	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
	CONTROL BLOCK:
0 1 7 8	W I P B H 2 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 5 5 TOTAL SE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 56
CON'T 0 1 7 8	REPORT L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 1 7 1 1 2 2 8 2 8 1 2 0 3 8 2 9 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10 During a review of computer data on 11/22/82, it was discovered that the
0 3	axial flux differential monitoring program and the associated alarm had
0 4	been inadvertently halted during the period from 1508, 11/20/82, to 1008
0 5	11/22/82, without manually logging the flux differential as required by
0 6	TS 15.3.10.B.2.F. However, the flux differential had been continuously
0 7	displayed and recorded in control and examination of these recordings dis-
08	closed no anomalies. LER's 78-006/01T-0 and 79-005/01T-0 are similar.
0 9 7 8	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBC
10	While attempting to diagnose another problem the operator stopped the
11	monitoring program. On 11/22/82 Reactor Engineering personnel discovered
1 2	this error and immediately reinstated the monitoring program. Solutions
1 3	are under investigation to provide a positive indication of program
1 4	status and prevent recurrence.
1 5	STATUS POWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 E 28 1 0 0 29 N/A A 31 Reactor Engineering review TOTAL CONTENT 12 13 44 45 46 46 46 46 46 46
1 6 8	ELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) 2 (33) (2) (34) (N/A) PERSONNEL EXPOSURES AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) (N/A) N/A 80
1 7 8	NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) 0 0 0 0 (40) N/A
1 8 7 8	2 11 12 12 13 80 80 Loss of or Damage to Facility (4) PDR ADDCK 05000301 S PDR ADDCK 05000301 S PDR ADDCK 05000301
20,	PUBLICITY SSUED DESCRIPTION 45 NRC USE ONLY NRC USE ONLY 68 69 80 80 6
	NAME OF PREPARE C. W. Fay PUONE 414/277-2811 6

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 82-009/01T-0 Wisconsin Electric Power Company Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 2 Docket No. 50-301 On November 20, 1982, at 1508 hours, an operator inadvertently stopped the reactor core axial flux differential monitoring program and the associated alarm. The axial flux

On November 20, 1982, at 1508 hours, an operator inadvertently stopped the reactor core axial flux differential monitoring program and the associated alarm. The axial flux differential monitoring program incorporates an alarm which indicates deviation from the axial flux differential target band as normally required by Technical Specification 15.3.10.B.2.f, a limiting condition for operation.

The operator was in the process of investigating the axial flux differential alarm as received in the backup computer. During this investigation, the operator attempted to request a printout of the current status of the monitoring program. Unfortunately, the operator was momentarily distracted and did not realize that the axial flux differential monitoring procram and associated alarm had been stopped. On November 22, 1502, at 1008 hours, while also investigating the backup computer alarm, Reactor Engineering discovered that the axial flux differential monitoring program had been halted. Upon this discovery, the program was immediately reinstated. The alarm received in the backup computer was traced to a computer entry error, unrelated to the alarm function on the main computer. The backup computer has yet to be accepted into service.

Technical Specification 15.3.10.B.2.f permits the alarm to be out of service if the axial flux differential is logged and assessed every hour for the first 24 hours and half hourly thereafter. But, because there was no indication of the alarm being out of service, the axial flux was not manually logged and assessed. The axial flux differential is, however, continuously displayed and recorded on a chart recorder on the main control board in the control room. Had a significant axial flux differential developed, the control operator would have noticed it. Examination of the axial flux differential recording verified that at no time was the flux differential outside the target flux band during the period in question.

Reactor Engineering is currently investigating means to prevent recurrence. These means may include an hourly display of alarm function status or the removal of the ability to stop the monitor program from the control room station. Also under consideration is a proposal to make stopping the monitor program more secure. The stop mode is necessary to eliminate spurious alarms during refueling outages. The precise action to be taken will depend on the ability of the software to accept these changes and upon the optimum solution.

The Resident Inspector has been informed of this event.