

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK  
INDIAN POINT NO. 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT  
P. O. BOX 215 BUCHANAN, N. Y. 10511  
TELEPHONE: 914-739-8200



March 7, 1983  
IPJAS-562

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes  
Regional Administrator - Region I  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pa. 19406

Subject: I.E. Bulletin No. 83-01  
Failure of Reactor Trip Breakers  
(Westinghouse DB-50) To Open On  
Automatic Trip Signal

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter confirms that the Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant does use the subject breakers in the Reactor Protection System. Attachment A provides the written reply requested by Action Item 4 of the subject bulletin.

Very truly yours,

*John C. Brons*  
J. C. Brons  
Resident Manager

JCB:ms

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO  
BEFORE ME THIS 7<sup>th</sup> DAY  
OF March, 1983.

IP3 Resident Inspector's Office

*Ruthanne B. Bowman*  
RUTHANNE B. BOWMAN  
Notary Public, State of New York  
No. 4651904, Westchester County  
Commission Expires March 30, 1983

## ATTACHMENT A

### Action Item 1

Perform surveillance test of undervoltage trip function independent of the shunt trip within 24 hours of receipt of this Bulletin unless equivalent testing has been performed within 5 days. Those plants for which on-line testability is not provided may complete this item before resuming operation or if currently operating, at the next plant shutdown.

### Response

The Indian Point 3 facility is currently in an extended maintenance outage. Modification work currently in progress to the Reactor Protection System prevents the Authority from performing the requested surveillance test. Due to the nature of the subject bulletin the Authority feels it is worth noting that the purpose of the modification work is to reduce unnecessary cycling of the reactor trip breakers during periodic testing and to increase the reliability of the undervoltage trip relays.

Upon completion of these modifications, and prior to returning to service, the requested surveillance test will be performed in conjunction with the required post modification testing. At that time the Authority will document the test results and report it to the NRC Resident Inspector.

### Action Item 2

Review the maintenance program for conformance to recommended W program (attachment) including frequency and lubricant applied to trip mechanism. Verify actual implementation of the W program. If maintenance including lubrication does not conform, initiate such maintenance within 5 days of receipt of this bulletin or provide an alternate maintenance program. Repeat the testing required in Item 1 prior to declaring the breaker OPERABLE.

### Response

Preventive maintenance for the reactor trip breakers is performed under a general maintenance procedure which includes other breakers of a comparable size. The portion of the maintenance procedure applicable to DB-50 breakers has been reviewed and found to be in conformance with the Westinghouse guidelines with the exception of frequency and minor details (e.g. the procedure specified cleaning the breaker after blow down by wiping instead of vacuuming and described other points of lubrication), which the Authority performs on a refueling outage interval, based on operational experience. Based on this determination no maintenance has been performed as a result of this bulletin.

Although the applicable portion of the Authority's general maintenance procedure was found to be adequate, a specific procedure will be written for the reactor trip breakers. This new procedure will be performed during the current outage, after the completion of the modifications but prior to the testing described in the response to Action Item 1.

### Action Item 3

Notify all licensed operators of the failure-to-trip event which occurred at Salem. Review the appropriate emergency operating procedures for the event of failure-to-trip with each operator upon his arrival on-shift.

### Response

Provisions are in place to notify all licensed operators, operators in training and Shift Technical Advisors of the Salem event and to bring to their attention the appropriate failure-to-trip emergency procedure. The Authority will ensure completion of these actions for licensed operators prior to the plant being brought above cold shutdown. In addition, the Authority has always included the failure-to-trip scenario in its' annual simulator training sessions.