NRC FOR	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
	IN FASE PRINT OF TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION
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CONT 21	REPORT IL 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 1 0 1 1 1 1 9 8 2 8 1 12 1 3 8 2 5 SOURCE 50 61 DOCKET NUMBER 56 69 EVENT DATE 74 REPORT DATE 80
0121	WENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) With the unit at 100% power, a routine walkdown of the Service building revealed
013	an open fire barrier penetration with no fire watch posted. This event is
014	contrary to T.S.3.21.G. All other fire detection & protection systems remained
0 5	operable, therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.
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D IE	80
7 8	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBC
0 9	9 10 11 12 13 16 19 20 REVISION
	17 LER/RO EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO. 17 NUMBER 8 2 - 0 7 0 - 0 3 1 0 32 17 NUMBER 21 22 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
	ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT NORDA PRIME COMP. COMPONENT TAKEN ACTION ON FLANT METHOD HOURS 22 SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER X 18 Z 19 9 9 9 26 33 40 41 3 42 43 25 Z 9 9 9 9 26
[1]0	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The penetration was temporarily sealed at the time of installation. How the
111	temporary seal was removed cannot be determined. A fire watch was posted until
112	the penetration was re-sealed.
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1114	
7 8	PACILITY NPOWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 E 28 1 0 0 29 N/A A 31 Q.C. Walkdown
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	Image: solution
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	NAME DE REERE J. L. Wilson Prove (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO: 50-281 REPORT NO: 82-070/03L-0 EVENT DATE: 11-19-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: OPEN FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION

1. Description of the Event

With the unit at 100% power, a routine walkdown of the service building revealed an open fire barrier penetration (4" Conduit) between the cable spreading room and the cable tunnel. This penetration was in a group of 5 installed during the summer of 1981 in accordance with Design Change 80-31 and all were temporarily sealed at that time. The other four in the same area remained sealed.

This event is contrary to Technical Specification 3.21.G.

2. Probable Consequences and Status of Redundant Equipment

The functional integrity of the fire barrier penetration seals ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. Since all other fire protection systems were operable during this period, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. Cause

The second

3 8 The fire barrier penetrations were sealed at the time of installation. How the temporary seal was removed cannot be determined.

4. Immediate Corrective Action

A fire watch was posted.

5. Subsequent Corrective Actions

The penetration was temporarily sealed on 11-19-82 and permanently sealed on 11-30-82.

6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The importance of maintaining fire barrier integrity has been re-emphasized to construction personnel.

7. Generic Implications

None.