



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III
801 WARRENVILLE ROAD
LISLE, ILLINOIS 60532-4351

JAN 07 1993

Docket No. 50-373
License No. NPF-11
NOED No. 94-4-001

Commonwealth Edison Company
ATTN: Mr. Warren P. Murphy
LaSalle Site Vice President
LaSalle Nuclear Station
2605 North 21st Road
Marseilles, IL 61341

SUBJECT: NOTICE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION FOR COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
REGARDING LASALLE NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1

Dear Mr. Murphy:

By letter dated January 5, 1994, you requested the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to exercise its discretion not to enforce compliance with the required actions in Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3.7. Your staff informed the NRC on January 5, 1994, at 11:00 a.m. (CST) that the LaSalle Nuclear Station, Unit 1, would not be in compliance with TS 3.1.3.7 with regard to the operability of the Control Rod Position Indication System (RPIS). Specifically, your letter stated that at 11:07 p.m. on January 4, 1994, LaSalle Unit 1 entered TS 3.1.3.7 Action Statement due to inoperability of RPIS. Limiting Condition For Operation (LCO) action statement 3.1.3.7 a.4 requires that if one or more control rod position indicators become inoperable and within one hour, action statements 3.1.3.7 a.1, 2, or 3 can not be met, the Unit must be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours. You requested enforcement discretion for a period of 12 hours because the time limits of the TS action statement did not allow sufficient time to repair and test the RPIS.

You provided as justification for continued operation that the control rod scram function was not affected by the loss of RPIS, control rod positions were verified by alternate means on January 5, 1994, at approximately 08:30 a.m., and any significant control rod movement will cause a power change which can be detected via the Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs), Feedwater flow, and Main Generator Output. Further, you stated that if a single control rod drifts, it can not pass the tip of any other rod due to the current rod positions; all control rods are fully withdrawn except for five control rods which are fully inserted. The control rods that are fully inserted are high power rods, which will cause a power change if a drift occurs and these rods were electrically and hydraulically isolated. In addition, you identified compensatory measures to include: power will not be changed during the time RPIS is inoperable, control rod positions are being verified every 8 hours using a multimeter, Core Thermal Power and Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) readings are being monitored approximately every 15 minutes; the APRMs,

26007

9405310142 930107
PDR ADOCK 05000373
P PDR


VRC FILE CENTER COPY

DF03

Feedwater flow, and Main Generator Output are being monitored continuously, no scram functional testing (half-scrams) will be performed during the time RPIS is inoperable, and reactor operators have been directed to manually scram the reactor if any changes in monitored parameters indicate possible control rod drifts.

Based on our review of your justification, including the compensatory measures identified above, the staff has agreed to grant enforcement discretion for a six hour period to allow the licensee to make preparations to scram the reactor in an orderly manner and bring Unit 1 to HOT SHUTDOWN. Because the only method available to achieve HOT SHUTDOWN is by scrambling the unit from power, we are concerned with the condition of the 1A recirculation pump seal, the potentially degraded condition of various Unit 1 ITE and EPA breakers, and the SRV's which are potentially outside their required setpoint and what effect scrambling the reactor will have on this equipment. The six hour discretion period is to allow the licensee to assess the NRC staff's concerns and to provide actions to minimize the consequences of the shutdown on equipment listed above and ensure the unit is brought to HOT SHUTDOWN in an orderly manner. The staff has concluded that this course of action involves the lowest safety impact to the reactor, and we are clearly satisfied that this course of action is warranted from a public health and safety perspective. Just prior to verbally granting this enforcement discretion, you informed us that repairs of the RPIS were completed at 11:32 a.m. (CST) on January 5, 1994. Therefore, this letter documents our verbal granting on January 5, 1994, of our intention to exercise discretion not to enforce compliance with TS 3.1.3.7 for a period up to six hours starting January 5, 1994 at 12:00 noon (CST), to allow for testing of the RPIS and declaring the RPIS operable or bringing Unit 1 to HOT SHUTDOWN in an orderly manner. However, we will consider enforcement action, as appropriate, for the conditions that led to the need for this exercise of enforcement discretion.

Sincerely,



Edward G. Greenman, Director
Division of Reactor Projects

See Attached Distribution

JAN 07 1993

Distribution

cc:

L.O. DelGeorge, Vice President,
Nuclear Oversight and Regulatory Services
D.J. Ray, Station Manager
J. Lockwood, Regulatory Assurance
Supervisor
D. Farrar, Nuclear Regulatory
Services Manager
OC/LFDCB
Resident Inspectors LaSalle
Dresden, Quad Cities
Richard Hubbard
J. W. McCaffrey, Chief, Public
Utilities Division
Licensing Project Manager, NRR
Robert Newmann, Office of Public
Counsel
State Liaison Officer
Chairman, Illinois Commerce
Commission
LaSalle, LPM, NRR
L. J. Callan, ADPR/NRR
W. T. Russell, ADT/NRR
J. W. Roe, DRPW/NRR
J. A. Zwolinski, ADR3/NRR
J. Lieberman, OE
M. C. Thadani, Technical Assistant, Division of
Reactor Projects - I/II, NRR
PDR