P.O. BOX 529100 MIAMI, FL 33152

FPL
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

December 17, 1981
L-81-528

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Re: RII:JPO
50-389
Indication In End Prep Of Valve
10 CFR 50.55(e) Report 50-389/81-006

Florida Power & Light Company on November 17, 1981 notified the Office of Inspection and Enforcement of a potential 10 CFR 50.55(e) incident regarding indications in the end prep of the valve I-MV-08-1A. We have evaluated this situation and deem that this incident is non reportable.

The valve I-MV-08-1A is in the bypass line around the main steam isolation valve, and is supplied by Rockwell International. A review of the vendor supplied documentation package established that the required ultrasonic and liquid penetrant examinations were performed with no rejectable indications. However during field installation the stem of the valve was improperly oriented. The valve had already been partially welded into the line when the incorrect installation was identified. In accordance with site construction procedures, a weld repair report (WRR No. 4553) was issued. According to this repair procedure the partial weld was cut out, weld ends reground to the original configuration, and the weld ends were liquid penetrant examined prior to re-installation.

The liquid penetrant test identified the existence of four rejectionable indications (3 linear and one rounded) ranging in size from about 1/8 inch to 1/2 inch in length. These indications were found on both the inside and outside of the end prep, two at the 12 o'clock position approximately 3/16 inch from the end and the other two at the 6 o'clock position approximately 1/8 inch from the valve end. All three linear indications were oriented circumferentially. The location, nature, and orientation of the liquid penetrant examination, in conjunction with the previous inspection and fabrication history of the valve, leads to the conclusion that the discontinuities were in the weld metal, which was not completely removed when the valve was cut out of the line.

Based on the rejectable liquid penetrant examination, a non-conformance report was issued. The valve end was subsequently repaired by grinding out the indications and re-examined by liquid penetrant method and is being re-welded to the

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pipe with no further problem anticipated.

Our justification for deeming this above incident as non reportable is based on the fact that although the affected valve is in the bypass line around the main steam safety valve and is required to perform as a containment isolation valve, the deficiency was detected following the normal post weld test procedures and did not require any extensive evaluation, extensive repair or extensive redesign.

All pertinent documentation regarding this concern will be maintained at the site and will be available for your inspection.

Very truly yours,

Robert E. Uhrig

Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems & Technology

REU/DME/ah

cc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Harold F. Reis, Esquire