

DUKE POWER COMPANY
POWER BUILDING
422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM O. PARKER, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
STEAM PRODUCTION

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December 8, 1981

TELEPHONE: AREA 704
373-4083

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Re: Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket No. 50-270

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report RO-270/81-22. This report is submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(2), which concerns an operation subject to a limiting condition for operation which was less conservative than the least conservative aspect of the limiting condition for operation established in the Technical Specifications, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public. The cause of this occurrence is currently under investigation and will be provided in a revision to this report by December 22, 1981.

Very truly yours,

William O. Parker, Jr.
William O. Parker, Jr. *By [Signature]*

JFK/php
Attachment

cc: Director
Office of Management & Program Analysis
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Records Center
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1820 Water Place
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. W. T. Orders
NRC Resident Inspector
Oconee Nuclear Station



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DUKE POWER COMPANY
OCONEE UNITS 2 AND 3

Report Number: RO-270/81-19

Report Date: December 8, 1981

Occurrence Date: November 24, 1981

Facility: Oconee Units 2 and 3, Seneca, South Carolina

Identification of Occurrence: Loss of Fire Suppression System on CT-5 Transformer

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Oconee 2 75% FP
Oconee 3 100% FP

Description of Occurrence: On November 24, 1981, Construction personnel severed a two-inch line which branched off the water header supplying the CT-5 transformer fire suppression system. To stop the leak, valve HPSW-27 was shut, isolating the sprinkler system for the CT-5 transformer. A fire watch and backup fire suppression equipment were not provided within one hour as required by Technical Specification 3.17.3.1.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence is currently under investigation and will be provided in a revision to this report by December 22, 1981.

Analysis of Occurrence: Transformer CT-5 provides power source redundancy for the on-site power sources. It is only required to be operable during extended outages of one Keowee unit or simultaneous outages of both Keowee units. Additionally, the loss of the fire suppression system does not affect the transformer operability; thus, it is considered that the health and safety of the public were not affected by this event.

Corrective Action: Oconee 2 and 3 commenced shutdowns. A backup water supply and firewatches were established, and the unit shutdowns were secured. The leak was repaired and the fire suppression system returned to service.