



December 14, 1981
L-81-525

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Re: RII:JPO
50-389
GENERAL ELECTRIC HEA RELAYS - MALFORMED
TORSION SPRINGS 10 CFR 50.55 (e) Report 50-389/81-005



Ref: 1) R.E. Uhrig to J.P. O'Reilly, L-81-476 dated November 12, 1981.

On October 13, 1981, Region II was notified that General Electric supplied HEA relays which could fail to operate when the trip solenoid was energized. Failure to operate may have been the result of malformed torsion springs incorporated in the relay.

An Interim Report was transmitted to your office via the Reference 1 letter.

Attached is the Final Report for your use.

Very truly yours,

Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems and Technology

Attachment

REU/DME/mm

cc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555
(w/attachment)
Harold F. Reis, Esquire (w/o attachment)

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I. Summary

General Electric (GE) received reports that some HEA relays failed to operate when the trip solenoid was energized. GE's analysis of the problem has led them to conclude that the failures to operate may have been the result of malformed torsion springs incorporated in the relay.

GE advised the NRC about this concern pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 21. Per the requirements of 10CFR50.55 (e), the event was considered potentially reportable and per telecon, FP&L (E Sherman) notified the NRC (K Landis) on October 13, 1981. Upon completion of our evaluation we deem this concern as reportable and a final report is being submitted to advise the NRC of the description of the deficiency and the corrective actions to be taken.

II. Description

In a letter dated September 1, 1981, GE informed FP&L that they had received reports that some HEA relays failed to operate when the trip solenoid was energized. GE's analysis indicated that failure to operate may have been the result of malformed torsion springs incorporated in the relay. Further analysis, indicated that the HEA relays with malformed torsion springs were manufactured during the period from May 1979 through December 1980.

We have identified one Class 1E HEA relay which is covered by the concern identified in the GE's September 1, 1981 letter. The above relay is utilized in the 4.16KV Switchgear 2A3 (auxiliary bus differential lockout relay) which was manufactured by Westinghouse.

III. Corrective Actions

The Class 1E HEA relay indicated in paragraph II will be replaced by a new relay with a Certificate of Conformance by the General Electric Company.

IV. Safety Implications

The installation of a HEA relay with malformed torsion springs in 4.16KV Switchgear 2A3 could have adversely affected the safety of plant operations, if it were to have remained uncorrected. If this relay failed to operate certain safety related equipment required for plant safety may not have been available. This was considered a deviation from equipment performance specifications and therefore considered reportable.

V. Conclusions

Corrective action as indicated in Paragraph III is being undertaken. This closes out this item for St. Lucie Unit 2 as regards to 10CFR50.55 (e) requirements.