

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | M | D | C | C | N | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | _____ | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
01 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 9
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
02 | During normal operation at 1030, Plant Management was informed that gen-
03 | eration of a Chemical Volume and Control Isolation Signal (CVCIS) may be
04 | prohibited by a single failure since the two (of 4) sensor channels lo-
05 | cated in the letdown heat exchanger room may not see a pressure increase
06 | caused by a letdown line break. Therefore, the CVCIS system was declared
07 | inoperable (T.S. 3.3.2.1). At 1122, one sensor channel was tripped, re-
08 | storing CVCIS to operability; terminating the event. No similar events.
7 8 9 80

09 | I | B | 11 | B | 12 | A | 13 | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | 14 | Z | 15 | Z | 16
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
17 | 8 | 2 | 21 | 22 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 24 | 26 | / | 27 | 0 | 1 | 28 | 29 | X | 30 | 31 | 1 | 32
18 | X | 19 | X | 20 | Z | 21 | Z | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | Y | 24 | N | 25 | Z | 26 | Z | 9 | 9 | 9 | 26
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
10 | Subsequent to the corrective actions stated in Rev. 0 of this LER the
11 | system was restored to operable status by plant modifications. A pene-
12 | tration was established to provide pressure relief between the two rooms
13 | and a metal door was installed on the exit from the letdown heat ex-
14 | changer room thus ensuring the pressure sensors would operate per design.
7 8 9 80

15 | E | 28 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 29 | N/A | 30 | D | 31 | A/E Notification | 32
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

16 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | N/A | 35 | N/A | 36
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | N/A | 39
7 8 9 11 12 13 80

18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | N/A | 41
7 8 9 11 12 80

19 | Z | 42 | N/A | 43
7 8 9 10 80

20 | N | 44 | N/A | 45
7 8 9 10 80

8303160274 830303
PDR ADOCK 05000317
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

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LER NO. 82-70
DOCKET NO. 50-317
LICENSE NO. DPR-53
EVENT DATE 11/18/82
REPORT DATE 02/09/83
ATTACHMENT

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (CONT'D)

At 1030 on November 18, 1982, while operating with Unit 1 at 100% power, the Plant Management became aware of a possible safety concern involving the ability of the Chemical and Volume Control Isolation Signal (CVCIS) to perform its intended safety function. The safety concern surfaced as a result of a review requested of the A/E regarding design documentation associated with the CVCIS. The A/E could not confirm that a trip signal could be generated with the system configured as it was at the time of the event.

Failure of the CVCIS system to perform its intended function could result in exceeding design stress values for the structural steel and concrete walls and floors of one room in the auxiliary building in the event of a high energy line break in the room.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (CONT'D)

The CVCIS portion of ESFAS system consists of pressure detectors, control logic and isolation valves located in the Chemical and Volume Control system letdown line. Prior to recent plant modifications, two adjacent rooms were connected by a pipe chase which was closed by a metal plate. Each room contains two pressure transmitters to detect a pressure rise which may occur for a rupture in the letdown line which runs through both rooms. The actuation logic for the CVCIS system is designed so that 2 out of 4 sensors must actuate to provide letdown system isolation.

One of the rooms (west piping penetration area) contains 2 pressure sensors and is isolated from adjacent spaces (with the exception of the letdown heat exchanger room) by metal doors. The other room (letdown heat exchanger room) contains the other 2 pressure sensors and, prior to recent modifications, communicated with adjacent spaces via a heavy gauge wire mesh door.

Subsequent plant modifications have returned the system to a fully operable status. These modifications included providing a penetration in the common wall between the two rooms thus allowing one room to vent to the other and the addition of a metal door in place of the heavy gauge mesh door on the letdown heat exchanger room. These modifications in conjunction with restoration of all pressure sensor channels to operable status place the CVCIS portion of ESFAS into a configuration consistent with the design bases of the FSAR. The A/E is currently reevaluating the design and applicability of this system with the intent of eventually deleting the system from the plant design.