LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: |__|__|__|__|__|__| (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

| 0 | 1 | | S | C | H | B | R | 2 | (2) | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | (3) | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | (4) | | | (5) |

7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

| 0 | 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | (6) | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 1 | (7) | 0 | 2 | 0 | 9 | 8 | 2 | (8) | | | | | | | (9) |

7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

| 0 | 2 | On February 9, 1982, it was determined that the pressurization of the BIT header at |

| 0 | 3 | 0030 hours on November 25, 1981, was reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.2.a.5. With the |

| 0 | 4 | plant in cold shutdown, the BIT header pressure indicator PI-934 was observed reading |

| 0 | 5 | above scale on the 0-2000 psig indicator. Maximum pressure was determined to be 2125 |

| 0 | 6 | psig. An evaluation determined that this pressurization did not degrade the integrity |

| 0 | 7 | of the system. Since the plant was in cold shutdown, there was no threat to the public |

| 0 | 8 | health and safety. |

7 8 9 80

		SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0	9	P C (11)	E (12)	B (13)	V A L V E X (14)	X (15)	B (16)
7 8		9 10	11	12	13 18	19	20

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.	OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE	REVISION NO.
	8 2	|__| 0 0 3	|/| 0 1	T |__|	0
	21 22	23 24 26	27 28 29	30 31	32

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
E (18)	G (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	N (24)	A (25)	C 7 1 0 (26)
33	34	35	36	37 40	41	42	43	44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

| 1 | 0 | The pressurization was caused by the BIT strip heater pressurizing the tank, the |

| 1 | 1 | operator not relieving the pressure, and the BIT safety valve SI-857A not relieving |

| 1 | 2 | at 1750 psig. The BIT header pressure annunciator procedure has been revised, and |

| 1 | 3 | the BIT safety valve SI-857A reset to 1750 psig. An engineering review was initiated |

| 1 | 4 | and is currently in progress to determine if additional corrective action is required. |

7 8 9 80

		FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1	5	G (28)	0 0 0 (29)	N/A	A (31)	Operator Observation
7 8	9		10 12 13	44	45 46	80

		ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1	6	Z (33)	Z (34)	N/A	N/A
7 8	9	10	11	44	45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

		NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1	7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	N/A
7 8	9	11	12 13	80

PERSONNEL INJURIES

		NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1	8	0 0 0 (40)	N/A
7 8	9	11 12	80

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

		TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1	9	Z (42)	N/A
7 8	9	10	80

PUBLICITY

		ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)		NRC USE ONLY
2	0	N (44)	N/A		|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|
7 8				68 69	80

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GPO 917-926

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
FOR
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 82-003

1. Cause Description and Analysis

On November 25, 1981, at 0030 hours with the plant at cold shutdown the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) header pressure indicator (PI-934) was observed reading above scale on the 0-2000 psig indicator. Maximum header pressure was determined to be 2125 psig. The BIT header pressure annunciator (A2-19) alarms at 200 psig. However, because the BIT is a strip heated tank it was common for the annunciator to alarm and the operator to vent the BIT back to the Boric Acid (BA) tanks. With many of the annunciators normally lit during cold shutdown, the importance of this particular alarm was overlooked for the time it took the BIT header pressure to reach 2125 psig. This excessive pressure was caused by the BIT strip heaters heating the BIT, the operator not relieving the pressure, and the BIT safety valve SI-857A failing to relieve at its 1750 psig setpoint.

An evaluation of the pressurization concluded that the excessive pressure did not degrade the integrity of the system.

At the time of the event, it was determined that since the plant was in cold shutdown the event was not reportable. However, on February 9, 1982, this event was reviewed again, and it was determined that it should have been reported.

2. Immediate Corrective Action

The BIT header pressure was vented back to the BA tanks. The set pressure for safety valve SI-857A had apparently drifted upward as it was bench tested to left at ∿N2000 psig. SI-857A was reset to lift at 1750 psig and was re-installed.

3. Corrective Action To Prevent Recurrence

Annunciator Procedure A2-19 was revised. "BIT header activation" was added to the causes for the alarm, and "vent BIT as necessary through CVC-841A and B (to BA tanks)" was added to the action items. An engineering review has been initiated and is currently in progress to determine if additional corrective actions are required. If any additional actions are identified as a result of this review, a supplement to this LER will be submitted.