U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

/0/1/ /V/A/N/A/S/1/ (2) /0/0/-/0/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/ (3) /4/1/1/1/1/ (4) / / / (5)

LICENSEE CODE | LICENSE NUMBER | LICENSE TYPE | CAT

/0/1/ REPORT SOURCE /L/ (6) /0/5/0/0/0/3/3/8/ (7) /0/2/1/8/8/3/ (8) /0/3/1/0/8/3/ (9)

DOCKET NUMBER | EVENT DATE | REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

/0/2/ / On February 18, 1983, with Unit 1 in Cold Shutdown, indications of cavitation /

/0/3/ / were observed on "B" Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump and later on "A" RHR Pump. /

/0/4/ / The "B" pump was started and returned to service in approximately 5 minutes. /

/0/5/ / "A" RHR Pump operability was subsequently verified. Since the RCS temperature /

/0/6/ / did not substantially increase during the event the public health and safety /

/0/7/ / were not affected. This event is contrary to T.S. 3.7.9.2 and reportable /

/0/8/ / pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. /

SYSTEM CODE | CAUSE CODE | CAUSE SUBCODE | COMPONENT CODE | COMP. SUBCODE | VALVE SUBCODE

/0/9/ /C/F/ (11) /X/ (12) /Z/ (13) /P/U/M/P/X/X/ (14) /B/ (15) /Z/ (16)

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER (17) | EVENT YEAR | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | OCCURRENCE CODE | REPORT TYPE | REVISION NO.

/8/3/ /-/ /0/0/9/ /\/ /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/

ACTION TAKEN | FUTURE ACTION | EFFECT ON PLANT | SHUTDOWN METHOD | HOURS | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

/X/ (18) /Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) /Z/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) /Y/ (23) /N/ (24) /N/ (25) /1/0/7/5/ (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

/1/0/ / The cause of the incident is not known. Subsequent operation after the event has/

/1/1/ / been without incident. With both RHR Pumps secured the containment operator /

/1/2/ / vented each pump. However, no air was observed. The "B" RHR Pump was restarted /

/1/3/ / vented (no air observed) and restored to service. The "A" Pump was subsequently /

/1/4/ / restored to service. /

FACILITY STATUS | %POWER | OTHER STATUS (30) | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

/1/5/ /G/ (28) /0/0/0/ (29) / NA / /B/ (31) / Operator Observation /

ACTIVITY RELEASED | CONTENT OF RELEASE | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

/1/6/ /Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA /

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER | TYPE | DESCRIPTION (39)

/1/7/ /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA /

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER | DESCRIPTION (41)

/1/8/ /0/0/0/ (40) / NA /

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

TYPE | DESCRIPTION

/1/9/ /Z/ (42) / NA /

PUBLICITY

ISSUED | DESCRIPTION (45) | NRC USE ONLY

/2/0/ /N/ (44) / NA / / / / / / / / / / / / /

NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station, Unit No. 1 Attachment: Page 1 of 2
Docket No. 50-338
Report No. LER 83-009/03L-0

Description of Event

On February 18, 1983, with Unit 1 in Cold Shutdown, the Control Room operator received the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) low flow alarm. The "B" RHR Pump amps were observed fluctuating at 30 ± 3 (normal is 35 amps) and RHR flow was near 2000 GPM (normal is between 3100-4000 GPM.) The "B" RHR Pump was secured and "A" RHR Pump was started. However, the "A" Pump amps only reached 30 ± 3 amps and RHR flow reached approximately 2000 GPM and was fluctuating. Consequently, the "A" RHR pump was secured and an operator in the containment was dispatched to vent each pump.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The operability of the RHR system ensures that Residual Heat Removal capability is available below 350°F following plant shutdown. Since the RHR Pumps were only shutdown for approximately 5 minutes and RCS temperature did not appreciably increase the public health and safety were not affected.

Cause of Event

The cause of the event could not be determined. Plant conditions at the time of the occurrence were as follows: The pressurizer was at 88% and being filled via charging pump seal injection; RHR letdown to the Chemical Volume Control System was isolated; one Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve was blocked open and vented to the Pressurizer Relief Tank which was at a pressure of 9 psig. No other abnormal conditions existed in the RCS or other adjacent systems.

Immediate Corrective Action

After the pumps were secured the containment operator attempted to vent each pump. No air was observed while venting either pump. The "B" RHR Pump was again started ("B" Pump reached the proper current and flow values) and vented. Again, no air was vented off the pump. Subsequent operation of the "B" RHR Pump and later, of the "A" RHR Pump was uneventful.

Scheduled Corrective Action

The operation of the RHR pumps are being monitored for proper operation. Further engineering studies and/or tests will be conducted to determine the cause of this event.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further action is required.

Generic Implications

No generic implications have been found at this time.