 47 and 48 of our April 21st Filing and 27 and 28 of our June 17th Filing, we have in that history of problems with Steam Generators, a basis for litigating the difficulties in the Model F. I would cite again the Catawba Decision that I cited earlier. We are here at the threshold where we have provided enough basis to at least get into

discovery to determine what the story is with the Model F as it relates to its predecessors.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Mr. Jordan, what is the story with the rest of the Steam Generators? They have problems and it usually represents expenses. What is the safety hazard in your Contention?

MR. JORDAN: The hazard we specifically reference is degradation.

JUDGE LUEBKE: That does not harm anybody except it costs a lot of money.

MR. JORDAN: I do not have the expertise frankly to say whether it does. It seems to me that if---

JUDGE LUEBKE: (Interrupting.) You say there has been many instances of failure. I just do not think that people have been harmed, except financially.

MR. JORDAN: The problem with that is, that is probably true. The question is not whether they have been harmed in the past, the question is when is one of these things going to harm somebody. Based on the history that we have---

JUDGE LUEBKE: (Interrupting.) You are suggesting that the Steam Generator might harm somebody?

MR. JORDAN: I am suggesting that there has been enough history, particularly of degradation problems, that we need to look at this one to be sure that its degradation problem does not get so far as to harm someone.

JUDGE LUEBKE: You did not say that?

MR. JORDAN: I did not put it in those terms in writing though, that is true but it seems to me that is implicit in what we have.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Jordan, is this somewhat of a summary of some of the other problems you think you may have had in some of the other systems? You enumerate all sorts of systems and sorts of problems throughout these contentions. Are these any different than what you have in some of the other system problems that are going to be in this case, looking at your previous contention?

MR. JORDAN: I guess I am at a loss---

JUDGE HOYT: Perhaps I am not phrasing it as well, being not as good at this phraseology as you are. The problem that I am having is that it seems like to me that you are just taking the whole system and saying, well, the individual parts of this thing that we have got on our list of contentions have all been enumerated here. If we did not catch them on everything else, we will catch them on this one. Is this kind of a summation of everything you have got up to that point?

MR. JORDAN: I do not think so. I am not sure I understand you but I do not think so at all.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, I am not sure I have phrased it well enough and I apologize for my inadequacies.

MR. JORDAN: I would like to get back to perhaps

to Dr. Luebke's concern. .What we do cite in our April Filing is the Report of the Reactor Safety Research Group in September of 1981 which does state that the consequences of transient or some other failure that might lead in turn to the failure of a significant number of tubes, such failures could lead to the degradation of ECCS's function. It seems to me that at least there, if not elsewhere, we get to this question of harm to someone as a result of an accident.

JUDGE PARIS: Such failure could lead to what?

MR. JORDAN: The degradation of ECCS functions.

JUDGE PARIS: Degradation of Steam Generator Tubes?

JUDGE LUEBKE: It would blow out to the Condenser.

MR. JORDAN: That is right. I do not have the expertise to back that up. I am reading from a report of the Reactor Safety Research Review Group as quoted in our document. It seems it is a matter of damage to the heat removal function.

JUDGE PARIS: Okay. I will get Dr. Luebke to tell me how that works at dinner tonight.

Is the hazard that you have in mind something like the Ginna Accident?

MR. JORDAN: The Ginna Accident is certainly one of the hazards we have in mind.

JUDGE PARIS: Which could lead into release of radioactivity into the atmosphere, is that right?

MR. JORDAN: As I understand it, yes.

JUDGE HOYT: Anything from the Staff?

MR. PERLIS: Yes. The Staff continues to see no basis in specificity in this Contention. As we have pointed out in both our Filings, the only thing I would is that if it is nonetheless admitted, we submit that NECNP should be required at some date to provide specifics that do relate to Seabrook. We think the Contention is too speculative as it is.

If it is admitted, we think at some point NECNP should be required to tie this in somehow with Seabrook.

MR. LESSY: In other words, Mr. Jordan's argument is that because there have been problems with other Westinghouse Model Steam Generators, therefore, since Seabrook is a Model F, he is suspect about the Model F. We are saying that is speculative but if the Board disagrees and lets it in, we want to know pretty soon into the proceeding what exactly he thinks is wrong with Model F so that we can address it in testimony or in summary disposition.

JUDGE HOYT: Is the only other Model F? Are there are other Model F's?

MR. GAD: I am told there are others, your Honor.

MR. JORDAN: Your Honor, our view on the Staff's position is that is not the proper burden. The history is enough to raise the question about the Model F. Then it is up to the Staff to demonstrate that in fact, the Model F refutes the history, if indeed it does. It should not be so difficult

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if presumably that is the reason they made the Model F.

MR. LESSY: The Staff did not make the Model F, Counselor.

MR. JORDAN: I am sorry. It is up to the party with the ultimate burden which is the Applicant to make that proof.

MR. LESSY: What would be the contention then? I you have a contention--Excuse me, I am addressing Mr. Jordan.

Your Honor, I do not see a contention then. Mr. Jordan wants information on Steam Generators difficulties with respect to other models, is he suppose to keep that information secret if he learns anything about a Model F. mean I do not see that we have a contention for Seabrook. has a logical chain which leads him to the argument that he has suspicion or wants to litigate this Model F but our position is, if in fact he finds out specifics about Model F, he must be required to amend his contention with respect to the Seabrook Steam Generator. That is the only thing that this Board is interested in, not the generic question of whether Westinghouse Steam Generators are safe or adequate. That is why citations to generic studies like that do not, in my opinion, prove too helpful in terms of litigating specific contentions to specific licensing proceedings.

JUDGE HOYT: In other words, you would depose the Westinghouse Engineer assigned to Seabrook for your discussion of questioning of any of the problems that Model F. may have?

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MR. JORDAN: What I am saying is that if NECNP wants to litigate this Contention, as opposed to just having a contention for discovery purposes, it should be required to provide specifics and bases with respect to the Model F.

The only argument we have now is that there is suspicion about the Model F because the Ginna and things that happened elsewhere. That is not a very specific contention for a different model, a different design at another plant.

(Off the record.)

MR. GAD: Once again, our position on this is fairly simple. This Contention neither has or discloses any basis for a specificity for what has happened here. NECNP acknowledges and demonstrates that maybe this thing is terrific and maybe it is not, and they have no way knowing one way or another.

Steam generators, NECNP perceives, has been an interesting thing to litigate for, and therefore, they served notice that they want to litigate it in this case.

If that is the standard for Contention -- if that is all you have got to do is get the right book and learn the right terminology, then frankly we have wasted a lot of our time here this morning.

There is no basis whatsoever for any allegation of a defect in the steam generators. There is no allegation of a defect in the steam generators. It is far from clear to me what the Witness is supposed to say or defend when he gets up there on the Witness Stand if this is admitted in its present form, and I think we will all take a basic course in steam generators, but without any real focus.

JUDGE HOYT: Anything else, Mr. Jordan?

MR. JORDAN: Well, I guess it is late, and perhaps that is the reason, but I am concerned that we did not pose this Contention because we think it is an interesting thing to litigate. We have never litigated it before and don't know much about anybody who has. It is a very grave concern of NECNP, and

that is the reason that we pose it as a Contention.

We will go to the following Contentions and Ms.

Curran will take over.

MS. CURRAN: This is Contention IU. The Staff does not object to this Contention. The Applicant objects in that it would require compliance with the Reg.Guide. I would like to reword the Contention to say ---

JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting.) Are you using your language on Page 49?

MS. CURRAN: That is correct.

JUDGE HOYT: Thank you. Go ahead.

MS. CURRAN: The Applicant has not demonstrated that it meets General Design Criteria for Appendix 8 to 10 CFR 50 in that it has not provided that structure systems and components important to safety be protected against the effects of turbine missles who's launching might occur as a result of equipment failure.

JUDGE PARIS: You are dropping the last sentence?

MS. CURRAN: Yes.

JUDGE HOYT: Go ahead, sir.

MR. GAD: I think we have no objection to the Contention as thus modified.

MR. PERLIS: The Staff has no objection to it.

JUDGE HOYT: Perhaps the sequel to this thing is to get everybody together at 4:30 in the afternoon.

All right. Let us see about Contention IV In Service Inspection of Steam Generator Tubes.

MS. CURRAN: On this Contention we would like to accept the Applicant's word of the Contention, which is found in its response to our reply. I will just read it into the record.

The Applicants have not demonstrated that they have met GDC 14, 15, 31 and 32 insofar and to the extent that those GDC require a program for the inservice inspection of steam generator tubes.

JUDGE HOYT: That is the Contention that is framed on Page 21 of the Applicant's response of June 28.

MR. GAD: Yes. Obviously we find it beautifully drafted.

MR. PERLIS: Even though it is after 4:30, the Staff objects to the rewording. Our original objection dealt with the failure of NECNP to provide any specificity as to how the Inspection Program was inadequate. It still has not done that. We are left with no idea as to why they complained about the Inservice Inspection Program. Until we get some specificity, the Staff will continue to object.

MS. CURRAN: I'd like to respond to that.

JUDGE HOYT: Surely.

MS. CURRAN: Our basis for this Contention lies in the fact that the Applicant's FSAR indicates that it has complied with Regulatory Guide 1.83. At the Ginna Reactor, a program in

compliance with that Reg.Guide did not reveal the existence of a defect in the steam generator tubes, which I believe it was a matter of weeks later, led to the accident.

This is our basis for saying that compliance with that Reg.Guide is not adequate to satisfy the General Design Criteria.

MR. LESSY: I think what the argument would have to be is that you have to make a showing that applicants, by complying with the Reg.Guide, have failed to heed the GDC.

It is true that compliance with the Reg.Guide is not mandatory. Applicants have stated in the FSAR that the Inspection Program will be performed in accordance with Reg.Guide 1.82, Rev. 1. Here you appear to be arguing that compliance with the Reg.Guide would not satisfy you.

MS. CURRAN: That is correct.

MR. LESSY: Although previously you have been arguing for compliance with the Reg.Guide.

You have made no showing that the Applicant, by complying with the Reg.Guide will not meet the applicable General Design Criteria. In the absence of that showing, you do not have a basis for your Contention.

JUDGE HOYT: Have you based your argument on the Revised Contention?

MR. LESSY: Yes.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. Anything else?

SODGE HOIT: All light. Any

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I think that brings us down to the Seismic Qualification of Electrial Equipment in Contention IW.

MS. CURRAN: All right. I think we can solve the Applicant's objection to this Contention by rewording it to eliminate mention of the Regulatory Cuide. The new Contention would read:

The Applicant has not demonstrated that is has adequately assured the seismic qualification of electrial equipment at Seabrook as required by Criteria III, Design Control of Appendix (b) to 10 CFR, Part 50.

MR. GAD: Could you read that again?

JUDGE HOYT: I think it is the one on Page 53,
Mr. Gad. It is the first paragraph down to Part 50, and then she
cut it off at that point. It is at the top of Page 53 of the
submissions of April 21st.

MR. GAD: My document only has 39 pages.

MR. LUEBKE: Are you looking at the April 21 ---

MR. GAD: Oh, the original one? I apologize. I

have it.

JUDGE HOYT: There must be an easier way to keep up with these files, but I do not know how you can refer to them except by dates.

When you file your responses and in your filing they relate to several different agreements, would you file them individually? I cannot seem to get everything together and we

keep making copies, which are probably lost. Would you just file your responses one at a time? I am afraid that it is going to cause some problems for you, but it is causing more problems for me. Since I may have a little leverage in this, I think I will use it today. Thank you. I appreciate it.

JUDGE PARIS: I have a housekeeping comment also.

I would like to ask everyone to please put the date of filing on the front page so that we can look at the title and the date it was filed without having to thumb through to the back.

JUDGE HOYT: We are getting pickey.

MR. GAD: Using that opportunity to find the right page, we are satisfied.

MS. CURRAN: The Staff has indicated that it would accept this Contention if we limit to an assertion that the Program has not itself complied with the Criteria III and not individual components.

We believe that our Contention is not limited to the Program and also includes individual components. It is entirely possible that the Program for Seismic Qualification could be approved and Individual Components could be found wanting.

In addition, I would like to point out that I believe that the Seismic Qualification Program for the Seabrook Plant is still under review by the NRC. Until we can see the final evaluation, we do not know what the evaluation is for individual

components.

MR. LESSY: How does that affect your Contention?

MS. CURRAN: We do not want to limit ourselves to

a. Contention that only the Program in general is inadequate.

There may be individual components that are inadequately qualified.

MR. PERLIS: On the assertion of NECNP's Counselor that they need the Staff document, we would be willing to wait until that document was forthcoming. But if they want to litigate individual Components, we think they should have to state fairly soon up front which Components they are dissatisfied with.

JUDGE HOYT: Do you mean accept this and take ammendments later, is that what you are suggesting?

MR. PERLIS: If Counselor asserts that they need a document, yes.

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MR. JORDAN: There is just one thing, your Honor, it does seem to me that in litigation the issue of the Seismic Qualification Program, it seems to me that one can litigate the question of whether various individual components are in fact qualified or not. Litigating that gets to the question of whether the program works, obviously.

JUDGE HOYT: Are you saying Electrical Equipment Program, is that the idea? I'm sorry. I do not see where we are getting Program.

MS. CURRAN: The FSAR identifies a Program for Seismic Qualification of NSSS Equipment which is safety related Electrical Equipment in the Plant.

JUDGE HOYT: Would it anything to it if we described it in the Contention as the Electrical Equipment Program? would nail it down to the FSAR.

MR. JORDAN: I do not think that really adds much.

JUDGE HOYT: I do not think so either.

MR. JORDAN: All I am trying to get to is that here is a Program, the Staff says that we can litigate the Program.. You go in and say, here are all these things under the Program that did not get adequately qualified. You have litigated the Program and maybe you have got some proof here of ten items that were adequately qualified and two that were not. So you may have a decision that the Program is adequate but you have got two of the items that are not adequate and somehow you are not allowing

the contention to get those items, whereas surely the Board should rule that those items are not adequate.

MR. LESSY: Which items do you want to litigate?

MR. JORDAN: I do not mind specifying items after

discovery when we are at a position we are able in fact to

identify the items. We do not have a problem with that.

JUDGE HOYT: Accepting this for the purposes of discovery, Mr. Lessy?

MR. LESSY: That would be acceptable, your Honor, subject to either proper specification or dismissal of the contention later.

MR. JORDAN: Although, I believe, your Honor,
I gather the Staff is satisfied that we can litigate the Program.
A dismissal would be respect to handling individual components.

MR. LESSY: That was the offer in our pleading.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. I think that is sufficient on that.

Now we get into the second section in here. Down towards the end here, Quality Assurance Contentions and the first one you have Division A, Design and Construction. So I guess we have got IIAl which is the General Design Criteria 1 of Appendix A to 10 CFR is the one you want to litigate here. You are contending that the Seabrook Quality Assurance Program for Design and Construction has been too narrow in scope?

MR. JORDAN: Yes, ma'am. On IIAI the objection by

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I believe both the Applicant and the Staff is an effect that the Issue has already been litigated at the construction permit stage to determine what would be the adequacy of QA Program for construction of the Plant.

In our view, the intervening development of the Commission finally saying to everyone in the documents that we have referenced, you have been doing it wrong. It is not safety related. The standard is important to safety which is broader and it is applicable to Quality Assurance for Appendix B.

We think that is sufficient to justify relitigating the contention and requiring the Quality Assurance of some form at least, although it could not be the original Quality Assurance Program, to be applied to those items important to safety that were not considered safety related and included under the Program

We made the argument. I do not think that we need to go on further with it.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Gad?

MR. GAD: Madam Chairman, insofar as NECNP in

Part II wants to litigate the correctness of the utility or

the sufficiency of the Seabrook Construction QA Plan, that is

not a litigable issue here for at least two reasons. The first

is that it has already been litigated. The second is that this

is an Operating License Case and not a Construction Permit Case.

The remedy that would flow from a determination that there is

something wrong with your Construction QA Plan presumably is

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some form of amendment to your Construction Permit. I say this with all due respect, this Board was not convened for the purpose of and its RIF does not run to the leasing, altering, revising or revoking of the Construction Permit.

Insofar as NECNP wishes to litigate the sufficiency with which the Applicants have executed their Plan, once again we think this is not an OL Issue. If in fact it were to be the case that the Applicants were not complying with their Construction Permit then again, the remedies have to do with Construction Permit and Forum to which that must be addressed and the means by which it is raised other than an Operating License Case. We think that has always been good Law. We think it has been recognized in the Midland Decision, ALAB 674, the complete citation to which appears on Page 23 of our response.

In a number of these contentions you are going to have to decide whether they are talking about how good is the Plan or how good did you follow it. We think that for slightly different reasons both types of issue are not within the scope of and Operating License Case.

MR. LESSY: Your Honor, the item before the Board is the Contention IIA1, Quality Construction QA Program. As I listen to Mr. Gad's comments, I think he was also arguing IIA2 which is another issue. I would like to limit my comments to IIA1.

As we pointed out in our May 19, 1982 response, the Licensing Board presiding over the Construction Permit Application

found that Applicant's Quality Assurance Program met NRC
Requirements. We gave the Licensing Board Cite to that, 3 NRC 857
at 866-867, June 29, 1976. NECNP was a party to that proceeding
and in the absence of either significant supervening developments
having a possible material bearing upon those previously
adjudicated issues, or the presence of some unusual factors
having special public interested applications, NECNP is a stop
from raising the issue in the Operating License Proceeding.

NECNP has failed to demonstrate or even meet any of those factors. They are a very high threshold because the matter was litigated and determined previously. We are talking about the scope of the QA Program and its acceptability for construction.

There also is an argument in addition to whether you tipify or label a collateral estoppel or res judicata as to the authority of the Board to consider a pure Construction Permit Issue, which this is. The cite which Mr. Gad gave is one of many. I believe he referred to the Midland Decision, Consumers Power Company, ALAB 674, May 5, 1982. I will quote on Page 3. It is important because I disagree with Mr. Gad with respect to the following contention but on this contention it says, "The Licensing Board for an Operating License Proceeding such as the one involved here, is limited to resolving matters that are raised therein as legitimate contentions by the parties or by the Boards sua sponte cites. It does not, however, have general

jurisdiction over the already authorized, ongoing construction of the plant for which an Operating License Application is pending. It cannot suspend such a previously issued permit." I would suggest when the Appeal Board said suspend, they also meant modify.

Now the Construction Permit pursuant to which construction is proceeding at Seabrook, was issued with an understanding and approval by the Licensing Board, the Appeal Board and eventually the Commission, as to the QA Program for construction. The programs and implementation, I think it is clear to me, that this is not an Operating License Issue.

JUDGE HOYT: Did you want to address IIA2 at the same time?

MR. LESSY: Now IIA2, that is a different matter. In IIA2 NECNP contend that the Applicant has failed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Appendix B with respect to Quality Assurance and the Quality Control Program at Seabrook. NECNP allege that that Program has been pervasively inadequate and they have asked for a number of things.

We continue to object to this Contention only inasmuchas NECNP refuses to give a complete list of the items it contends were properly excluded from the QA Program. Mr. Gad's argument is that Construction QA, not the scope of the Program pursuant to which construction will proceed, but the success of the Program, the actual construction that takes place, is not an Operating License Issue. Now if that were true, Mr. Perlis

and I wasted all last fall litigating that in an Operating License Proceeding in Callaway and Mr. Jordan wasted about a year in other proceedings doing the same thing and the Chairman's comments about Construction QA are gone. I mean if you do not litigate them here, where do you litigate them.

Let me just ask Applicant's Counsel, what is the purpose of an OL Proceeding?

MR. GAD: I think that we may have failed to adequately articulate a distinction that maybe is more subtle than appeared to us.

what you want to litigate is how well did you execute a program in the sense that did you have the right guys, did they wear the right hats, was there vision of sufficient acuity. That we think is not an OL Issue. If somebody thinks that we have blind men out there reading the labels or inspecting the wells, then the answer to the question is I think you do that by means of 10 CFR 2.206.

according to spec., is the as built machine what it was suppose to be, then I do not think that is a QA Question at all. That is simply, did you build it with the number inches of concrete or the number inches of steel or the number of pounds of straw, or whatever it is suppose to have in it. You may have gotten perfect even though you had a crummy QA Program and frankly, you may put in too little concrete even though you had a perfect

QA Program.

So I think we have to be careful to distinguish between execution of a QA Program as one topic and the compliance of as built machinery with to be built plans and specifications. We are not suggesting that the latter is not on OL Issue. We are suggesting only that former is an OL Issue. I was not there in those cases to which my esteemed colleague refers. Maybe if I had been, it would have been a shorter case.

MR. LESSY: If you cannot litigate the way in which construction is proceeded, in other words, if there are Quality Assurance deficiencies in an OL Proceeding then the public cannot litigate the adequacy of construction in a nuclear power plant. I do not have the string of cites here, we could provide them but that has been litigated in many, many, proceedings. It is not even an issue.

It is certainly an ingenious argument to the extent that you can only litigate the program rather than a deficiency but I am afraid that the weight of Commission Policy and Decisions goes the other way.

The point I wanted to make with respect to that is that since Mr. Jordan, Mr. Perlis and myself have sat through such litigation that the Staff really feels that the contention should be limited to the specific alleged failures of the QA Program.

NECNP in its answer appeared to admit that it had

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no additional information other than roughly a dozen items that were listed in Pages 58-61 of its contention.

The contention should be limited to those and if during the discovery process it learns of any other, they should seek to amend it. I can tell you that in terms of long summer days, there is nothing that will be less interesting to the Board, I should suggest and to anyone else, to have welders and other craftsman come up here and tell how they welded each weld and tell you how they did each item of construction.

What I would ask is that the contention be limited to these items and would hope that Mr. Jordan would take a look which of those he really wants to litigate because we can bring the Inspectors on board for which each of these 13 and indicate what the problems initially were and to the extent that they were satisfied.

I think we need to have a lot of focus on Quality Assurance, Quality Control type contentions. If not, we can spend the next decade here up in Seabrook. It is going to be difficult.

My suggestion is that the contention is admissible if, contention to the effect that Applicant's QA/QC Program has not operated in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, etc., limited to these 13 items.

That would be our position on that.

(Off the record.)

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JUDGE HOYT: Back on the record.

JUDGE LUEBKE: In the few cases I am familiar with where the QA gets into an operating license proceeding, it is by way of a whistle blower who alleges something or other. That gets to be a specific item in a contention. If you have two or three whistle blowers, you r ht have two or three contentions.

My question nere is, do you view the Contention in that way, or do you view the Contention more generally as it is presented?

MR. LESSY: What has happened here in terms of basis, is that NECNP has taken roughly thirteen NRC Office of Inspection I and E reports and indicated those as failure of the QAQC Program.

When we get to litigate the merits, I think it will be found that these thirteen, first of all, in terms of what Mr. Jordan and Mr. Perlis and I have been through, is that thirteen is an awfully small number for a project like this.

These programs will probably indicate the working of a QA Program as opposed to its failure. But the point here, for Contention purposes, instead of whistle blowing, which did happen in the beginning, there are public reports of construction defects, if you will. These defects enter the Operating License Proceedings on the grounds that they reflect a deficiency in the QAQC Program, because if that Program worked, everything would be perfect.

Whether that is a valid hypothesis or not, however, I would limit the Contention to the thirteen. In essence, he was a welding contention, there is an inspection contention and things of this nature, a pipe support contention.

That is something we can litigate precisely.

JUDGE LUEBKE: But isn't there a process for resolving these things to a happy conclucion, and if it is not a happy
conclusion, then something else happens?

MR. LESSY: That is right.

JUDGE LUEBKE: That is not in a Board Hearing?
MR. LESSY: That is right.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Could you describe that briefly for the record. These matters are taken care of somehow, someplace else.

MR. LESSY: Well, there is a 2.206 procedure. After the authorization for construction there are two things that happen.

Under 10 CFR 50.55 (e), at that point, the permitee has reporting responsibilities when the construction at the site do not in its view meet the requirements that they are supposed to.

In addition to that, the NRC has resident inspectors at the sites and also regional inspectors that make announced and unannounced inspections with respect to these matters.

With respect to the NRC inspections, these matters are brought to the attention to the Licensee in a letter which

is put in the public document room and then after that, corrective action is taken and the matter is closed. The NRC inspectors review the action taken and they either agree or disagree with it and eventually the matter is disposed of. It is either closed out or accepted.

What has happened in a lot of Operating License Proceedings, this process which I described, has been the genesis of contentions to the effect that these wouldn't have happened if the QAQC Program had worked adequately. When we come to litigate the merits of this Contention, each instance stands on its own footing. That is basically the process.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Could it be said that these items have been closed?

MR. LESSY: Generally, yes. I am not familiar in detail with each one of these. Generally these are closed items. These thirteen items would be the history of the construction of the Seabrook Plant from a deficiency standpoint, and there are relatively a small number of items

JUDGE HOYT: Could we get you to redraft that Contention?

MR. JORDAN: Well, I really strongly disagree with Mr. Lessy's point about limiting the litigation to the thirteen.

By the way, thirteen categories, but considerably more than that of Inspection Reports that are cited.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, I can tell at a glance that that

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is true. How about the drafting point?

MR. JORDAN: Well, my view is that what we have is a series of Inspection Reports that show a continuing failure of Quality Assurance.

Just to take one for example, number 2. If the system were working, and perhaps this is a repeat of what Mr. Lessy was just saying, those should not be recurring.

Our point is that they are recurring -- some of them. An infinitestimal number are being caught by NRC personnel. The desperate hope is that the rest of them are being caught by the Applicant's program.

The problem is if they are being caught by the NRC personnel, they are not being caught by the Applicant's program, but it seems to us that is what those Inspection Reports tell you.

To get to the drafting question, what we have done is give you, in an analysis of I and E Reports; there isn't any other source unless you get a whistle blower, until you get into discovery and begin to analyze for yourself the various kinds of internal reports and documents and non-conformance reports, deficiency reports, trending reports and so on, on the Applicant.

Even then, those tell you something. What they
don't tell you is what wasn't reported on. What I am saying is,
what we have a basis for is pervasive quality control failure,
for which reason the Contention should not be redrafted to be

limited. It should stand as a broad contention related to the entire Quality Control Program.

JUDGE PARIS: So you are offering these thirteen examples as the basis for your Contention when you would like to go in with discovery and uncover more?

MR. JORDAN: Yes, Sir.

MR. LUEBKE: My question is, when you go through this process, is there a regulation which tells you that if you find ten more examples in Category 2 that the Plant should not be licensed?

MR. JORDAN: That is a factual judgment. In fact, I went through that just about a month ago with Mr. Taylor who is the Resident Reactor Inspector at Comanche Peak. He testified and probably accurately that it is indeed, very difficult to evaluate whether a program is working or not. But, it can be done and that there is a range and it depends upon the safety of the significance of the particular item. It depends on the number of items and the number of deficiencies given the number of items. It there are ten out of a million, maybe it is not important. If there are ten out of 20, then it may become important. That is the kind of thing. It gets down to a factual judgment.

The answer is there is a requirement for an adequate Quality Assurance Program and that Quality Assurance Program is essentially, and I believe Mr. Taylor agreed with this, the

last line of defense to determining that the reactor is properly built. You need it to know whether it is properly built.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Well, the fact that you have got all these things to look at, it shows that there is a Cality Assurance Program. Otherwise, you wouldn't have the paper to look at.

MR. JORDAN: Well, that is a rather complicated philosophical question. It is not at all clear that just because you have all of these that the program is actually working.

The question is, when you analyze them, what do you learn from them; what's missing and what do people tell you about them?

JUDGE LUEBKE: Yes, but after you have supplied all this information to us at a Hearing six months or a year from now, we still need a regulation which says, yes or no, it is adequate or inadequate.

MR. JORDAN: Well, I think you have. You have

Appendix B which require the Program to be effective. There are

at least as specific as most NRC regulations. To my mind, most

NRC regulations do not require what is done to be effective.

At least this one does. That is as good a standard as I find in

NRC regulations, generally.

JUDGE LUEBKE: So that is your plan. How about the other parties. Can you work with that kind of principal case?

JUDGE HOYT: Let me just get one thing. The basis of your Contention, then, would be in your version would be on Page 57, starting about one-quarter of the way down with: The NECNP contends that the Applicant has failed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B with respect to either the design or construction of Seabrook.

The Quality Assurance and Quality Control Programs at Seabrook has been subject to pervasive inadequacies in all areas such that there is no assurance that the Plant has been designed or constructed in accordance with the applicable requirements in consistence with the protection of the public health and safety.

That is the kernel of your Contention?

MR. JORDAN: I think that is the kernel of it.

I guess I am not so concerned that we leave the remainder of it
in, but it is important to our point of view. Maybe there is a
remedy that doesn't involve denying the license as such. It is
a remedy of a complete independent audit and so on.

You are correct, the kernel of the Contention is the two sentences that you read.

JUDGE HOYT: I wonder, though, if the word "design" be struck, because beyond the design part. We can only deal now with the Quality Assurance as to construction.

MR. JORDAN: That gets me to actually respond to some of the things Mr. Gad said.

JUDGE HOYT: All right.

MR. JORDAN: I think it rather works well together.

JUDGE HOYT: Can we dispose of that particular

phrase?

MR. JORDAN: Yes, indeed. I don't mean we can dispose of the word design. I will dispose of the other point in argument.

In effect, what Mr. Gad says, and in that sense he is right, we are not only beyond design, we are beyond construction here. The question is not how to construct the Plant. The question is, should you give it an operating license?

What we are saying is the Quality Assurance Program for design and construction is such that you shouldn't give it an operating license. The requirements apply to design as they do to construction and we press them both.

I would add, I believe the case cited by the

Applicant, ALAB 674, is a case in which suspension of construction

was requested. We are not doing that. This is an Operating

License Proceeding. If we were to request suspension, we would

go under 2206.

Similarly, we are not requesting a modification of the construction permit as Mr. Lessy suggested we might be in our Contention to Al. We are saying, given what has happened in the past, you can't give them an operating license unless you remedy the inadequacy.

I would add one further point. I loaned out my . copy of the Duke Power Catawba Decision of June 30, 1982, but again, the Board there does make the point, on Page 12, that the Applicant is not going to have told us in the FSAR where the QA Program was wrong or where the construction was deficient. We need to do that on discovery. That is why we need to get this Contention in and not limit it to the thirteen items we have discussed.

MR. LESSY: Well, I guess the Staff's position is a hybrid of that. I think discovery could go in on the scope of the QA Program, but that litigation, the acceptance of this Contention for litigation purposes, should be limited to those thirteen categories of I and E Reports, subject to appropriate and timely ammendments by NECNP.

I have litigated these kinds of matters before, and if you have a contention to the effect that QA Program is inade-quate, there are only two ways to address it in terms of testimony. One way is to get an overall QA person in to say that it is not adequate. I do not know whether or not the Board would accept that.

The other way is to bring in a representative of virtually every craft at the site or their Inspector or Super-visor for every craft at the site to talk about each area and its adequacy and that will take all year.

My suggestion is that we have the overall QA Program

in for discovery purposes so Mr. Jordan can engage in the kind of discovery he would like to engage in, subject to objections by appropriate parties, but that the Contention for litigation purposes be limited to the areas that he has identified.

I would secondly ask one other thing. Even though there may be, and this would be of NECNP, an area of deficiency I would hope that NECNP, for litigation purposes, would look at those categories and decide if they really want to litigate Wells. If you want to really litigate Wells, we will bring in the Welders and the Welding Inspectors and we will put pictures before the Board and radiographs and everything else. It takes a lot of time.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Excuse me. As I am listening here, you are talking about items which have been closed out?

MR. LESSY: That is right.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Why are they any longer problems?

MR. LESSY: We may ask Mr. Jordan.

JUDGE LUEBKE: All right. I ask Mr. Jordan. Why are they problems?

MR. JORDAN: They are problems because in most, if not all of these cases, we have an I and E Report on any given subject. I will get back to the point I made earlier. An I & E Report is a snapshot of that Plant at a thousanths of a second. It sees very little. It doesn't see the whole thing. It has found these inadequacies continue over time. Of course, when the

NRC Staff has found inadequacies, of course, they have twisted the arm of the Applicant and the Applicant has fixed the inadequacies.

It goes without saying the questions is, what wasn't found, and what this shows us is that there were things there to find that the Applicant's Progarm had not found and I don't think anyone would assert to the NRC's Program that the purpose of the NRC's Program is to find everything the Applicant didn't find. There are other things there.

MR. LESSY: It was for that reason that the Resident Inspection Program was implemented. I think Mr. Jordan's comments are a little outmoded in that regard.

When there were periodic inspections, the purpose of the Resident Inspection Program was to have an Inspector there at all times.

The NECNP in litigating this Contention, your Honor, would have to demonstrate that this particular deficiency evidenced that there was not only a bad well, but that that bad well evidenced the failure of the QAQC Program that has caused safety problems. That is a pretty significant burden.

If we are not careful about framing this Contention for litigation purposes as opposed to discovery purposes, we have bought an awful big pie to eat.

JUDGE HOYT: How about if the Contention is as I suggested to you? The wording should be, admitted for purposes of discovery only.

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MR. JORDAN: Actually I was hoping I would be breaking the dam in a few minutes in agreeing to limit our Contention for litigation as Mr. Lessy has suggested to the thirteen items on the premise that we would then be able to litigate on discovery, to pursue on discovery the entire QA Program and add if we found something wrong.

I certainly agree with Mr. Lessy. It is not an inconsiderable proof that we have to make, but it is a proof that we believe is there and is indicated at least, by the documents that we have seen thus far.

MR. LESSY: The matter that is still pending, though, is the Board's question to NECNP as to whether or not they would agree to strike out the word "design?"

JUDGE HOYT: I think he has rejected that.

MR. JORDAN: Oh, no. I rejected that one.

MR. LESSY: So the Board only has before it a Contention which says design or construct?

MR. JORDAN: Let me see if I can read this into the record and perhaps satisfy your concern.

Let me look at it for a second.

MR. JORDAN: This is my proposed language. Let me read it out for you.

NECNP contends that the Applicant has failed to meet the requirements of Appendix B with respect to the design and construction of Seabrook in the following areas: Such that there is no assurance the Plant has been designed or construction in accordance with the applicable requirements and consistent with the public health and safety: Following the colon would be the Items No. 1-13 on pages 58-61.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Item No. 13 does not even have a subject word in it.

MR. JORDAN: Do you mean it is not a sentence?

JUDGE LUEBKE: No, it does not say what.

MR. JORDAN: I guess I think it says a lot.

JUDGE LUEBKE: No. 12 has to do with welding and wells. No. 11 has to do with document control.

JUDGE HOYT: No. 13 deals with the Order Program.

MR. JORDAN: No. 13 deals with the Order Function.

What they found in the I and E Reports were deficiencies in the

Order Function as opposed to deficiencies in Wells as opposed

to deficiencies in Concrete, deficiencies in the Order Function.

JUDGE HOYT: I do not think anything can be said to change your position, has it, Mr. Gad?

MR. GAD: No, Madam Chairman. I will relieve the room of that suspense. The question that Dr. Luebke pitched to

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my direction a little while ago is, can you live with what was then on the table? The shortend answer is, if someone wants to tell me that a plant that has been built in perfect conformance with the plans and specifications approved in the Construction Permit Case, is either not get licensed or is going to suffer three years worth of litigation while we worry about how it was that you built it perfectly. Then the answer is no, I cannot live with that and I do not think there is any point to be litigated there.

JUDGE PARIS: If I understand what Mr. Jordan is driving at, he is not contending that you build it perfectly.

MR. JORDAN: Dr. Paris, my point is this. As I understand, the contention that we say is not admissible is did you properly execute your QA Plan. We have no objection to the contention that says, you did not build a plant the way you were suppose to. There is only three bolts where there is suppose to be four, they are only torque to 100 pounds instead of 125 or whatever else the deficiency may be. We are not opposing that whatsoever.

I am also not saying that on account or because of a certain report somebody cannot go in and litigate whether or not the thing is reported on and five or six other around perhaps were torque to the right spec. or had the right number of bolts in them.

What I am suggesting is, and I am not saying that

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these might not be evidence to some other admissible contention, what I am saying is that a QA Plan is for two purposes. It is for planning purposes and it is for ongoing construction. IT is to help you get a perfect plan.

Once the whole thing is built, the issue is did you build it right not did you build it right because you a good plan and it worked or did you build it right in spite of a good plan that you did not do a good job following, or did you build it right in spite of a bad plan that you followed or not. It does not really matter. My point is that once you have built the thing, the issue is how well is built, not how did it get built that way.

If anybody is concerned about a QA Plan functioning today or for the rest of the construction, then Appendix B talks about remedies. They do not include litigating it in the OL Case. 2206 has remedies, they do not include remedying it in the OL Case and if the issue is that we are to have this Plant which for all we know is a perfectly built plant, in conformance with all the plans and specifications, and is going to sit their idle while we have fun with three years worth of litigation to which my brethren say we are inviting ourselves, then I say to you that is a regulatory disaster.

There is no reason why that issue ought to be litigated in an Operating License Case and if there is no reason why it ought to be litigated in an Operating License Case, then

it ought not to be litigated.

JUDGE HOYT: Is not your argument more directed towards IIAl rather than IIA2?

JUDGE LUEBKE: He has been speaking to all of 2.

MR. GAD: There is really very little distinction between IIAl and IIA2, IIAl says you did not plan to send the Inspector out often enough and IIA2 says, well, you planned to send him out every day but he only went out Monday, Wednesday and Friday.

I am asserting to you, Madam Chairman and Members of the Board, that once we have the thing built, it does not matter whether you send him out the right number of days per plan or per execution. What matters is whether or not the Plant was built in accordance with the plans and specifications that it was suppose to be built with.

I am not suggesting that to you that somebody cannot use I and E Reports or Licensee Deficiency Reports or anything else as evidence for to bolster a case that says this is not built right or that is not built right. What I am suggesting to you is, a decision at the end of this case says the Seabrook Construction QA Plan is the greatest thing in the world is not what we are after.

What we are after is whether or not the Plant as built meets the Statute and the Regulations of the NRC. If it does then it will be licensed to operate.

It may very well be that the air conditioning in here does not have a very good QA and it is late in the day and I may not be articulating myself very well. We see a distinction.

JUDGE LUEBKE: No one has mentioned in this argument, the Test Program that follows construction. There is a PreOperating Test Program and a Low Power Test Program, I do not know what all the phrases are but that ought to be good for something. Is that pertinent to the contentions on the table?

MR. LEGSY: Well, those programs I should think are additional assurance that as to the safety of the plant and its compliance with NRC Requirements. They are complimentary to the QA/QC Construction Program but in my view at least, would not be a substitute for it.

I do have one further comment I would like to make with respect to the restated contention.

JUDGE HOYT: Let us move on unless we have something radically different.

JUDGE LUEBKE: He has got something.

JUDGE HOYT: Oh, yes, Mr. Lessy, excuse me.

MR. LESSY: I do have one more comment with respect to the restated contention of Mr. Jordan's which includes the 13 categories.

That is, this Contention still is phrased in terms of the design and construction of Seabrook. It is not phrased solely in the terms of whether or not Applicant's QA/QC Program

has not operated. It includes design and construction in it and for those reasons the Staff objects to the restated Contention to the extent that includes design issues because we feel that is not Operating License Issue.

Since Mr. Jordan has stated the Contention in the conjunctive, in other words, the design and construction and since the Board has stated that it will not rephrase contentions, unless that Contention were changed, then that in my view would clearly not be an acceptable contention for litigation.

JUDGE PARIS: Well, Mr. Lessy, if he could show that that product or show that the plans were drawn backwards and the pipe supports were put in mirrorimage position than what they should have been or something like that, would that not be design?

MR. LESSY: Say that again, sir?

JUDGE PARIS: If he could show that the plans were drawn mirror images to what they should have been and pipe supports were put in according to the Plan but because of that are wrong, would that not be design?

MR. LESSY. Yes, but we are talking about design of QA Program, not the design of Plan. QA Contentions are not the same.

MR. JORDAN: No, I am sorry. That is the misunder-standing that we are not concerned with the design of the QA Program. It seems to me that if anything is true about nuclear

plants, it is that they are not fully designed by the time they are authorized to be built and that design, with intended Quality Assurance related to design continues, my understanding is practically up until the time the thing is turned on, of course, there is an initial threshold of what the QA Program is for both design and construction. That is where we got into the argument on IIAl but there is an implementation of Design Quality Assurance throughout the period. The issue is really the same in the sense of whether it is a CP Issue or whether it is an OL Issue, it is an OL Issue.

MR. LESSY: That is an important clarification as far as the Staff is concerned.

JUDGE HOYT: Then you would be willing to accept that Contention, Mr. Lessy, if it read after Appendix B with respect to either the design of construction of the Seabrook Plant? Does that make any difference to you?

MR. LESSY: Yes, that would be acceptable.

MR. JORDAN: I hate to do this but may I have two more seconds?

JUDGE HOYT: Go ahead.

MR. JORDAN: I would disagree with Mr. Gad that he has been inarticulate this afternoon, I think he has been very articulate.

Our point is and I think the function of Quality
Assurance is to tell you whether in fact you are building the

Plant right and to be able to look at it and tell whether you built the Plant right. That, in our view is very important to mural from the conclusion. If the Program did not work, you cannot tell.

JUDGE HOYT: I think we have done enough with that one. Let us look at IIB2.

MR. JORDAN: Parts of IIB are easy. IIBl we are clear for lift off on both the Staff and the Applicant.

on the grounds that we refuse to give a conclusive items improperly excluded from the QA Program, those would be items important to safety, improperly excluded. By the way, we are now talking about the Operations QA Program as opposed to the Construction QA Program. I believe we have answered that.

I am sorry, let me be clear on IIB1. We did reword IIB1. That rewording is at Page 35 of our June 17th Filing.

I believe that the Catawba opinion that we cited before on June 30th, again is important on this point. The question of importance to safety, the Regulatory Agenda in which the Commission discussed this issue and the language itself of importance to safety is not specific. We need to get into the discovery to determine in fact what items that are important to safety as a matter of fact, have not been included under the operations of the QA Program.

JUDGE PARIS: Excuse me. Did you say that IIB2 has

been reworded?

MR. JORDAN: No. that was IIBl that was reworded, I am sorry.

JUDGE PARIS: Oh, IIBl was reworded.

MR. LESSY: We had objected to IIB2 on the grounds it lacked specificity and NECNP has not given a list of items it contends were excluded from the QA Program. We do not even have a category of items or one example. We just have a generic distinction between safety related and important to safety.

I think that before we can engage in extensive discovery on this, we need to know the kinds of items that NECNP feels should be included within the QA Program for operations that are now not included. I do not think we need a complete listing but we need certain examples and categories and we do not have any. We have asked for them so in the absence of that, we continue to object to IIB2's as lacking required specificity.

MR. JORDAN: I think we give specific examples on Page 36 of our June 17th Filing, the middle of the Page. I think we actually discuss this in more detail in our earlier Filing of Contention IIAl.

JUDGE HOYT: I think you have some matters related to Emergency Planning on the bottom of Page 35 and then on 36 you go back.

MR. JORDAN: Yes. I am afraid that we did do that and we are back to IIB2.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. So that is on Page 36?

MR. JORDAN: Right.

JUDGE HOYT: Did you reword that at any point?

MR. JORDAN: No.

JUDGE . HOYT: Do you have anything, Mr. Gad?

MR. GAD: We did not object to anything in IIB,

your Honor.

MR. JORDAN: Should we go on to IIB3?

JUDGE HOYT: Right.

MR. JORDAN: We can pass IIB3 which is a blessing from the Applicant, I believe. We have not reworded it. The wording is as in our original Filing of April 21st.

JUDGE HOYT: IIB4?

MR. JORDAN: IIB4, the Applicant objected. The Staff argues that there is no regulatory requirement. I think we have adequately answered in writing on Pages 37 and 38 of our Filing of June 17th.

(Off the record.)

MR. LESSY: The Staff continues to object. The regulatory requirements are kind of a grab bag of things that might help, but seldom do, and the Board has before it the issues in writing, and will determine whether or not there is a regulatory delay.

JUDGE HOYT: That gives us five is the last one.

Do you have anything, Mr. Gad? Do you have any objection to

5, Mr. Lessy?

MR. LESSY: IIB 5, there is no objection.

MR. JORDAN: We have reached a rather sensitive subject of Emergency Planning. We happen to have 16 items that we have termed specifications and bases, and then what we intend is incorporate into the Contentions my view of NECNP, which is that it is by far the most resonable way to approach the Emergency Planning Contention is that proposed by the Applicant, essentially that proposed by the Applicant.

I am in a quandry, unfortunately, because I guess we feel that we need some guidance from the Board, but let me lay out what I think is a good way to treat this, and we can save this and let us go home tomorrow and then have a hearing on Saturday. I would buy the language that Mr. Gad has proposed as the language of the Contention, subject to that we then proceed with discovery on Emergency Planning. We then would be required to provide specificity or specific Contentions after all the Emergency Planning documents of all the various sorts have been received, so that

by the time we go to litigation we do not have the problem to which I am sensitive, which is completely unfocused litigation at that point and really nothing for the Board to decide on with vague Contentions. You end up with thorough specificity at the later time, after discovery is completed. You end up with specificity for the litigation and for the Board's decision. We don't have to address now the seemingly intractable questions of how to deal with the unavailability of documents and whether to accept a Contention at a given time or not at this time, when and whether to file them later, and so on.

I would add this and have a reasonable concern which is that the discovery might indeed ask for the kitchen sink if they were completely broad Contentions except for purposes of discovery. I suggest that discovery proceed, and as the parties who raise the Emergency Planning Contentions be limited in their discovery to the matters that they raised in their draft material that they filed with the Board so far, so we can't go beyond that with some limit. We don't have to go ahead and argue with everything now. It deals with the issue of picking up later on the documents that come in and give you specific Contentions to litigate when we get to the hearing.

The only thing that I see any potential complexity in is exactly when we file the this specified Contention. It seems to me to be easy to deal with. Now, the other side of that is I would have to say that if we can't go that way, and I seek

the Board's guidance on this, then I guess I think we tried to in effect incorporate our 16 items as part of our Contentions. I think that we would have to target, redraft each of those, to have a sentence or two which is the kernal of a Contention for your use and then argue about them tomorrow, rather than having the way they were written, because they weren't written as Contentions. We are simply trying to in our June 17th filing say okay if the Staff wants us to give this stuff, here it is.

I think if we are going to argue about each one of those specifics, we need to rewrite them.

JUDGE HOYT: Now, the wording that you talked about was the wording that was offered to Ms. Shotwell earlier today in regard to her four Contentions.

MR. JORDAN: I don't have the formal wording, but that is what I am talking about.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, it is on the record. Would you give the Board a minute?

MR. JORDAN: Certainly.

(There was off the record discussion.)

JUDGE LUEBKE: Are there any other Petitioners with an Emergency Planning Contention? I want to see the scope of this thing.

MR. EDELMAN: Sun Valley has two Contentions and they both have to do with Off-site Emergency Planning.

MR. LESSY: Also Massachusetts has four Contentions.

JUDGE HOYT: Four, yes, we discussed that a moment ago and we know that we have those four, and I believe there is some in New Hampshire. How many?

MR. BISBEE: Three.

JUDGE HOYT: Three, fine. We have 75 Contentions in all.

MR. PERLIS: Madam Chairman, there also other parties that have Emergency Planning Contentions. I believe South Hampton does and Ms. Hollingworth.

JUDGE HOYT: The Chamber, yes. They do. That is principally the thrust of their position.

JUDGE LUEBKE: We were thinking a little bit about the prospects of consolidating.

JUDGE HOYT: I think it is the consensus of the Board that we will go along with the proposal of Mr. Gad this morning which will get at least the case started and in a posture that we can at least as we go along--I understand.

MR. LESSY: I would like to argue on that point.

JUDGE HOYT: We already got you this morning. Is there anything different than that?

MR. LESSY: Yes. I think it can be more specifically be addressed in the context of Massachusetts Contentions as well as Mr. Jordan's.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. Well, let's take your argument then at this point, Mr. Lessy, but let me say that that is

the consensus of the Board at this time at this point. We are certainly not going to be iron-clad if you can come up with something pursuasive argument that we should not go in that direction.

MR. LESSY: May I do it first thing in the morning, or do you want me to go on with it now?

JUDGE HOYT: Well, I --

MR. LESSY: I think it is a fairly substantial point.

MR. JORDAN: I am certainly sensitive having had my tongue begin to tie considerably over the last hour or so at the late hour. What I am concerned about is that we have some guidance so that we know what to do tonight whether we should come to you with having reworded all those 16 things to be argued tomorrow or not.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Sixteen things on what?

MR. JORDAN: We are talking about 16 items that we listed.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Oh, well, Emergency Planning is the tail end of every hearing, is it not?

MR. LESSY: We have FEMA here to avoid that.

JUDGE HOYT: I am sorry, you did what?

MR. LESSY: We have been working with FEMA here to avoid that so that their process would be available here in tune with the process of the Staff had proposed, so that there findings will be coming in--I mean their testimony and their formal findings

will be coming in in May and their drafts and comments will be coming in earlier during the process, so it doesn't have to be here. We have been able to avoid that. If you want me to proceed I will. The problem that I have with a very general Emergency Planning Contention apart from the fact that I don't believe that such a Contention complies with the Commission's Regulation 2.714 even for discovery purposes, especially here where we have specifically delineated areas; Massachusetts Contentions, NECNP Contentions—I am losing it, too—is that what they do really in as broad a form is, just take a look, for example—one moment.

Just for discussion purposes, and I know that it is Massachusetts Contention 2, it simply says The Applicant has failed to account for local emergency response needs and capabilities in establishing boundaries for plume explosion pathway and just in pathway EPZ's for Seabrook Station is required by 10 CFR 50.33(g) and 50.47(c)(2). Now, that Contention is nothing more than a statement of what the law requires and saying that the Applicant hasn't done it.

ones that Massachusetts filed in the now defunct Pilgrim Proceeding and Massachusetts has indicated, I believe, will file the same discovery that was filed in that proceeding, probably, and that was about three and a half inches high, and it was filed within about an hour after the Board's Order setting forth and admitting discovery. What that does is imposes upon the Staff and the

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Applicant the requirement to answer extensive questions about Emergency Planning as a basis for framing further specified Contentions before discovery.

One of the parts of Massachusetts Contention 2 is that these local emergency response needs, for example, have not been drawn or clarified including, a) Jurisdictional boundaries, and the proximity of the site to the Atlantic Ocean, and things of this nature. We discussed today earlier the Staff Discussants views on why in the case of Massachusetts the only that they had to do was look to a map to find out which of the jurisdictional boundaries were not properly drawn and to add that to the a Contention; but this kind of Contention, if the Board allows them the Contention as a generalized Emergency Planning Contention, but require us, because it would be within the penumbra of such a Contention to look at the map and to answer the question as to which of Applicant's -- which of the jurisdictions within the . ten mile zone are cut in half and which are the roads that are cut in half, without any real specificity.

In the Emergency Planning area, such broad-based discovery becomes a fishing expedition, okay, and the basis of which is the hope that specific Contentions can lie. Now, here Mr. Jordan and NECNP has, I think, 16 specific areas at least according to our analysis that they have concerns with. They have concerns with Emergency Classification, simultaneous failure to both units, training of unit shift supervisor, the plume EPZ,

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meteorology, access routes, etc. These are specific areas of concern on a specific matter which can be litigated. Now, Mr. Jordan has said that he is willing to specifically delineate those Contentions and take the time to come up with specifics and we realize, the Staff realizes, when it came up with its response to this that even though some of these were objectionable, that this was preliminary at this point and many of these objections could be overcome by a little more drafting, and I think that Mr. Jordan realizes that. But we can see no merit from the standpoint of timeliness, joinder of issues in a litigative sense, or efficiency in terms of litigation, to permit broad-based issues which just say the Regulations haven't been complied with, EPZ zone is insufficient, when you have available a number of very specific areas that people what to litigate, and that is, and we strongly urge the Licensing Board, to litigate the specific areas that have Contentions on the specific areas, allow more liberal discovery, but not allow a fishing expedition that transfers the burden from one party to another, and then let the parties who propose these Contentions have an opportunity to amend them after discovery based upon any information that was properly obtained during the discovery process; but to have a Contention that as there was in both the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon Licensing Board Decision and Licensing Board Proceedings which is setting up the possibility of endless discovery and endless litigation without real joinder of issue, and we think the whole

direction of the Commission's jurisprudence over the last few years having rules to modify 10 CFR Part 200 and the experience of the Staff and the Licensing Board to go in the way of having specific Contentions, and for whatever reasons underlie the proposal to have generalized Contentions we can only say that we wish that those who propose would talk to those who litigated it, because it was really a very inefficient process.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Was it legally decent for the Board to consider deferring all Emergency Planning Contentions now to a later date when more reports are in hand and specific Contentions can reasonably be raised?

MR. LESSY: I think that would be legally acceptable if the bounds of discovery were somehow limited. In other words, if you define.

JUDGE LUEBKE: If there is no discovery until the reports are out; what is there to discover until the reports are out?

MR. LESSY: That is a very good question. I would like to consider that.

JUDGE LUEBKE: It is a very big question concerning the legal aspects of it whether there is solid ground to take such a view.

MR. LESSY: I think there it is legally within the Board's discretion to do that. The thing that you need to do is to ascertain the possible date of availability of these

documents and meld that into the overall hearing process.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I have in mind the saying wait to motivate the production of those documents.

MR. GAD: Well, unfortunately, Dr. Luebke, the people that you want to wack over the head aren't in this room.

JUDGE HOYT: And we don't have any jurisdiction over that.

MR. LESSY: If the Board would look at the 16 items specifically in the draft response, just to consider this, and I wouldn't ask the Board to rule now, but take a look at the 16 areas which NECNP itself has delineated. If there is something in these precise 16 areas as well as an opportunity to engage in other responsible discovery and inother areas, the parties preparation time and understanding time of what is really at issue in my view would be much greater than that which would happen if you had a broad understanding that an Emergency Planning issue is going to be litigated, now let's just find out, let's just disengage and go on the broadest possible fishing expedition.

I really think that by focusing on specific areas
the proponents of this Contention will be able to sharpen their
thinking and those that respond to those Contentions on the offsite will be another agency also have some focusing on their thinking
and I just think that the process will be much more efficient
and not run the risk of just having open-ended, undefined,
Contentions, because at some point they are going to have to be

defined. My view that is let's define what we can right now and not defer it to November or December when a lot of other issues are then going to be defined.

Mind you, I haven't probably articulated my views as well as I would like to, but I think you get the genesis of my thoughts.

JUDGE LUEBKE: The only reports that exist, as I understand it, are some words in the FSAR. Is there any other report on the Emergency Planning?

MR. GAD: I want to be a little careful here, but I believe that there is a discussion in the FSAR. I believe that there is a the Applicant's Radiological Emergency Response Plan, a separate document, and I am really out on a limb here, but I think it is about two volumes.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Is that on-site only?

MR. GAD: That is the Applicant's plan, that is correct. So, that is on-site what we do. There already exists, at least in certain respects, a plan for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a generalized plan. I don't know exists generally for Emergency responses for the State of New Hampshire. There may very well be a whole--I am not certain of any of this, but I was in about this position a year ago and I am really generalizing from that--there are a whole fistful of studies that show exactly why the EPZ borders were drawn as they were and goodness knows what else.

Dr. Luebke, I hate to be the skunk at the lawn party,

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but the suggestion of deferring anything at all on Emergency Planning until some point in time in the future troubles me.

As I said earlier, in my judgement, the schedules only go one way, and time that is given away today can never be recovered. I think that there is an awful lot of discovery that probably could be undertaken at this point in time, much of which may in fact convince people that there is not prospect of fruit in litigating some of the things that they want to litigate and may serve to narrow all of this.

Just let me make one other observation, if I may.

This has been called the Applicant's suggestion and I suppose historically it is the Applicant's suggestion. I would sort of like to make it clear. This is a suggestion born out of a certain measure of frustration, a certain measure out of resignation; we are not suggesting that this is how it ought to be done with respect to other topics than EPZ or in other cases than Seabrook.

reports exist, then it would be possible to say that discovery could proceed with respect to those identified reports, and not in general because if discovery proceeds in general, the person can just answer and say that I haven't done the work. You can't discover new work. You can only discover on work that has been done, and if we can identify the existing reports, then the Board can say, okay, proceed with discovery on those reports. And if two months from now two more reports exist, the Board can amend

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its order and say amplify your discovery to two more reports.

Is that palatable? Then we are not deferring indefinitely. We are getting started. As you say, it's bad to not start.

MR. LESSY: Until yesterday, I was under the hope that the FEMA counsel from Region I was going to be attending this proceeding to give a status report with respect to the activities of that agency. I was told this morning, or yesterday morning, that he wasn't going to come. I can't say what he was going to say. I do think that FEMA feels that they can meet the May 5th date for testimony that they are starting. FEMA Regional Committee just commented on one of the lead Town Emergency Plans. So there are a number of documents being generated and my understanding is that a lot of this work is done in draft stage in the November, December timeframe here, and of course there are a number of documents which are available already, including particularly to on-site plans. The off-site plans require the occasion of local groups and work by the various States. So, there are a number of documents that could be used already and could be the basis for a particularizing Contentions at this point in time.

JUDGE LUEBKE: If and when these reports are finished then they are open for discovery. If they are three months late, they are three months late, but before then there is no need to discover that party, is there?

MR. LESSY: I am always impressed with the amount of interrogatories and document requests that that can be generated by attorneys.

MR. JORDAN: It is an interesting suggestion. I am not sure it is workable. I guess there can be a sort of discovery that involves getting the documents that are available. Perhaps interrogatories with respect to positions contained in or positions with respect to what is in the documents---

JUDGE LUEBKE: (Interrupting.) If the document has all the answers, you don't need to ask any questions.

MR. JORDAN: I am bothered that there seems to be something there that I am not going to work very well.

JUDGE LUEBKE: There would be no work for you to do.

MR. JORDAN: I thought that I had presented a proposal that would be reasonable and then Mr. Lessy ably expressed his concern, and then I thought that he basically said that he agreed with the proposal, so I want to go back to that. He wants to tie the discovery to the specific things that the various parties have raised, and what I said was the discovery should be undertaken by the parties would be limited to, in our case, the 16 areas that we have raised. There are four areas that Massachusetts has raised. So there are three areas that New Hampshire has raised. I got the impression from what Mr. Lessy was saying that he wanted to be clear that it would be limited to those specific areas.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Well, anybody can make a list like

that. It is easy. My problem is that it is kind of wheel spinning unless you are working with published reports.

MR. JORDAN: As I say, the concept sounds useful.

I am just not sure how I am going to see it working.

MR. LESSY: And my point is that if you done even have a list like that, then you are ten yards behind even there.

JUDGE LUEBKE: This like what?

MR. LESSY: Of specific areas like Mr. Jordan has.

JUDGE PARIS: Are you and Mr. Jordan in agreement?

MR. LESSY: No, Mr. Jordan had said that he would be willing to go either one of two ways. Mr. Jordan is completely agreeable to that. He said that he would be willing to litigate the Emergency Planning Contentions the way the Applicant had proposed, which is a general Contention.

JUDGE PARIS: Which you are violently opposed to.

MR. LESSY: He would be willing to, which we are opposed to. He also said that he would be willing to particularize his 16 areas add language here and there, and make them acceptable as Contentions, which means that he has asked the Board for guidance as to whether or not he should add those sentences to those 16 tonight, and that raises a question as to whether Emergency Planning Contentions have to be general or whether or not they need to be more specific. That is exactly where we are. So, depending on Mr. Jordan, he and I are in agreement that on 16 particular ones, but that puts him in disagreement with Mr.

Gad as I understand it.

MR. GAD: It depends on how we play it. If we are going to--I am sorry. I didn't mean to lead in.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Glad to know you are still here.

Go ahead.

MR. GAD: If we are going to have to litigate Mr.

Jordan's 16 items as Contentions, yes, indeed, we will be here
for another four or five hours. Let me suggest that the motion
that might pass by acclaimation would read a little like this:

Massachusetts and NECNP are admitted. For the time being, the

Contention upon which they are admitted is the broad one articulated
by the Applicant. For the time being each would be permitted
discovery with respect to EPZ matters, but only insofar as that
discovery relates to the areas of concern, or categories of concern, that each has identified, and that both parties are on
notice that by some fashion or another substantially before we
write testimony, they are going to be forced to either specify
what bothers them or drop their Contention.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Can I add, identified in a report?

I don't want to have my desk cluttered up with motions to compel and motions to protect.

MR. GAD: I am not certain that I understand that.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Well, when you do discovery in general,

we end up with what I call dump trucking of paper.

(There was a brief recess taken at six o'clock.)

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JUDGE HOYT: We have been off the record for a few moments. The parties are all back in their seats.

MR. GAD: Let me just finish one part of what I was saying. There is an awful lot of material that is available for discovery today. If you exclude simply the text of the local community plans themselves, then probably, I won't go so far as to say the bulk, but a large measure of what will ultimately be produced on this, exclusive of lawyers' briefs, is in existance today. There are studies that are no secret to anybody; most of them are referred to in the plan, so we for one look with grave misgivings on any idea that says let's take effort on this topic and put it off to later.

As to the method by which we proceed, we thought we had an idea that made a certain amount of sense. As said at the outset, it was born of resignation as much as anything else.

Maybe it wasn't such a good idea after all, and maybe we are going to have to litigate the legal sufficiency at the outset of a bunch of details of this topic.

But, those are the two ways we can go from this point.

What I do not think is a third alternative is to just take the whole thing and put it off to another day. That just buys us unnecessary delay.

JUDGE HOYT: I am certainly in agreement with you on that. I would like to get this done now. I don't want to put anything off that we can avoid.

It appears, Ms. Shotwell, you would agree to the suggestion now that the new Applicant's plan, if I may burden you with that description.

MS. SHOTWELL: Right.

JUDGE HOYT: Let me turn to Mr. Lessy and here from you; how about that? Do you have any fault with that?

MR. LESSY: The technical Contention would be the broad form one, but for discovery purposes, each of them would be limited to the areas that they heretofore identified in their bases, without us having to argue and decide today what are the legal boundaries of Emergency Planning issues.

JUDGE HOYT: Would you do this, Mr. Gad, would you reduce that to a written format.

MR. GAD: As long as I don't have to sign it, your Honor..

JUDGE HOYT: Never would I ask you to do that.

And let's run it through the Commonwealth and you too, Mr. Lessy,
and see if it would be acceptable in the morning and we will dispose
of that and we will have the show on the road, and then you won't
have to go through the 16 Contentions and redraft them this evening.

MR. JORDAN: May we look at it, too?

JUDGE HOYT: Yes. I would assume that everything would go through Mr. Lessy. Let me ask you, sir, would you be willing to accept that as well? I think you indicated that that was your Contention as well.

MR. EDLMAN: Yes, we would be willing to subsume our Contention within that general plan.

JUDGE HOYT: Does that dispose the Town of South Hampton, too?

MR. EDLMAN: No. The Town of South Hampton will object to the transmission line.

All right, at least we can get through with three of the Intervenors if we can work that out in such a fashion on each of them and accept that. The Board might be subject to criticism which doesn't bother me particularly if I think it is going to serve the useful purpose, and that is that we be hitting the same Contention from several different Intervenors, but I think that with the explanations certainly liberally sprinkled over this record, it would be recognized why we did it in the fashion that we did.

MR. LESSY: Do I understand that the proposal to be that the technical Contention would be in the broad form, each Intervenor would be limited to the area delineated in the bases of his present pleadings? And what were the other elements of that?

MR. GAD: That we would proceed to discovery now or whenever the order on Contentions comes out, and that everyone will be on notice that by a certain period of time, and by a certain fashion, and I am indifferent as to precisely how it is done either an amendment to their Contention or an answer to the last answer

to interrogatories that we would propound, they are going to have to specify tightly and in a legally sufficient fashion the Contentions that they want to litigate. Any that are not so specified are out the window.

JUDGE LUEBKE: So, preliminarily then, these are preliminary Contentions we are talking about at the moment?

JUDGE HOYT: For purposes of discussion.

JUDGE LUEBKE: For purposes of discussion.

JUDGE HOYT: I think that gives you sufficient enlightenment.

MR. JORDAN: Indeed it does, yes.

JUDGE HOYT: I think that satisfies Sun Valley, too.

MR. EDELMAN: It sure does.

JUDGE HOYT: So as soon as we get that matter straight ened out in the morning, counsel, the parties may wish to---

MR. LESSY: (Interrupting.) Is this a proposal that is under consideration or is it a proposal that has been adopted by the Board?

JUDGE HOYT: I think the strong indication is the Board has every intention of adopting the idea that has been presented after Mr. Gad drafts it out.

MR. LESSY: So it is not a point in the Board's mind that all the proposed Contentions of some of the other parties may be subsumed within this overall umbrella?

JUDGE HOYT: Since they are not here, I am going

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subsume it for them.

MR. LESSY: Let's try it.

JUDGE HOYT: We can try.

MR. LESSY: Even if there outstanding deficiencies in the Contention?

JUDGE HOYT: Other than the ones that have already been expressed here? I think we have covered all of them.

Haven't we?

MR. LESSY: I have an outstanding objection. For instance, Staff has objected to all of Massachusetts' Contentions.

MR. LESSY: And Staff has objected to ---

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, you have.

MR. GAD: (Interrupting.) Even for purposes of

discovery?

MR. LESSY: This agreement works to the detriment of Staff positions with respect to this matter.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, Mr. Lessy, you can't win them all.

MR. LESSY: This is a pretty important one, your Honor. Your Honor's indication is that for exploratory purposes this is a matter of a ground which you think may be adopted by the Board.

JUDGE HOYT: I certainly intend for to be a very strong indication to you, and unless I am very pursuaded by your arguments, I think that they are all very well taken, but it

still does not get the Board past the difficulties that we feel that we must resolve here and get the case in a litigating posture.

MR. LESSY: Rather than requiring the specificity which is available to Mr. Jordan with just an hour or so of work and is available to the other parties with some additional work.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, you see, if we do that so far as Mr. Jordan's Contentions are concerned, Mr. Lessy, we have given a different treatment to the Commonwealth Contentions, and what I think we are trying to do here, and I certainly hope I have indicated it, and if not I will say it, and that is we want to give equal treatment to the Contentions of the Commonwealth as we give to the Contentions of the Coalition.

MR. LESSY: I understand that, your Honor, but Mr.

Jordan specified that the only thing that the Board would have
to do is add the Commonwealth's file, and the trouble I have
with this, and I realize that I am in a minority of one, is that
it subsumes to be the umbrella of acceptability Contentions which
the Staff feel are not legally acceptable, which I want to register
now the Staff objection to the preliminary indication of the Board
on this method, and we will proceed in due course as we deem appropriate.

JUDGE LUEBKE: But it is the Staff's position that it would be possible now to be more specific about these Contentions.

MR. LESSY: Yes. They can do that this evening.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, we have offered two methods by

which we can proceed. It appears that we can dispose of those Emergency Planning Contentions of the Sun Valley Intervenor and of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts if we accept this approach.

As I understand this procedure, MR. Lessy, these Contentions are not cast in concrete. They can be amended, changed, deleted and prior to the litigation of this case, all the way up to that point.

JUDGE PARIS: But the pile of paper that you get is quite different.

MR. LESSY: It is going to be much higher now.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, you know, I have heard cases that involved a great many problems.

MR. LESSY: It's not a problem. I wanted to make clear on the record that I have two objections to this proposal.

The first objection that I have to this proposal is that I think it permits within the umbrella the admission of Contentions for discovery purposes which would not otherwise be admissible under 2.714.

JUDGE HOYT: I don't read 2.714 with that.

MR. LESSY: The second objection to this proposal that I have is that it will set a different standard for the admission of the discovery purposes of Emergency Planning Contentions than any other Contentions that we are handling. It lowers and sets a different standard for admission of Contentions.

JUDGE HOYT: I think you are right. I think it

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perhaps does at this point in time, but we haven't been able to arrive at any other method, Mr. Lessy, and we spent all day here arguing this through and we can't seem to do it.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I have to disagree with the Chairman, but we have to ask the parties to be more specific.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, we have asked Ms. Shotwell and we have got pretty much---

JUDGE LUEBKE: (Interrupting.) Well, then we can refuse.

MS. SHOTWELL: Well, if I may speak to that. haven't had a chance to yet go into the specificity that we provided in our Pleading. We have provided about 20 pages of specificity of our Contentions and we haven't discussed that today and perhaps you are not aware that it is there, but it is there, and one of the offers that we made to try and resolve this entire situation was the same one that Mr. Jordan has made of incorporating that spcificity into the actual Contention. What that doesn't relieve is the burden on the Board and all of the parties to argue at length about each one of those particular bases or specific bases that have been presented, and those involved fairly significant issues of interpretation of the Commission's Emergency Planning Regulations. I think that the proposal offered by Mr. Gad avoids all of the necessary review of those questions at this point in time, because I think it is not the most appropriate time to lengthy discussion on those kind of issues.

appropriate to the issue of Emergency Planning to be treated slightly differently than the others for the reason that if there is any issue that is of critical concern to the people living in Massachusetts, and I am sure New Hampshire as well, and if there is any issue that they can understand relative tothis proceeding it is the issue of Emergency Planning. If there is any issue that they need to see that there is thorough study and thorough discovery on, and thorough investigation by their representatives, it is the issue of Emergency Planning.

JUDGE PARIS: We recognize that. Mr. Gad, if I understood you correctly, you promised if we had Mr. Jordan come in with 16 specific Contentions tomorrow to give us two hours of argument?

MR. GAD: I did not mean to put a time limit on it, doctor. My recollection is that our original suggestion arose out of an attempt to decide whether or not each of those was in fact a properly admissible Contention. I recollect that it was our judgment that at least some of them probably were not, and it is my recollection that it would take a fair amount of time. I did not mean to be peremptory.

JUDGE PARIS: Okay, but in any case, if we went that route, we would be in for some additional argument about the-- whether those additional Contentions were litigable, right?

MR. GAD: I think it is necessarily true if they

are going to be proposed Contentions.

JUDGE PARIS: Can I assume from that that if Ms. Shotwell did the same thing with her 20 pages, he had 10 pages, of specificity we would in for maybe twice as much argument with respect to her specific Contentions.

MR. GAD: Actually, the Commonwealth's last two EPZ Contentions are no more specific than the one that we used taken the Contentions themselves. I am not sure it will be exactly twice as much. I do have a distinct recollection that a fair measure of, I think it is one of the subparts of the Contention No. 2, we do think is inappropriate, inadmissible.

Now, I guess I just want to say that frankly among the list of merits behand the proposal that is quickly being labelled the Applicant's Proposal, frankly, I don't think saving work is one of them.

JUDGE PARIS: Just the opposite.

MR. GAD: Well, I mean saving work today. I don't think that that is one of them at all. The reason why we advanced this was to avoid what we regarded as premature attempts to define something that we certainly would define itself a little bit more over tire.

I also want to disassociate myself from the justification Ms. Shotwell offered. That is not the reason why the proposal was urged when it was.

JUDGE HOYT: Mr. Lessy, unless there is some other

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way in which you can possibly suggest the Board handle it and reach a conclusion, I certainly don't want to preclude you. I realize the seriousness of your position and I understand it.

MR. LESSY: It is a policy decision made on behalf of the Licensing Board with respect to interpretation of important regulation. The more important the issue, in responding to Ms. Shotwell, the more important it is to proceed by the rules of cricket, and that is by requiring and complying with the Regulations in terms of bases of specificity.

I don't see any advantage, frankly, to proceeding in any other way from Emergency Planning Contentions than in a different way from how we proceed with respect to the other Contentions. Now, I realize that may require some argument, but I think additional time on behalf of the parties, but on the other hand, I think that in the long run it will save time because when we have specific Contentions, FEMA, and the NRC reviewers, and the others, have specific items that they can look to that they can consider in evaluating the plans, that they can consider with respect to preparing testimony, that they consider with respect to discovery. When you have a vague Contention such as this, in my view, the focus of the parties will be much broader and won't be as clear, and I am afraid that in the long run we set ourselves into a situation where we are not going to get joinder of issue, and frankly, I am concerned about that procedure. I want to give full consideration to what options the Staff has

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to expeditiously oppose this if that is the way we are going to go, because the experience in two other licensing proceedings has been that such a start is a nonstart. The parties don't know how to prepare the testimony; they don't know how to bring Contentions, and the testimony draws the Regulations and the NuRegs, and they are fairly undefined in this area -- it is just a guideline, sort of like the reasonable man theory -- and I am afraid that the only way to do it is on a Contention by Contention basis by the party. I don't see the long run merit of adopting special procedure with respect to this, and that is all I can say.

JUDGE LUEBKE: There was a day when we decided on Contentions on things called Petitions without oral argument.

MR. LESSY: Yes.

JUDGE LUEBKE: We received the Petitions on paper. We received the comments of other parties on paper. We sat down in a room and we made decisions and we wrote an order. Is there any reason why we couldn't do that now?

MR. LESSY: No.

JUDGE LUEBKE: In other words, you all resubmit more specific Contentions, as it has been said this afternoon for the parties to do, the parties that are here and the parties that are absent, and in the next week or two, we resolve this thing on paper.

MR. LESSY: The Board's order, I quess, would resolve

it.

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MR. JORDAN: I think in response to that, I think what you will get is not simply a restatement of the Contention, but another full round of argument. That is where we have been so far.

JUDGE LUEBKE: In which case, we might vote them down.

MR. JORDAN: Well, in our case we have been through it twice and I am not sure where we have gotten with it.

I would like to respond to what Mr. Lessy said about somehow the approach of the Board is an innovative concept being a change of the policy of the Commission, or some kind of intolerable disaster.

MR. LESSY: I don't like to be mischaracterized.

MR. JORDAN: I would like to finish.

JUDGE HOYT: Just a moment, Mr. Lessy. You will get your chance. Let Mr. Jordan finish his own.

MR. JORDAN: I have no wish to mischaracterize Mr. Lessy.

JUDGE HOYT: Just proceed, Mr. Jordan.

MR. JORDAN: However, I don not think that to adopt

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this approach is in any way a violation of a policy or the establishment of a new policy. What I gather, Mr. Lessy has referred a couple of times now to at least two cases in which a very similar approach has been taken with respect to Emergency Planning.

He appears to have been dissatisfied from the Staff's point of view with the way it went, but it seems to me that we know having happened before, and I don't know whether one of those decisions was the Catawba Decision that I referred to earlier, but indeed again the Catawba Decision, the one of June 30th that I have mentioned and there is a predesessor that actually adopted the contentions, that adopted a number of Contentions for the purpose of discovery. It is a standard practice of this Commission and these Boards to take those vague Contentions when there is a reasonable justification for doing so, having discovery, and that justification exists in this area of Emergency Planning for all of the reasons that have been laid out so far.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I heard this afternoon that the thing could be more specific.

JUDGE HOYT: Let Mr. Lessy defend his honor here.

MR. LESSY: I don't like to be misquoted. I am sure that Mr. Jordan didn't mean that.

JUDGE HOYT: I think it was unintentional.

MR. LESSY: All I said was that it seems that the Board is adopting a different standard for the admissibility of Emergency Planning Contentions for discovery purposes than any

other Contention in this proceeding heretofor.

Setting up to blaze new trails, Mr. Lessy, in regard to Emergency Contentions. It is merely because the Contentions and contentiousness of the group has dictated that the Board has to act in some fashion. This is the only way that apparently that we can resolve the conflict. It is not that we are trying to blaze new trails and give a different consideration to Contentions dealing with Emergency Planning; it is merely because of the status of the case at this point. The Contentions are on the Board and we have to act accordingly in some fashion.

I for one am very much in agreement with Mr. Gad.

I think we want to get the proceeding going, and the more you wait, the longer and more difficlut it is going to become.

Let's get something started and with the Rules as flexible as they are, we can change and alter and amend these, and revise, and all these other words you want to use and apply to it. When Contentions are in line and the case is in a more documented status---

MR. LESSY: (Interrupting.) How does what I suggested cause more delay?

JUDGE HOYT: I am not too certain the position that you would take, Mr. Lessy, pertaining to the Coalition's Contentions on Emergency Planning. It would then give us an opportunity to adjudicate the Contentions that the Sun Valley

Intervenor has proposed and the Contentions that the Commonwealth has proposed. They sent—The Commonwealth refuses to change the Contentions as they are now stated and make them more specific. They say they are already specific enough. Well, if we take then in a generalized fashion at this point in time, at least we got the Commonwealth in and they can participate in discovery.

MS. SHOTWELL: We have not refused to make Cortentions more specific. We agree between the two approaches that have been suggested that the more general approach in this particular case is more appropriate. But we have provided already, as I said, over 20 pages of specification in support of our Contentions and one of the things that we have offered to do is to incorporate those into the Contentions. That is one possible approach.

Now, I understand from Mr. Lessy that at least in certain respects, and certain minor aspects, I am not sure since I haven't heard yet, I believe he expects that more specificity would be required, even than what we have provided in our bases.

JUDGE HOYT: Is that right, Mr. Lessy?

MR. LESSY: That is right.. That is correct.

JUDGE HOYT: On the Commonwealth's?

MR. LESSY: Sun Valley, as I recall, had no bases for their Contentions. So we have objection to that. I don't want to rehash it ad infinitum, but it makes acceptable Contentions that might otherwise be unacceptable for purposes of discovery and to which there are outstanding objections by the Staff. That

is basically it, and I don't want to delay this Board and the parties.

JUDGE LUEBKE: And Mr. Jordan has offered to be more specific if I heard him right.

MR. JORDAN: What I offered to do was work with the language that we have to write those 16 items as Contentions that were originally drafted as something else.

Whether I would be able to put more specifics in them than are already in them tonight, that is something else.

JUDGE LUEBKE: But it is good because we can identify them by number then.

JUDGE PARIS: Is that the same thing you are offering, Ms. Shotwell?

MS. SHOTWELL: Yes. I can put them in another form, but I cannot without hearing any greater specificity that would be needed, I can't provide more than my complete document.

JUDGE PARIS: But you can organize them with numbers.

MS. SHOTWELL: Yes.

JUDGE LUEBKE: And that is what you want, Mr. Lessy?

MR. LESSY: Yes, sir

JUDGE LUEBKE: An your problem with that,

Mr. Gad?

MR. GAD: I have no problem with putting numbers on them, but if you call it a Contention that says, for instance, Emergency Plans are no good because they don't go out 12 and a

half miles, then I want to argue to you the law as to whether they have to go out 12 and a half miles. And that is just an example.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Doesn't that get to the merits of the case.

MR. GAD: That would begin to be the merits of the legal sufficiency of the particularized Contentions.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Relating to our Regulation of whether it's 12 and a half miles or ten miles or something else.

MR. GAD: That is why I didn't do it this morning on the question of who has got the burden, if you will, of at least saying something about the EPZ.

JUDGE LUEBKE: I just wanted to be sure it wasn't the merits.

JUDGE HOYT: Sir?

MR. PERLIS: May I ask Mr. Gad a question? I am wondering under his proposal if it is going to have to be specified at a later cate. If it is a Contention at some point that the EPZ go out 12 and a half miles instead of ten, sooner or later before litigation, the parties are going to argue and the Board will have to decide whether in fact that Contention is acceptable. We may be postponing this beyond tomorrow, but at some point before a Contention is accepted, even as I understand it under Mr. Gad's plan, that that argument is going to have to be made, in which case I am not sure what we are going to get by putting this off.

MR. GAD: I think Mr .---

JUDGE PARIS: (Interrupting.) Are you arguing against Mr. Lessy, Mr. Perlis?

MR. PERLIS: No, no.

MR. LESSY: He is saying way specify later, and I am saying you might as well do it while we are all here and ready to do it before we engage in free for all discovery.

MR. GAD: There is no question that we are going to have to do it later. The reasons, I hope, that some of the ambitions of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts about what law they would like to make in the case, and some of the ambitions about NECNP as to what issues they would like to make in the case will in fact prove to be futile and recognized by such by their authors, when we get to it in point of time, so that they amount of it may be less.

There is also some hope that between now and then this amorphous EPZ set of Regulations may in fact have had more meat put on them so that there will not be so many difficult questions as there are today. There may be some in this room who hope it to be appealed by then, but the point is that, yes, indeed, you are going to have cross some of these legal bridges at some point in time. It is possible that you will have to cross just as many of them and it is possible that everything will be just as hard to do then as it is now, and it is possible that intervening discovery will not have made any of them go away in

one fashion or another. Absolutely so; it is possible. The proposal was based on the assumption that it is unlikely then, and the effort will have reduced it in some fashion.

MR. LESSY: My point is that I just didn't see the time setting for the proposal.

in more agreement with you than you think. The thing that I was hanging my hat on is that I feel that discovery is going to change Contentions considerably. And perhaps that was a new experience, and maybe it is broad enough to indicate that it would not change it that much, and in fact it will not be that much saved. Maybe that is where you are going with it beyond where I had thought.

Well, it still leaves Mr. Jordan up in the air.

We indicated that we are not going to ask him to do the specifications, the specificity of those 16 Contentions, I believe it is, any further. If you feel like going through the exercise,

Mr. Jordan, perhaps it would be worthwhile in the morning.

MR. JORDAN: I must say to the Chair that I still strongly urge you to adopt what I call our proposal. I thought I had amended Applicant's proposal.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, let's just call it your proposal.

MR. JORDAN: Well, in any case, I like the proposal.

I think it is better for the hearing for all the reasons that

I have already said.

JUDGE HOYT: Ms. Shotwell, I take it you and Mr.

Edelman.

JUDGE LUEBKE: Would you be satisfied if the Board voted the whole thing down?

MR. JORDAN: Well, what I would say is that if the Board does not find that proposal to be acceptable, which I hope we can know in the morning, unless we know it now, then I think that Dr. Luebke's suggestion of another round of filings without any further oral argument is a good one. For one thing, we will take all day tomorrow these 16, those 4, these 3, his 2; and---

JUDGE HOYT: (Interrupting.) We had hoped to get this Prehearing Conference business out of the way with these two days.

JUDGE LUEBKE: You weren't alone.

JUDGE HOYT: I am standing here alone, it seems like by myself, but perhaps we will need to have another conference.

I don't know.

JUDGE LUEBKE: The written process is also worthwhile because it makes us sit down and think about it.

MR. JORDAN: I hope you mean that it makes us sit down and think about it some more.

JUDGE HOYT: Well, let's see what we can do with it in the morning. I think the Board will want to talk it over this evening, and I think that certainly we won't ask you to do anything unnecessarily overnight, Mr. Jordan. It doesn't mean that all is lost, Mr. Lessy. It merely means that if we have

to have more specificity that we will ask for it and give the parties ample time. But I would ask you to go ahead with what I requested of you earlier in the drafting of that.

MR. GAD: Yes, ma'm.

JUDGE HOYT: All right, is there anything else?

MR. GAD: I don't want to sound impertinent, but

I am going to suggest that we turn before we depart tonight to

NECNP 4 and 5. I think they can be disposed of relatively quickly.

JUDGE HOYT: Four and five what?

MR. GAD: Contentions. That way, perhaps, we will have NECNP behind us.

JUDGE HOYT: All right. I thought we had.

MR. BISBEE: I would like to clarify for the record that the State of New Hampshire would be included in any arrangements being discussed if it is turned down and ultimately ordered by the Board on the Emergency Planning issues.

JUDGE HOYT: Sure.

I think four and five is the ones that Mr. Gad said we had not covered. I have some that were refiled.

MR. GAD: They are in the second of two documents that were filed on the 17th of--

JUDGE HOYT: -- June.

MR. GAD: Yes. I apoligize for keeping you waiting, but these supplemental Contentions which be on Page 24; is that the one that you had in mind, sir of the Pleading of--I'm sorry.

Strike that.

MR. GAD: Madam Chairman, I have a separate document called NECNP Supplemental Contentions.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes.

MR. GAD: It is only about six or seven pages long.

JUDGE HOYT: Yes, thank you. That is on the first

page, then, of that, and this is Contention No. 4 of NECNP,

Blockage of Coolant Flow Through Safety Related Systems and

Components. All right, who has that one. Do you have that one?

Go ahead.

MS. CURRAN: I do. I won't go into a lengthy description of the Contention. The Staff has not objected to it, and therefore thinks it is timely filed under the Fed Reg. on this.

Our Contention is based on unpublished accidents.

The Applicant has objected to this Contention on the ground that the Atlantic Ocean is not open heat sink for the Seabrook Reactor. The Contention concerns a possible accumulation of marine organisms in cooling systems in the Plant which could cummulatively—the cooling systems are essential for safety.

I can only point of the Applicant's FSAR which in Section 9.2.1 says that the Atlantic Ocean is not only the ultimate heat sink for all operating and active heat loads, so as far as that objection to this Contention goes, it simply is not supported by the FSAR.

MR. GAD: The Contention, as I understand it, is

based on the assumption that the Atlantic Ocean and the cooling tunnels are a system essential to safety. As I understand it, NECNP will withdraw this Contention if they were satisfied that the cooling tunnels were not classified in this Plant as a system essential to safety.

May I ask if the Board would so inquire?

JUDGE HOYT: Can you respond to that?

MS. CURRAN: The answer to that is no. We base our Contention on the fact that cooling water which may be used to counter accident conditions may be drawn through the tunnels from the Atlantic Ocean. We think--Well, I guess we are saying that we think that the equipment is essential to safety.

MR. GAD: The problem I have with that, Madam
Chairman, is that to a certain it has already been litigated
as to whether or not those tunnels need be seismically qualified
or anything else. There is an ultimate heatsink at Seabrook
that is something other than the Atlantic Ocean. That is why
we built the cooling tower for.

It may very well be, in the unlikely event there is ever an accident there, that and I quote, the water that is used to cool during the accident sequence may come from the Atlantic Ocean, if it happens to be available. The point is it need not come from the Atlantic Ocean, and the unavailability of those tunnels on account of cockles and muscles alive are simply not a safety issue, and I guess I will have to find a

Citation for that. I thought it was well-known.

MS. CURRAN: If I may, your Honor, one of the notes that was raised in the Federal Register Notice about these six abnormal occurances that took place at a number of Plants was that it is not always recognizable when marine organisms are accumulated in the cooling system. Now, as far as I understand from the FSAR the cooling towers are not to be called upon unless a seismic event blocks 95 per cent of the cooling fluid in the tunnels, so this leaves a whole area of uses of those cooling tunnels for safety purposes, and regardless of whether there is seismic event, cooling fluid may be blocked to the safety systems by either an accumulation in those tunnels either getting into the heat exchangers or other phases of safety in the Plant, and that is all documented in the Federal Register Notice.

MR. GAD: Madam Chairman, the problem with this one is that, and this is why I asked the question at the outset, if someone is going to argue that these cooling tunnels are supposed to be safety related for one purpose, then they are safety related for all purposes. We have crossed that bridge a long time ago when we went and built them, and we put up other equipment particularly the cooling tower to deal with that problem. That covers this question of their getting blocked by organisms just as much as it covers the question of their getting blocked by an earthquake or submarine that turns down the wrong lane and gets stuck. I don't think Ms. Curran really meant what she said which was that

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we would only use the cooling tower if the tunnels were blocked by an earthquake and not by something else. That just doesn't make any sense.

The cooling tunnels are not a safety grade system.

Period. We submit that is the end of this Contention. As I say,

I thought that was widely understood. It was certainly litigated

in the Construction Permit Case, and I don't believe it is open

for litigation again today.

JUDGE HOYT: Okay. Anything else on that?

MR. LESSY: Staff has no objection to that.

JUDGE HOYT: I don't think we need to consideration of the justification of the late-filing. We are going to permit you to file this, at least. What we do with it will be done later.

On the fifth Contention, Ms. Curran, I believe the Commission has ruled on that and you are presently in Court, your client is presently in Court on that, Appellate Court on that, are you?

MS. CURRAN: This Contention is based on a recent decision from the District of Columbia Circuit invalidating the FC Table.

JUDGE HOYT: Oh, I am sorry. I thought that was a financial justification. You are right. Go ahead. Go ahead on this one. My colleagues have reminded me, Ms. Curran, that the Commission intends to make some policy statement. You don't have anything recent on that, do you?

MR. PERLIS: It is supposed to be coming out soon, but we don't have it.

JUDGE HOYT: This century. We want to take your argument on this regardless of what the policy statement will be.

MS. CURRAN: Our Contention here is that in light of the recent Circuit decision a new cost-benefit analysis is required under the National Environmental Policy Act for the Seabrook Reactor. It is particularly important for Unit II, which is only partially completed at this point, whose need for a cost-benefit analysis could very well be tilted by a new evaluation with different assumptions than those that were in the FC Table.

Now, both the Applicant and the Staff have suggested that the Board wait until the Commission has issued its policy statement before they accept this Contention. It is our position that rather the D.C. Circuit mandate has issued. It is a valid decision. It is an important decision. It is an enforceable decision and that our Contention is perfectly viable as it is.

MR. GAD: Madam Chairman, I am reasonably certain as of whenever it was that we were scurrying to leave Boston yesterday, the mandate was not issue out of the United States Court of Appeals.

JUDGE HOYT: That is my understanding, too, Mr. Gad, that has not issued out of the Court. When I left Washington, that was the latest thing that I had done.

MR. GAD: I can further advise the Board that the Department of Justice has notified the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that it has asked the Solicitor-General of the United States to file a Cert Petition in the S 3 case. And, of course, Seabrook was not involved in the D.C. Circuit case. There is a separate action now pending a separate appeal, now pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on Seabrook and S 3, so we are all of those reasons we think this thing is a little premature.

I have about a half dozen more reasons, if you would like to hear them.

JUDGE HOYT: No, I think that we are all aware of what most of those are, Mr. Gad. I don't mean to cut you off, but the hour is getting late.

Is there anything else on that?

MS. CURRAN: If I may respond. We believe that the existance of a Petition for Cert could not in any way vitiate the strength of the D.C. Circuit Decision, and that that is a valid precedent for this particular case, and we consider that the D.C. Circuit Decision is res judicata as far as the First Circuit goes.

MR. JORDAN: Let me just add that with respect to the mandate that it was my impression that it had been issued, but perhaps it had not. But what had happened, I do know, is that the Petition for Rehearing had been denied and there is a

pending Motion, as I understand it, for a Stay of Mandate. I do not believe that that Motion has been granted. My impression was that the mandate would issue when the rehearing was denied. That could be incorrect. But at any rate there is a pending Motion.

JUDGE HOYT: The only thing I can add to that is that it was my understanding that the mandate had not issued. So, at this point in time, that is all I know. Sir.

MR. PERLIS: Let me just add, regardless of what is going on in the Federal Courts, the Commission is planning on doing something in the very near future, so that whatever the Courts determine, this Board is guided by the Commission's policy statement when it comes out, and I think it would be best if we deferred action until the Commission's statement of policy.

MR. LESSY: I saw the matter on the Commission's agenda for today. Probably it was scratched.

JUDGE PARIS: If we had been home in time for the six o'clock news.

MS. CURRAN: May I add one more thing?

JUDGE HOYT: Surely.

MS. CURRAN: We would request that our Contention be lodged until the Commission acts upon the D.C. Circuit Decision and possibly the affects of the majority of the Commission.

JUDGE HOYT: It is on the agenda of the Contentions to be considered by this Board. Anything else for this evening?

If not, let us adjourn for the moment and we are off the record at this point.

(Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6:55 p.m.)

## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
in the matt	of New Hampshire Date of Proceeding:
	Docket Number: 443-01 and 444-01
	Place of Proceeding: Portsmouth, New Hampshire
were held a thereof for	as herein appears, and that this is the original transcrip the file of the Commission.
	Janet M. Hills
	Official Reporter (Typed)
	Official Reporter (Typed)

Official Reporter (Signature)