



EDISON DRIVE  
AUGUSTA, MAINE 04336  
(207) 623-3521

February 17, 1983  
MN-83-30

JHG-83-34

Region I  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Attention: Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator

References: (a) License No. DPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309)  
(b) USNRC Letter to MYPACo, dated January 3, 1983, Inspection  
No. 82-25

Subject: Response to Inspection No. 82-25, Health Physics Program

Dear Sir:

This letter transmits Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company's response to Inspection Report No. 82-25. This response addresses the specific violation identified, and provides corrective actions completed and planned to reduce the probability of recurrences.

ITEM OF NON-COMPLIANCE - APPENDIX A

Contrary to 10 CFR 20.201, "Surveys", on November 12, 1982, the licensee did not make a survey for a specific work area for individuals working in accordance with Radiation Work Permit (RWP 82-11-1085). Such survey was reasonable under the circumstances, to evaluate the extent of the radiation hazard that was present.

RESPONSE

This event resulted in an unplanned exposure to one member of the work party covered by the RWP. The unplanned exposure was the result of a communications breakdown between the work party, the technician issuing the RWP and the technicians performing job surveys and providing HP coverage.

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The RWP was requested for "Removing the freeze seal from RC-27." The technician issuing the RWP thought the freeze seal was in the same location as the RC-27 valve for which he had adequate surveys (40 - 200 mr/hr).

The working party leader did not know or failed to inform the technician that the freeze seal was in a different location. The technicians covering work in the area of RC-27 knew the dose rates on the freeze seal but did not turn this information over to their relief.

The newly assigned technicians were not aware of the radiation levels near the freeze seal and assumed (without a verifying survey) the RWP information was correct. After the pocket chamber results indicated an unexpected condition, the freeze seal was surveyed and the RWP was changed to reflect actual conditions.

This situation was caused by a communications problem which occurred during the outage. The following interim corrective steps were taken to achieve full compliance for Radiation Control Area work in the containment:

- ° All technicians issuing RWP's were instructed to determine exact work locations and to get detailed work location surveys before issuing any RWP.
- ° Technicians covering jobs in the Radiation Control Areas were instructed to verify RWP survey data prior to allowing work to begin and to provide detailed turnover information to their relief.

Following these instructions there were no further instances of unplanned exposure due to inadequate surveys.

The following steps are planned to reduce the probability of recurrences:

1. The interim steps described above will be formalized in Refueling Outage Procedure 9.1.11 by April 1, 1983.


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We trust that this response is satisfactory. Should you have further questions, please feel free to contact us.

Very truly yours,

MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY

  
John H. Garrity, Senior Director  
Nuclear Engineering and Licensing

JHG:pjp

cc: Mr. Robert A. Clark  
Mr. Paul A. Swetland