

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-454/82-22(DPRP); 50-455/82-16(DPRP)

Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455

Licenses No. CPPR-130; CPPR-131

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company  
Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Byron Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Byron Station, Byron, IL

Inspection Conducted: September 1 through October 31, 1982

Inspectors: *W. L. Forney*  
*for*

11-19-82

*K. Connaughton*  
*for*

11-19-82

Approved By: *D. W. Hayes*  
D. W. Hayes, Chief  
Reactor Projects Section 1B

11/19/82

Inspection Summary

Inspection on September 1 through October 31, 1982 (Reports No. 454/82-22(DPRP); 455/82-16(DPRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced safety inspection to review preoperational testing; IE Bulletin responses; IE Circular file responses; quality assurance/quality control documentation pertaining to the installation of selected Unit 1 NSSS components; implementation of housekeeping requirements; licensee actions on previously identified items; training and other activities. The inspection consisted of 313 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 19 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.

Results: Of the seven areas inspected, four items of noncompliance were identified in three areas (inadequate corrective action - Paragraph 2.b; failure to document a deficiency and determine impact - Paragraph 2.e; inadequate program for care and preservation of safety related equipment - Paragraph 4; and failure to issue Nonconformance Reports or evaluate impact on quality from failure of contractors to perform quality control inspections - Paragraphs 5.b, 5.c, and 5.d); one unresolved item and one open item were identified in one area.

## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Commonwealth Edison Company

- \*V. I. Schlosser, Project Manager
- \*G. Sorensen, Project Construction Superintendent
- \*R. Tuetken, Assistant Project Superintendent, PCD
- \*R. B. Klingler, Quality Control Supervisor
  - J. Binder, Lead Electrical Engineer, PCD
- \*C. Tomashek, Lead Startup Engineer
- \*M. Stanish, Construction Quality Assurance Manager
- \*R. Querio, Station Superintendent
- \*R. Ward, Station Assistant Superintendent for Administration & Support
- \*R. Pleniewicz, Station Assistant Superintendent for Operations
- \*L. Sues, Station Assistant Superintendent for Maintenance
- \*D. St. Clair, Technical Staff Supervisor
  - F. A. Hornbeak, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor, Startup
  - A. C. Chomacke, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
  - P. Nodzinski, Quality Assurance
  - T. P. Joyce, Operating Engineer
  - W. Burkamper, QA Supervisor
- \*T. Schuster, Technical Staff
- \*S. Putman, Supervisor Structural Engineering Specialist
- \*J. DeRosia, Piping Coordinator, Construction
- \*T. Tramm, Nuclear License Technician
- \*K. J. Hansing, QA Supervisor

\*Denotes personnel at exit interview.

### 2. Preoperational Test Witnessing

#### a. General

The inspectors witnessed portions of preoperational tests 2.066.10 "Containment Floor Drains," 2.005.10 "Safety Related Auxiliary Power," 2.008.10 "Boron Thermal Regeneration," 2.017.10 "Containment Spray," and 2.010.10 "Component Cooling," to determine whether or not: initial conditions and prerequisites, as applicable, were met; precautions were observed; the test procedure was adhered to and; deficient conditions were identified, documented, evaluated and corrected in accordance with applicable test program requirements. Observations and findings pertaining to the conduct of specific tests are discussed in Paragraphs 2b through 2f.

#### b. Preoperational Test 2.066.10 "Containment Floor Drains"

On September 8, 1982, the inspectors accompanied licensee personnel to the reactor cavity sump weir to witness execution of Section 9.1. The test was terminated upon discovery that three of the nine weir-plate mounting bolts required to maintain a leak tight seal between

the weirplate and the weirwall were not installed. Previous to this occurrence, while establishing test initial conditions, test personnel had discovered that the weirplate was not installed. Deficiency No. 1702 was written to address this condition on July 7, 1982. Resolution of this deficiency (installation of the weirplate) was assigned to the Project Construction Department on July 14, 1982. On September 3, 1982, Project Construction indicated on the Deficiency Report Form that the weirplate had been installed. Subsequently, startup group personnel signed the deficiency form indicating that the installation had been completed. The incomplete installation of the weirplate and subsequent processing of the deficiency form was contrary to the Byron Startup Manual, Section 4.1.4, which requires that the person or persons assigned to carry out corrective action complete the work and briefly describe the results prior to submittal for startup group signature. This is an example of noncompliance identified in the Appendix to the report transmittal letter. (454/82-22-01)

- c. Preoperational Test 2.005.10 "Safety Related Auxiliary Power 480V and Above"

No items of noncompliance were identified.

- d. Preoperational Test 2.008.10 "Boron Thermal Regeneration"

No items of noncompliance were identified.

- e. Preoperational Test 2.017.10 "Containment Spray"

On October 1, 1982, the inspector noted that on Drawing 6E-4030 CS08, Revision C, the specified time delay associated with the "Eductor 1A Additive Flow Low" alarm was 200 msec while the test procedure indicated an acceptable range of 20-60 seconds. The measured time delay was approximately 25 seconds. The inspector informed licensee test personnel of the discrepancy and reminded them of the need to document the discrepancy to assure resolution. Licensee test personnel acknowledged the discrepancy and stated that the time delay values indicated on the drawings were incorrect. Section 4.1.4 of the Byron Startup Manual, states in part that "Deficiencies are documentation of incomplete or improper installation, documentation, design or testing identified at the time of turnover for test, or thereafter," while Section 4.6.3 states, in part, that "deficient conditions discovered during testing will be recorded as deficiency drafts and, if not resolved, be processed per 4.1.1 above." On October 4, 1982, the inspector asked licensee test personnel if the discrepancy had been written up as a deficiency or otherwise documented. The licensee's reply was negative. The inspector then stated that if the drawing was indeed incorrect, that the failure to document this as a deficiency was in noncompliance with the Byron Startup Manual. Licensee test personnel subsequently wrote Deficiency Report AB, dated October 4, 1982. Failure to document this deficiency upon discovery is an example of noncompliance identified in the Appendix to the report transmittal letter. (454/82-22-02a)

Prior to system turnover for test, on August 31, 1982, Deficiency Report Nos. 2.017.10.005 (2.017.10.006) were written. The deficiency descriptions provided on the deficiency forms stated "Contacts from DGIAEM2 (DGIBEM2) not installed. This involves Containment Spray Pump 1A (1B)." The inclusion of these contacts into Containment Spray Pump 1A and 1B control circuits was reflected in Revision G to Control and Instrument Drawings 6E-1-4030-CS01 and 6E-1-4030-CS02, respectively. Apparently with no more information than was provided by these deficiency descriptions, test personnel attempted to perform Section 9.2 of the test. Section 9.2 could not be completed. Subsequently, Licensee test personnel stated to the inspector that they had presumed that the as-built control circuits conformed to the previous drawing revisions (i.e., the control circuits were built to the previous drawing revisions and rework had not started). Section 4.5, Paragraph 4.5.6 of the Byron Startup Manual states, "The System Test Engineer will determine which deficiencies must be cleared prior to testing." This is an example of the noncompliance identified in the Appendix to the report transmittal letter. (454/82-22-02b)

The containment spray preoperational test procedure, Section 9.5, Step 9.5.3 stated, "Verify the Logic of CS007B in the auto mode. For each row in Data Sheet 11.5.3 align the Switch 1HS-CS018 in the appropriate position and then simulate an "ENERGIZED" K643 status (contacts 17-18) by jumpering contacts 11-12 of TB 640 within 1PA10J. Log jumper installation at 7.4.15..." This step was inconsistent because Data Sheet 11.5.3, Lines 4, 5, and 6 required removal of the jumper to simulate the "DEENERGIZED" K643 status. Step 9.5.4 stated, "Log jumper removal at 7.4.16..." On October 6, 1982, the inspector observed that Licensee test personnel removed the jumper and logged its removal prior to completion of Step 9.5.3. The Action prescribed by Step 9.5.4 was thus performed prior to completion of Step 9.5.3.

Test personnel performed and documented jumper removal at the appropriate point in the test though the test procedure did not explicitly direct jumper removal where required for the completion of data Sheet 11.5.3. It was to be inferred from Step 9.5.3 that where data Sheet 11.5.3 indicated a "DEENERGIZED" K643 status, the jumper had to be removed. The licensee stated that this was an established format for directing the lifting and landing of jumper leads required for data collection. The inspectors cautioned the licensee that where this format is used it should be clearly stated on the data sheet or in steps directing completion of the data sheet, when jumpers are to be installed or removed.

On October 6, 1982, the inspector witnessed the performance of Section 9.7. Step 9.7.3 required placement of a jumper between Terminals 3 and 4 on terminal block 640 in panel 1PA10J. The jumper was erroneously placed between Terminals 11 and 12 of terminal block 641 in panel 1PA10J. Misplacement of the jumper was subsequently identified by test when expected results were not achieved. Deficiency Report AF was written to document the misplaced jumper. The deficiency description stated, "1CS007B doesn't open when K643 jumpered and switch in auto." Corrective action taken was described as "incorrectly jumpered, replaced jumper." Subsequently, the

inspectors expressed concern to the Licensee that documentation of the deficiency did not include sufficient information to assure that the potential for damage to safety related equipment which may have resulted from the misplaced jumper could be evaluated. On October 8, 1982, Deficiency AF, Page 2, was written to identify where the jumper had been misplaced and recommend that an evaluation of the occurrence be performed. This deficiency was closed after it had been determined by review that the misplaced jumper could not have adversely affected related equipment. The Licensee informed the inspectors that guidance would be provided to test personnel to assure that errors such as misplaced jumpers and operation of components not authorized by test would be documented and evaluated. This is an unresolved item pending further review of Licensee actions in this area. (50-454/82-22-03 50-455/82-16-01)

f. Preoperational Test 2.010.10 "Component Cooling"

Just prior to witnessing performance of Section 9.7, a cursory review of the test procedure by the inspector revealed that certain steps required throttling individual component cooling water pumps to a "nominal" 4800 gpm while a "CAUTION" statement at the beginning of that section stated, "DO NOT allow flow rate to exceed 4800 gpm for one pump operation..." The inspector also noted that Steps 9.7.44 and 9.7.45 were in reverse order and therefore could not be performed. As testing began the inspector informed test personnel of these observations and learned that these items had not been previously identified.

The inspector emphasized the desirability of finding procedural inconsistencies as obvious as these prior to commencement of testing in order to prevent interruptions which can obscure test objectives.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

3. Preoperational Test Program

The inspectors met with Licensee representatives on October 4 and 6, 1982, to discuss concerns regarding the conduct of pre-test activities which may impact on the quality of testing. Three broad areas of concern were identified: quality and timeliness of "Pre-Test Reviews" performed in accordance with Section 3.6 of the Byron Startup Manual; accuracy and completeness of information readily available to test personnel concerning system status from the time it is turned over for flushing until commencement of testing and; utilization of this information by test personnel to accurately determine whether or not test objectives can be met in accordance with approved test procedures and approved changes thereto, prior to commencement of testing. Section 3.6 of the Byron Startup Manual, "Pre-Test Procedure Review" states that shortly before a test is executed the procedure will be reviewed to assure all installed design changes are accounted for in the test, required deficiencies are resolved, all required test procedure open items are resolved, references to drawings in the test procedure are updated to those used in the test and acceptance criteria limits are available in the data section and/or an appendix and are so identified. The inspectors noted that for certain preoperational tests,

the period of time between the "Pre-Test Procedure Review" and commencement of test execution ranged anywhere from one to nine months. The inspectors expressed concern that considering the frequencies of design changes and discoveries of deficient conditions, the "Pre-Test Procedure Reviews" conducted for several systems currently under test appeared untimely. The Licensee agreed to specify, by revision to the Byron Startup Manual, a maximum acceptable time period between completion of the "Pre-Test Procedure Review" and the beginning of test execution. This is an open item pending review of Licensee actions (50-454/82-22-04; 50-455/82-16-02).

The inspectors were informed by licensee personnel that the Byron Startup Manual was being revised to provide guidelines for system "Shakedown." System Shakedown will occur following flushing activities but prior to system release for testing. The System Test Engineer, Construction and OAD Field Engineers, as necessary, will complete the shakedown which will typically consist of cycling certain valves, establishing system flows, and observance of system operation. The inspector agreed with the Licensee that system shakedown should improve the quality of turned over systems as well as increase the System Test Engineer's knowledge of system status and operation. System shakedown would not, however, be a substitute for accurate and complete documentation as a means of informing test personnel of system status prior to commencement of testing. The inspectors noted instances where the descriptions of deficient conditions provided on the deficiency report forms did not, by themselves, allow an accurate determination of impact upon testing (see example in Paragraph 2b). The inspectors also noted that descriptions of corrective action taken, provided on deficiency report forms, were not always sufficient in themselves to allow determinations of whether or not the deficiencies had been appropriately resolved prior to commencement or resumption of testing or during post test review (see example in Paragraph 2a). The Byron Startup Manual, Section 4.1.4 requires the individual, who identifies what he believes to be a deficiency, to complete the deficiency description on the deficiency report form. This section also requires the person who is assigned to carry out corrective action to complete the work and briefly describe the results on the deficiency report form. The inspectors stated their position that either sufficient information should be included on the deficiency report form to support required evaluations of deficient conditions and corrective action taken or formal guidance should be provided to personnel on the retrieval of supplementary information necessary to support these evaluations.

#### 4. Housekeeping

During tours of the Unit 1 containment the inspectors noted that all steam generator primary side manways were uncovered. The inspectors informed the Licensee that this condition appeared to be contrary to Hunter Site Implementing Procedure 4.000 "Control of Construction Processes," Section 13.7. Subsequently, on September 15, 1982, the inspectors observed that similar conditions adverse to quality existed elsewhere. The inspectors provided the Licensee with five examples where Safety Related Category I piping and penetrations had end covers either damaged or missing; one main steam line penetration inside containment (Penetration P-78) and four steam generator blowdown line penetrations (Penetrations P-80, P-81, P-82 and P-84). Approximately ten days later

the inspectors observed that these conditions had not been corrected. Additionally, the inspectors observed end caps missing from essential service-water piping in the 2A diesel generator room. This is an item of noncompliance identified in the Appendix to the report transmittal letter. (454/82-22-05; 455/82-16-03)

5. Quality Assurance/Quality Control of Nuclear Steam Supply System Component Installation

a. General

The inspectors reviewed quality assurance/quality control documentation pertaining to the installation of the Byron Unit 1 steam generators, safety injection accumulators, pressurizer and reactor coolant pumps to determine whether or not adequate measures to assure quality had been established and implemented in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, the Commonwealth Edison Company and Hunter Corporation quality assurance programs and applicable procedures. This review revealed apparent omissions in the required documentation of quality control activities. Audits performed by the Licensee in 1980 and 1981 also identified quality control documentation deficiencies. The inspectors determined that followup of audit findings in this area apparently did not include verification that nonconformances were documented and evaluated for required quality control activities that could not be verified as having been accomplished. Specific findings for each component category are stated in Paragraphs 5b through 5e.

b. Steam Generators

Process Sheets 1RC01BA, 1RC01BB, 1RC01BC and 1RC01BD provided step by step instructions and documentation of quality control activities for final setting of the Byron Unit 1 steam generators. Process Sheet 1RC01BD Sequence Step No. 3 required quality control personnel to check surface conditions on the undersides of the steam generator feet and the top sides of support column plates using the ASME Code, Section III, Paragraph NF4723 as acceptance criterion. This step was not signed off as having been performed. The Licensee stated that this omission had been identified in January of 1979 and that an effort had been made to find objective evidence that the required inspection had actually been performed. The Licensee could not establish that the inspection had been performed. The omission of the required quality control inspection was never formally evaluated to determine appropriate corrective action. This is an example of noncompliance identified in the Appendix to the report transmittal letter. (454/82-22-06a)

c. Safety Injection Accumulators

Grouting of the Safety Injection Accumulators took place in August of 1981. Hunter Quality Control Site Implementing Procedure 4.201, Revision 2, dated February 3, 1981, required quality control personnel to verify that anchor bolts for equipment have not been bent or tampered with prior to grouting. Grouting was performed without the

required quality control inspection. The inability to perform the required inspection after grouting was documented for each accumulator on Hunter Equipment Inspection Checklists (Form HC-159, Revision 2). The Licensee never formally evaluated these omissions of required quality control inspections to determine appropriate corrective action. This is an example of noncompliance identified in the Appendix to the report transmittal letter. (454/82-22-06b)

d. Reactor Coolant Pumps

Process Sheet 1RC01P, Revision 2, (6 pages) provided step by step instructions for the retightening of hold down bolts for all Unit 1 reactor coolant pump support columns following final setting of the reactor coolant pumps. Sequence No. 1 required lubrication of exposed male threads of the hold down bolts. This step was also designated a quality control inspection hold point. The required quality control inspections were not signed off as having been performed. The Licensee did not document or evaluate this omission as a nonconformance. This is an example of noncompliance identified in the Appendix to the report transmittal letter. (454/82-22-06c)

e. Pressurizer

No items of noncompliance were identified.

6. Inspection and Enforcement Circulars

(Closed) IEC 80-21 "Regulation of Refueling Crews": The Licensee's file response indicated that the circular had been reviewed and will be used as a guideline for refueling procedures. Also, the Licensee's "Technical Specification" describing the licensing requirement for the individual manipulating the fuel handling equipment will be incorporated into site procedure. This circular is closed.

(Closed) IEC 81-05 "Self-aligning Rod End Bushings for Pipe Supports": The Licensee's file response indicated that the recommended reviews had been performed and identified the ITT Grinnell Size 1 Figure 306/307 pipe support utilizing a Pacific Scientific Size 1 mechanical shock arrestor as having the potential for complete disengagement of the bushing assemblies. Spacers will be installed to preclude this type of occurrence. This circular is closed.

(Closed) IEC 81-13 "Torque Switch Electrical Bypass Circuit for Safeguard Service Valve Motors": The Licensee's file response indicated that the actions requested by the NRC had been performed or will be performed in accordance with established construction, operating or maintenance procedures, as applicable. This circular is closed.

(Closed) IEC 81-14 "Main Steam Isolation Valve Failures to Close": The Licensee's file response indicated that the common mode failure potential attributed to poor control air quality did not exist since Byron Units 1 and 2 employ hydraulically actuated MSIVs. The Licensee also stated in the file response that the failure potential due to stem binding will be



addressed by periodic valve stroking, valve stroking following maintenance and an ongoing program to monitor and investigate methods for improving packing performance. This circular is closed.

7. Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins

(Open) IEB 81-01 and 81-01 Revision 1 "Surveillance of Mechanical Snubbers": The Licensee's file response indicates a commitment to develop and implement a mechanical snubber surveillance program. This bulletin will remain open until the Licensee develops and implements a snubber surveillance program and it is verified to be acceptable by subsequent inspection.

(Open) IEB 81-02 "Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against Differential Pressure": The Licensee's file response does not include verification of completion of modification to valves identified in CECO letter Swartz to NRC-Keppler dated July 8, 1981. This bulletin will remain open pending receipt of verification of completion of required modifications.

(Closed) IEB 80-04 "Analysis of a PWR Main Steam Line Break With Continued Feedwater Addition": This bulletin was issued to Byron for information only. Review of CECO file response indicates S&L letter Cleff-CECO of August 24, 1980, provides a Westinghouse letter Kortier-S&L of April 15, 1980, which summarizes review of FSAR commitments relative to IEB 80-04. Results of the review indicate that no action would have been necessary had the bulletin been applicable to Byron Units 1 and 2. This bulletin is considered closed.

(Open) IEB 80-06 "ESF Reset Control": This bulletin was issued to Byron for information only; however, review of CECO file response indicates in memorandum Westermeier-DelGeorge of May 15, 1980, that testing and verification of diagrams be accomplished by station personnel, that S&L is performing a design review and will provide any necessary modifications prior to system turnover for test. This bulletin is considered open pending review of file information indicating that identified actions are complete.

(Closed) IEB 80-10 "Contamination of Nonradioactive System and Resulting Potential for Unmonitored Uncontrolled Release of Radioactivity to Environment": The bulletin was issued to Byron for information only. Review of the Licensee's file response indicates CECO/S&L performed an analysis and developed a table of monitoring or sampling recommendations for potentially contaminated non-radioactive systems. This bulletin is considered closed.

(Closed) IEB 80-12 "Decay Heat Removal System Operability": This bulletin was issued to Byron for information only. Review of the Licensee's file response indicates that station procedures will be written to adequately safeguard against loss of redundancy and diversity of the DHR (RHR) capability and to preclude a Davis-Besse type accident. The inspector verified the Licensee is controlling this item in their tracking system. This bulletin is closed.

(Closed) IEB 80-18 "Maintenance of Adequate Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal Charging Pumps Following Secondary Side High Energy Line Rupture": This bulletin was forwarded to Byron for information only. The concern of the bulletin will be addressed as part of the licensing process for Byron. Review of the Licensee's file response indicates concerns of the bulletin are being reviewed and addressed thru the licensing process. This bulletin is closed.

(Closed) IEB 80-19 and 80-19 Revision 1 "Failures of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relays in Reactor Protective Systems of Operating Power Plant Designed by Combustion Engineering": The Licensee's response indicates the Byron Solid State Protection System (SSPS) does not utilize mercury wetted relays to perform its function; however, the Byron SSPS does use relays manufactured by the C. P. Clare Company that are a different model and do not require mercury-wetting for contact. This bulletin is considered closed.

(Open) IEB 80-20 "Failures of Westinghouse Type W-2 Spring Return to Neutral": The inspector reviewed the Licensee's response which indicates the item is being reviewed on a continuing basis for Byron and notes the Licensee's file does not indicate that the review and subsequent actions have been completed. This bulletin is considered open.

(Closed) IEB 80-24 "Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment": This bulletin was issued to Byron for information only. The inspector reviewed the Licensee's file response which indicates actions that will be taken by the plant staff with regard to concerns identified in the bulletin and have these actions identified on their internal tracking system. This bulletin is considered closed.

#### 8. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Open Item (454/82-04-02; 455/82-03-02) "Need for two party verification subsequent to component restoration."

The inspector reviewed Procedure BAP 300-5, Revision 2 dated September 16, 1982, (Jumper/Lifted-Lead Log) and verified the procedure had been revised to include specific requirements for two party verification subsequent to component restoration. The inspector also verified the revision was inserted in a random selection of procedures in use. This matter is considered closed.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (454/82-10-03; 455/82-07-02) "Final Setting of Steam Generators."

This item is discussed in Paragraph 5b of this report and is hereby closed.

(Closed) Open Item (454/82-10-06; 455/82-07-05) "Need for determination of "Just Prior To" in Hunter Corporation Site Procedure (SIP) 4.201."

The inspector reviewed SIP 4.201, Revision 5, of September 30, 1982, Paragraph 5.3.4.B and determined the procedure had been modified to eliminate the words "Just Prior To" and identifies a specific maximum period of time that may occur between inspection and application of insulation. This item is considered closed.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (454/82-15-03) "Commitment Action Item Record System don't cover long term commitments on circulars, bulletins or inspection reports."

The inspector was informed by the Licensee that all circulars, bulletins and inspection items will be controlled on the Action Item Record System (AIR), that all outstanding inspection items have been placed on the AIR system and that bulletin and circular actions are being reviewed for outstanding items which will be added to the AIR system as identified. The inspector has reviewed the format and the contents of the items currently in the system and has no further concerns. This item is considered closed.

(Closed) Open Item (454/82-10-05; 455/82-07-04) "Need for positive control of documentation."

The inspector reviewed guidance procedures and the training and qualification program developed by the Nuclear Station Office Supervisor to ensure that documentation and procedures are maintained in a complete and updated condition. The training and qualification program consists of a training manual and on the job training. The Central File Supervisor examines the personnel by discussion and or performance of a particular task and certifies the individual as qualified to perform the job task. The program provides that only qualified personnel may perform any given task relative to maintenance of documentation and procedures. This item is considered closed.

9. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection report is discussed in Paragraphs 2a and 5c.

10. Exit Interview

The inspector met with Licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted, in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on October 29, 1982. The inspector summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection and the findings. The licensee acknowledged the findings reported herein.