

DFC 0 2 1982

Docket No. 50-282
Docket No. 50-306

Northern States Power Company
ATTN: Mr. C. E. Larson
Director of Nuclear
Generation
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, MN 55401

Gentlemen:

This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Messrs. J. P. Patterson and R. M. Lickus and others of this office on October 13-15, and November 9, 1982, of activities at Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant authorized by NRC Operating Licenses No. DPR-42 and No. DPR-60 and to the discussion of our findings with Messrs. E. C. Ward, J. A. Gonyeau, D. A. Schuelke and others of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel.

No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified during the course of this inspection.

We are concerned with two events that occurred during the Prairie Island Emergency Exercise on October 14, 1982. The first one relates to scenario conditions which we feel should have resulted in a General Emergency being declared sooner and the second relates to poor access control which resulted in a (simulated) radiation overexposure to a plant employee. These exercise weaknesses are described in the enclosed Appendix.

Accordingly, you are requested to submit a written statement within 30 days of the date of this letter describing your planned actions for improving these two items identified.

8212210329 821202
PDR ADOCK 05000282
G PDR


DMB
IE 35

DFC 0 2 1982

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of this letter, the enclosures, and your response to this letter will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. If this report contains any information that you (or your contractors) believe to be exempt from disclosure under 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4), it is necessary that you (a) notify this office by telephone within ten (10) days from the date of this letter of your intention to file a request for withholding; and (b) submit within twenty-five (25) days from the date of this letter a written application to this office to withhold such information. If your receipt of this letter has been delayed such that less than seven (7) days are available for your review, please notify this office promptly so that a new due date may be established. Consistent with Section 2.790(b)(1), any such application must be accompanied by an affidavit executed by the owner of the information which identifies the document or part sought to be withheld, and which contains a full statement of the reasons which are the bases for the claim that the information should be withheld from public disclosure. This section further requires the statement to address with specificity the considerations listed in 10 CFR 2.790(b)(4). The information sought to be withheld shall be incorporated as far as possible into a separate part of the affidavit. If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified periods noted above, a copy of this letter, the enclosures, and your response to this letter will be placed in the Public Document Room.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,



J. A. Hind, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Operational Support


Enclosures:

1. Appendix, Exercise Weaknesses
2. Inspection Report
No. 50-282/82-13(DEPOS);
No. 50-306/82-18(DEPOS)

cc w/encls:


E. L. Watzl, Plant Manager
DMB/Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, RIII Prairie Island
Resident Inspector, RIII Monticello
John W. Ferman, Ph.D., Nuclear
Engineer, MPCA


D. Bement, FEMA, Region V

RIII

Patterson/jp
11/18/82

RIII

Axelson

RIII

Reyes
12/1

RIII

Paperiello
11/30/82

RIII

Hind
12/1/82

Appendix

Exercise Weaknesses

1. Based on plant data including containment pressure, two out of four containment fan coils being inoperable, one out of two containment spray pumps inoperable, both diesel generators out of service, high radiation levels in containment and primary coolant activity greater than 300 $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$, a General Emergency should have been declared at 11:00 a.m. Instead a General Emergency was not declared until 11:30 a.m.

Thus, by the earlier General Emergency declaration, more time would have been available to notify State and local governmental agencies who in turn could have begun evacuation and/or sheltering of the general public, earlier than actually occurred during scenario conditions.

2. An apparent (simulated) overexposure occurred about 10:40 a.m. when an equipment operator was sent to the Auxiliary Building to check the two containment fan coil breakers as a response to Message 10A in the scenario. This equipment operator did not start from the Operations Support Center (OSC) and consequently he had no Health Physics representative to monitor his pathway for radiation levels. He passed through a high radiation area without being aware. This indicates inadequate access control of plant personnel during an emergency.