

MISSISSIPPI POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Helping Build Mississippi

BOX 1640, JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

JAMES P. McGAUGHY, JR. ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT

31 pecember A14, 1981

Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, N.W. Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attention: Mr. T. P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SUBJECT: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-416/417 File 0260/15525/15526

PRD-81/47, Interim Report No. 1, Pipe Support Spring Settings

AECM-81/490

On November 13, 1981, Mississippi Power & Light Company notified Mr. P. A. Taylor, of your office, of a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) construction site. The deficiency concerns actual cold and hot settings on MS-3201 and MS-3401 springs. The actual travel range of the springs differs from that shown in the Bergen-Patterson catalog.

Our investigation into the deficiency has not been completed. However, we have determined that it is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e) as it could adversely affect the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant. We have not determined reportability under the provisions of 10CFR21.

Details are contained in our attached Interim Report. We expect to submit a Final Report by January 15, 1982.

Yours truly.

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J. P. McGaughy, Jr.

KDS:dr ATTACHMENT

cc: See page 2

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cc: Mr. N. L. Stampley Mr. R. B. McGehee Mr. T. B. Conner

> Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. G. B. Taylor South Miss. Electric Power Association P. O. Box 1589 Hattiesburg, MS 39401

INTERIM REPORT NO. 1 FOR PRD-81/47

I. Description of the Deficiency

The actual cold and hot settings on all MS-3201 and MS-3401 Bergen-Patterson springs cannot be accurately achieved because the actual travel range of the springs is differenct than that shown in the Bergen-Patterson catalog and load capacity data sheets.

These type springs have been installed in both "Q" and BOP systems. The springs are used to support the dead weight load of the pipe and to allow for thermal movement in the upward/downward direction.

All deficient springs have not been identified at this time. It is presently known that the deficiency applies to Unit 1 and Common.

Our Architect/Engineer has evaluated the deficiency and has determined that ten (10) springs would be overstressed in the upset condition if they had remained incorrectly set. This overstressed condition could eventually result in piping failure creating a small break accident inside the drywell. Therefore, had the condition remained uncorrected, it could have adversely affected the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant and is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). Reportability under 10CFR21 has not been determined at this time.

We have not determined at this time if the deficiency affects the NSSS vendor.

II. Approach to Resolution of the Problem

The cause and extent of the deficiency have not been determined at this time. Therefore, corrective actions and actions to preclude recurrence cannot be formulated.

III. Status of Proposed Resolution

The effect on safety of plant operations has been determined. Our Architect/Engineer is presently in the process of determining cause and extent, corrective actions, and actions to prevent recurrence.

IV. Reason Why a Final Report Will be Delayed

Corrective actions and actions to prevent recurrence cannot be formulated until cause and extent of the deficiency are determined by our Architect/ Engineer.

V. Date When Final Report Will be Submitted

A Final Report will be submitted by January 15, 1982.