

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | 0 | H | D | B | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 58
LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 58

CON'T
0 1 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 3 | 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80
REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | (NP-33-83-12) On 2/7/83 at 1455 hours during the performance of the Miscellaneous
0 3 | Valves Quarterly Test ST 5099.08, containment isolation valve CV5010D failed to close
0 4 | electrically. The station entered the action statement of Technical Specification
0 5 | 3.6.3.1. The penetration was isolated by manually closing CV5010D. There was no
0 6 | danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. An alternate
0 7 | sample lineup was made for the containment hydrogen analyzer.

0 8 | _____ 80

0 9 | S | D | 11 | E | 12 | G | 13 | V | A | L | V | O | P | 14 | A | 15 | Z | 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
SYSTEM CODE CAUSE CODE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE COMP SUBCODE VALVE SUBCODE
17 | LER RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 3 | 21 22 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 23 24 26 | / | 0 | 3 | 28 29 | L | 30 | / | 31 | 0 | 32
EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE REVISION NO.
ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPRD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A | 18 | X | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | Y | 23 | Y | 24 | N | 25 | L | 2 | 0 | 0 | 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The apparent cause of this occurrence was the failure of the torque switch close
1 1 | contacts. The torque switch was replaced with a new, heavier duty switch and set as
1 2 | per drawing E-15. The valve was tested per Surveillance Test ST 5064.01 and returned
1 3 | to service on 2/9/83, removing the station from the action statement. All similar
1 4 | torque switches will be replaced with the new stype switch.

1 5 | E | 28 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 29 | NA | 30 | B | 31 | Surveillance Test ST 5099.08
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80
FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION

1 6 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | NA | 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80
ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE

1 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | 39
7 8 9 11 12 13 80
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION

1 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | 41
7 8 9 11 12 80
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION

1 9 | Z | 42 | NA | 43
7 8 9 11 12 80
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE DESCRIPTION

2 0 | N | 44 | NA | 45
7 8 9 10 80
ISSUED DESCRIPTION PUBLICITY
8303170526 830308
PDR ADOCK 05000346
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

U.S. G.P.O. 917-926

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-83-12

DATE OF EVENT: February 7, 1983

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Failure of containment isolation valve
CV5010D

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power
(MWT) = 2752.5 and Load (Gross MWE) = 916

Description of Occurrence: On February 7, 1983 at 1455 hours during the performance of the Miscellaneous Valves Quarterly Test ST 5099.08, containment isolation valve CV5010D failed to close electrically. This placed the station in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.6.3.1. The penetration was isolated by manually closing and deenergizing CV5010D.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause of the occurrence was the failure of the torque switch close contacts.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The penetration was isolated and an alternate sample lineup was made for the containment hydrogen analyzer.

Corrective Action: Maintenance Work Order 83-1839 was issued to investigate the control scheme. It was determined that the close contacts on the torque switch would not close. The torque switch was replaced with a new, heavier duty switch and set per drawing E-15. The valve was tested per Surveillance Test ST 5064.01 and returned to service on February 9, 1983 removing the station from the action statement. All similar torque switches will be replaced with the new style switch when maintenance is performed on a valve operator per Maintenance Procedure MP 1410.32.

Failure Data: There have been no previously reported failures of CV5010D to close electrically due to a faulty torque switch. However, previous failures of this type torque switch manufactured by Limitorque have been reported in Licensee Event Reports NP-33-77-83, NP-33-78-33 (78-027), NP-33-79-33 (79-030), NP-33-79-85 (79-073), NP-33-80-18 (80-014), and NP-33-81-16 (81-017).

LER #83-009