LILENSEE EVENT REFURT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK: 0 1 1 LICENSEE CODE TNCS E 0 5 0 0 0 0 2 8 1 0 0 2 1 4 8 3 E 0 3 0 4 8 3 9 REPORT L 0 1 SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSECUENCES (10) With the unit at 190% power, the trip valve, TV-DA-200B, failed to close when the 0 2 Containment Sump Pump stopped. This is contrary to T.S.3.8.A.1 and reportable per 0 3 T.S.6.6.2.b.(2'. The redundant valve was closed, therefore, the health and safety 0 4 of the public vere not affected. 015 0 6 0 7 3 C COMP CODE CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUECODE S | D | (: B 13 V A L V E X 14 E (12) F (15) D (15 0 9 12 13 18 OCCURRENCE REVISION SEQUENTIAL REPOR CODE EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. NO. LER/RO 0 3 18 13 10 16 NUMBER 0 n 25 31 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED SUPPLIER PORM SUS EFFE: TAKEN ACTION METHOD HOURS 2 18) Z YIC Z 12 1(21) 0 0 0 0 0 Ý 24 19 (20) (25 14 19 A 76 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The cause of this event was a defective SOV. The valve was replaced and returned 110 to service in accordance with PT-18.6. 111 112 .13 114 . METHOD OF OTHER STATUS 30 FACILIT DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) & POWER E 128 1 0 0 3 31 Operator Observation 15 10 CONTENT TVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) RELEASED OF RELEASE 3 N/A Z 33 Z 1 6 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) 0 0 1 0 1 37 Z 32 : 7 -PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTON NUMBER 0 10 10 @ X/A 18 12 DSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY B303160165 B30304 PDR ADOCK 05000281 FDR 20 (1) DESCRIPTION YPE S Z 42 19 10 10 PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION 45 N 1111111111 210 ... 80 5 62 (804) 357-3184 NAME DE POEPLEES\_ J. L. Wilson PHONE ..

ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO: 50-281 REPORT NO: 83-006/03L-0 EVENT DATE: 02-14-83

TITLE OF THE EVENT: TV-DA-200B FAILED TO CLOSE

#### 1. Description of the Event

With the unit at 100 percent power, the operator observed that trip valve, TV-DA-200B, failed to close when the containment sump pump stopped. Inoperability of an automatic containment isolation valve is contrary to Technical Specification 3.8.A.l and reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.b.(2).

# 2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

The design basis for the containment isolation system is that during accident conditions at least two barriers exist between the atmosphere outside the containment structure and (1) the atmosphere inside the containment (2) the reactor coolant system.

Therefore failure of one valve or barrier will not prevent isolation of the containment.

The redundant isolation valve, TV-DA-200A, was closed. Therefore an isolation barrier existed throughout this event and the health and safety of the public were not affected.

## 3. Cause

The solenoid operated valve (SOV) that controls the air to TV-DA-200B was found to be binding.

# 4. Immediate Corrective Action

The air supply to the trip valve was isolated. The valve then closed.

## 5. Subsequent Corrective Action

The solenoid operated valve was replaced and the valve returned to service in accordance with PT-18.6.

#### 6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

None required. This SOV cycles each time the containment Sump Pump cycles and therefore it's normal life is much shorter than the other trip valves.

### 7. Generic Implications

None.