



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

January 27, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: L. J. Evans, Jr., Chief  
Requirements Analysis Branch

FROM: Bob Nulsen  
Requirements Analysis Branch

SUBJECT: UPGRADE RULE TRANSPORT PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS

In response to George McCorkle's comments on my memorandum of January 17, 1978, the following is submitted.

In regard to the insider being able to neutralize the armored escort vehicle leaving only an unarmored vehicle to delay the adversary until a response force appears, the main issue is not armorment but tactics. The armorment of an escort vehicle is really a secondary consideration against the sophisticated adversary who would have planned in sufficient detail to have an insider in his employ. The insider, while giving the adversary an advantage, probably could do no more than neutralize one escort vehicle regardless of the number of guards. The difference between neutralizing an armored or unarmored vehicle is not that significant, since there are weapons available to terrorists that can penetrate any armored car. Additionally the armored cab of the transport could be used as a maneuver vehicle in some circumstances. In sum, the key to the success of the delaying action is the aggressiveness of the maneuver tactics employed by the guards, not the armorment of the vehicle.

While the comment about the relative importance of costs to "what is needed to counter the threat" is an accurate statement, it is irrelevant. My memo stressed the tactical needs to counter the threat and mentioned costs only in relationship to DOE's position and public comments. However, if we were to take PSL's comment literally, then presumably we would not be able to drop the requirement for SECOM to which PSL has recommended.

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
*Enclosure 4*

The DOE SST and SECOM II are certainly superior systems to those used by private industry. However, the conclusions in the memorandum are not based on a DOE comparison but rather on military experience and doctrine in comparable circumstances and a Sandia simulation analysis.

With respect to transfer points, the physical protection upgrade rule specifies that guards have certain security and surveillance duties. It states that three guards shall maintain "continuous surveillance of the cargo compartment." Seven armed guards can accomplish this function as easily as nine.

At transfer points, two guards are required to take up positions at a "remote monitoring location." The stand-off vehicle with two guards could logically carry out this function. That would leave five guards to protect the transport and three of the five to maintain continuous surveillance.

It is still my contention that the requirements to protect SSNM in-transit can be satisfactorily met with seven armed guards and two escort vehicles, one of which is armored and one unarmored.



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