

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1)

0 1 | V | A | S | P | S | 1 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

9 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE JO CAT 56

CONT

0 1 | L | 6 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 8 | 2 | 9

60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 12 | With the unit at full power, the control room operator observed that the

0 13 | Containment Spray Chemical Addition Tank level had decreased to 96%, which is 22

0 14 | gallons less than the Tech. Spec. 3.4.A.4 low limit. This event is reportable as

0 15 | per Tech. Spec. 6.6.2.b.(2). Since the tank level was restored within the time

0 16 | period specified by Tech. Spec. 3.0.1, the health and safety of the public would

0 17 | not have been affected.

0 18 | _____

0 19 |

SYSTEM CODE: S C (11) CAUSE CODE: E (12) CAUSE SUBCODE: B (13) COMPONENT CODE: V A L V E X (14) COMP. SUBCODE: E (15) VALVE SUBCODE: D (16)

17 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 3 | L | 0

21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

18 | B | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | A | 25 | A | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 26

33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER EVENT YEAR SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPD-4 FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 10 | The loss of volume was caused by leakage past the manual isolation valve while

1 11 | maintenance was being performed on the CAT tank discharge valve. The valve was

1 12 | torqued shut, stopping the leakage, the tank refilled to above the Tech. Spec.

1 13 | minimum. The valve will be overhauled during the next refueling outage.

1 14 | _____

1 15 | E (28) 1 0 0 (29) N/A (30) A (31) Operator Observation (32)

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 80

1 16 | Z (33) Z (34) N/A (35) N/A (36)

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 80

1 17 | 0 0 0 (37) Z (38) N/A (39)

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 80

1 18 | 0 0 0 (40) N/A (41)

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 80

1 19 | 2 (42) N/A (43) 8212210397 821213 PDR ADOCK 05000280 S PDR

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 80

1 20 | N (44) N/A (45) NRC USE ONLY

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 80

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 82-116/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 11-13-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: CHEMICAL ADDITION TANK LOW LEVEL

1. Description of the Event

With the unit at full power, and Maintenance of the Chemical Addition Tank discharge valve (MOV-CS-102A) operator being performed, the control room operator observed that the level in the Chemical Addition Tank had decreased to 96%, which is approximately 22 gallons less than the Technical Specification 3.4.A.4 low limit of 4200 gallons. This event is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(2).

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

The containment spray system is an engineered safeguards system comprised of spray rings, pumps, valves, tanks, and inter-connected piping. The Chemical Addition subsystem supplies Sodium Hydroxide (NaOH) from the Chemical Addition Tank to the containment spray pumps suction lines. The purpose of the NaOH solution is 1) for ultimate sump pH (long term corrosion control and retention of iodine) and 2) to enhance the spray removal of radioactive iodine from the containment atmosphere, thus reducing the concentration of airborne fission products available for leakage.

Since the peak pressure inside the containment would occur within one minute following a DBA, the CAT would still have provided NaOH to the spray during the period of greatest potential for leakage to the environment. The CAT level was restored within the time period specified by T.S.3.0.1. Therefore, the health and safety of the public would not have been affected.

3. Cause

The loss of volume was caused by leakage past the downstream isolation valve, 1-CS-38, for MOV-CS-102A. Although this isolation valve had been shut for the maintenance, it required re-torquing to provide proper isolation.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

Isolation valve 1-CS-38 was shut with a valve wrench, thereby stopping the leakage.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action

The Chemical Addition Tank was filled with 17-18% NaOH solution to the required volume.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The manual isolation valve, 1-CS-38 will be overhauled during the next refueling outage. A temporary trend recorder of the CAT level has been installed in the control room to assist the control room operator in determining any level changes.

7. Generic Implications

None.