

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 82-009/01T-0

Wisconsin Electric Power Company
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 2
Docket No. 50-301

On November 20, 1982, at 1508 hours, an operator inadvertently stopped the reactor core axial flux differential monitoring program and the associated alarm. The axial flux differential monitoring program incorporates an alarm which indicates deviation from the axial flux differential target band as normally required by Technical Specification 15.3.10.B.2.f, a limiting condition for operation.

The operator was in the process of investigating the axial flux differential alarm as received in the backup computer. During this investigation, the operator attempted to request a printout of the current status of the monitoring program. Unfortunately, the operator was momentarily distracted and did not realize that the axial flux differential monitoring program and associated alarm had been stopped. On November 22, 1982, at 1008 hours, while also investigating the backup computer alarm, Reactor Engineering discovered that the axial flux differential monitoring program had been halted. Upon this discovery, the program was immediately reinstated. The alarm received in the backup computer was traced to a computer entry error, unrelated to the alarm function on the main computer. The backup computer has yet to be accepted into service.

Technical Specification 15.3.10.B.2.f permits the alarm to be out of service if the axial flux differential is logged and assessed every hour for the first 24 hours and half hourly thereafter. But, because there was no indication of the alarm being out of service, the axial flux was not manually logged and assessed. The axial flux differential is, however, continuously displayed and recorded on a chart recorder on the main control board in the control room. Had a significant axial flux differential developed, the control operator would have noticed it. Examination of the axial flux differential recording verified that at no time was the flux differential outside the target flux band during the period in question.

Reactor Engineering is currently investigating means to prevent recurrence. These means may include an hourly display of alarm function status or the removal of the ability to stop the monitor program from the control room station. Also under consideration is a proposal to make stopping the monitor program more secure. The stop mode is necessary to eliminate spurious alarms during refueling outages. The precise action to be taken will depend on the ability of the software to accept these changes and upon the optimum solution.

The Resident Inspector has been informed of this event.