United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRC Classification Guide for Safeguards Information

DIVISION OF SECURITY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

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CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION

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CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION

INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

To provide security classification guidance for the safeguarding of information about certain nuclear material or facilities.

B. SCOPE

This guide provides for the classification of information concerning: (1) reactor and research facilities which have nonself-protecting formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM); (2) shipment activities involving nonself-protecting formula quantities of SSNM; and (3) fuel cycle facilities authorized to possess or use nonself-protecting formula quantities of SSNM.

For convenience, this guide divides safeguards information into the following five categories: (1) material control and accountability; (2) physical protection at fixed sites; (3) in-transit protection of SSNM; (4) safeguards analyses and plans; and (5) safeguards research, development, test, and evaluation.

C. BASIC POLICY

The principle which underlies the policy for classification of safeguards information is to provide the maximum possible information to the public, while at the same time protecting against unauthorized disclosure of information which could cause damage to the national security. Such information includes:

- Information from SSNM accounting and control systems that could:

 (a) facilitate assistance to, frustrate or delay the detection of, or the response to, the attempted theft or diversion of formula quantities of nonself-protecting SSNM;
 (b) enhance the credibility or frequency of nuclear threats;
- (2) Information that could facilitate carrying out a successful sabotage mission against any facility or activity involving formula quantities of nonself-protecting CSNM;
- (3) Information that could facilitate carrying out a successful theft or diversion of formula quantities of nonself-protecting SSNM.

Safeguards information placed officially in the public domain or obtainable by visual access from uncontrolled areas is unclassified.

Retention of safeguards information is subject to authorized records disposition schedules.

This guide is approved for use by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), NRC Luntractors, licensees, and other personnel in classifying safeguards information.

D. USE OF THIS GUIDE

- 1. Information designated as either "CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET" in this guide will be classified accordingly by users of the guide. This guide constitutes a record of an original classification decision by the approving authority and directs the derivative classification of information which the guide indicates is classified. Any questions concerning the applicability of this guide should be directed to the Director, Division of Security, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 20555.
- 2. Certain topics indicate that information to which they apply may be either CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET. Application of these topics requires informed judgment based on knowledge of the overall context of the information. Any questions concerning the applicability of this guide should be directed to the Director, Division of Security, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 20555.
- In some cases, more detailed supplementary guides may be required. Proposals for such guides should be forwarded to the Director, Division of Security, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 20555.
- 4. Compilations of unclassified information are generally considered to be unclassified unless some additional factor is added in the process of compilation. For example: (a) the fact that the information is complete for its intended purposes may be classified; or (b) the fact that the compiled information represents an official evaluation may be classified.
- Care should be taken that the declassification of a document does not violate provisions of the guide when evaluated in connection with information already unclassified.
- If classified information can be discerned from the use, presence, or capabilities of any equipment, the equipment will be classified at the level of and as long as classified information can be discerned from the equipment.

E. DEFINITIONS USED IN THE GUIDE

1. Formula Quantity of Strategic Special Nuclear Material (SSNM) -(sometimes referred to as: formula grams, trigger quantity, strategic quantity, threshold quantity, and significant quantity), a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material is 5,000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams = (gradient contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams Pu).

- 12. Special Nuclear Material (SNM) (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope-233 or in the isotope-235, and any other material which the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of Section 51 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include source material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing but does not include source material.
- Strategic Special Nuclear Material (SSNM) uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium.

F. DECLASSIFICATION - E.O. 12356

Restricted Data is exempted from automatic declassification and does not require declassification markings. National Security Information identified in this guide will be marked for declassification or review for declassification as specified by the applicable topic of this guide. This guide has been approved by an original Top Secret classification authority.

G. ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used in this guide:

S	. *.	Secret	
С	-	Confidential	
U	-	Unclassified	
RD		Restricted Data	
NSI		National Security Information	
OADR		Originating Agency's Determination Required	
SSNM	-	Strategic Special Nuclear Material	

CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE

100 MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY

- 110 SSNM QUANTITIES
 - 111 Total quantities of SSNM at any given time by total plant.
 - 112 Total quantities at any given time of SSNM by designated vault and vault-type storage areas.

NOTE: Inventories of SSNM for classified DOE programs (e.g., production, naval reactors) will be classified in accordance with DOE guidance applicable to those programs.

120 SSNM MEASUREMENT DATA

- 121 Measurement accuracy required by unclassified regulations (e.g., 10 CFR Part 70).
- 122 Measurement uncertainties associated with bulk and analytical measurements that are typical for the nuclear industry provided information classified by other topics in this guide is not revealed.
- 123 The Limit of Error on Inventory Difference (LEID) for individual material balance period or on a cumulative period basis.

130 MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING PLANS

131 Plans submitted in accordance with 10 CFR Part 70 which contain details of the licensee plan for the material control and accounting programs.

These include frequency and schedule of SSNM inventories, and measurement control, including equipment, methodology, quality assurance, destructive and nondestructive analyses, audit and organization. CNSI -Declassify On: OADR

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CNSI -Declassify On: OADR

140 QUANTITATIVE SSNM BALANCE DATA

The classification guidance in these topics applies to SSNM balance information not classified by other guides, e.g., production or naval reactors; classified topics in such guides take precedence where applicable.

- 141 Receipts.
- 142 Shipments.

But see Topic 312.

143 Other removals: measured discards, decay losses, and losses due to fission and transmutation and ID.

143.1 Total "other removals."

143.2 Itemized "other removals" for a reporting period.

U when ID is unclassified. See Topic 144.

144 Inventory Difference in any amount.

- 150 OTHER ITEMS PERTAINING TO MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING
 - 151 Any computer output displays or printo which provide itemized "other removals" or inventory difference data.

200 PHYSICAL PROTECTION AT FIXED SITES

201 The physical security plan for a nuclear facility or site. Plans may be SNSI in accordance with other applicable classification guidance.

Secret if significant vulnerability is revealed, e.g., degree of seriousness, or explicit means of penetrating existing security defenses are disclosed. See, for example, Section 400 of this guide. U

U.

U-CNSI - See declassification note for Topic 144

CNSI*

CNSI - See 143.2 or Topic 144 for applicable doclassification marking

C-SNSI -Declassify On: OADR

^{*}May be declassified after a period of 6 months from date of inventory assessment, provided (a) any resulting investigation is completed, and (b) the initial classification determination was not due to extenuating circumstances. ID data remains classified for the duration of an investigation.

210 SITE AND FACILITY DESCRIPTION

- 211 Only the general layout that can be seen from uncontrolled areas and which does not identify a vulnerability. This general layout may include: buildings, parking areas, access roads, fences, outside storage areas, natural terrain, landscaped areas, tunnels, storm and waste sewers, water intake and discharge conduits, culverts, creeks, canals, and any other physical characteristics such as features of buildings, barriers, fences, guard stations, etc.
- 212 Site-specific "as built" drawings, diagrams, sketches, maps, etc., showing identity together with location and/or description of facility features of special interest because of their relationship to the physica' security system, that if revealed could facilitate theft or diversion of SSNM or sabotage of a facility.

But see Topics 211, 213, and 221.

213 Scope, conceptual design, and construction drawings showing construction characteristics of buildings and associated fencing, electrical and other utility system layouts.

But see Topic 212.

214 Government sponsored or required evaluations of site-specific construction features or physical security barriers revealing vulnerabilities or limitations which could facilitate penetrating or bypassing physical security barriers.

Secret if significant vulnerability, e.g., degree of seriousness, or explicit means of defeating these systems is revealed.

220 INTRUSION AND DETECTION ALARM SYSTEMS

Includes Manually Activated Duress Alarms.

221 Scope, conceptual design, and construction plan.

CNSI -Declassify On: OADR

CNSI = Declassify On: OADR

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C-SNSI -Declassify On: OADR

See Topic 222.

- 222 As installed details of alarms system layout, location, and electrical design that if disclosed could facilitate gaining unauthorized access to SSNM, nuclear facilities, or classified information.
- 223 Vendor hardware performance specifications. Specification: for vendor custom design equipment may be classified.
- 224 Informin, including the effect of specific modif. a ons, revealing in-place operating capabite that if disclosed facilitates bypassing such systems.
- 225 Security-related vulnerability or weaknesses.

Secret if significant vulnerability is revealed, e.g., degree of seriousness or explicit means of drieating these systems.

- 225.1 Vulnerability information directly available from vendor specifications.
- 226 Sensitivity levels or limits to which installed systems have been set.

230 PLANT RADIO AND TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

231 Government sponsored or required evaluations of site-specific existing plant radio and telephone communications systems revealing vulnerabilities or limitations in operating capability or procedures.

Secret if significant vulnerability is revealed, e.g., degree of seriousness or explicit means of defeating these systems.

240 TAMPER INDICATING SEALS

241 Information revealing ways of successfully circumventing seals which are used to protect SSNM.

Secret if explicit means of successfully bypassing seals are disclosed.

242 Methodology of manufacture.

243 Methodology of application.

CNSI = Declassify On: OADR

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250 KEYS, LOCKS, AND COMBINATIONS

	251	Generi used.	c types and models of keys and locks	U		
	252	coding	nical key design, e.g., key cut depths systems which are used to protect of a security interest.	C-SNSI		
			fy consistent with the level and dura- f classification of information being ted.	May be RD		
	253	Combin	ations and codes.	C-SNS1		
			fy consistent with the level and dura- f classification of information being ted.	May be RD		
	254		pecific evaluation of lock or door g systems that reveals vulnerability.	C-SNSI - Declassify On: OADR		
			if explicit means of surreptitiously g access are disclosed.			
260	THREAT RESPONSE CAPABILITY AND PROCEDURES					
	See Plan		ction 400, Safeguards Analyses and			
	261	Number	of security personnel.			
		261.1	Information available by visual access from uncontrolled areas to routine guard patrol activities.	U		
		261.2	Total security personnel available onsite at a particular time for a site or particular activity including number and type of weapons, other than standard sidearm.	CNSI - Declassify On: OADR		
		261.3	Guard force deployment plan or scheme.	CNSI - Declassify On: OADR		
		261.4	Size and armament of in-house reserve force.	CNS1 - Declassify On: UALR		

262 Contingency plans.

	°62.1	Response to a specific threat, e.g., disposition, armament or planned response of security forces including numtor of personnel responding to specific incidents.	C-SNSI Declassify On: OADR
		Secret when revealing increased degree of vulnerability of a site as a result of a specific action.	
	262.2	Arrangements with local, state, and federal law enforcement units.	U
		See Topic 262.1.	
	262.3	Numerical threat level for contingency planning.	CNSI - Declassify On: OADR
263	Respon	se time of guards and backup force.	
	263.1	Response time required.	U+CNSI * Declassify On: OADR
		Unclassified if stated in unclassified NRC manual chapters or regulations.	
	263.2	Actual response time capabilities.	C-SNS1 - Declassify On: OADR
		Secret when revealing increased degree of vulnerability of a site as a result of a specific action.	
264	Securi	ty patrols.	
	264.1	Procedures, schedules, and frequency for routine security tours.	CNSI - Declassify On: OADR
	264.2	Actual prearranged schedule including the specific times and locations.	CNSI - Declassify On: OADR
PERS AND/	SONAL VE	RIFICATION (EMERGENCY OR DURESS) CODES THEY ARE USED	CNSI - Declassify On: OADR

280 AUDIT AND ASSESSMENT INFORMATION

- 281 General methods for auditing of physical security measures or assessing of these measures.
- 282 General procedures for routine inspection and testing of equipment, e.g., barriers, alarms, communications.
- 283 Government sponsored or required evaluations of security systems revealing vulnerabilities or limitations in physical security measures, operating procedures or personnel capabilities.

Secret if significant vulnerabilities are revealed, e.g., degree of seriousness or explicit means of penetrating security defenses.

290 MISCELLANEOUS

291 Detailed reports of attempted or successful penetration of nuclear facilities and attempted or successful diversion or theft of special nuclear material within or from a nuclear facility.

Reports of facts of attempted or successful penetration or diversions, without further elaboration, are unclassified.

Information covered by this topic is declassified when operationally necessary to repel attacks or recover stolen SSNM.

- 292 Reports of other unusual or abnormal occurrences or incidents, the release of which would not reveal security-related vulnerabilities.
- 293 Administrative control procedures.
- 294 Complete emergency plans such as fire, safety, and radiological emergency plans provided they do not reveal information classified by other topics of this guide.

300 IN-TRANSIT PROTECTION OF SSNM

Topics in this section apply only to shipments of formula or greater quantities of SSNM.

Certain classification guidance in the area of in-transit protection is classified.

On: OADR

Declassify

C-SNSI -

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CNSI -Declassify On: OADR

- 301 Fact that SSNM shipments are protected by various unspecified means.
- 302 Information regarding operations, shipments, routine and protection available as a result of uncontrolled visual access to the shipment when it is in progress.
- 303 Fact of use of any shipment mode, e.g., air, rail, truck, ship, etc.
- 310 SHIPMENT CONTENTS

The classification guidance in this section applies to shipment composition information not classified by other guides, e.g., those relating to production, weapons, or naval reactors; classified topics in such guides take precedence where applicable.

Shipment contents information for a specific shipment is declassified when it is determined to be necessary to release such information in the event of an operational exigency, e.g., vehicle accident.

- 311 Fact that a specific shipment contains radioactive material.
 - 311.1 Any further elaboration as to identity or composition of the material, e.g., fact that it is SSNM, fact that it is PU or U.

312 Quantity of SSNM in a particular shipment.

CNSI - May be declassified after arrival of shipment at final destination provided neither classified shipping patterns nor other information classified by this guide is revealed.

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CNSI - May be declassified after arrival of shipment at final destination provided neither classified shipping patterns nor other information classified by this guide is revealed. 333 Operating procedures.

	333.1	Base Station Operating Procedures.	CNSI - Classify Dn: OADR
	333.2	General Mobile Operating Procedures.	U
		But see Topics 333.3 and 334.	
	333.3	Appendices to General Operating Procedures that concern the security/safeguards of shipments.	CNSI* - Classify On: OADR
33	4 Detail	ed description of:	
	334.1	Operation and Equipment.	CNSI* - Declassify On: OADR
	334,2	Checkpoint System.	CNSI* - Declassify On: OADR
	334.3	Authentication System.	CNSI* - Declassify On: OADR
33	5 Emerge	ncy Response Procedures	CNSI* ~ Declassify On: OADR
33	6 Authen	ticator Lists	CNSI* - Declassify On: OADR (see Topic 336.2)
	336.1	Before use.	
	336.2	After use, if information relevant to subsequent use is not revealed.	Ų
33	7 Maps s shipme	howing in-transit locations of nts.	CNSI - Maps become declassified after removal of in-transit locations.

^{*}Individual items of information not revealing (1) significant information concerning the (a) security protection, (b) the disposition, armament, or planned response of security forces or (2) information classified under other topics of this guide or other applicable guides should be submitted through channels to the NRC Division of Security, for possible declassification.

423.2	Threat levels against which NRC licensees intend to protect in the	C+SNS1 * Declassify
	future.	On: OADR

423.3 External and internal threat levels C~SNS1 which are used as part of a sensitivity Declassify analysis of a security system to On: OADR threats in that system.

500 SAFEGUARDS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION (RDT&E)

- 510 GENERIC FUNCTIONS, GENERAL PERFORMANCE CHARACTER-ISTICS, AND GENERAL APPLICATIONS OF MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT, PROCESSES, AND CONCEPTUAL STUDIES IN RDT&E FOR NEW OR IMPROVED SAFEGUARDS, PROVIDED INFORMATION CLASSIFIED BY OTHER TOPICS IN THIS GUIDE IS NOT REVEALED.
- 520 CONCEPTUAL STUDIES FOR A GENERIC FACILITY OR SITE. THE OBJECTIVES, CAPABILITIES, AND APPLICATIONS FOR AN ENTIRE SITE SECURITY SYSTEM.
- 530 EVALUATIONS OF COMMERCIAL OR COMMERCIALLY DEVELOPED U EQUIPMENT WHICH HAS UNDERGONE OR IS UNDERGOING LABORATORY TESTING.

But see Topics 214, 222, 224, 231, 241, 410.

- 540 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES OR VULNERABILI-TIES OF SYSTEMS, SUBSYSTEMS, MATERIALS, EQUIPMENT, OR PROCESSES IN RDT&E FOR NEW OR IMPROVED SAFEGUARDS.
 - 541 Information revealing a vulnerability which would significantly assist the bypass or defeat of the integrated safeguards system actually installed (or planned to be installed) at a specific facility or in the transportation system.
 - 542 Information about a characteristic or feature that meets all of the following criteria: (1) it would significantly delay the bypass or defeat of an operational application, and (2) its presence in an operational configuration and application would not be reasonably expected or predicted.
- 550 HARDWARE IS CLASSIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INFORMATION IT REVEALS.

CNSI -Declassify On: OADR

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CNS1 -Declassify On: OADR