



GPU Nuclear
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Writer's Direct Dial Number:

March 4, 1983

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Docket No. 50-219
Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-05/03L

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report (LER) to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-05/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications. We realize this LER is being submitted beyond the time limitation specified in Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b. The cause of the delay is attributed to administrative delay within the department responsible for the investigation of the event described herein and the preparation of this LER.

Very truly yours,

Peter B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek

PBF:jal
Enclosures

cc: Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director (3)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

NRC Resident Inspector
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
Forked River, NJ 08731

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/83-05/03L

Report Date

March 4, 1983

Occurrence Date

January 26, 1983

Identification of Occurrence

Containment Spray System high drywell pressure switches IP15A, IP15B, and IP15C tripped at a value greater than that specified in the Technical Specifications, Table 3.1.1, Item E.1.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b(2).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power. Plant parameters at the time of occurrence were:

Mode Switch	Run
Thermal Power	917 MWt
Generator Load	244 MWe
Reactor Coolant Temp.	537°F

Description of Occurrence

On Wednesday, January 26, 1983, while performing the "Containment Spray System Automatic Actuation Test," procedure 607.3.002, the IP15A, IP15B, and IP15C trip points were found to be less conservative than those specified in the Technical Specifications. Surveillance testing on the High Drywell Pressure Switches for the Containment Spray System revealed the following data:

<u>Pressure Switch Designation</u>	<u>Desired Setpoint</u>	<u>As Found</u>	<u>As Left</u>
IP15A	2.0 psig	2.15 psig	1.84 psig
IP15B	2.0 psig	2.24 psig	1.84 psig
IP15C	2.0 psig	2.10 psig	1.80 psig
IP15D	2.0 psig	1.91 psig	1.91 psig

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

The cause of the occurrence has not yet been determined. After reviewing previous surveillance data sheets from the past 12 surveillances, it has been determined that the setpoint drift found in this surveillance is not indicative of previous setpoint drift. Further investigation will be required to determine the cause of this unusually high instrument drift.

Analysis of Occurrence

The Containment Spray System consists of two independent cooling loops, each capable of removing fission product decay heat from the primary containment after a postulated loss of cooling accident. The containment spray system automatically actuates upon receipt of two high drywell pressure and two reactor low-low water level signals in either of two trip systems.

This function would have been delayed by approximately 0.1 seconds from the start of a Design Basis Accident. Additionally, since the reactor low-low water level setpoint is not expected until approximately 4 seconds from the start of the design basis accident, the delay in actuating the high drywell pressure switches would have no effect on initiating the containment spray system.

The safety significance of this event is considered minimal since the high drywell pressure switches would have actuated but at a slightly higher pressure than the required setpoint.

Corrective Action

Pressure switches IP15A, IP15B, and IP15C were adjusted to trip within the Technical Specification limit of 2.0 psig. Investigation is continuing to determine the cause of the instrument setpoint drift. Additionally, procedure acceptance criteria will be reviewed to possibly accommodate problems encountered from instrument repeatability.

Failure Data

Manufacturer:	ITT Barton
Model:	228A Indicating Pressure Switch
Range:	0-10 psig