


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J. T. Beckham, Jr.
Vice President - Nuclear
Hatch Project



May 17, 1994

Docket No. 50-366

HL-4590

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 2
Special Report 2-94-001
Fire Rated Assembly Inoperable
for Greater Than 14 Days

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications and Fire Hazards Analysis, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed special report concerning an event where a fire rated assembly was inoperable for longer than 14 days as the result of planned activities.

If you have any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

J. T. Beckham, Jr.

JKB/cr

Enclosure: Special Report 2-94-001

cc: Georgia Power Company
Mr. H. L. Sumner, General Manager - Nuclear Plant
NORMS

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
Mr. K. Jabbour, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
Mr. S. D. Ebnetter, Regional Administrator
Mr. L. D. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch

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Enclosure

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 2
Special Report 2-94-001
Fire Rated Assembly Inoperable for Greater Than 14 Days

A. Requirement for Report

This report is required by the Plant Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.2, and the Plant Hatch Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, Section 1.1.1. Specifically, Technical Specifications Section 6.9.2 states:

Special Reports for fire protection equipment operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted, as required, by the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and its Appendix B requirements.

FHA Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, states:

Fire-rated assemblies and sealing devices in fire-rated assembly penetrations separating fire areas or separating portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area shall be "OPERABLE."

Furthermore, Action Statement (a) of Appendix B, Section 1.1.1, allows the fire rated assembly and/or sealing devices to be inoperable provided, within 1 hour a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly(s) and/or sealing device(s) is established, or fire detectors are verified operable on at least one side of the inoperable barrier and an hourly fire watch patrol is established. Action statement (b) states that, if the barrier is not returned to operable status within 14 days, a special report must be submitted to the NRC within the next 30 days. On April 20, 1994, fire door 2L48-2R23 had been inoperable for greater than 14 days.

B. Unit Status at Time of Event

On April 20, 1994, Unit 2 was in shutdown for a planned refueling outage.

C. Description of Event

This report describes an event in which a fire rated assembly was breached in a controlled manner to support Unit 2 outage work and, as a result, was required to remain inoperable for more than 14 days. On March 17, 1994 at 1513 CDT, fire door 2L48-2R23 was blocked open, Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 2-94-108 was entered, and an hourly fire watch was established as required by the

FHA, Appendix B, Section 1.1.1., action statement (a). On March 25, 1994, off load of the nuclear fuel from the reactor vessel was completed and fire door 2L48-2R23 was no longer required to be operable. On April 14, 1994, fuel reload was initiated. On April 20, 1994, fire door 2L42-2R23 had remained inoperable for longer than 14 days. The door was open from March 17, 1994, until April 26, 1994; however, fuel was not in the vessel from March 25, 1994, until April 14, 1994, during which time door operability was not required.

D. Cause of the Event

The fire rated assembly was breached in a controlled manner to support scheduled refueling outage work. Fire door 2L48-2R23 serves as an entrance between the Turbine Building and Reactor Building 130 foot elevation and as such is located in a high personnel traffic area. Fire door 2L48-2R23 was blocked open in a controlled manner during the Unit 2 refueling outage.

E. Analysis of Event

In this event, Operations personnel declared fire door 2L48-2R23 inoperable on March 17, 1994. Appropriate fire detectors were verified to be operable and an hourly fire watch patrol was established as required by the FHA, Appendix B, Section 1.1.1., action statement (a).

Since all actions required by Appendix B of the FHA were taken immediately upon declaring the door inoperable and remain in effect, it is concluded this event did not adversely affect nuclear safety.

F. Corrective Actions

Fire door 2L48-2R23 was declared inoperable. LCO 2-94-108 was initiated, appropriate fire detectors were verified to be operable, and an hourly fire watch was established as required by the FHA, Appendix B, Section 1.1.1., action statement (a). These actions were taken on March 17, 1994 when the door was blocked open in a controlled manner.

On April 26, 1994, fire door 2L48-2R23 was restored to operable status and LCO 2-94-108 was terminated.