

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-305/82-18(DPRP)

Docket No. 50-305

License No. DPR-43

Licensee: Wisconsin Public Service Corporation
P. O. Box 1200
Green Bay, WI 54305

Facility Name: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

Inspection At: Kewaunee Site, Kewaunee, WI

Inspection Conducted: September 1-October 31, 1982

Inspector: *John L. Reyes for*
K. L. Nelson

11/23/82

Approved By: *John L. Reyes*
A. A. Reyes, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 2B

11/23/82

Inspection Summary

Inspection on September 1-3, 7-10, 13-14, 16, 20-21, 27-30, October 1, 4-8, 4-8, 12, 14-15, 18-21, 25-29, 1982 (Report No. 50-305/82-18(DPRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings; Operational Safety Verification; Monthly Maintenance Observation; Monthly Surveillance Observation; Licensee Event Report Followup; IE Bulletin Followup; Independent Inspection; Regional Requests; and Organization and Administrative. The inspection involved a total of 173 inspector-hours by one inspector including 34 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.

Results: Of the nine areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviation were involved in eight areas. One item of noncompliance was identified in one area (Failure to perform required surveillance-Paragraph 5).

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- *D. C. Hintz, Plant Manager
- *M. C. Marchi, Technical Supervisor
 - R. W. Lange, Superintendent, Maintenance
- *C. R. Steinhardt, Superintendent, Operations
 - W. J. Richmond, Plant Services Superintendent
 - D. W. McSwain, Assistant Superintendent, Instrument and Control
 - K. H. Evers, Reactor Supervisor
- *C. A. Schrock, Nuclear Licensing Supervisor

The inspectors also talked with and interviewed members of the Operations, Maintenance, Health Physics, Instrument and Control, Quality Control, and Security Groups.

*Denotes those attending one or more exit interviews.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Noncompliance (305/82-10-01): Failure to adequately administer the maintenance program which would have prevented the plant from entering a Limiting Condition of Operation. Corrective actions by the licensee include; completion of a Design Change Request which reduced the number of non-safety related alarms which can initiate the common alarm; assigned the responsibility of followup for boric acid heat tracing work requests to one individual; and issuance of a Night Order memorandum to all shift supervisors delineating required action in the event of a failure indication. The above actions appear adequate to prevent recurrence of this type of noncompliance.

3. Operational Safety Verification

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period of September 1-October 31, 1982. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the containment, auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.

The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the period of September 1-October 31, 1982, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the auxiliary feedwater, fire protection, service

water, emergency diesel generator, high head safety injection, containment spray, resident heat removal, component cooling, spent fuel pit cooling and radiation monitoring systems to verify operability.

4. Monthly Maintenance Observation

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.

The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:

MWR No.	Activity
35-20889	1B Seal water injection filter Replaced filter
38-20321	BRA-106 Instrument transformer overheating Installed cooling fan and initiated DCR-1245
05B-20903	Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump-low speed Adjusted governor linkage
42-20934	Load sequencer TDR 57/B5 out of specification Readjusted timer
35-20911	1C Charging pump excessive leakage Rebuilt cylinder
25-20742	Control room post-accident filter high D/P Replaced filters
53-20980	Load tested and inspected spent fuel pit bridge crane
25-20872	Rewound control room A/C fan motor

Following completion of maintenance on the work requests 20903, 20911 and 20872, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The inspector reviewed/observed the following Technical Specification required surveillance testing:

<u>Surveillance Procedure</u>	<u>Test</u>
54-058	Turbine First Stage Pressure
48-003	Nuclear Power Ranges
36-013	Reactor Coolant Flow
5A-027	Steam Generator Level
18-043	Containment Pressure
47-010	Reactor Coolant Temperature
36-016	Pressurizer Level
06-030	Steam Generator Pressure
06-033	Steam Generator Flow Mismatch
55-155	Engineered Safeguards Logic

The following items were considered during the inspection: that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

On September 23, 1982, the licensee while reviewing the status of surveillance procedure scheduling cards, noted that surveillance procedures 45-49.11 and 45-49.12 had not been completed within the time interval specified by Technical Specifications Table 4.1-1 and Section 4.1.c. Surveillance procedures 45-49.11 and 45-49.12 are monthly tests of Radiation Monitoring Channels R-11 and R-12 respectively. Containment air particulate activity is monitored by R-11, and containment air gaseous activity is monitored by R-12. Their primary function during power operation, is to provide detection of small leakages of reactor coolant.

The inspector's review of the factors which contributed to the untimely performance of the surveillance procedure indicate the following. The surveillance procedure for R-11 and R-12 had been satisfactorily completed on August 2, 1982. On September 3, 1982, an Instrument-Control Technician was directed to perform the monthly procedures for R-11 and R-12. One of the procedure requirements is testing the containment

ventilation isolation function of each channel. To perform this test, four valves controlled by R-11 and R-12 are placed in the open position, a high level trip signal is generated by the channel in test, and closing of the valves is verified. Two of the four valves associated with channels R-11 and R-12 can also be closed by channel R-21. On September 3, 1982, channel R-21 was out of service, which resulted in a close signal being applied to two of the valves controlled by R-11 and R-12. Therefore, with these valves closed from R-12 they could not be opened to test the isolation functions of R-11 or R-12.

As required by procedures, the Technician initiated a surveillance procedure exception report when he was unable to complete the procedure. The need to reinitiate action to have the surveillance procedures completed was not recognized until September 23, 1982, at which time the procedures were completed with satisfactory results. The time interval between the prior testing on August 2, 1982 and the test on September 23, 1982, was approximately 52 days. This is a violation of Technical Specification 4.1.a and 4.1.c (50-305/82-18-01).

No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Licensee Event Reports Followup

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished as required, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished or initiated.

82-021/01T	Reduced combined air flow from containment fan coolers (DCR 1291)
82-026/03L	1B boric acid transfer pump (Replaced carbon steel pipe plug with stainless steel plug)
82-027/03L	Train A shield building vent system damper failed to open (Replaced static pressure controller)
82-031/03L	Train B shield building vent system failed to switch to recirculation mode (Replaced failed hydraulic pump)
81-036/03X	Wear and misalignment of auxiliary switch linkage on American Switchgear, 4160 volt breakers (DCR 1162)

No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.

7. IE Bulletin Followup

For the IE Bulletin listed below the inspector verified that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments

based on information presentation in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response.

IEB 82-02, Degradation of threaded fasteners in the reactor coolant boundary of PWR plants (Responded to Action Item 3, as required)

No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.

8. Independent Inspection

The inspector conducted a general inspection of operations, maintenance, health physics, security, quality assurance, and administrative activities.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9. Regional Request

The inspector was requested to determine if the licensee utilized containment electrical penetration assemblies fabricated by Bunker Ramo Corporation (Amphenol Sams Division). It was determined that Bunker Ramo assemblies are not installed at Kewaunee.

10. Organization and Administrative

The licensee's onsite organization was inspected to verify that personnel qualification levels, lines of authority, and organizational structure were as described in the Technical Specifications and ancillary documents.

Proposed Amendment No. 50 to the Technical Specifications was submitted to NRR on September 27, 1982, to reflect the reorganization of the Nuclear Department, which became effective June 1, 1982.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

11. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the period of September 1-October 31, 1982 and at the conclusion of the inspection on November 1, 1982 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the statement by the inspector with respect to the item of non-compliance.