



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

January 11, 1978

NOTE TO: Ralph Jones, Chief  
Material Protection Standards Branch  
Office of Standards Development

FROM: L. J. Evans, Jr., Chief  
Requirements Analysis Branch  
Office of Nuclear Material Safety  
and Safeguards


SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDED UPGRADE RULE CHANGES AND CONSIDERATIONS  
FOR INCLUSION IN STAFF PAPER TO COMMISSION

Enclosed for your use in preparation of the Commission Paper concerning the resolution of the public comments regarding the Upgrade Rule, are three attachments. The first attachment contains a preliminary list of items that should be included in the revised Upgrade Rule and Statement of Considerations (SOC). This paper proposes general modifications to the rule or SOC without specifying the specific wording for the changes.

The second attachment is a preliminary list of decision points, requiring the development of a staff position prior to inclusion in the rule or SOC.

The third attachment is a marked copy of the Upgrade Rule. It includes revisions to the rule based on staff response considerations received regarding the public comments. These revisions do not include the proposed changes in attachment 1.

The proposed changes for transportation will be forthcoming shortly.

  
L. J. Evans, Jr., Chief  
Requirements Analysis Branch

(3) Any other physical obstruction constructed in a manner and of materials suitable for the purpose for which the construction is intended.

\* \* \* \* \*  
(h) "Vital area" means any area which contains vital equipment.

\* \* \* \* \*  
(k) "Isolation zone" means any area, clear of all objects which could conceal or shield an individual, adjacent to a physical barrier.

\* \* \* \* \*  
(p) "Radiological sabotage" means any deliberate act directed against a plant or transport in which an activity licensed pursuant to the regulations in this chapter is conducted, or against a component of such a plant or transport which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation <sup>IN EXCESS OF</sup> ~~that~~ such acts by an enemy of the United States ~~or~~ government or other person.

3. Section 73.2 of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended to add paragraphs (i) thru (x).

§ 73.2 Definitions

As used in this part:

\* \* \* \* \*

→ 25 Rem for A TOTAL RADIATION dose to the whole body for an individual exposed to the radioactive release AT THE SITE boundary resulting from the act of Sabotage. \*

\* Applicant for a license to operate and construct a production ... is NOT required to provide ... features or measures ... AGAINST ... ATTACKS ... by enemies of the U.S. (use 50.13 wording)

nuclear material; takes delivery of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material free on board (f.o.b.) the point at which it is delivered to a carrier for transportation; or imports or exports formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material shall establish and maintain or make arrangements for a physical protection system which will prevent with high assurance theft of strategic special nuclear material and protect against radiological sabotage by the following:

(1) A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, by a small group with the following attributes, assistance and equipment: (i) well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, (ii) inside assistance which may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in both a passive role (e.g., provide information) and an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack), (iii) suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long range accuracy, (iv) hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or otherwise destroying the plant or transport integrity, and (v) the ability to operate as two or more teams,

(2) An insider, including an employee (in any position), and

(3) A conspiracy of insiders or employees in any position,  
one or more of which does not have a full  
field background investigation clearance.

(2) within 180 days after the effective date of these amendments or 90 days after the plan(s) submitted pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) of this section is approved, whichever is later, implement the approved plan;

(3) within 270 days after the effective date of these amendments submit a revised fixed site safeguards physical protection plan and, if appropriate, a revised safeguards transportation protection plan describing how the licensee will comply with the requirements of paragraph (a)(3) of this section; and

(4) within 540 days after the effective date of these amendments or 90 days after the plan(s) submitted pursuant to paragraph (c)(3) of this section is approved, whichever is later, implement the approved plan.

§ 73.25 Performance capabilities for physical protection of strategic special nuclear material in transit.

(a) To meet the general performance requirement of § 73.20 an in-transit physical protection system shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, <sup>the achievement of</sup> the performance capabilities described in paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section unless otherwise authorized by the Commission.

(b) Restrict access to and activity in the vicinity of transports. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:

(1) Detect and delay any unauthorized attempt to gain access or introduce unauthorized materials into the vicinity of transports by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Protected areas or temporary exclusion areas to isolate shipments or transports at all scheduled and emergency stops to assure that unauthorized persons or materials shall not have direct access to the transports or shipment;

(ii) Access detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any unauthorized access or penetration of a temporary exclusion area, ~~or such attempts by persons, vehicles or materials at the time of the penetration or the attempt~~ so that response can be such as to prevent the unauthorized penetration or prevent such penetration from resulting in theft of strategic special nuclear material or radiological sabotage; and

(iii) Planning and information systems, to provide for preplanned shipments and updated route conditions to avoid areas which would increase the vulnerability of the shipment and to provide for communication with the transport in order to maintain the status and position of the shipment and to inform the escort commander of changes in the itinerary.

(2) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized materials into the vicinity of transports by receipt using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) Access authorization controls and procedures to provide current authorization schedules and access criteria for persons, materials and vehicles; and

(ii) Access controls and procedures to verify the identity of persons, materials and vehicles and assess such identity against

(iii) surveillance subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any unauthorized presence of persons or materials and any unauthorized attempt to penetrate the transport so that the response can prevent the unauthorized penetration.

(3) Prevent unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material from transports by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) authorization controls and procedures to provide current schedules for authorized removal of strategic special nuclear material which specify the persons authorized to remove and receive the material, ~~and~~ the authorized times for such removal, and receipt; <sup>AND authorize</sup>

(ii) removal controls and procedures to establish removal procedures for transferring cargo in emergency situations; and <sup>places for such removal AND Receipt,</sup>

(iii) removal controls and procedures to permit removal of strategic special nuclear material only after verification of the identity of persons removing or receiving the strategic special nuclear material, and the identity and integrity of the strategic special nuclear material being removed from transports.

(4) Detect attempts to remove strategic special nuclear material from transports by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) cargo containers and transport structure to delay unauthorized strategic special nuclear material removal attempts sufficient to assist detection and permit a response to prevent the removal; and

(ii) detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material so that response to the attempt can be such as to prevent the removal.

(d) Response: Each safeguards program shall provide a response capability to assure that the two performance capabilities described in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section are achieved. To perform this capability, the licensee shall:

(1) Establish a security organization to:

(i) provide trained and qualified personnel <sup>to man the movement control center</sup> to carry out assigned duties and responsibilities, and

(ii) provide armed escorts to respond to and coordinate transport and escort activities for routine security operations and safeguards contingencies.

(2) Establish a predetermined plan to respond to safeguards contingency events.

(3) Provide communication networks to:

(i) enable the escort commander to communicate on routine and non-routine situations to a movement control center for assessment of the status and position of a shipment;

(ii) enable the movement control center to communicate to the escort commander to assist in carrying out actions as identified in the safeguards contingency plan;

(iii) enable the escort commander to communicate with escort vehicles for implementation of the safeguards contingency plan; and



(iv) enable both the escort commander and movement control center to notify law enforcement authorities of need for assistance as specified in the safeguards contingency plan.

(4) Provide equipment for the escort forces to provide for a response which is sufficiently rapid and effective so as to achieve the predetermined objective of the response.

§ 73.26 Transportation Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems, Elements, Components, and Procedures

(a) A transportation physical protection system established pursuant to the general performance requirements of § 73.20(a)(1) and (a)(2) and performance capability requirements of § 73.25 of this part <sup>MAY</sup> include, but <sup>ARE</sup> not necessarily be limited to, the measures specified in paragraphs (b) through (k) of this section. The Commission may require, depending on the individual transportation conditions or circumstances, <sup>ALTERNATE OR</sup> additional measures deemed necessary to meet the general performance requirements of § 73.20 of this part. The Commission also may authorize protection measures other than those required by this section if in its opinion the overall level of performance meets the general performance requirements of § 73.20 and the performance capability requirements of § 73.25 of this part.

(b) Planning and Scheduling.

(1) Shipments shall be scheduled to avoid regular patterns and preplanned to avoid areas of natural disaster or civil disorders, such as strikes or riots. Such shipments shall be planned in order



§ 73.45 Performance Capabilities for Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems

(a) To meet the general performance requirements of § 73.20 a fixed site physical protection system shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, <sup>approved</sup> the performance capabilities described in paragraphs (b) through (g) of this section unless otherwise authorized by the Commission.

(b) Prevent unauthorized access of persons and materials into material access areas and vital areas. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:

(1) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized material across material access or vital area boundaries by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) barriers to channel persons and material to material access and vital area entry control points and to delay any unauthorized penetration attempts by persons or materials sufficient to assist detection and permit a response that will prevent the penetration; and

(ii) access detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any unauthorized penetration attempts by persons or materials at the time of the attempt so that a response can prevent the unauthorized access or penetration.

(2) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized materials into material access areas or vital areas by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

strategic special nuclear material removal attempts sufficient to assist <sup>Assessment</sup> ~~Detection~~ and permit a response that will prevent the removal; and

(ii) detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material so that response to the attempt can be such as to prevent the removal.

(2) Confirm the identity and quantity of strategic special nuclear material presented for removal from a material access area and detect attempts at unauthorized removal of strategic special nuclear material from material access areas by direct using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) authorization controls and procedures to provide current schedules for authorized removal of strategic special nuclear material which specify the authorized properties and quantities of material to be removed, the persons authorized to remove the material, and the authorized time schedule;

(ii) removal controls and procedures to identify and confirm the properties and quantities of material being removed and verify the identity of the persons making the removal and time of removal and assess these against the current authorized removal schedule before permitting removal; and

(iii) communications subsystems and procedures to provide for notification of an attempted unauthorized or unconfirmed removal so that response can be such as to prevent the removal.

(f) Provide for authorized access and assure detection of and response to unauthorized penetrations of the protected area to prevent theft of strategic special nuclear material and to protect against radiological sabotage. To achieve this capability the physical protection system shall:

(1) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized persons, vehicles, or materials into the protected area by stealth or force using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(i) barriers to channel persons, vehicles, and materials to protected area entry control points; and to delay any unauthorized penetration attempts or the introduction of unauthorized vehicles or materials <sup>a</sup> sufficient <sup>time</sup> to <sup>+ Assessment</sup> assist detection and permit a response that will prevent the penetration or prevent such penetration from resulting in theft of strategic special nuclear material or radiological sabotage; and

(ii) access detection subsystems and procedures to detect, assess and communicate any unauthorized access or penetrations or such attempts by persons, vehicles, or materials at the time of the act or the attempt so that response can be such as to prevent the unauthorized access or penetration, or prevent such penetration from resulting in theft of strategic special nuclear material or radiological sabotage.

(2) Detect attempts to gain unauthorized access or introduce unauthorized persons, vehicles, or materials into the protected area by deceit using the following subsystems and subfunctions:

(iii) provide protection for the assessment and response personnel so that they can complete their assigned duties.

(4) Provide communications networks to:

(i) provide rapid and accurate transmission of security information among on-site forces for routine security operation, assessment of a contingency, and response to a contingency; and

(ii) provide rapid and accurate transmission of detection and assessment information to off-site assistance forces.

§ 73.46 Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems, Elements, Components, and Procedures

(a) A licensee physical protection system established pursuant to the general performance requirements of § 73.20(a)(1) and (a)(2) and the performance capability requirements of § 73.45 of this part ~~shall~~ <sup>MAY</sup> include, but <sup>see</sup> not necessarily be limited to, the measures specified in paragraphs (b) through (h) of this section. The Commission may require, depending on individual facility and site conditions, <sup>ALTERNATE OR</sup> additional measures deemed necessary to meet the general performance requirements of § 73.20 of this part. The Commission also may authorize protection measures other than those required by this section if, in its opinion, the overall level of performance meets the general performance requirements of § 73.20 and the performance capability requirements of § 73.45 of this part.

(b) Security Organization

(1) The licensee shall establish a security organization, including guards. Criteria and requirements for security personnel

suitability, training, equipment, qualifications, and requalifications are set forth in Appendix B to this part "General Criteria for Security Personnel" as proposed elsewhere in this issue.

(2) The licensee shall have onsite at all time at least one full time member of the security organization with authority to direct the physical security activities of the security organization.

(3) The licensee shall have a management system to provide for the development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of security procedures. The system shall include:

(i) written security procedures which document the structure of the security organization and which detail the duties of guards, watchmen and other individuals responsible for security;

(ii) provision for written approval of such procedures and any revisions thereto by the individual with overall responsibility for the security function and by <sup>security</sup> licensee plant management;

(iii) provision for a review at least every 12 months of the security system by individuals independent of both security program management and personnel who have direct responsibility for implementation of the security program. The review shall include

<sup>AN EVALUATION</sup> ~~a review and~~  
<sup>AN AUDIT of commitments established with LLEA;</sup> ~~audit of security procedures and practices; an audit of the~~  
<sup>licensee's internal</sup> ~~security~~  
<sup>P.O.R.</sup> ~~system testing and maintenance program, and a test of the safeguards~~  
<sup>of the security system; AND EVALUATION of PRACTICAL</sup> ~~exercises to test the effectiveness of the physical security system~~  
~~system along with commitments established for response to local law~~  
~~enforcement authorities.~~ <sup>EVALUATION;</sup> The results of the review ~~and~~ <sup>audit,</sup> along  
<sup>CORRECTIONS AND</sup> with recommendations for improvements, shall be documented; reported

to the licensee's ~~corporate and plant management, and kept available~~ <sup>to at least one</sup>  
<sup>higher level of the corporate structure that does NOT HAVE DAY TO DAY</sup>  
~~at the plant for inspection for a period of five years~~  
<sup>operational responsibility for the plant, and a copy kept available at the</sup>  
~~plant for~~ (4) <sup>inspection for a period of 5 years,</sup> The licensee shall not permit an individual to act as a

guard, armed response individual, or other security organization member unless the individual in accordance with his assigned duties meets the requirements of Appendix B as proposed elsewhere in this issue.

X (5) Guards and armed response personnel shall pass a physical examination, receive training and requalify with assigned weapons at least every twelve months.

X (6) Guard and armed response personnel armament shall include handguns, shotguns, and semi-automatic rifles consistent with site specific conditions.

(c) Physical Barrier Subsystems

(1) Vital equipment shall be located only within a vital area and strategic special nuclear material shall be stored or processed only in a material access area. Both vital areas and material access areas shall be located within a protected area so that access to vital equipment and to strategic special nuclear material requires passage through at least two physical barriers. More than one vital area or material access area may be located within a single protected area.

(2) The physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area shall be separated from any other barrier designated as a physical barrier for a vital area or material access area within the protected area.

(3) Isolation zones shall be maintained in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and shall be large enough to permit observation of the activities of people on either side of that barrier in the event of its penetration. If parking facilities are provided for employees or visitors, they shall be located outside the isolation zone and exterior to the protected area.

(4) Isolation zones and all exterior areas within the protected area shall be provided with illumination sufficient for the monitoring and observation requirements of paragraphs (c)(3), (e)(8), (h)(4) and (h)(5) of this section, but not less than 0.2 footcandle measured at ground level.

(5) Strategic special nuclear material, <sup>which is undergoing processing</sup> not ~~in process~~ shall be stored in a vault, ~~or vault type room.~~

(6) <sup>Strategic special nuclear material</sup> ~~Enriched uranium~~ scrap in the form of small pieces, cuttings, chips, solutions or in other forms which result from a manufacturing process, contained in 30 gallon or larger containers with a uranium-235 content of less than 0.25 grams per liter, may be stored within a locked and separately fenced area within a larger protected area provided that the storage area fence is no closer than 25 feet to the perimeter of the protected area. The storage area when unoccupied shall be protected by a guard or watchman who shall patrol at intervals not exceeding 4 hours, or by intrusion alarms.

(d) Access Control Subsystems and Procedures

(1) A numbered picture badge identification subsystem shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected



areas without escort. An individual not employed by the licensee but who requires frequent and extended access to protected, material access, and vital areas may be authorized access to such areas without escort provided that he receives a picture badge <sup>which indicates</sup> ~~upon entrance~~ ~~into the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected area and which indicates~~ (i) Non-employee-no escort required; (ii) areas to which access is authorized, and (iii) <sup>Non-Employee badges shall be returned to the licensee if the individual is to be absent from the facility for a period exceeding 30 calendar days.</sup> ~~the period for which access has been authorized.~~ Badges shall be displayed by all individuals while inside the protected areas.

(2) Access to vital areas and material access areas shall be limited to individuals who are authorized access to vital equipment and strategic special nuclear material and who require such access to perform their duties. No activities other than those which require access to strategic special nuclear material or equipment used in the processing, use, or storage of strategic special nuclear material, shall be permitted within a material access area. Authorization for such individuals shall be indicated by the issuance of specially coded numbered badges indicating vital areas and material access areas to which access is authorized.

(3) The licensee shall establish and follow procedures that will identify to access control personnel those vehicles ~~and materials~~ <sup>AND THOSE MATERIALS THAT ARE NOT AUTHORIZED</sup> that are authorized entry to protected, material access, and vital areas, ~~and those vehicles and materials that are not authorized entry to such areas.~~

✓ (4) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area. Identification and search of all individuals <sup>by a physical search or by use of equipment capable of</sup> ~~for~~ <sup>detecting</sup> ~~firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices~~ <sup>such devices</sup> shall be made and authorization shall be checked at such points. <sub>NS</sub>

ERDA couriers engaged in the transport of SNM need not be searched. Licensee employees having an NRC or ERDA clearance may be searched on a random basis. The individual responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) shall be isolated within a structure, with bullet-resistant walls, doors, ceiling, floor, and windows.

(5) At the point of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area, all hand-carried packages shall be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices.

✓ (6) All packages and material for delivery into the protected area shall be checked for proper identification and authorization and searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior to admittance into the protected area, except those Commission approved delivery and inspection activities specifically designated by the licensee to be carried out within material access, vital, or protected areas for reasons of safety, security or operational necessity.

(7) All vehicles, except ERDA vehicles engaged in transporting SNM and emergency vehicles under emergency conditions, shall be searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices prior to entry into the protected area. Vehicle areas to be searched shall include the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area.

purpose of visit and employment affiliation, citizenship, and name of the individual to be visited.

(11) All keys, locks, combinations and related equipment used to control access to protected, material access, and vital areas shall be controlled to reduce the probability of compromise. Whenever there is evidence that a key, lock, combination, or related equipment may have been compromised it shall be changed. Upon termination of employment of any employee, keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment to which that employee had access, shall be changed.

(e) Detection and Alarm Subsystems

✓ (1) The licensee shall provide an intrusion alarm subsystem such that penetration or attempted penetration of the protected area or an isolation zone adjacent to the protected area barrier will be detected ~~at the time of penetration or attempted penetration~~ <sup>in a manner which assures that an adequate response by the security organizations can be initiated.</sup>

✓ (2) All emergency exits in each protected, material access, and vital area shall be locked <sup>(with panic hardware on the inside)</sup> ~~from the outside~~ and alarmed to <sup>shall be</sup> provide local visible and audible alarm annunciation.

(3) All unoccupied vital areas and material access areas shall be locked and protected by an intrusion alarm subsystem which will alarm upon the entry of a person anywhere into the area, upon exit from the area, and upon movement of an individual within the area, except that for process material access areas only the location of the strategic special nuclear material within the area is required to be so alarmed.

(4) Preventive maintenance programs shall be established for security related subsystems and components to assure their continued performance in an operable and effective condition.

(5) All security related subsystems and components shall be maintained in operable condition. The licensee shall develop and employ corrective action procedures and compensatory measures to assure that the effectiveness of the security system is not reduced by failure or other contingencies affecting the operation of the security related equipment or structures.

(h) Contingency and Response Plans and Procedures

(1) The licensee shall have a safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats, thefts, and radiological sabotage related to the special nuclear material and nuclear facilities subject to the provisions of this section. Safeguards contingency plans shall be in accordance with the criteria in Appendix C to this part, "Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans" as proposed in 42 FR 25744. Contingency plans shall include, but not limited to, the response requirements in paragraphs (h)(2) through (h)(5) of this section.

(2) The licensee shall establish and document liaison with law enforcement authorities.

(3) A minimum of five (5) guards shall be immediately available at the facility to fulfill response requirements. In addition a force of guards or <sup>ASSESSMENT AND</sup> armed <sup>RESPONSE INDIVIDUALS</sup> ~~trained personnel~~ also shall be immediately available to provide assistance as necessary. The size of the additional force shall be determined on the basis of site-specific

considerations that could affect the ability of the total <sup>ONSITE</sup> response force to engage and <sup>CONTAIN</sup> ~~defeat~~ the adversary force <sup>UNTIL LER ARRIVES</sup>. The rationale for <sup>ONSITE</sup> including the total number of response personnel shall be included in the physical protection plans submitted to the Commission for approval.

(4) Upon detection of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles within an isolation zone, a protected area, a material access area, or a vital area, or upon evidence of intrusion into a protected area, a material access area, or a vital area, the facility security organization shall:

- (i) determine whether or not a threat exists,
- (ii) assess the extent of the threat, if any,
- (iii) inform law enforcement authorities of the threat and request assistance, if necessary,
- (iv) require guards or other armed response personnel to interpose themselves between vital areas and material access areas and deny adversary attempting entry for purposes of radiological sabotage or theft of strategic special nuclear material, and
- (v) instruct guards or other armed response personnel to prevent or delay an act of radiological sabotage or theft of strategic special nuclear material by applying a sufficient degree of force to counter that degree of force directed at them, including the use of deadly force when there is a reasonable belief it is necessary in self-defense or in the defense of others.

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION  
ACT REQUEST

FOIA-82-441  
Rec'd 9-20-82

September 15, 1982

Joseph M. Felton, Director  
Division of Rules and Records  
Office of Administration  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: Freedom of Information Act Request

Dear Sir:

Pursuant to the federal Freedom of Information Act,  
the Natural Resources Defense Council requests the following:

1. Any documentation of inventory differences at NFS-Erwin since August, 1979.
2. All NRC inspection reports pertaining to NFS-Erwin and analyses thereof since August, 1979.
3. All correspondence between NFS and NRC with regard to NFS-Erwin since August, 1979.
4. All correspondence between DOE and NRC with regard to NFS-Erwin since August, 1979.
5. NRC or contractor comments on possible changes to the Material Control and Accounting and Physical Security rules, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 46 F.R. 45144, Sept. 10, 1981; Proposed Rule, 46 F.R. 46333, Sept. 18, 1981.

Please note that I am cleared by NRC to receive classified material in connection with the Commission proceeding regarding the NRS-Erwin facility, Docket No. 70-143. as are the three other persons at NRDC who will deal with it. We also have an NRC-approved secure facility in which to store the documents.