


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NRC REGION  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA



Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

December 17, 1981  
PM-81-1046


PLANT E. I. HATCH  
Licensee Event Report  
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region II  
Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303



ATTENTION: Mr. James P. O'Reilly

Pursuant to section 6.9.1.8.i of Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications, please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report # 50-321/1981-129.

  
J. M. Henry  
Plant Manager

MM/CLC/hh

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LER #: 50-321/1981-129  
Licensee: Georgia Power Company  
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch  
Docket #: 50-321

Narrative Report  
for LER 50-321/1981-129

On December 1, 1981, while Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in steady state power operation, the site discovered that the torus to reactor building vacuum relief isolation valve 2T48-F310 failed to close after normal drywell venting was complete. This event could possibly result in a loss of primary containment (HNP-2 Tech Spec 3.6.1.1) (refer to Deviation Report No. 2-81-217). While performing work per MR 2-81-4588 (due to 2T48-F310 failing to close), it was discovered on December 3, 1981, that the reactor building to torus pressure sensing lines on Unit 2 had low sections which would allow water to accumulate and which could possibly prevent the reactor building to torus vacuum breakers from operating. Additional investigation indicated that the same situation existed on Unit 1 (refer to Deviation Reports No. 1-81-286 and 2-81-220). Neither plant operation nor the health or safety of the public was affected. This is a non-repetitive event. (The event of December 1, 1981, would have required a thirty-day report, however, it is being included with the events of December which require a 14-day report. Thus, the event date for the LER is 12-03-81).

The cause of this event has been attributed to error in the installation of the reactor building to torus pressure sensing lines. For an immediate solution, Standing Order No. 81-34 has been issued to purge (with air) the pressure sensing lines on a daily basis, thus removing any accumulated water. Action is underway to arrange rerouting of the sensing lines to permit the proper slope of the sensing lines and to allow any condensed moisture to drain into the torus. An update report is to follow.